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

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HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT

OF THE DOCTRINE OF

THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

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BY

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DIVISION FIRST.

FIRST FOUR CENTURIES.

VOLUME I.

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PREFACE.

THE subject to which this work is devoted, is one which has repeatedly engaged the attention and occupied the pens of theologians in this country. Besides the palmary work of Bishop Bull, entitled, "Defensio Fidei Nicenæ," published first in 1680, we have the treatise of Priestley on the "History of Early Opinions," 4 vols. 8vo, with the controversy between him and Bishop Horsley;[1] the later work of Wilson, entitled, "An Illustration of the Method of explaining the New Testament by the Early Opinions of Jews and Christians concerning Christ,"—an admirable work, published first in 1797, and of which a new edition was issued at Cambridge in 1838; and the still more recent work of Mr Stanley Faber, on "The Apostolicity of Trinitarianism," 2 vols., London, 1832. Works such as these attest the interest which the question of the History of Opinions concerning the Person of Christ has awakened in this country. But, though these works have their merits, and some of them possess a high and permanent value, they for the most part labour under two defects: the one is, that, being originally and primarily polemical, they are all more or less one-sided in their representations; and the other is, that they are lacking in scientific fulness and development. It may be added, that they are all confined to the Ante-Nicene period, and take no cognizance of the progress of opinion subsequent to the Council of Nice.

[1] Priestley's Letters to the Archdeacon of St Alban's; Horsley's Tracts in controversy with Dr Priestley on the Historical Question of the Belief of the First Ages in our Lord's Divinity. 1783-86.

The work of Dr Dorner will be found peculiarly to excel exactly where these most fail. Purely scientific in its character, and the result of long and patient study of the original sources, it supplies a comprehensive, impartial, and exhaustive survey of the whole subject of which it treats. The author preserves throughout the tone of a judge, calmly and perspicuously weighing all the evidence that can be brought to bear on the case; patiently collecting every particle of evidence pertaining to the subject; and pronouncing his decision without regard to polemical considerations, or the interests of parties.

The form in which this work first appeared, was that of two essays in the *Tübinger Zeitschrift;* the former of which appeared in the fourth number for 1835, the latter in the first for 1836. In introducing them, with the motto, "Descendit Deus, ut assurgamus," the author said, "It is gratifying to see how, in the long conflict between Christianity and Reason, the point, on the handling of which the decision of the controversy turns, has become ever more and more distinct to the consciousness. The energies of all parties engaged in this conflict are gathered ever more and more around the Person of Christ, as the central-point at which the matter must be determined. The advantage of this is obvious, as respects the settlement of this great strife; as in other things, so here, with the right statement of the question the answer is already half found. It is easy also to see that, in point of fact, all lies in the question, whether such a Christ as dwells, if not always in the words, yet ever in the mind, of the Church,—one in whom the perfect personal union of the divine and human appeared historically,—be necessary and actual. For, let us suppose that philosophy could incontrovertibly establish, and carry to the conviction of all thoughtful men, that the Person of a Christ in the sense above set forth is a self-contradiction, and therefore an impossibility; there would be no longer any conflict between Christian theology and philosophy, because with the Person of Christ would be abolished the Christian theology, as well as the Christian Church, altogether.

"And, conversely, were it brought under the recognition of philosophy, that the idea of an historical as well as an ideal Christ is necessary, and were a speculative construction of the Person of Christ once reached, it is clear that philosophy and theology, essentially and intrinsically reconciled, would thenceforward have a common work, or rather, properly speaking, would have become one; and philosophy would consequently not have relinquished her existence, but confirmed it.

"Hence it is well for both, in the great conflict between the mighty powers of Christianity and Reason, when the struggle is ever more and more concentrated on the point where alone all is ultimately to be won or lost. This is well for Christianity, not because, driven from so many positions, otherwise esteemed essential, she as it were has to call forth her very last forces for the protection of the Person of her Chief against the pressure of His opponents; but rather because this Person alone, as the central-point of the whole, is able to determine the positions which may and must be maintained, and to oppose all as a complete whole to the attacks of opponents, and defend it against them. Philosophy, however, knows now the point whither her attacks, in case she must strike, must be directed; or if she prefer to present herself in peaceable and friendly guise, rather than in open hostility,—a phænomenon which we frequently see in recent times,—it is salutary for her to know from what position the Christian theology cannot depart, before she extends the hand to her. Otherwise, it is only an untrue, precipitate reconciliation that can be effected, which will be soon dissolved again, and but tends to hinder and defer the true reconciliation.

"But not only has a clear perception been obtained of the point that must be reached, if the controversy is to be decided in one or other of the ways indicated; we even hear numerous voices which exclaim that the decision is already obtained, though only from the philosophical side, and from this in a very disputed way. Some we hear saying, The internal reconciliation of philosophy and theology is concluded,

the Person of Christ speculatively construed; whilst others prove, speculatively also, that the judicial process may now terminate, the impossibility of a Christ who shall be at once historical and ideal being demonstrated. If we know not, in consequence of this, whom to believe, the confusion is increased by the voices meanwhile which fall on us from the side of theology; which, delighted that the kingdom of speculation is divided against itself, not only asserts her right to abide by her own domain until philosophy shall have healed her own divisions, but also commands to relinquish the attempt to understand the Person of Christ scientifically, as an empty and vain undertaking of the Reason. To this last view we cannot resign ourselves, unless we would hold that between Faith and Reason there is a great gulf fixed, so that they that would pass from this side cannot, and they that would come thence to us cannot. Whoever reveres Christianity as accordant with the highest reason, must also assume a progressive unfolding and strengthening of Reason through the power of Christianity, and that no term can be fixed for Reason in this advance. If in Christ be found, as theology must hold to be the case, the key to the world's history, and the solution of all enigmas, it is not humility, but a self-willed inactivity, to refuse to seek how we may ever better and better apply this key for the resolution of all mysteries.

"To the establishment of our decision concerning the true state of the matter, the critical treatment of the history of the development of this dogma will in the most fundamental way contribute. It will thus be best proved to the one party, that the question has not been validly settled either in the one way or the other, but that much still remains to be done; and to the other party, that much has been already accomplished, so that the work cannot be viewed as a hopeless one. This historical path, also, must be the fittest to prepare for the further development of this dogma.

"In attempting this path, we pass by the personal ministry and history of Christ on earth, and address ourselves alone to

the consideration of the mode of construing his Person in itself, except where this itself demands something further."

In further elucidation of the author's design and method in this work, the following sentences from the preface to his first edition may be cited. "I have not, I confess, concerned myself about an historical objectivity apart from a dogmatical background; nay, I count every history of the development of a dogma which is *without* this, as among the impossible things with which people deceive themselves and others. Whether, however, it is brought in as a foreign criterion from without, or springs from the same spirit which created this great history, the history itself must show. And in this respect I resign my work to criticism with an easy mind; for its ground-idea, that neither a merely historical nor a merely ideal and metaphysical significance belongs to Christ, but rather that both are absolutely one in His perfect Person, whereby He is the Head, and humanity is not a mere mass but an organism,—this ground-idea I have not, thanks be to God, to boast of having discovered; though, alas! there are many ears in which in the present day it sounds strange; but I have received it through the communication of the Church of Christ, true to the word of Scripture, and I give it back again as it has been reproduced and found in me."

The appearance of this elaborate and thoughtful work produced a great impression in Germany. It was felt not only to furnish a full and final annihilation of the old Socinian pretension to trace the root of their system to primitive Christian antiquity and apostolic teaching, but also to subvert the basis of that more recent form of antichristianism, which, presuming to call itself "the higher construction" of Christianity, renounces with disdain all attempts to prove itself in harmony with the teaching of Christ and His Apostles, and remands all that men have been accustomed to take for history, both as respects the Founder of Christianity, and as respects the working of His Apostles and their immediate followers, to the cloudland of myth

and fable. The work was thus one eminently "for the times" in Germany; and there can be no doubt that results of a most important kind to the cause of truth have flowed from its appearance.

Whether the work will find equal acceptance, in the form of a translation, in this country, remains to be seen. The author's style of thought and mode of expression are certainly very different from what we are accustomed to, and it is to be feared that complaints of obscurity and incomprehensibility will be uttered against the work. As one of its translators, I dare not say that the blame of this, so far as the charge may be well founded, lies with the author; but I may be permitted to remind the reader, that the work is written, not for popular use, but for those who are students and thinkers; and it may be confidently expected of such, that they will not allow themselves to be deterred from reaping the treasures of learning and thought which this work contains, simply because the author has occasionally got a little into the clouds, or his translators, it may be, have occasionally failed to convey a clear and adequate rendering of his words.

For my own part, I must frankly confess that I have made no attempts to turn Dr. Dorner's somewhat rugged German into graceful or fluent English. I would not say that it is impossible to do this; but I stand in doubt of all such attempts, and for myself would rather struggle through the difficulties of a literal version, which preserved not only in substance all that the author has written, but gives it with the hue and character of the author's idiosyncrasy upon it, than peruse a translation, the ease and elegance of which constantly would awake suspicions of liberties having been used with the author, such as it is not competent for a translator to use. And here I cannot refrain from introducing some sentences from the pen of Dorner himself, bearing on the alleged obscurity of German theologians, and in reply to a wish uttered by the Bishop of Cork, that they would express themselves so as to be understood by English-

men. "Were we," says he, "to set ourselves up as teachers of other peoples, it would be reasonable to require of us that we should make use of the modes of speech of these peoples. But it is not so. Our theology is primarily German theology, and we speak in the manner natural to us, that is, in the manner most suited to the subject as we see it; and we think it is fitting that whoever will participate in what we have, should put himself to some pains to understand us, as we all have to do with respect to the ancients. If it be that German theology (in many cases, it may be, misunderstood) is exercising an undesirable influence in England, this requirement becomes doubly pressing even in the interest of England herself. If negative forces, such as we have long known, and in a measure have overcome, are stirring in England, if they prop themselves especially on the reputation of German thinkers and critics, it would afford no remedy were we to propose, through some change in our method of speech, to spare any the labour of scientifically penetrating into the depths of the subject. Each has as much knowledge as by his own labour he has obtained; a dead handing over or importing even of the best, is no better than a sham gift." He adds, however, that "it is only what courtesy requires, when men converse with each other, that they do their utmost to be understood; at the same time, when one fails to be understood, the fault is not always with the speaker."[1]

The justice, on the whole, of these observations all must feel; at the same time, one cannot help wishing that our Teutonic brethren would take a little more trouble to make themselves intelligible than they are apt to do. It is not Englishmen and Frenchmen alone who find it difficult to understand them: I have frequently found their own countrymen quite as much at fault; and I have sufficient reasons for doubting whether they always take pains to understand themselves before committing their thoughts to writing. With regard to this work of Dorner, I cannot in this respect better express my feeling than by

[1] Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie, 1861, p. 404.

adopting the words of Socrates in reference to a treatise of Heraclitus: *"Α μὲν συνῆκα, γενναῖα· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἃ μὴ συνῆκα. πλὴν Δηλίου γέ τινος δεῖται κολυμβητοῦ.*[1]

One difficulty with which the translator of a German theological work has to contend, arises from the use which German theologians make of philosophical terms. In regard to these, the German has the advantage of the English, in respect both of variety and the precision with which terms are fixed to special meanings. The word "idea," for instance, is loosely used by us in at least *four* different applications: as designating, 1. the perception of an external object by the mind; 2. the representation or picture of that object in the fantasy; 3. the notion or concept which the mind forms by abstraction; and, 4. the intuition of what can neither be perceived nor represented. Now, for all these mental modes the Germans have distinct terms, which they generally use with scrupulous precision. I have done what I could to adhere to this in the translation. "Vorstellung" I have always rendered by *representation;* "begriff" (the gripping up of objects), by *concept;* "idee," by *idea;* and "bild," by *figure* or *picture.* I have also retained the word "moment," so constantly used by German writers, in the form of *momentum.* It is not easy to define the sense in which they use this word; but it answers generally to an *operative element, i.e.*, a constituent which not only is part of a whole, but has an operative effect in producing that whole. The word in this sense has dropped out of use with us, but it occurs in our older writers.

I have only to add, that the Notes in the Appendix have, with the exception of one short one, been translated by Mr Simon.

[1] Diogen. Laert. Bk. ii. ch. 5, § 7.

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EDINBURGH.

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INTRODUCTION.

THE idea of the God-man is not one which belongs only to this or that religion; rather may the germ of it be found in all, and that just because they are, and in so far as they are, *religions;* and hence, as may be supposed, the maturity of each results in the advancing of essential differences as to the way in which the unity of the Divine and the human is aimed at and conceived. It will ever remain the ideal of human life, that it is God-manlike, sustained and influenced by Divine power; and, as soon as thought is directed to this relation, this holy life, this life blessed in God, will be conceived no otherwise than as the unity of the Divine and human life. Not less, conversely, when the subject is viewed from the side of God, will the ideal of the condescension and manifestation of God be ever placed in this, that God reveals Himself not merely in signs and natural phenomena; nor in hallowed Palladia and pledges let fall from heaven; nor even in Nature, which, blind and dumb, knows not for herself Him by whom she is known: but that God knows and represents Himself in the form of a being who knows Him as he is known of Him.

This concert of the Divine and the human—of which not only is religion the vital sphere, but to which also genuine science and its history not less give testimony—is not to be imputed to anthropomorphic constraint, of which, as one sometimes hears said, it is only with difficulty and approximatively that we are able to rid ourselves; but its cause is the objective bearing of the matter itself. Were it not so, it would remain a puzzle how reason or science in its progress, in place of gradually repu-

diating that as profane, ever more and more deeply enters into it. Whilst in the beginnings of religions, and of thinking, the adequate form for a full revelation is not found in the Divine-human shape, it is, on the contrary, seen as the result and acquist of the whole religio-historical and philosophical process, that the Divine and the human conspire towards unity. In point of fact, it came at an early period to this, that the human was viewed as something not capable of being united with God; the latter being regarded as purified from all finitude, as an essence abstract and shut up in itself, to which men hesitated to ascribe existence, since it was rather the *ὑπερούσιον*, not Being in the concrete, but the universal Being, that is equivalent to the Nothing. And when, consequently, the only thing aimed at was to get rid of anthropomorphisms, and not to reach a living relation between God and man, all was quickly accomplished that could be attempted. But when the former has come to be realized, there must always be a passing over to the opposite, —to a revelation, a living communion between God and man; not only because an absolutely hidden God is for man virtually no God, and such a pretended purification of the concept of Deity closely approaches to Atheism, but also because the concept of Deity cannot otherwise be preserved from self-contradiction. If God be thought as the pure Absolute, in the sense that He cannot come into contact with the finite, then is He no longer the Absolute; since He can have nothing to do with the finite, the latter is *without Him;* that is, He is no more the Absolute, if it is not He who reveals Himself in the finite.

Christianity, however, asserts the idea of the God-man in a manner altogether peculiar. In Jesus of Nazareth, according to the universal and perpetual belief of the Christian Church, the unity of the Divine and the human has appeared in a personal and unique mode. Some decenniums ago, it formed part of the tactics of the opponents of Christianity to depreciate the originality and peculiarity of her system by adducing parallels, especially from earlier times; and it would seem as if of late something of the same kind is again to be attempted.[1]

[1] See Gfrörer, Das Jahrhundert des Heils, Stuttgart, 1838, 1st and 2d Parts. He observes, ii. 431, "that to every doctrine, almost to every proposition of the New Testament, a parallel may be adduced from the Talmud, the Sohar, the Midrashim," etc.

So far, indeed, as this is designed to serve as an objection to Christianity, its time is past, and its force materially reduced, since men have ceased to treat Christianity onesidedly as *doctrine*, rather than as Divine fact; and, on the other hand, have begun to find its peculiarity, in a theoretical respect, in this, that in it, as the organism of the truth, the elements of truth, elsewhere here and there to be met with in a scattered form or a disfigured guise, come together in unity,—a unity which, as it personally appeared in the God-man, so in the course of history ever more and more rises upon the consciousness of mankind. But only the more decidedly does the problem present itself, viz., to determine the relation of the Christian religion to what is beyond the pale of Christianity, both as respects their unity and their essential diversity. Under such circumstances, all contributions must be welcome which serve to throw light on the province of religion anterior to Christianity. Whether they are advanced in a spirit friendly or in a spirit hostile to the Christian theology, is a matter of indifference to it, provided only they set forth what is true. For the more thoroughly we understand, in its entire compass, the religious domain previous to Christianity; so much the more clearly, on the one hand, will the preparation for the latter by all religions, and its historical necessity, be made apparent; and, on the other, on a *retrospective* view, as set over against all phenomena in this department, will that same newness and originality become apparent, which, looking *forward*, a sound historical sense has long ago assigned to it,—such a sense as takes into view its world-pervading, inexhaustible force. Nay, we must say, that for proof of the truth of Christianity, and especially of its all-sustaining, fundamental idea, the absolute man-becoming of God in Christ, the more restricted position—that which sets out from details, inspiration, prophecy, and so forth—may be abandoned only for the sake of recognising from the more comprehensive position of the entire historical process of religious belief before Christ, how the whole pre-Christian world aspired after Christianity; how in this the common ænigma of all pre-Christian religions is solved; and how in it, especially in its ground-idea, lies the key by which all these religions may be better understood than they could understand themselves. Though speculative divinity may always exempt itself from the proof of the inner truth of the idea of the God-

manhood, so long as philosophy and history refuse to coalesce; on its historical side, Christianity will hover in the air so long as all religions are not recognised in their *essential* relation to it, as negative or positive preparations for it.

This is not the place to illustrate this in detail. All that can be here shown, is, that whilst the ground-idea of Christianity cannot be elucidated either from heathenism or Judaism, in and by itself, there yet lies in it that which both, from very different sides, seek and forebode.

A.

To resort to heathenism as the source of the Christian ground-idea, might be suggested by the consideration, how much the Jewish national spirit must have recoiled from the idea of the man-becoming of God, and in fact did recoil; of which we have evidence in many phenomena of the early Christian Church, such as the various forms of Ebionism, which were not so quickly extruded from the Church. Even in the New Testament, the evidences of faith in the Deity of Christ are by no means proportionally distributed through the different books: in the Epistles of Peter and James, for instance, and in the first three Gospels, they are comparatively deficient. It is not till after the fall of Judaism, and the reception of the heathen world into the Christian Church, that the Church's consciousness of the Deity of Christ becomes free and unrestricted. And since, moreover, of the Apostles themselves, it was those whose sphere of action was within the heathen world who set forth most prominently the Deity of Christ, one might be induced to ascribe this doctrine to a pagan influence. What of truth there is in this, demands a closer consideration. And, in the outset, we must distinguish the *Oriental* from the *Occidental* heathenism. As representative of the former, we may take the Indian religion; of the latter, the Hellenic. It is common to both, not with sufficient precision to distinguish God and the world, and hence both may be called Nature-religions; nevertheless, the point of departure of both is opposite. The East sets out from the Objective, the Divine; the West, from the Finite: but both seek the same end, the unity of the Divine and the human. Hence, in the former, the doctrine of the frequent incarnations

of God, in which He assumes the most perfect form, the human,[1] for the purpose of teaching men the truth, and reconducting them to heaven. In Greece, on the other hand (as also in the religions of Rome and the North), men become gods; they by virtue and valour ascend Olympus. From this side of Hellenism it is impossible to illustrate the Christian ground-idea; for, according to the fundamental Christian notion, which is not wholly repudiated even where Christ is chiefly thought of as a man (as in the different forms of Ebionism), God has *descended* to earth, and manifested Himself in Christ. In Hellenism, man celebrates his own apotheosis; in Christianity, the condescending grace of God is glorified.

And this belief is so essential to even the first centuries of Christianity, so assuredly to be referred originally to the very self-consciousness of Christ, that we must hold it as established. However much, in other respects, there may seem to lie in Hellenism, as distinguished from Judaism, what is akin to the Christian ground-idea, we cannot trace the latter to that side of Hellenism on which its belief was in a deification of man. For this representation, which must have come forth as the primary form of the doctrine of the Deity of Christ, had this sprung out of Hellenism, is not to be found at all where first the Deity of Christ was spoken of, and only appears at a later date with Paul

[1] As Crishna. [Crishna, *i. e.* the Black One, appears in the Indian mythology as the ninth incarnation of Vishnu, the Crishnavatar, *i. e.* the descent into the person of the Black One. He is said in the Bhagavat to have been the son of Vasudeva and Devagui, sister of King Kamsa. He was the last of seven brothers, and the only one whom his mother succeeded in saving from the hatred of her brother. When he grew up, he avenged himself and his parents by the slaughter of Kamsa; and after many proofs of his deity, amongst which may be mentioned his destruction of the serpent Caliga, and many proofs also of the reality and badness of his humanity, he was put to death by being shot with an arrow on a tree, leaving behind the prediction, that thirty years after his death the Kali-yuga, the iron age, would begin. He is represented as a black man, with a figure of the sun on his breast, the lotos round his neck, and on the soles of his feet and the palms of his hands a triangle or quinquangle as signum et principium omnis generationis. In the Amarasinha he is called, He of the Strong Curly Locks, Husband of Lakshmi, Lotus-eyed, Enemy of the Giant Madhu, Slayer of King Kamsa, Son of Devagui, Best of Men, Crowned with Flowers. See Kleuker, Das Brahmanische System, p. 66; Creuzer, Symbolik u. Mythologie in Auzsug, p. 204; Asiatic Trans. iv. 66.—Tr.]

of Samosata, whose doctrine was so abhorrent from the Christian consciousness, that, according to the decree of the Council of Nice, its adherents were required to be rebaptized. And yet he had only subordinated the grace of God descending upon Christ to the Hellenic mode of representation; he by no means wholly set it aside.

One might be inclined rather to go back to the *theogony* of the Hellenes; for the Olympians, for instance, though coming into being in time, are yet not deified on account of their excellences, but are from the commencement of their existence divine essences. But even this does not correspond; for in the Hellenic theogony a plurality of gods and their finitude were assumed, whereas the professors of Christianity never allowed the Deity of Christ to endanger monotheism, and, as is well known, retained an abhorrence of polytheism, the influence of which, had the Deity of Christ implied polytheism, would have been rather to hinder than to incline them to ascribe that to Him. Moreover, the concept of a Hellenic god never comprehended what the Church from the beginning saw in Christ. For none of these gods passes beyond the national limitation; nay, to none of them does Deity, in its true sense, belong; for over them and behind them stands that remnant of monotheism—banished into the shadowy background, but not altogether extinct—Fate, which threatens even them. This is the Absolute of heathenism; but it is shut up in itself, rigid and unchangeable; from it no theogony issues, so as that the gods, transferring to themselves its essence, and thus raising it to subjectivity, might in a sense present an absolute personality: rather are the gods not true absolute essences, as indeed their plurality sufficiently indicates. The Christian Church, on the contrary, recognises itself as in the God-man, as placed in the closest union with the absolute God; and hence for it the God-man must have, not a national, but a universal significancy.

But the theogony conducts us to the East. Does the Eastern mode of looking at things supply a connecting point for the Christian ground-idea? Without doubt, more than the Hellenic. For there we have the incarnation of the second member of the Trimurti; Vishnu becomes, among other things, truly *man;* and thus we have the idea of the God-man as a Divine condescension. We should also, doubtless, greatly err, were we

to deny entirely the diffusion through middle and hither Asia, and especially in Alexandria, of Indian religious ideas; it is, especially, well known how eagerly thousands in the time of Christ snatched at foreign modes of worship and religious ideas, and how closely allied to Indian representations is much that is to be found prevailing at that time, and long after, in those regions.[1]

Nevertheless, it is easy to see that it is not by reference to the Indian religion that the Christian ground-idea is to be explained. For the incarnation in human form of Vishnu is no true assumption of humanity, as is sufficiently evinced by the *plurality* of the incarnations, in the most diverse forms. The essential unity of the Divine and the human, which the Church recognises as for ever complete in Christ, does not appear in Crishna; for Crishna returns to his heaven, and lays aside again his humanity. His redemption is therefore transient; another kalpa (world-period) may succeed, during which evil shall be triumphant.[2] The basis of all this lies in the dualistic view of the relation of the Divine to the finite. This dualism absconds in pantheism; but to the Indians there is an irreconcilable opposition between the finite and the Infinite, and hence it is that the Divine with them is All, and the world can attain to only a seeming being. But the idea of the God-man is not thus to be truly reached. Where these two come together, this is effected only by an intermixture, a non-discrimination of what should be discriminated, which must forthwith degenerate into an *annihilation* of the one member,—naturally, on Indian ground, of the finite. This dualism, which lies at the basis, and which can admit of only a doketic God-manhood, becomes most clearly apparent in this, that the creation or rise of finitude is also that of evil; and also in this, that it is only by the laying aside of finitude, the annihilation of the individual, that the pure, perfect spirit is to be reached. When we consider, further, how superficially sin is here viewed, how entirely the ethical has been made to vanish together with the physical; and how the germs, lying from the beginning in this religion, tend to Buddhaism,

[1] We need only here refer to the doctrine of the Macrocosm and the Microcosm, and the frequent emanistic theories prevailing in the time of Christ and afterwards.

[2] See Stuhr, Religionsystems des Orients.

where a world-denying pantheism falls over into a nominalism, which in turn denies the independent existence of God, and transfers all that is Divine, especially the Buddhas, to this world; we shall find it impossible to discover in the religion of India a source or a rival in respect of the ground-idea of Christianity. The Indian religion has a long and rich development, such as no other heathen religion has. Awakened in the heroic era to a consciousness of liberty, the Indian mind, that before had yielded itself up onesidedly to the All-life (Atma), was in Buddhaism turned round against the Divine, so as to enunciate its non-existence; and thus according to the contemplative or simply practical tendency of the individual, either the subject, as Buddha, laid hold of deity for himself, or there was a falling into materialism.[1] Thus the Indian religion finished its course; it reached to the opposite extreme from which it started, for there is for it no longer God: He is expelled. But that from this last form also of the Indian religion the Christian ground-idea is irreconcilably different, may be seen from this, that the unity of the Divine and the human, as Christianity acknowledges it in Christ, has here no existence. The Buddha aims at the annihilation of the human, the resolution into the Nothing: Dualism, which from the beginning coalesces with the Indian religion, comes on the other side into being just as both the human and the Divine are annihilated. Of the *materialistic* mode of thought, which is closely associated with this, it is needless to speak; for its relation to the ideal character of Christianity is antipodal: there, God is suppressed, and the world in proportion brought into prominence; the far has become the near; the kingdom of China is likewise the kingdom of heaven.

Little, however, as the pre-Christian religions of heathenism possess the ground-idea of the Christian, that which, nevertheless, they sought, was none other than that which is the ground-idea of Christianity. In the East, the mind, setting out from the simple All-life, sought to arrive at a consciousness of the personality and presentiality of God. But its best efforts proved fruitless, because of a fundamental dualistic bias. Just

[1] Herein lies the cause why, in China, Buddhaism has become almost the national religion. The modifications it has there received are not opposed to its essence; but unfold it only on a new side.

where it comes nearest to the finding of rest in the true idea of the God-man, in the stages antecedent to Buddhaism, *i.e.* the Bhagavad Gitta, it flings itself over impatiently to the other extreme; and in the realm of the immoveable middle, the fiery ideal spirit, that would be and have spirit alone, arrives at this, that it becomes only world.

In the West a similar course has been pursued, only that the development begins from the opposite terminus. Here the starting-point is not that of patient resignation, but that of the self-consciousness of the free subjective spirit, which seeks to bring forth its inner ideal world-form itself, and so to become worthy of participating in the blessed life of the gods,—the Apotheosis.* But as this is rather a practical than a religious course, so the act is rather finite than ideal. The untruth that lies in it,—the would-be production of the Divine from out of ourselves, the treating it as something to be brought forth in and out of ourselves, instead of being, on the contrary, something to be *received* by us, and which is to be brought forth by God condescending to us,—displays itself principally in the tragic fate which befell the whole Occidental world. With the attainment of its end, the empire of the world, Rome became deprived of freedom, a slave: with the efflorescence of the Hellenic genius, in which it attained to full consciousness of itself, with the possession of science, began also its decay; and in place of rejoicing over its spiritual empire and its splendour, in the clearness of the consciousness, its opulent world disappeared from it,—it became poor. Thus the effort of the West after the union of the Divine and the human degenerated into its opposite. There remained to it but a deified world; and as this could neither be proved true in itself, nor find acceptance especially with so intellectual a people as the Greeks, it is not to be wondered at, that this world also sank into nothing as an object of spiritual apprehension; and that thus nothing was left for the Neo-Platonists but the simple Monad, the one Divine substance, before which everything finite is but phenomenal. The Hellenic setting out from man and his power ends where the Oriental began—but there also found its grave. And

* [The bliss of the Oriental heathen is passive absorption into the Deity; the bliss of the Occidental was elevation, by an active process of intellectual and moral culture, to the society of the gods.—Tr.]

since its starting-point was where the Oriental ended, the entire cycle of the heathen world has thus been completed: returning to its poor unsatisfying beginning, it has pronounced judgment on itself—and the sentence is one which all history confirms—viz., that it has not attained to the true idea of the God-man, though its entire spiritual history has unmistakeably its meaning in this, that it seeks the inner and true interpenetration of the Divine and the human. It could not find this, though it sought it, because it set to work *precipitately;* that is, without allowing to the distinction between the two, in the first place, its due weight. The confounding of what should be discriminated, which thence arose, entailed as its penalty, that both sides of the distinction, which neither in their difference nor in their unity were understood (else had their *confusion* been impossible), cannot be set in stern antagonism to each other so as to become mutually exclusive. And in this respect the history of the pre-Christian religions affords a very instructive example for any history that seeks to trace the dogma of the God-man within the Christian Church; and suggests how these pre-Christian modes of looking at things did not immediately vanish with the advent of Christianity, but exercised the most marked influence on the Christian Church.

Thus far the opinion must seem well founded, that the entire vast region of heathen religion contains nothing that can impeach the originality of the Christian ground-idea; whilst, on the other hand, the whole of Heathendom strains after this idea, without being able, from its stand-point, so much as distantly to approach the conception of it in its truth. And the blame, high above all, is due to what has not hitherto been adverted to, viz., that heathenism utterly wants a profound moral view of the world; a defect which also shows itself in the confounding of the consciousness of the world and of God; for thereby also is the ethical idea physically conceived and bedimmed. Ethics includes chiefly the rectitude by which man is put in relation, not only with his fellows, but primarily with God, and so arrives at personality. Thus this idea of rectitude, essential to the ethical, and ever immanent in it, preserves the distinction between God and the world; and without it, love itself would not be love. An idea, therefore, of the unity of the Divine and the human, not mediated by the idea of the ethical, can of necessity be only

of a physical kind, and superficial, such as we must pronounce that to be which among the Hellenes was consummated in the idea of the beautiful, or of art. We have not there the true spiritual Infinite presented in a finite form, nor have we even man conceived as the true living work of art; and hence this beautiful Greek world fell to pieces, because it had only the form of naturality.

Where the moral consciousness is not cultivated, the *antithesis* between man in his naturality and the Divine will be easily removed, since even involuntarily the form of the latter will be borrowed from the former. But in such a case the idea of the unity of the Divine and human is deprived of its high spiritual significancy. Hence in the whole heathen world the idea of the God-man has never been even remotely approached in the sense in which it always lived in the Church's consciousness. The only apparent exception to this is furnished by Parsism, in which the ethical elements approach so nearly to a free development, that there have not been wanting those who incline to withdraw it from among heathen religions. But however noble the position of this among others of the heathen religions, it has, nevertheless, not risen by any means above that stand-point of natural religion, through which ethical conceptions are contaminated. Resting on the fundamental representation of the natural antithesis between light and darkness, it thereby acquired sufficient elevation to obtain, veiled in this, the ethical opposition between good and bad. Still, on that very account did this opposition remain but a veiled one. The Persian dualism, however (into which the opposition of the two elements, already lying in the Indian religion, but there appearing as a *successive* one, has become condensed, since here both elements enter *simultaneously*, and stand in the rudest tension over against each other), admits no true unity of the Divine and human; as even within the Christian Church itself is sufficiently proved by Manichæism ever lapsing into Doketism. And supposing this dualism to be completely overcome in the Persian religion, there would still, even then, remain another irreconcilable antithesis, that, namely, between Zeruane Akerene,*

* ["Zoroaster (Zerdusht), during the reign of Gushtasp (Darius Hystaspes), assumed, according to the common opinion, the existence of an infinite original essence (Zeruane-Akerene, the boundless time), from

on the one hand, and Ormuzd and Ahriman, on the other. The relation of the former to the latter is very obscure; nevertheless the idea of the absolute truly Divine, so far as this religion possesses it, belongs to Zeruane Akerene. As, however, it is immoveably shut up in itself, the Persian religion cannot possibly know a unity between the finite and the truly Divine.[1]

In the Persian religion we find the knot with which all systems of natural religion are coupled most of all firmly tied; for here comes out into clear consciousness that dualism which unconsciously perverts them all, and historically works from one extreme to the other. It is assumed as the starting-point, and aims at an ethical result. But however deep may be the moral earnestness which lies at the bottom, neither the moral nor the religious (the latter even less than the former) receives its due; not the latter, because from the thoroughly practical character of this religion it knows nothing of a condescension and communication of God, though it commands to produce the divine, the good. And in this respect the Persian religion, albeit proposing to itself a different problem, stands on a parallel footing with the religions of the West.. In estimating, however, its moral earnestness, we must not overlook the reverse of the matter—namely, that if evil be treated as a substance, and be transposed into *Nature*, the spirit comes off guiltless. Thus must Parsism, in place of going deeper into itself and introducing a spiritual process, take its direction to what is outward—must stand spiritually still, and persist in the insoluble enigma and contradiction which, rather than its confession of faith, it utters. On both sides, the ethical and the religious, it is the *Hebrew* religion which holds that which Parsism seeks or needs.

which eternally proceeded by means of the Word (Honofar) two principles of things, Ormuzd and Ahriman. Ormüzd is the purest endless light, the wisest and most perfect one, the author of all good. To him Ahriman, as the principle of darkness or evil, is opposed, either originally, or through defection from Ormuzd."—Tennemann Gesch. d. Phil. § 70. See also Hengstenberg's Christology, vol. iv., p. 320, Eng. Tr.—TR.]

[1] According to Stuhr, the hero Sosiosh belongs to a later period, and shows traces of the influence of the Hebrew idea of a Messiah. For the rest, this personage affords a proof of how the Persian religion strives after the idea of the God-man, without being able, however, to rise above an Arian mediator between God and man. The reason lies in the deistic conception of the Absolute, Zeruane Akerene.

In it is the solution of the enigma, at which Parsism vainly toils;[1] and in so far as that which lies unconsciously at the basis of the rest of the religions of Heathendom, namely, the dualism between the Divine and the finite, is in this brought out clearly, and is fully recognised, the Hebrew religion contains the revelation of the mystery that lies as a burden on the whole world outside the testament.* Not that the Hebrew religion has not here also its new and deeper enigmas and mysteries, but that in it the enigma of heathenism, which lies in this, that it ever falls involuntarily into the opposite of that which it would, or, at any rate, hesitates in its advance, is solved.† It remains for us to inquire whether the Hebrew religion could have engendered the idea of the God-man.

B.

The Hebrew religion stands distinguished from all the pre-Christian religions by this, that it clearly discriminates God and the world, and so acknowledges alike the personality of God and man. As the former is exalted high above nature by His spirituality and Oneness (קָדוֹשׁ), and man is regarded as created in the image of God, the *distinction* is duly maintained; so that only an ethical mediation of unity remains to be thought of here. Of an *essential* relation of the world, and particularly of humanity, to God, there is scarcely an intimation; the Hebrew people were but little addicted to metaphysical inquiries. Still, that ethical mediation must not be regarded under a Pelagian aspect; for in the mind of the Hebrew people

[1] One might so far—though the same thing applies in a sense to all ethnic religions—designate Parsism the Hebrew religion barbarized, and thus many peculiarities in both religions would be denoted according to their significancy. In this case, the attempt—certainly not often made—to reduce the higher form of religion, the Hebrew, to a dependence on the lower, and to represent it as receiving influences therefrom rather than the converse, must appear unnatural; for where in all the world does the youth learn more readily from the boy than the reverse? Hence Stuhr justly pursues the opposite course.

* [Aussertestamentlichen Welt.—Tr.]

† [To those who are interested in this inquiry, it may be worth while to recommend the (unhappily unfinished) work of the late Archdeacon Hardwicke, "Christ and other Masters."—Tr.]

it rested on a religious basis, on a Divine condescension; and this became always clearer to the people. And as the finger of God at the first inscribed the law on tables of stone, so the divinely-inspired prophets anticipated, in the lapse of time, a period when God would cleanse away the sins of His people and write His law on their hearts. But at the basis of the Christian idea of the God-man there lies a *relation* of *essence*, and not merely a moral or religious one; hence it does not appear presumptively probable that it is from the spirit of the Hebrew people that such an idea could be derived. That Jehovah, He who is highly exalted above all that is finite—who, in the sense of forming a conception of Him, cannot be seen, yea, the very sight of whom would consume—that He should come down to this world, should put on a finite nature and become man, is an idea which never could have come into the Hebrew religion out of itself. On the contrary, we must assume that, as the boast of the Hebrew religion, in opposition to the whole heathen world, lay in its upholding the holy personality of God pure and highly exalted above nature and the whole world, it could not have held fast this personality if it had maintained a *homoousia*, as of man and God for instance, in any sense. In order to sustain itself above the nature-religions, it must, in virtue of its ethical method of dealing with things, have formed such a metaphysical view of the relation between God and the world as was far removed from an incarnation of God, nay, such as removed the Hebrews, and by law precluded them from such a thought as this, although, as already hinted, the Hebrew people speculated but little on the relation of the Divine essence to the essence of the world in the general. It cannot be alleged against what is here advanced, that under the ancient economy Jehovah by no means appears as afar off from the world and uncommunicative, but rather nigh to the world, yea, filling it with His omnipresence; revealing Himself first to the patriarchs in manifold manner, and especially afterwards being nigh to His covenant-people as their Lawgiver, Judge, Avenger; who inspired their magistrates and prophets, and by many appearances and signs made Himself known to them. For all this is quite compatible with what has been said above; neither excludes the other. Who can say that all this even in the most distant manner approaches the idea of the

incarnation of Jehovah, who is, and who was, and who is to come? It is not to be denied that the Hebrew popular spirit, especially at a later period, when, less subject to a living religious process, it turned more to investigation, sought to fill up the gap which existed metaphysically as the reflex of the ethical view, between God and the world; and here the idea of the Maleach Jehovah (the mediator between God and the patriarchs, latterly between God and the theocratic people) furnished a point of connection. But neither is the mediatorial office constantly ascribed to him, for Jehovah in many instances reveals Himself, without a Maleach, in visions, voices, symbols, etc.; nor does the Maleach in the Old Testament appear as endowed with an abiding personality, on the one hand, distinct from the choir of created angels, who bear in themselves, but not as he, שֵׁם יְהוָה, and on the other, not continually sinking back into, and losing itself in, the personality of Jehovah. An hypostasis so purely parastatic, consequently, does not stretch out much beyond the personification of what was ever a theocratic work; at least it does not serve to mediate the relation of the *essence* of God and the world. At the utmost, we have in the Psalms some passages,[1] in which not merely a theocratic but a cosmical significancy is given to the Maleach Jehovah. But there he appears either only as a personification, and consequently not as an hypostasis; or, if the latter, as a creature. Under the former aspect, the Maleach Jehovah is set forth in the חָכְמָה, *σοφία*. In the latter case, he stands among the angels, who certainly in the lapse of time acquire more and more of significancy; but still, far from mediating the essence of God and the world, they rather make it perfectly clear that Jehovah's essence comes not into contact with the world. And as to these angels is attributed ever more and more what belongs to God—such as creation, preservation, and government—and they become His vicegerents in the world, so there comes to be a gradual falling off from the purer religious consciousness of earlier times towards the wildness and fantasticality of heathenism, whilst the living God passes into the background. It is well known into what insipid and wanton fancies the Jewish traditions before the time of Christ passed over in this respect—how the waxing angel-lore of these filled

[1] Comp. Ps. ciii. 20, cxlviii. 2, xxxiv. 8, xci. 11.

heaven and earth, Paradise and Gehenna, with histories full of marvel and romance. But to propose to place the Christian fundamental idea in relation with these traditionary beings is inadmissible, not only on the ground that they are all creatures, whilst the Christian Church recognises in Christ always the truly Divine, but also, still more definitively, on the ground that this angel-lore, occupying the foreground of the consciousness, places and holds the truly Divine in the background; hence it first begins to appear in this guise from the time when God had ceased to speak with His people, when there is no longer a living approximation and revelation of the Lord.[1]

As respects the חָכְמָה of the Proverbs, the *σοφία* of the Apocryphal books, it has certainly a *cosmical* significancy. In it lies that which came nearer to the Hebrew genius, religion, and ethics, and became manifest over the relation of the essence of God to the world.—The *Wisdom* of Prov. viii. 22 ff. has an inner relation to the world, to its *wise* arrangements—*i.e.*, to the *form* of the world. Though, accordingly, only teleologically conceived, and ever in inner relation reverting to the practical, it carries nevertheless into the world, under one aspect—that of form—Divine thoughts, and thus establishes an inner relation between God and the world. Wisdom itself is introduced *speaking*, as a personality distinct from God; still the passage does not clearly lead to a hypostasizing of the Chochma. In Ecclus. i. 1–10, xxiv. 8–10, Wisd. of Sol. vii. 22 ff., the mere personification is still clearer. The Son of Sirach conceives under Wisdom the whole world-plan—the eternal idea of the world as existing in time and space, and according to its inner measures: "He has poured out wisdom upon all His works, and on all flesh, according to His grace;" i. 9, 10. Here Wisdom is conceived not simply as form, but also as substance—as poured forth on all things, a power wisely forming all; but manifestly not as a person. In the twenty-fourth chapter of the same book, Wisdom identifies herself with God's *word*,

[1] Whilst this angel-lore at a later period assumed a pantheistic garb, and ascribed the creation of angels, as well as their distinction from God, to emanation, there nevertheless thus still remained the fundamental representation, that the true Absolute is known only afar off, and along with this, a system of subordination; so that in the doctrine of Æons the Church never could recognise herself.

says that she broods over the whole earth; and ascribes to herself omnipresence in the depth, in the sea, and on the earth. It thus approximates immediately to the idea of the Logos among the Alexandrians. The Wisdom of Solomon and the Book of Ecclesiasticus lead us directly to Philo. In the beautiful seventh chapter of the latter of these books, for instance, Wisdom is conceived as the all-operative, and yet as that which is limited by nothing. Hovering over all, it both physically and spiritually enters all; and entering therein, it is yet not bound thereby. It is called, ver. 27 ff., Sir. xxiv. 14, "abiding," that is, eternal, and yet it has relations with time; growing as a palm-tree, Sir. xxiv. 18; spreading forth its branch like an oak; seeking and finding a firm abode in Jacob, Sir. xxiv. 11; for ever and ever communicating itself to holy souls, forming prophets and friends of God, and yet not bound to these, since it *pervades all spirits*, Wisd. of Sol. vii. 23, 24. It is viewed as the principle of the many, the diversified, and yet as one, vers. 22, 27. In the Wisdom of Solomon, however, Wisdom appears more decidedly than in Ecclesiasticus, not merely as a formal, but as a real principle, which is doubtless to be put to the account of a strong Hellenic influence upon that book. But the more universal the meaning of the σοφία thus becomes, and the more akin to the Philonian Logos, so much the more does the possibility vanish of deriving from it the Christian ground-idea. It is true that by all this the strongly determined distinction between God and the world, recognised by the Hebrew people, was somewhat softened; but, on the other hand, the universalism of the Hellenic Logos-doctrine precludes its furnishing to the Christian ground-idea any anthropological and theological basis, inasmuch as the stand-point of *historical* revelation, which forms one essential side also of the Christology of the Church, is forsaken, and is volatilized into a general inward revelation of God in the spirit; and under this aspect nothing but a *Doketic* Christology could be formed on this basis. On the whole, where this generality and pure spirituality in the agency of the Logos is retained, there remains no longer any reason on the side of men for an incarnation such as that in Christ. In fine, this conception of the Logos, through the immediate universality of his operation, as well as through the constant relapsing of his hypostasis into God, *i.e.*, in mere

personification, utterly excludes the thought that this *entire* Logos, and not merely a part of him, an efflux of his power, appeared in Christ. And this is, Christologically considered, the *Ebionitish* aspect; an aspect which does not satisfy the Christian idea of the God-man, to which this Alexandrian construction of the doctrine of the Logos must lead.

In the Book of Sirach there is shown a remarkable attempt to meet this modification of the idea of the universal *σοφία*, so uncongenial to theocratic principles and to historical revelation generally, and to amalgamate it with these interests. Wisdom, according to Sir. xxiv. 10–16 ff., seeks an *abiding, certain place, i.e.*, a place of perfect revelation, concentratedly: "Amongst all men, amongst all heathen, she has sought a dwelling, that she might find a place. Then the Creator of all things appointed her a dwelling in Jacob, and granted her a settled place in Zion."—But it is only as opposed to the heathen that the representation of Wisdom as rooted with this honoured people has its truth; just as Israel generally is called עַבְדּוֹ יְהוָה in contradistinction from the heathen, without being the servant of God in the full sense. But where in Israel is the proper throne of this *σοφία*, and her full revelation? Ver. 15 points to the temple (and with this coalesces the later Jewish doctrine of the Shekinah), vers. 32, 33,* to the Book of the Covenant, the Law, whence wisdom flows. But were the author to abide by this, not only would the Messianic idea be lost for him in the delusive notion that the temple and the Book of the Covenant are eternally sufficient, but he must also satisfy himself with a purely external dwelling of the *σοφία* in Jacob. But little as we find in him, or in the Book of Wisdom, as to the *σοφία* being placed in conjunction with the idea of the Messiah,[1] yet both know well that the *σοφία* has her satisfaction neither in the general rooting in Jacob, nor in that outward dwelling with him. Hence the Son of Sirach represents her as striving after an ever-growing *extension*, vers. 17–22 [13–16]. More he

* [These references are to the arrangement of verses in Luther's translation. The corresponding verses in the original, which the English Version follows, are 10, 23, 24.—Tr.]

[1] This was not in itself to be expected, since in these ideas there prevails an antitheocratic, philosophic element; whereas the idea of the Messiah grows only within theocratic bounds.

seeks not; an extensive growth satisfies him. In like manner, the author of the Book of Wisdom, who is still less theocratic in his tone of thought, is even more satisfied with a μεταβαίνειν of the σοφία into the ψυχὰς ὁσίας. But in recognising only a communication to many, they know nothing of a concentration in one; they lose also more and more, as they become in a two-fold way superficial, the need of the same. The Palestinians maintained, indeed, the theocratical stand-point, but the religious process came to a stagnation; and in place of an intensive progress, in place of the Messianic idea becoming ever clearer and richer, they sought progress in extension, in proselytizing, and hoped for a political Messiah to succeed therein, according to their notion, to the utmost extent.[1] The Alexandrians, on the contrary, as already the Book of Wisdom shows, through their appreciation of heathen wisdom, and by a process of volatilization, lost sight of the need of an historical God-man; nay, in the Hellenic mixture they lost even the solid principles of their religion, and the firm faith of their fathers. Philo would thus form an exception; and he, in the present state of our inquiry, requires a more penetrating investigation.

The Book of Wisdom shows that Philo was not alone in his tendency, but that in him we have the blossom of a philosophical school, growing up on Jewish ground, and without doubt spreading wider. This makes it all the more worth while to confer with him a little more closely, since he not only is a contemporary of Christ, and, whilst Palestine saw the Saviour, is the most remarkable among the extra-Palestinian Jews; but also since his system forms at once the directest antithesis to Christianity, and at the same time shows an apparent concurrence with it which has deluded many. In him Judaism, tinged with Hellenism, struggles upwards even to the attempt to realize by the force of thought what the Messianic idea intends, and thereby at the same time to supersede the Messiah, and render Him superfluous. From this process of the ideal interworking of the heathenish and the Jewish, which in him affords a sort of prelude to what was consummated under Christianity, may be explained the fact that, during a period of little acuteness in historical composition, he should be held for a Christian; as well

[1] Mohammedanism is the continuation of this Judaism.

as his own fluctuating between opposite points of view, which set at defiance all attempts at union.[1]

The two opposite sides of Philo's system, now approaching to, now recoiling from each other, cannot be rightly represented if the attempt be made, for the sake of vindicating their unity, to derive the one from the other. In Philo himself there is no perfect union of these to be found; the fact historically with regard to him is, that the old Hebrew concept of God is dissolved in his mind by means of a pagan view of the world, and thereby a sort of theogonic process begins to introduce itself to him; and the abstractness of his concept of God is, by another ethnical ingredient, the emanistic, rendered to a certain extent relaxed.* On the other hand, however, his abstract monotheistic consciousness reacts on that objective and eternal definiteness in God, so that the more concrete form which he would be led to construct out of his simple absolute essence, is again negatived and set aside. Philo's monotheism lets slip the highest element in the Hebrew monotheism, namely, the ethical energy which is expressed in the righteousness of God and His holiness, ever sure of its end; from the old Hebrew ethics he falls back into the pagan physics; so that it is self-evident that he holds, and does not hold, the distinction between God and the world; sets forth the theogonic process as well as the cosmogonic; and consequently mars his concept of God by that of the world, and that of the world again by his idea of God.

Prejudice in his favour has led many recent students of Philo to present him prominently as holding that God is in His pure absoluteness the One and Unchangeable. They further say that this absolute retraction of God into Himself renders a mediatory being, the Philonian Logos, necessary; and he is not to be confounded with God, for then would God again be brought into contact with the world, but must be regarded as a proper hypostasis, though of subordinate rank. It is true that the passages in Philo are numerous that speak of God's sublimity. That God is, says he,[2] we may know from the world; for such a

[1] See Appendix, Note A.

* [Flüssig, fluid, liquefied.—Tr.]

[2] Philo de Monarch. L. I. § 3–6, Opp. ed. Mangey, T. II. pp. 216–218, ed. Richter, IV. 289–93; de poster. Cain. Mangey I. 258, § 48 in Richter; de somniis, L. I. 40, Mang. I. 655, Richt. III. 264.

work of art, such a mighty city, is not of itself. But how God is, we cannot find. We must, indeed, constantly search after this, for the inquiry is too attractive to be relinquished; but nothing in the world can teach us how God is. "Show me Thyself, cried Moses. In the whole world I find no one who saith to me what Thou art; Thou must show Thyself to me. I beseech Thee, be entreated by Thy humble worshipper, and bring help, for Thou alone canst. For as the light manifests itself without aid from another light, so must Thou also show Thyself." It has been thought, since he sets a high value on the desire to know God, as noble and divine, he stands in this respect on the threshold of wisdom, longs after the knowledge of God through God, through revelation. But how does he make God answer Moses, the representative with him of God-fearing men, his wise man? "What thou desirest is indeed praiseworthy; but thy prayer befits no created being. To Me, indeed, it were easy to grant it, but not to thee to receive it. I give to each, deserving grace, what he can bear; but heaven and earth cannot comprehend Me, *how much less a human being?*" And not only is the incomprehensibility of God by men asserted by him simply, but also His infinitude is, after the manner of the apophatic* theology, described so that all and every quality, such as goodness, loveliness, is denied of Him objectively, and only the attribute of indeterminateness remains.[1]

But with equal justice might others say: With Philo, God is anything but a being shut up in Himself; very much the contrary. Over all is He, the beginning and bound of all. Not only is it in a sense said of the Logos that he is the creator of the world, and is poured out upon all, but also of God generally is it said, He fills all and penetrates all, and there is nothing which He hath left empty or destitute of Himself.[2] He was and is the Maker of the universe, the world-Father, who sustains earth and heaven, water and air, and what therein is, and rules

* [I suppose the author alludes to what divines are accustomed to call the *via negationis*, *i.e.*, our way of apprehending God by what He is not. The term ἀποφατικὸς is used by Aristotle, see e. gr. Analyt. Pr. Bk. II. ch. 15; but its use in theology is a neologism and an affectation.—Tr.]

[1] Appendix, Note B.

[2] πάντα γὰρ πεπλήρωκεν ὁ Θεὸς καὶ διὰ πάντων διελήλυθεν, καὶ χενὸν οὐδὲν, οὐδὲ ἔρημον ἀπολέλοιπεν ἑαυτοῦ.

over them.[1] Here also comes in his doctrine of the *πρόνοια* of God. Moreover, so far is he from describing the simple, self-resting being of God as anyhow satisfying His essence, that he calls Him, as also afterwards the Logos, the place of ideas, the fulness in Himself and through Himself,[2] the place of the universe, that is, He who has the universe for His fulness, and that not viewed in its separateness, as it appears to us, but in its unity. The world belongs necessarily to God, and thereby is made sure of eternity and incorruptibility.[3] Were it to perish, God would, from want of occupation and terrible inactivity, lead a life not worth living. Nay, if it be lawful to say so, the consequence of perfect solitude would be *θάνατος* for God. By this also may His freedom in Himself from all need, of which Philo says so much, be rightly apprehended: it is to be understood so as that there is, in virtue of His goodness, a need to Him to leave nothing without participation in the Divine essence; and all that Philo repudiates is the affirmation that, conversely, God partakes from the world, or that this can give Him anything which He has not in Himself. Pervading all things, omnipresent, He is not comprehended by the world; receiving nothing from it, He communicates Himself to all, without which there would be nothing. So entirely does it live by participation from Him, that He Himself is its reality as the ideal world, which He, under one aspect of His essence, is. But He Himself does not participate with it as the sensible world; untarnished by it, He is in it; taking nothing from it, He is the active principle (*δραστήριον*), whilst it, by itself considered, is purely passive and determinate (*παθητικὸν, οὐσία= ὕλη*).[4]

With by far too much confidence has it often been asserted, that the Logos of Philo is an individual essence, occupying a middle place between God and the world, a distinct hypostasis from God. But how could Philo in this case have described, in numberless places, God as in the manner above indicated coming into immediate contact with the world, only signalizing the *παθητικὸν*, matter, as something external to Him, receptive from Him? Against an individual hypostasis of the Logos he speaks

[1] Appendix, Note C. [2] Appendix, Note D.
[3] De Mundi incorrupt., Mangey, T. II. 503, 504, 508; § 16, 17, 20, 21.
[4] Appendix, Note E.

most decidedly when he says: "Nothing Divine communicates itself by means of separation; it only extends itself."[1] In so far, then, as the Logos is Divine, it is only the extended, or the self-extending God. But the Logos has nothing in himself not Divine; matter (*οὐσία*) is not created by the Logos, he only conforms it to himself like a seal; and as this is also numberless times ascribed in the general to God, the Logos can be regarded in no other light than as God Himself viewed under a definite aspect. Where does Philo show the least anxiety to reconcile his doctrine of the Logos with the unity of God? And yet this he could hardly have avoided, had he co-ordinated the Logos with God as a hypostatic essence.[2] If, in order to represent God in the definiteness of His self-extension, of the *ἐνέργεια* or the world-idea of the creative thought, he constructs proper categories and names for Him, he does not omit the necessary correctives in order to preserve what he considers the right monarchian view (comp. especially De Leg. Alleg. II. 1, Tom. I. pp. 66, 67). It is true he not only calls the Logos (De Mundi Opif.) the world-thinking and world-making power of God, which was its proper concept, so as thereby to denote that aspect of God under which He appears as in active relation to the world, as *δραστήριον*, but he calls Him Son, First-born of God, the link between God and the actual world; to which may be added such appellations as Mediator, High-priest, Advocate, Surety, Archangel, Pillar, etc.[3] But from the use of the term Son by Philo it will not do to infer a hypostasis, because he calls the world also a son of God; and by this cannot be denoted a personality, although the world, this younger son of God, at least in unity with the Logos, the elder Son, appears as animated and intelligent. If it be considered also how different are the meanings which the Logos has with Philo, though it is not in every case of a different object he speaks, there will arise fresh and weighty doubts as to the assumption that his Logos is an individual, a second personality distinct from God. If it be assumed, as it must be, that his *θεῖος λόγος* is always conceived as one and the same, though under varying relations, his individual personality must be accordant with all his significations; if not so, one would be led to inquire whether the

[1] Appendix, Note F. [2] Appendix, Note G. [3] Appendix, Note H.

expressions referred to, that sound as if personal, are not to be understood as personifications.

1. The Logos with Philo is, *first*, a Divine *faculty*, whether of thought or creation, or both together.[1] No one would wish to affirm that Philo conceived of God as without wisdom or might; and yet this must be done if he placed the faculty of thought and action in another being than God, in the individual hypostasis of the Son.

2. But the *second* leading meaning of the Philonian Logos is the Activity itself. The Logos is not only thought-power, and creation-power, but also the thinking-creative.[2] But neither thus does he arrive at an hypostasis distinct from God, but only to a position fluctuating between self-sustenance and attributiveness, which accords well with a doctrine of Divine potences. God saw that there could be no fair image without a fair model; that nothing sensible is faultless, unless as it is formed on an archetype and a conceived idea. Wherefore He created, when He would form this visible world, first the ideal world, in order to have an incorporeal, God-like type of this corporeal world, this later image of the earlier. This supersensible world, consisting in ideas, may not be allocated to any place. Where it existed, may be indicated by the analogy of the architect who plans a city in his mind, and expresses each particular which he formed in idea on his soul as on wax. This city exists in no place; but by means of it he constructs the city from stone, according to the type. So was it with God when He would construct this world, this Megalopolis.[3] Here it is again clear that to God is ascribed the conception of the ideal world, the *κόσμος νοητὸς*.— He then proceeds thus: As the soul of the artist is the place of this ideal city, so has the world consisting in ideas no other place than the Divine Logos who formed it. Thus it is evident that the Logos is the understanding of God, which thinks the world. Immediately thereupon he says: The world-forming might has also its source in the truly good. The truly good is with Philo God. Since, then, he finds in the Logos the *τόπος* for all powers, he must by the Logos understand God under a certain definite relation. The Father and Creator, says Plato, is good; and hence He grudges not His very best to matter (*οὐσία*).

[1] Appendix, Note I. [2] Appendix, Note J.
[3] De Opific. Mundi, T. I. 4, § 4.

For it had no good out of itself, though it may become all. Without, then, using any other help—and what other was there for Him to use?—only drawing on His own resources, God resolved to endow with superabundant grace Nature, which out of itself could not become a participant of any good.[1]

3. But as the Logos is, with Philo, the thinking, *i.e.*, the ideal-world-forming God,[2] so is He, *thirdly*, the thought, or the thing thought, *i.e.*, the ideal world itself. "If one," says he, "may speak openly, the ideal world is nothing else than the Logos of God already conceived in the formation of the world" [*εἰ δέ τις ἐθελήσειε γυμνοτέροις χρήσασθαι τοῖς ὀνόμασιν οὐδὲν ἂν ἕτερον εἴποι τὸν νοητὸν εἶναι κόσμον, ἢ Θεοῦ λόγον ἤδη κοσμοποιοῦντος*].[3] As the ideal city in the architect is not distinct from his mind, having no objective existence, but being only a determination of his mind, not more is the ideal world distinct from the Logos; whilst, again, this is not distinct from God, but is God, thought as intelligence, or world-forming power. "It is manifest that the archetypal seal which we call the ideal world is itself the archetypal model, the idea of ideas, the Logos of God."[4] In Him a multiplicity of ideas, the fulness, is not to be denied; rather does Philo speak of *ἰδέαι*, *λόγοι*, in this sphere also; but here these are in their eternal harmony and connection (in the *μοναδικὴ φύσις*, l.c. § 9), not in their spatial and temporal antithesis, as they appear in the sphere of the sensible world, the *κόσμος αἰσθητὸς*, at least to the party contemplating.[5]

4. As respects, *fourthly* and *finally*, the actual sensible world, *κόσμος αἰσθητὸς*, the Logos is here, certainly, frequently called the active Divine principle. He arises (*ἀνατέλλει*), is begotten of God, for the end that this world may be (T. I. p. 414). Here is the point at which alone any special personality of the Logos can be supposed. Nevertheless this by no means follows from the words which denote his proceeding from God, since the same

[1] De Opific. Mundi, T. I. 4, § 6.

[2] It is true there are passages in Philo where God is represented as the self-illuminating light; but the meaning there must be, not that He thinks Himself, but that He reveals Himself according to His existence. Of the Divine self-consciousness he had no idea; for the Divine thought he had no other contents than the world; comp. II. 216–218, 415.

[3] Ib. § 6. It is worthy of note that he does not say *κοσμοποιοῦντα*.

[4] Ibid. [5] Appendix, Note K.

expressions are used of the world, to which no personality is ascribed. Innumerable times is it called the younger son of God, so that, if the more obscure is to be explained from the more clear, the elder Son of God would have as little claim to personality as the younger makes; and this the more, that the one is a world as well as the other,—the latter the actual world, the former the ideal world. Or must this latter be a person, in order to attain the end of entering the ὕλη? If Philo had in view an actual creative act, which he ascribed to the Logos and not to God, there might be on this point reference to a Divine hypostasis; but the Emanatist doctrine requires nothing of this for the transition from the ideal world to the visible, but rather repudiates this.

But, as already observed, the forming of the world is ascribed also to God Himself. This world, the younger son of God, was not formed by the agency of the Logos as a representative of God, but God, "availing Himself of Himself, and of the help of none other," Himself created the world, in that He impressed His conception of the world, as the elder Son of God, as a seal on matter. Matter is τὸ παθητικὸν, soulless, and not self-moved (De Opif. p. 2), without order, without attribute, full of heterogeneity, disharmony, and contradiction. But it may become anything, being capable of transformation into its opposite best: order, precision, animation, congeniality, symmetry, coherence, and harmony (same pl. p. 5). It is moved, informed, besouled by the Divine intelligence; and thence comes the most perfect work, this world, the Megalopolis. Although commonly he represents matter as given to the Divine agency,[1] not created thereby, he nevertheless bestows on the world the predicate of being created (createdness, de Opif. 2); meaning by that, however, only that this infusion of the Logos into the world, or this self-extension of God into the ὕλη, which takes place for the latter in order to a communication of Himself to it, has always its cause in God. The nature of the world (as well on the side

[1] In the fragment preserved by Euseb., Præp. VII. 21, and contained in Mangey's Philo, T. II. p. 625, from the treatise περὶ προνοίας, it is said that God found (ἐστοιχάσατο) adequate material for the formation of the world, neither more nor less than was required. Comp. de Incorr. Mundi. ὥσπερ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν γίνεται, οὐδ' εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν φθείρεται. Ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ οὐδαμῇ ὄντος ἀμήχανόν ἐστι γενέσθαι τι.

of matter as on that of the Logos) has not come to be in time, passes not away in it, is incorruptible.[1] The world is God's son, *υἱός, ἔκγονος*, for, in its relation to God, it is nothing else than the ideal world placed in all its fulness in relation with the *ὕλη*, and appearing in it. The distinctive, discriminative principle, is not the *ὕλη*, it is not by it that unity becomes multeity; but the *κόσμος νοητὸς* is already in itself a membered, ordered multeity of ideas, which separation Philo sets forth as the presupposition of true harmony.[2] And this unity, which at the same time is Fulness, is viewed in relation to matter, together with it the world of actuality. So little does Philo bring it to an actual separation between God, or even the Logos, and the world. Of creation there can be no mention; for the ideal world comes to be the objective actual world, not by any new determination in itself, but only by its becoming, in relation to the *ὕλη*, what in itself it is from eternity (de Opif. p. 2); there being in this for the ideal world or the Logos nothing new, but only for the *ὕλη*.[3]

Let any one now take what has been said, according to which the Logos is partly identical with the world, and therefore not personal, partly identical with God, and only in Him personal—the personality, however, not being per se—and apply it to Philo's monotheism, which so decisively excludes any duality of Divine persons (e. gr. de Somn. I. 39), nay, denies even creative power to any but God Himself; and the hypothesis, that with him the Logos is an hypostasis, will be utterly destroyed. Even the later Church doctrine, that the hypostasis of the Son issued from the inner Divine self-diremption, must be quite foreign to him, since in his view the inner nature of God is and must be simple, indivisible. Where God is little known in His free self-sufficiency, He is as little contemplated ethically; He there remains, of necessity, only the substance or the Divine basis of the world, in which latter alone, therefore, can any distinctions exist.

At the same time, it must be considered how these apparently personal designations of the Logos are to be taken, and how, in

[1] De Incorr. Mundi, p. 496. Comp. the above passages, where *ἀπραξία* and *ἐρημία* are represented as for God equivalent to *θάνατος*. See p. 22, 32.

[2] Under this aspect the Logos is *τομεὺς τῶν ὅλων*. Quis rer. div. hær. p. 491. But this is also ascribed to God Himself, p. 491. Comp. de Mundi Opif. § 6, T. I. p. 5. *Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ νοητὴ πόλις ἕτερόν τί ἐστιν ἢ ὁ τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος λογισμὸς, ἤδη τὴν αἰσθητὴν πόλιν τῇ νοητῇ κτίζειν διανοουμένου.*

[3] Appendix, Note L.

the general, Philo combines the Divine activity in respect of the world with the abstract essence of God.

After what has been said, it is not difficult to estimate his appellations of the Logos. If the Logos, as the *κόσμος νοητὸς* in the sense alleged, is the principle of the actual world as one subject to order, he may also be called the Regent of the world, and of the powers therein diffused. Inasmuch as these powers are called, not in a hypostatic, but evidently in a personified sense, *λόγοι* and *ἰδέαι*, also *ἄγγελοι*, he may also, as their unity, be called *ἄγγελος πρεσβύτατος, ἀρχάγγελος πολυώνυμος*.[1] In order to indicate that God has His adequate representation (*εἰκὼν*) in the *κόσμος νοητὸς*, and that His Divine agency in relation to the sensible is not of equal date with His agency in conceiving the ideal world, in which God abides identical with Himself, at home with Himself;[2] Philo may call the Logos, in his relation to the world of sense, the Legate or *ὕπαρχος* of the cosmical host.[3] God is *ποιμὴν κ. ἐ.*, but He has set His first-begotten Son over the world of His reason; *i.e.*, the Divine agency in relation to the world has always, as its last principle, the source in itself, that out of which the all-ruling and penetrating world-idea sprang. It is thus that we arrive at an understanding of the name High-Priest, which is ascribed to the Logos, or to God as the Logos. The Logos[4] stands on the boundaries (of the actual and the ideal world); to him, the archangel and oldest Logos, hath the Father, the Creator of all, given the most distinguished gifts, that he, standing on the boundaries, might keep the created separate from the Creator, and the evil away from the good. Thus he, the warder of finitude, is the limit against pantheism, in so far as by the category of the Logos it is affirmed that the world never can be God as He is in Himself; though by this is not excluded the position, that it is God viewed in relation to His vitality and agency. Yet even this Philo will not fully admit, inasmuch as to the world in its actuality matter belongs, which in itself is altogether ungodly. He thus is saved from pantheism in the last resource,

[1] De Confus. Ling. T. I. 426.

[2] De Migrat. Abr. T. I. 437. The Logos—here the ideal world—is God's house.

[3] De Agric. T. I. 308, § 12.

[4] Quis rer. div. T. I. 501 ff., § 42. See Note H in App.

not by his concept of God, for this is not held ethically, but only by his view of matter, or his dualism. In reference to this, he calls the world of the Logos also God's garment (de Profug. § 20, T. I. p. 562). For this actual world, "the mortal, however, the same Logos is at once intercessor with the Immortal, and ambassador of the Lord to the subject;" consequently mediator under both aspects. And he delights in his office. "I stand," he thus introduces him, "mythologically speaking (T. I. pp. 501, 502), between the Lord and you; for I am neither unbegotten as God is, nor begotten like you, but the middle between the extremes, a surety to both:—to the Creator, that He may be sure the entire race shall not be consumed and perish, choosing disorder in place of order;—to the creature, that it may have good hope that the gracious God will never neglect His own work. For I will be the herald of peace, who brings to the creation from God, the eternal Guardian of peace, the message of peace."[1] Similarly elsewhere the High-Priest is the Divine Logos, blameless in birth and essence; his Father the *νοῦς*, his mother the *σοφία*, Wisdom. The oldest Logos is surrounded by the world as by a garment: by earth and water, air and fire, and what proceedeth thence. He is, as the reason of the Existing One (God), the bond which unites all parts as the members, just as the soul of man the members of his body. The Logos is called also the High-Priest once, as the faultless unity of the world, which he represents as the *κόσμος νοητὸς*, the world-idea; and in this idea is the individual reconciled and represented to God. In so far, however, as it is not an inoperative idea, but makes the actual world with its plastic matter into an impression of itself, of the Divine seal, or into the garment wherein He eternally lives and moves and represents His ideas, it is real. And as this living, powerful unity, it gives bail at once to the world for its perfection in God's eyes, and to God Himself, the Existing One. For it is the world itself in respect of that which constitutes it a *κόσμος*,—not simply ideal, but real. Nevertheless in this world-idea no reference to *history* is contained. The Logos is not the world-idea to be realized from the world, the free essence, ethically, from God by revelation in the course of history; but this world-idea is immediately actual,

[1] De Profug. § 20, T. I. 562. See Appendix, Note M.

i.e., physical. Here comes into view the point at which the deep antagonism of the system of Philo with the Christian idea clearly emerges; for in what has been already advanced, there is often, at least in expression, a deceptive resemblance to Christian dogmas. But before we enter on Philo's relation to the Messianic ideas of his people, we must cast a glance back on what has just been advanced.

From what has been said, it clearly appears, that not only is there nothing to necessitate our taking the Philonian Logos hypostatically, but that all that is customarily advanced as favouring that, when more narrowly looked at, is against it; as also, that such a hypostatic plurality in God would be utterly opposed to the modes of thought of one under the influence of an impulse so strongly pressing from plurality to unity of substance. To this tendency he has sacrificed the deep ethical distinction which the old Hebraism made between God and the world, and is saved from sinking into an indiscriminate unification of God and the world only by the narrow ridge of the ὕλη.

But it does not certainly follow that the entire Logos-doctrine, with those depending from it, is so to be sunk in the absoluteness of the simple Divine essence, as that it should be immediately identical with the Divine essence. The Divine Logos is as little God per se (τὸ Ὄν), as he is a hypostasis. But since, as what goes before shows, the Logos is certainly again to be ascribed to God, we are constrained to say that in the Philonian doctrine of the Logos there is a path opened, though from far, to the doctrine of a distinction in God Himself. God is distinguished as respects His self-existence and His vitality. (A higher category Philo could not reach.) As self-existent, He is τὸ Ὄν; as an actual being, He is the Logos. To these two chief elements there is added a third, inasmuch as He as Logos is, 1. inseparable, and thus He is at once the world of the Divine thoughts and the thinker of them; and, 2. the revealer of these in matter, which he makes the medium of actuality in the ideal world.[1] We have thus *the Divine life contemplated in three stages, through which it advances or extends itself* (T. I. p. 209): *God in Himself, the Ideal world, and the Actual world.* But to distinguish these three remains only an attempt: the distinguished

[1] Appendix, Note N.

sink again, when narrowly viewed, back together into themselves; thus the actual world, so far as it is to be viewed as a determination of the Divine life, is not in itself distinct from the ideal world, but only by means of something outward, its relation to matter. The ideal world itself, however,—nay, the Logos in the general, cannot be fixed as an objective distinction of God from God; for were the Reason to fall actually only on the side of the Logos, God would hardly be to be called God; or were one to say, The Logos is God as thought, the Θεὸς with the σοφία of the thinker, this could not, on the one hand, be carried through strictly, since the Logos is also called the thinker of the ideal world; and, on the other hand, we should thus have no making of God the object of thought, since what is thought is rather only the world. In fact, he calls God and the Logos alike the place of the universe, which embraces all and is embraced by nothing, since He is Himself One and All: he desires that the Spirit might in the height of thought transcend the plurality of numbers, the Triad, and even the Duad neighbour to the Monad, and might ascend to the unmixed, absolutely simple and independent Idea (see App. G and K). All apparent plurality in God's working, whether in reference to the ideal or to the actual world, is attributable, therefore, to the beholder. If he, on the one hand, in order to avoid representing God as Himself appearing, describes the Old Testament theophanies as irradiations of His powers (e. gr. de Abrah. § 22, T. II. 17; de Nomin. Mut. T. I. 581; de Confus. Ling. I. 430, 431, § 33), he yet, on the other, regards these powers as not separate from God, but each as infinitely in Him (de Monarch. Lib. I. § 6, T. II. 218). As Moses could not see God, he at least wished to behold His satellites, the Divine powers, which in their unity are called the δόξα of God. But God answered that they also are invisible and ideal, incomprehensible as God in respect of their essence, but they radiate forth an impression and image of their ἐνέργεια. For to that which is formless and without attribute they give form, without in aught altering their eternal essence. Thus the powers come to be placed by the side of God Himself: "Hope not to comprehend either Me or My powers as respects essence; the attainable for thee I give thee readily and willingly. Therefore I summon thee to the contemplation of the *world*" (same place, p. 219).

The whole world framed by God exhales, morning and evening, a thankoffering.[1] It is vital and intelligent;[2] Reason inborn in it is the law, the ordering of the universe. It is the son of God, itself a *θεῖον, μεγαλόπολις πρὸς ἀλήθειαν.* It is through and through one and whole; its power is invincible, for it embraces all in itself; it cannot be divided into parts, but is indestructible (comp. de Mundi, T. II. p. 616 ff., § 14 ff.). It cannot fall into confusion; nor even so much as increase, and have various stages and ages; for then would it at first, like children, be a child, *ἄλογος*, which is without God. It cannot, he maintains, be denied without sin that the world is always perfect, soul and body[3] (*ἀγέννητος καὶ ἄφθαρτος*, T. II. pp. 496 and 505). He is especially vehement against the doctrine of a consuming of the world by fire; indeed, generally, of any palingenesy of the world;[4] for the world seems to him to be fair and perfect: he has imbibed Hellenic draughts, and misses nothing in it. Having sunk back from the ethical to the physical stand-point, he has no sense, no need of history; there is, in truth, for him no discord in the world, and no proper need for reconciliation. But as, when he has to speak of God, he lays hold of only the world as the content of God (in place of thinking Himself in His absoluteness, his God thinks only the world); so with the same mingling of concepts, when he speaks of the world, he expresses himself so that he denies it to be a world properly, and substitutes for it immediately Divine predicates.

In the world man holds the first place; nevertheless, strictly, to him this is true only of the primal man, whom it is impossible to discriminate from the Logos,[5] and who, consequently, can hardly be reckoned as belonging to the actual world. In the actual world, however, man, with all his imperfection through the body, nevertheless represents the world in little (T. I. p. 494). The world is the great man, man is the little world, and combines in himself corporeally the four elements.[6] Above all has God

[1] Quis Rer. Div. T. I. p. 501, § 41.

[2] See on what follows, especially the treatises De Opif. Mundi, and De Incorrupt. Mundi, T. I. 28–34, T. II. 495–507.

[3] De Mundi Incorr. T. II. 496, § 9 ff.

[4] Ib. p. 505.

[5] De Opif. Mundi, pp. 32, 33, § 46, 47.

[6] De Opif. Mundi, p. 35, § 51.

given to him the lordly reason; the same that is in God is also in man. From this, indeed, it follows, that as the content of the Divine reason is the world, it cannot be held to be otherwise with that of man. Yet man forms the point of unity in the actual world; and most of all, such an one as is one in thought and will with the order and reason immanent in the world, which in the human consciousness comes to be the *νόμος*.[1] Such is the pious (T. II. p. 407) and wise. Among nations, the Jewish represents this blossom of manhood;[2] within Israel itself, this place is due to the prophets, the interpreters of God (T. II. p. 222, de Monarch. L. I. § 9), and the wise men, for the wise is of equal worth with the world (*ἰσότιμος τῷ κόσμῳ*, T. I. p. 165, de sacrif. Abel, § 3). This nobility of man is a reconciliation, a ransom for the world. The Jews particularly, the people loved of God,[3] discharge in constant and regular manner the office of priest and that of prophet (which both stand above that of king, II. 124, de Vit. Moys. I. § 50) for the whole world. Hence the high-priest, when he goes into the Holy Place, bears the symbols of the whole world, for he represents the universe before God.[4] Other priests intercede and offer only for friends and citizens; the high-priest of the Jews presents prayer and thanksgiving, not only for the entire race of men, but also for the elements of nature, earth, water, air, and fire, inasmuch as he regards the world, as in truth it is, as his fatherland, in whose stead he is bound by prayer and entreaty to make reconciliation with the Prince. This substitution has thus also again a physical character: the world is reconciled through Israel without knowing it, and without personally in itself completing the reconciliation. Not less is the essential equality of all men yet unknown, hidden by a *hierarchia terrestris*, which is a copy of the heavenly; and this gradation, again, stands connected with the physical character of his system. Still more is this apparent, as well as the contradictions thence arising, from this, that the high-priest, and by consequence also the wise man, has not the world-reconciling

[1] De Opif. Mundi, p. 34, § 60.

[2] T. II. p. 15, de Abrah. § 19. They have assumed the priesthood and prophethood for all nations.

[3] Ib.

[4] De Vit. Moys. L. III. § 14, T. II. 155. De Monarch. L. II. § 6, T. II. 227.

power in himself. But this same world, which he has to reconcile before God, is to him again the Son, the perfect Paraclete, which he himself resembles as the little world, the aid of which he needs to make his service of God of effect. For therefore must he bear the symbols of the universe, in order that in its entireness the individual (and thus the high-priest as well) may compensate for his deficiency, and God through it may see all to be good.[1] He has on his holy garments the emblem of the universe, that he, by the constant contemplation of it, may make his own life worthy the nature of the universe, as well as that he may in his service have the whole world as his co-worshippers.[2] Now, had Philo admitted a historical development of revelation and of mankind, this might have been taken in the sense that through the whole the individual would be reconciled; for to the whole world there belongs the sum of the future development, which, had he held the idea of the Messiah, would be through him rendered certain. But it is the world as it is that reconciles man; which, if man be also included in the world, means as much as that he needs no reconciliation: he is by his being at one with God, he is, as he is, good and well-pleasing to Him; or, if he must be reconciled by the objective world, then again is the world the higher, and the apparent nobility of man, his distinction, sinks away;[3] as a difference and mediation for which, a fictitious ground had been assumed.

It is now scarcely necessary to deduce the consequence, that Philo did not participate in the warm desires and hopes which filled the heart of the believing Jew.[4] The idea of the Messiah has become in him a dead coal: nothing but the phlegma of it remains with him, the hope of a miraculous restoration of the scattered Jews from all parts of the earth to Palestine by a superhuman Divine appearance (ὄψις), which shall be recognisable only by the just;[5] and this strangely contrasts with the

[1] De Vita Moys. L. III. § 14, T. II. p. 155.

[2] De Monarch. L. II. § 6, T. II. p. 227.

[3] This lies also in the position: The whole heaven and the world cannot comprehend God, how much less the φύσις ἀνθρώπου! T. II. de Monarch. L. I. 218.

[4] We may even infer from T. II. p. 656, that these were not otherwise than displeasing to him.

[5] De Execrationibus, § 9, T. II. 433 ff., comp. De Praem. etc. § 16, T. II. 423, de Vita Moysis, I. § 29, T. II. 107.

world-citizenship which he ascribes to his people as a commendation, and with his satisfaction with the whole world. This last remnant of the Messianic idea is with him evidently a hereditary possession; as heterogeneous to his system, as in it without significancy; but it affords us, in its singularity in Philo, an intimation of the energy of the Messianic hopes among even the Alexandrian Jews of his time, for it is to his connection with them that this tribute is due. It remains, however, to ask, why the Messianic idea, and especially the idea of the incarnation, to which latter he so often approximates,[1] find no place with him? The answer is, that a reconciliation appears to him unnecessary on account of his concept of sin and the Divine righteousness; whilst the incarnation would be for him an absolute impossibility.

It is true that he ascribes freedom to men; but he immediately appends to that, that God excepts nothing from His *power;* and with this, viewed from Philo's stand-point, the former hardly consists. For he takes no cognisance of the category of holy love. Very instructive, however, is what he says of the creation of man.[2] The higher nature of man, his rational type, must have been engraven by the Divine Logos, not by God, who is before the Logos, and better than all Logical nature.[3] Hence God speaks of Himself, in Gen. i. 27, as of another: "I have made man after the image of God." But why does God speak of Himself, in the plural (Gen. i. 26, iii. 22, xi. 7), "Let Us make man," etc.? This language relates to His surrounding Powers, for it did not beseem Him (as Ὄν) to have immediate connection with the world. The Powers (angels, ἰδέαι) had to form the mortal part of our nature,

[1] See, for instance, T. II. p. 462, Quod omnis probus liber, § 16; T. I. pp. 280, 283, Quod Deus sit immut. § 10 ff.

[2] The principal passages are, De Confus. Ling. T. I. pp. 430, 431; De Profug. p. 556; De Opif. Mundi, pp. 17–19. In all these passages Philo reiterates the same doctrine. This his constant doctrine, therefore, must be kept in view in the interpretation of the above-cited fragments (T. II. p. 625), in which he may appear to speak otherwise.

[3] For the extensive infinite, which in truth does not surpass the physical, he shows here also such reverence, that everything Logical and Spiritual is represented as inferior, since it is a definite thing in God; on the other hand, since it also is a definition of God, it is represented as Θεὸς, though δεύτερος Θεός.

imitating the skill of Him who formed the princely part in us. This princely part the Prince of all things framed; the lower part, lower Powers. But man must be able to choose between good and bad, whilst other beings either can have no fault and no virtue, like Nature, or have only virtues, like the stars; and thus must God transfer the γένεσις κακῶν to other beings, whilst He retains with Himself the source of good. For the mixture [of good and bad] is partly in keeping with God, in so far as the ἰδέα of the better is therein mingled, and partly not in keeping, on account of the antithesis, since the Father cannot be the cause of evil to His children. Accordingly, evil has its origin in the creation in which the more subordinate Powers participated. Elsewhere he reverts to matter as the source of evil.[1] In this way it is difficult to arrive at any personal blame; since even Philo speaks of evil as if it did not belong to the concept of it to be posited of the will of man. But if there be only such physical evil, there is really no evil. In fact, the evil would, according to him, be easily retaken. He ascribes to each soul immediately the divine power of virtue,[2] as he elsewhere says: "Not to sin at all, belongs to God only, perhaps also to a divine man." This fluctuating laxity culminates in the concept of God, in the relation which, according to him, the Divine rectitude has to goodness. "God is not unmerciful, but gentle by nature. He who believes that, comes easily to repentance, hoping that God will forgive."[3] But since Scripture speaks not of gentleness and goodness only, but also of righteousness and wrath, he attempts to reconcile them by comparing the lawgiver to a physician, who in what he says regulates himself by a regard to his patient, not always strictly by a regard to what truth would dictate. Hence, to terrify the fierce, and to benefit thoroughly and universally, the lawgiver must *represent* God as angry.[4] Of the earnest strifes in which the noblest of the Old Testament folk engaged, to mediate between the holy rectitude and the grace of God, he knows nothing. He

[1] This position was still more fully worked out by the Gnostics.

[2] T. II. p. 462, Quod omnis probus liber, § 16 ff.

[3] T. I. p. 561, De Profugis, § 18; De Creatione princip. § 14, T. II. p. 373; De Justitia; De Execratione, § 8 ff. Sometimes the old Hebraic feeling of rectitude breaks out, T. II. p. 419, De Praem. etc. § 12.

[4] Quod Deus sit immutab. T. I. pp. 282, 283.

obliterates that which gives the religious process its tension—the holy righteousness, and treats it as a mere figure of speech; whereby the whole becomes relaxed, the hope, nay, the aspiration after something better is destroyed, and the ethical consciousness eudæmoniacally poisoned. For a Divine goodness that is not righteous can but sink back into the physical; and as its highest end, can have only enjoyment, only well-being, even though this well-being may in its highest degree be the feast of knowledge.[1] This knowledge does not thus find its highest object the spiritual, the divine, but remains a world-wisdom, world-consciousness, intuition and knowledge of the world, as of the holiest theatre.[2] And in this undervaluing of the Divine righteousness, Philo is a predecessor of Gnosticism; by his doctrine of the Divine goodness, he has an appearance of something Christian, something surpassing the Old Testament and the stand-point of law, but in reality he sinks back below this, and renders the Christian redemption superfluous. In the places where he speaks of the return of his people, he could not altogether lay aside the old Hebraic doctrine of the necessity of a foregoing expiation; but the Jews, according to him, will be richly supplied with intercessors before the Father, for[3] they will have three *παράκλητοι τῶν καταλλαγῶν*: 1. The gentleness and goodness of God Himself, who ever prefers the remission of punishment. 2. The holiness of the progenitors of the race; for the souls set free from the body, which offer pure and unsullied service to their Lord, present not ineffectual intercessions for their sons and descendants; as a mark of distinction, the hearing of their prayers is certified to them by the Father. 3. The third Paraclete is the amendment of those who shall be brought under the covenant.—We have seen above, that according to him the world is always reconciled to God, always reconciles itself, since it always stands before God as blameless unity in the Logos, which from the beginning is immanent in it. Hence to him any further progress of *revelation* must have appeared superfluous, disturbing to the peace, the unity, and the entireness of the world,

[1] De Opif. Mundi, p. 18. Appendix, Note O.

[2] De Opif. Mundi, p 18, and T. II. p. 229, De Monarch. L. I. § 6, where God says to Moses, "And so I call thee, since thou canst not know Me, to the contemplation of the world."

[3] De Execrat. § 9, T. II. p. 435.

looking at it as he did, not ethically, but Hellenically. The law which Moses gave is one with the law of the world. The world is rational; the law, which is immanent in it, Moses expressed to the consciousness; therefore is it eternal and not far from us.[1] It is complete and whole, and leaves nothing to wish beyond.[2]

According to his doctrine of the Divine image in man (which he, indeed, without carrying this through, yet intimates to have been of a progressive character[3]), his participation in the Divine Logos already by nature (see above), one would expect that Philo would set forth the closest relation between the Divine and human nature, and that the idea of the incarnation could not be strange to him. He speaks[4] of heroes, in whom mortal and immortal elements were mixed, in whom the mortal was overruled by the immortal part, and intimates it as possible that other such may appear. But with all this, the Divine remains foreign to the human according to its nature. Where the Divine light shines forth, there the human fades (Quis rer. div. hæres, § 53, T. I. p. 511), and where the former sinks, the latter blazes up. *Θέμις γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι θνητὸν ἀθανάτῳ συνοικῆσαι.* Hence to the idea of Prophecy, ecstasy belongs. The reason of this lies not so much in this, that Philo distinguishes a hidden God from the actual; for he brings in God as saying to Moses,[5] "To Me it would be easy to give what thou askest, but not for thee to receive." It is rather, on the one hand, in his idea of God ever falling back to simple physical endlessness, and on the other, in the *ὕλη* mingled with all mortals, that we are to seek the reason why "God according to the greatness of His grace is not communicable, but is to be received according to the capacity of the creature. His power is insuperable; all the powers of God are without limit, endless; that which has come into being is too weak to receive His greatness:[6] and so God gave to our nature not all, but only so much as our mortal complexion could apprehend."[7] If man would reach a higher being, he must leave the body. We have seen that he knew to dis-

[1] T. I. p. 34. [2] De Justitia, T. II. p. 360. See Appendix, Note P.
[3] See e. gr. De Confus. Ling. I. 426.
[4] Quod omn. prob. lib. T. II. p. 462, § 14; De Migr. Abrah. § 31, T. I. p. 463.
[5] De Monarch. p. 216 ff. [6] De Opif. § 6. [7] De Opif. p. 35, § 51.

tinguish God and the world, so that the former is the Agent, the Unchangeable,—the latter, the Mutable, the Passive. This distinction would have seemed to him confounded were God to become man. For he knew neither to treat suffering as an act, nor the body as other than limit and bound; whereas Christianity treats it as not merely the organ of the spirit, but also as a representation of it, or as the essential momentum of its self-realization. His Christ, if he needed any, could only be the Λόγος ἄϋδιος (comp. the fragment in Eusebius, Præp. Evang. vii. 13); consequently a Doketic Christ; but never once does he indicate a longing for a new Theophany. So little, also, has he of even a metaphysical union of the cosmical opposites, God and the World, that Man, who at the highest is viewed as the point of unity in which the extremes meet, inasmuch as the Divine Logos and the ὕλη are united in him, nevertheless under two aspects does not truly represent this unity. For God remains foreign to the actual humanity; Philo's concept of God is widely removed from the acknowledgment of the man-being or the man-becoming as a determination placed in God Himself; whilst man himself remains so foreign to the other extreme, the ὕλη, that it is without it he has his true development, as Philo conceives the original man and the perfected man; so that both termini, God and ὕλη, lie without man, absolutely limit his freedom and his knowledge, and an absolute mystery as well as insuperable might of gravity stand over against him. They stand, however, also unreconciled over against each other; and as their dualism, mirroring itself in the consciousness of men, must impose the deepest unholiness, he sets also over against God, who cannot become perfect Master of matter though He would, a dark Fate, robs the concept of God of its monotheistic absoluteness, and impresses on it one of a pagan character.

Philo, imbued with the Hellenic idea of beauty and wisdom, knew how to clothe over these contradictions, and to give to the scientific, ethical, and religious cheerlessness of his position the colouring of brightness and beauty. But very far from that nature-growth of beauty of the Greeks was the artificial harmony which he composed. This appears to him at the same time as something higher, namely, that union of the heathen and the Jewish which as a historical problem was imminent; and it must be acknowledged, that in his system the human

mind has made the attempt to complete the union of the pre-Christian religions. To Christianity, hardly then in its dawn, he presents himself in this respect as a rival. But blinding as is the resemblance, on a superficial view, of many of his ideas and modes of expression with Christianity, the principle of both is fundamentally different, and even the seemingly similar, when taken in its connection with the whole, has a quite different meaning. With Christianity he would let the world celebrate an eternal reconciliation through the Logos; but what the fact of the Divine condescension was intended for the first time to establish, and what the ancient saints, in fulfilment of their pious longing, were authorized to expect as a Divine fact, that he imagined as already *done*, nay, eternally happening, and thus set aside Christianity. So that his system came, like an apparitional contrast, to the cradle of Christianity; or appeared like an impalpable dissolving Fata morgana on the horizon on which Christianity had to arise.

At the same time, it is not to be denied that this system has contributed somewhat to Christianity in the course of its development; but this is the service which all opponents of Christianity, even its antipodes, render: merely that he should have something in accordance with Christianity, was demanded of him by his system as historically unfolded, and, still more, that Christianity should with it. Philo's mind, and without doubt that of many of his contemporaries, laboured *philosophically* at the same problem as that which the person of Christ *in fact*, and from Him the Church historically, has solved and is solving. And since also the Christian fact, as it is the historically realized *idea* of religion, and seeks to be so recognised, has to reproduce the ideal according to all its moments the same, the tendency thereto was the earlier called forth from the circumstance that Christianity entered a world impregnated with questions and ideas which were allied to it. As thought began to place the Christian idea in relation with the sphere of reason, it came in most intimate contact with those pre-Christian essays and ideas, and allowed itself at first, as we shall see, not seldom to be drawn out of its own proper track; but the Christian principle, for which these questions were essentially modified by the entering in of the fact of Christianity, not only again collected itself, but had allowed itself to enter into that alliance

with philosophy in order to take in its own time the reins in its own hand, and to initiate a new era in philosophy. Of this influence of the Philonian collective tendency on the Christian world, the Alexandrian Gnosticism is the most remarkable monument, though by no means the only one, as, for instance, Justin Martyr and the Alexandrian Church-fathers show.[1]

From what has been advanced, it appears that the derivation of the idea of the incarnation of God from Hebraism or Judaism* is untenable. It is not from the former; for it is utterly foreign to that development of the idea of God which we find in the Old Testament, that the only God, Jehovah, should have condescended to the finite so as to become man in time, to mingle in the commonness of every-day life, and expose Himself to the vicissitudes of human existence. There may be, in the judgment of some, more probability of the Christian idea being connected with Judaism. But the two principal parties whom we best know, the Alexandrian and the Palestinian Jews, were demonstrably ignorant of the idea of an incarnation of God. We must consequently betake ourselves to that varied mixture of heathen and Jewish modes of religious representation which is to be found in secret doctrines, or in the dim fancies of small individual sects about the time of Christ. But these contain partially marvellous and fantastic things, such as the doctrine of the Adam Kadmon, or First Man. The one side of this mystical doctrine is that according to which is intended by him the male-female first being from which, by means of a separation of the sexes, an emanation begins; representations which have evidently come over into it from the nature-religions, and would be abhorrent from the whole character of Christianity. The other version of this doctrine is, that by the Adam Kadmon is to be understood a high *created* being, made in the image of God, whether we call it Æon or Archangel.

[1] See Appendix, Note Q.

* [The German divines distinguish Hebraism from Judaism, applying the former term to designate the religious system developed in the Old Testament, and the latter to designate the system of traditionary belief which arose after the closing of the O. T. canon. The distinction of nomenclature is founded on a passage in Josephus, Antiq. XI. 5, 7. See De Wette Lehrbuch der Christ. Dogmatik, vol. I. p. 53, third edit.—Tr.]

This Adam Kadmon passes through a whole series of incorporations: he has appeared as Adam, as Enoch, as Noah, etc.; and last of all he appears in the Messiah. It need hardly be pointed out that the Christian idea of the God-man receives no illustration from this: in the incarnate Archangel there is no manifestation of God in manhood; only an Arian Christ could be illustrated from this, which is no Christ, since he leaves God in the background. Nor does the pantheistic Emanationism improve the matter, it rather makes it worse; for by the multiplicity of incarnations, each individual incarnation is degraded. How much, however, with all these mystics the proper Divine essence is the far-off, self-enclosed original essence, to which it is consequently a contradiction to become man, not simply doketically, but in reality, is shown directly by that gradation of being, or incorporations of the same high Being, which at least, as apparently mediating between the true Divine essence and man, are placed between them. A third phase of this doctrine is, that from the original Being Adam Kadmon sprang as a hermaphrodite, which forthwith split into two sexes, the Son and the Holy Ghost. Against this notion unite the reasons which have been adduced against the two former, between which it undecidedly wavers. But enough of these perplexed and fantastic ideas. They are instructive to us in so far as they, whether originated in the time of Christ or later, show how the mind ever felt itself pressed towards the same problem, to see an essential inner unity established between God and man. But the unbiassed feeling must judge whether the Christian doctrine of the God-man stands related to this as its copy, or this is not rather a paganized caricature of the archetype which appears historically in Christianity.

Of the Theologoumena of this time, there further come under this head the *Memra* (Word=λόγος) and *Shechinah*, as also the *Metatron*. Of all these, however, it is to be said, that either they never grew into the assertion of an hypostasis, but affirmed only the parastatic appearance of God, or the mere symbol of His presence, and hence the Targums identify, e. gr., the Memra with Ruach; or, conversely, though they are made to represent a personality (especially to the Metatron), a higher heavenly being, he is still a creature, so that the truly Divine lies ever beyond it. *To the idea of an incarnation of the*

properly Divine these Theologoumena never as a whole conducted.[1]

Up to this point we have considered how far the Old Testament and the Jewish modes of treating the relation of *God* to the world, and consequently the path from above to below, are opposite to the New Testament. It remains to take the converse view, the anthropologic, for the purpose of seeing how the concept of *man* conforms to that of the God-man. The Hebrew popular genius framed for itself in the divinely-inspired prophets an *ideal* of man, and sought in this the balance and reconciliation between God and man. The ideal is the servant of God, that is, the subject in which the Old Testament righteousness, the Tsedaka, is so represented, that he is the perfect servant of God, that is, does God's service perfectly, in obedience and piety. Now, even if we adopt Nitzsch's fine remark, and say that the Old Testament not only recognises a δοῦλος, but also sees realized a nearer relation to God, e. gr. in Moses,—who appears *hence* to be called afterwards θεράπων, nay, rises to the idea of an οἰκονόμος, who, as a steward over the house of the Lord, is trusted by Him as a confidential servant,—still there is a long way from this to the New Testament *Son of God*. It is true that this phrase occurs not seldom in the O. T., having reference in the theocratic sense to a moral or particular personality; as e. gr. Jer. xxxi. 20, "Is not Ephraim My dear son, My beloved child?" Hosea xi. 1, "When Israel was young, then I loved him, and called him, My son, out of Egypt;" comp. Jer. xlix. 15, and so also Ps. ii. 7 of our subject. But the metaphysical, the essential unity of this בֶּן־יְהוָה with God is not sufficiently to be proved even from the last passage. On the other hand, the עֶבֶד־יְהוָה is certainly concentrated ever more and more into a high personality, in which the scattered features of all the servants of God in Israel become collected. He is not merely a moral person, identical with Israel as opposed to the heathen, or with the prophetic body as opposed to the Spirit-forsaken Israel, but *the* servant of God. Still more the threefold theocratic office, the royal, the priestly, and the prophetic, never united in any ordinary man, is represented as combined in David's Son, and herein is completed the image of the Messiah.

[1] See Appendix, Note R.

Still, even in this there is no going beyond the theocratic ideal of the servant of God. It lies, indeed, in the nature of the case, that the human ideal sometimes in its predicates passes into a higher sphere. If the inspiration which is ascribed to the prophets is ascribed to them in the fullest measure, it can no longer be represented as an operation from without, but passes into an essential being and dwelling of God in the prophet; the prerogatives of kingly might, conceived in their fulness, pass over into the Divine predicates of eternal and all-embracing rule; and, in fine, the idea of the perfect high-priest leads to a not merely symbolical, but to a practically powerful and actual substitution, and this again oversteps the limits of man as an individual related to others simply as brother.[1]—When, in fine, it is said, Dan. vii. 13, "I saw One like unto a son of man coming with the clouds of heaven to the Ancient of days; who gave Him power, glory, and kingdom," etc., there is undoubtedly showed in the vision the glorification of the human to the higher majesty; for had only the *form* been human, Daniel would certainly have said "an angel." But not mankind in general, but only Israel, seems, according to verse 27, to be understood by the son of man, so that as before with "the servant of God," we have here a moral personality brought to become an actual anthropological one.* And so, on the anthropological side also, we arrive at the result, that from the Old Testament stand-point it was impossible to announce that a man was God, or God's son, not simply in a figurative, but in an actual, metaphysical sense.

Now, had there been no passing beyond the Old Testament ideas, the concept of the revelation of God, viewed from above downwards, would have remained incomplete, the σοφία would have found no sure and abiding place; looked at from below

[1] Comp. Is. ix. 6, 7, xlii. 1, liii., with Ps. xlix. 8, 9.

* [This inference by no means follows; for the fact that the people of the Messiah are represented as in and through Him sharing in His power and glory, no more proves that the phrase, "son of man," is a collective designation of them, and not a personal designation of Him, than the same fact occurring in the N. T. would prove that the terms applied to designate our Lord are not personal but collective. In ver. 27, "the people of the saints of the Most High" are distinguished from the latter; and the language used of them is such as to lead to the impression that this term is employed to designate the same being who in ver. 14 is called "A son of man."—Tr.]

upwards, the Old Testament ideal itself would not have been completed. The self-revealing God, or Logos, and the concept of man, stand so related to each other, that the one reaches its perfect actuality and truth only through the other; *i.e.*, only as the condescending grace of God is a humanification of the Logos, is the latter the absolute revealer of God; and only as He is a man who is at the same time the Logos, is the entire idea of manhood realized. In this lies the reason why the entire Old Testament mode of thought arrives first at its truth in the idea of the God-man, so that this religion, as well as the pagan, struggles after this idea. Thus there lies not less in the above the proof that this idea came as little within the bounds of Hebraism and Judaism, as those of heathenism.

And so, in the retrospect of all religious history before Christ, we find this as a Præparatio Evangelica in the fullest sense, and as serving for a proof that Christianity gives expression to that which all religions seek, that it embraces within itself whatever is true in Heathenism and Judaism; but not less for a proof also that the idea of the God-man, which so peculiarly characterizes Christianity, has not emerged from without Christianity, but wholly from within it. To Christianity this idea is original and essential. The beginning was the fact, and the fact gave the knowledge.

Whilst, however, all genuine historical investigation presses to the result that the Founder of our religion was Himself, through His own self-consciousness, and the utterance of that to others, the cause at once of the introduction into the minds of men of the Christian idea of the God-man and of the attribution of that to Him; it would be rash to conclude, that from the first it was a constitutive element of the Christian doctrine expressly and consciously to ascribe to Christ all that without which the idea of God-manhood, in its truth and in its whole extent, cannot be thought. Such an opinion would be wholly at variance with the picture which we must form especially of the first centuries, when a very respectable party of Christians did not by any means ascribe to Christ all that is involved in the concept of perfect Godhead—nay, when the Church itself affirmed neither of this, nor of the humanity of Christ, all that belongs to the concept of each respectively. Such

an opinion would also indicate a want of perception of how it is that the mind arrives gradually at consciousness in religious things.

The Church, indeed, from the first received the Christian truth in its totality, but not in a fully developed form. Hence she could not immediately diffuse, in sharp, definite, dialectic shape, the contents of the faith which she bore, shut up within her, complete in all its parts; but she abode by declarations such as the immediate necessity required, and which were to a certain extent unsatisfactory to a later age, and in want of completion. She was not thereby, however, deprived of a certain tact which guided her securely to the detection and excision of what was hostile to the faith. As in reference to morality the conscience, though unable in every moment to determine quickly and securely how the moral problem is to be solved, yet knows by a safe tact to discriminate what is evil; so there is a faith-conscience; and this is the less deceptive the more the Church remains in the concentrated sincerity of her primitive state, and the more immediately the questions mooted approach the central point of Christianity. Hence that clearness and firmness which we find in the Church decisions of the first centuries; hence the spiritual authority which, after so many centuries, is willingly conceded to these decisions. In this state of affairs, it need not seem strange to us that the Church, when called upon by the assertion of unchristian positions, either to repudiate these, or to assert the Christian truth in opposition to them, should have had no conviction that she had in the strict sense aught new to assert; but rather, that she had to maintain and freely utter that which she had always borne within her.[1] By more recent investigations, indeed, the progressive working of the Christian mind from element to element has been brought to be recognised, and consequently it has been shown how the definite and conscious adduction of each individual element is certainly new; but, on the other hand, we should grievously err were we, overlooking

[1] When the ancient Church, after the fitting enunciation of a theological truth, uttered as it were from her very soul, was found by some of her teachers, expressed this by saying, This teacher has not said this as its author, but τὴν τῆς ἐκκλησίας μυστικὴν ἑρμενεῦσαι παράδοσιν, the essential fact was thereby expressed. The Church teachers are not authors of dogmas, but interpreters, or the mouth of the Church.

that original implantation of the truth in its totality (though as yet in immediate or relatively unconscious form), to incline to the opinion, that nevertheless the individual articles of the faith only gradually came into being, and so have only a Church validity. He who would adopt this latter view, and would thence deduce the accidental character of the particular dogmas, their purely human origin, or, it may be, their untruthfulness, would betray an ignorance of the organizing plastic power of a new principle such as Christianity is, and a deficiency in profounder historical insight, akin to that of those who conversely believe that Christianity itself is to be conceived through pre-Christian parallels.

We shall set forth this more minutely, with direct reference to our dogma.

The reason of the general impulse to think the elevation of Christ in a peculiar way, which is evident enough even in the Judæo-Christian tendency, and which cannot rest until it finds satisfaction in the assertion of a ὁμοουσία of the Son with the Father, is based in the essence of Christianity itself. The fact that men strictly trained in Judaism, like Paul, give, in their writings, to Christ such high Divine predicates, which stand in direct contradiction with strict Jewish monotheism, remains inexplicable, unless we presume a total and overmastering change of their religious views, by which these were transposed into an entirely new element of thought and life. There wants not, indeed, from the beginning, an objective *doctrine* on the nature of Christ. His declarations concerning Himself would be transmitted; for the two statements stand connected, "I believe, therefore have I spoken," and "Faith itself cometh by preaching." But this doctrine came to be truly and spiritually appropriated first in the following way:—They had experienced Christianity as a Divine history of their inner being; believing in Christ they had obtained access to God, in the Son they had found the Father. In this innermost, most certain fact of their consciousness, there lay for them the impulse and the necessity to place the person of Christ, the *founder* of this their new life, in the closest, most vital relation to the Father.[1] In this all Christians were at one; but the first preachers of Christianity,

[1] See Appendix, Note S.

no less than Christians of the following times, differed from each other as to the measure of knowledge they possessed of the relation between God and Christ. Besides the divers measure of individual impulse and natural inclination to Christian gnosis, there must with the Apostles have been an especial effect produced by outward circumstances and relations, through which the Christian spirit of some would receive a more universal culture (as with Paul and John), but through which it would become more difficult for others quickly, and when set loose from the fetters of traditional modes of thought, to advance in free Christian knowledge. Hence, as we shall presently see, the former already unfold more specially the relation of Christ to God, but the latter not.

The History of Dogmas, as such, has to do, not with the utterances out of which faith springs, *i.e.*, not with the objective doctrinal declarations of Christ and His Apostles, but with the faith that is exhibited to the knowledge of men, or developed into Church doctrine. It belongs to other departments of inquiry to set forth the doctrine of Christ concerning Himself, and the testimony of the Apostles, since the import of the canon cannot become the first link in the chain of Dogmatic History. History of Dogmas has to show how the objective testimony concerning Christ, given for all times, is, in the entire fulness of all its elements, more and more disclosed to the consciousness of the Church in virtue of her work, conducted by the Holy Ghost. No generation of the Church, least of all the first, has the entire riches of the apostolic preaching vitally in it; the word of Christ and His Apostles rather stretches beyond and over each, as the all-sufficient norm, even to the end of time. But in spite of this its dogmatic position, the testimony of Christ and the Apostles finds its place also in the History of Dogmas; it forms the *impulse* which must be presupposed in the dogmatico-historical process of the Church. To view it merely as a part of this process itself, would be to treat it erroneously as respects its characteristics; but starting from it as the impulse without which the spiritual movement, which Dogmatic History has to describe, would be incomprehensible, we gain at least this much, that the sufficient cause of this movement is brought to light. For this, however, the highest types of doctrine in the canon are not required; the lower will suffice.

When Dogmatic History occupies itself with the Christian truth, inquiring how it has become a subjective possession in the Church, and has more and more developed itself under the guidance and direction of the written accredited testimony of the Apostles, the differences which appear in the canon on even Christological points, have, as respects its beginning, but little significancy. For Dogmatic History cannot in that case expect or show at the beginning, in the collective conviction of Christians, a mirror of the highest which the canon contains on the Christology; on the contrary, it is only natural and in full order that that canonical form of doctrine should soonest find vogue which approaches nearest to the pre-Christian modes of thought. Only the specifically Christian element therein must ever be preserved unadulterated;[1] a condition which we must extend, in part, to everything that is the object of Dogmatic History. For phenomena in which the specifically Christian element is no longer retained, or never has existed, no one has any right to draw into a history of Christian dogmas. Where the Christian fundamental presumption is wanting, *i.e.*, where there is not an acknowledgment that in Christianity something Divine has become historical, and that something Divine of a decisive significancy, and furnishing the complement of religion; then it is no longer Christianity of which men speak, but something pre-Christian which has some appearance of Christianity. But neither a reflection of the whole, nor of some one Christian element, is a Christian element itself. For one Christian element is not where the other elements, though it may be in fettered state, oppressed, nay, menaced by the overweight of the one, are not to be found. This is the peculiarity of the Christian truth, that it either exists wholly—though, it may be, in a very incomplete form—or not at all; and this is involved in the relation of Christian thought to belief, the latter being the prior, and not that which receives its first establishment through thought.[2]

If now we pass over to the introductory consideration of the impulse which the concept of a history of dogmas presumes, there are two things against which we must be on our guard. *First*, we must beware of treating it so narrowly as to presup-

[1] See Appendix, Note T.

[2] See Appendix, Note U.

pose in the appearance of Christ, and the testimony of His Apostles concerning it, nothing essentially new. If we do this, we shall, to speak briefly, deprive Dogmatic History of its proper and peculiar privilege. *Secondly*, however, we must guard against setting forth this impulse, as it operated in the Church, as so dogmatically formed from the beginning, that we shall ascribe to the Church as a common good what was the collective property of the Apostles. But it is according to nature that the development within the Church, just that it may be really its own, that it may proceed systematically and not in a desultory manner, begins with what is still for the most part indefinite; which, as such, is, dogmatically (not practically) considered, at the same time, as yet, the most imperfect form of the Christian truth. Hence the right course will be here to consider somewhat more closely only that form of apostolic doctrine which undoubtedly stands nearest to the Christological standpoint of the primitive Church, and represents the sure as well as sufficient impulse for its dogma-framing activity. We would not thereby exclude the fact, that at a later period the Pauline and Johannine form of doctrine obtained a decisive guiding and directing influence. But as Paul and John do not essentially differ from the others,—rather only as the advanced development differs from the germ; so does the synoptic age of Christology not essentially differ from that later age in which the influence of Paul and John predominates: the later Church did not receive something new as from without, but only a higher form of the doctrine held by the primitive Church.

Now, within the New Testament canon, which presents to us the apostolic form of doctrine, there is no writing to be found in which the Christian fundamental presupposition—and that in its double form, the Christological and the anthropological—is not expressed. For our present object, there are at least three principal types of doctrine to be discriminated: 1. That which approaches nearest to the Old Testament, and to which James, the Synoptists, Jude, and Peter conform; 2. the Pauline, which presents what is specially Christian in its distinction from the O. T., and construes it rather in the anthropological than in the Christological form; and, 3. the Johannine, in which the objective Christological form predominates, and which, conse-

quently, though not destitute of an Old Testament background, is yet especially adapted to suit the Hellenic mind, and to show to such, in Christianity, as well the truth contained in the heathen theory of the world, as its difference therefrom (1 John v. 20, 21). But the two latter may be dismissed here with the single remark, that there can be no doubt about them; in the First Epistle of John, the genuineness of which is unquestioned, not less than in his Gospel, in the earlier epistles of Paul not less than in those to the Colossians, the Philippians, the Ephesians, and the Pastoral Epistles, there is ascribed to the Son not merely a moral but an essential Deity, a not merely economical but an ontological or metaphysical relation to the Father; so that He, with the Father and the Holy Ghost, a Holy Triad, renders the work completed by this Person the absolute end of the creation of the world, accomplishes the completion of religion through the reconciliation with God in Christ.[1] Not less with Paul and John is the true manhood of Christ, and its perfect historical reality, indubitably taught and presupposed.[2]

[1] See from *Paul* such passages as 2 Cor. v. 17-21; Gal. ii. 20; Rom. viii. 11, 31 ff., vi. 1-10; 2 Cor. i. 19-21; 1 Cor. xvi. 22; Gal. iii. 17, 22, 26, 27, iv. 6, 26; 2 Cor. v. 10, xiii. 13; Col. i. 13-21 and Phil. ii. 6-10 comp. 1 Cor x. 4, 9, xv. 22-28, 45, 47; and 1 Tim. iii. 16, which passage, even with the reading ὅς, asserts the pre-existence of Christ according to His Godhead. Comp. also 1 Tim. i. 15. From *John* comp. 1 Ep. i. 1-3; Gosp. i. 1-4, 14, 17, 18; 1 Ep. iv. 2, 15, ii. 23, v. 5-7, 9, 12, 20 (God in Christ is the true God), i. 7, ii. 2, iv. 10, iii. 5, 16, 20, 21, comp. Gosp. i. 29, iii. 14-16, xi. 51, 52, x. 15, 17, vi. 51. Christ's eschatological position, 1 Ep. iii. 2, ii. 28; Gosp. v. 26-29. His oneness with God not merely in a moral sense, Gosp. v. 17, xiv. 9, 10, 30, xvii. 5 comp. 1 Ep. ii. 23, 24, iv. 9, 10, 15, 16. The Divine Triad, e. gr., 1 Ep. iii. 23, 24, ii. 24 comp. 27, iv. 13, 14, v. 10 comp. 6; Gosp. xiv. 16, 17 comp. 23, 26, i. 33, xv. 26, xvi. 7-9, 13. From the Apocalypse comp. xix. 11-16, v. 6-8, 12, 13, i. 5, 17, 18 comp. 8, iii. 14, 21, vi. 16, 17, vii. 15-17, xi. 15, 8, xii. 11, xiii. 8, xvii. 14, xix. 7, 8, xx. 6, xxii. 13.

[2] John i. 14 comp. xvii. 2, i. 32, 52, ii. 13, iv. 6, v. 27, vi. 27, 53, vii. 39, viii. 16, 28 f., 40, x. 11, 15 comp. xv. 13, x. 33, xi. 15, 35, 38, 41, 50 (comp. ix. 11, 24), xii. 23, 27, 34, xiii. 23, 31, xix. 17, 18, 26, 28, 30, 34, xx. 11, 17; Apoc. xiv. 14, i. 17, 18, xi. 8, i. 5; Rom. i. 3, ix. 5, iii. 25, v. 6-10, vi. 3-10, vii. 4, viii. 2, 3; 1 Cor. i. 23, ii. 7, x. 15, 16, xi. 3, 24-27, xv. 3-8 (comp. Acts xxiii. 6, xxii. 8-10, ix. 5, xvii. 31); 1 Cor. xv. 47; ὁ δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος Rom. v. 14, 19; 2 Cor. iii. 18 (comp. 1 Cor. xv. 49), iv. 6, v. 16; Gal. ii. 20, iv. 4; Eph. i. 20-23, ii. 6, v. 23 ff.; Phil. ii. 6-10 (comp. Rom. xiv. 9, 11; 2 Cor. v. 10); Col. i. 13-19, 24,

As respects the rest of the New Testament writers, special consideration must be given to the Synoptists, as it is well known that the proclamation of the Gospel commenced not so much with doctrine as with history, in which the doctrine was contained. The history of Christ forms most certainly the common good of the first Christians; above all, the fact of His death and of His resurrection. But with that was conjoined the relation of His miracles, of His discourses, which even with the Synoptists refer us to His person as the central point. Among these discourses, those especially important for our present object are the eschatological.

In the synoptical Gospels Christ has commonly the names *υἱὸς Θεοῦ* and *υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου*. Of these the Apostles usually give Him the former when they would designate Him worthily; the latter they do not apply to Him, it is His own self-chosen name. The title, Son of God, in the Synoptists, does not refer to the meaning of this phrase in the Old Testament; He is not merely *a* son of God, as was David, or other kings of Israel, or pious men of this people, or as the prophets; He appears, in general, not as one among many, not as one of the sons of God, but as *The* Son, the only, the well-beloved; and, though they do not use the expression, "Only-begotten," they have the meaning, that which ascribes to His Sonship exclusiveness* (comp. Matt. iii. 17, xvii. 5, xxii. 42–45, xxi. 33 ff. comp. 37; Mark xii. 6). In contrast with Him, the great men and prophets stand as *δοῦλοι* before the *υἱός*: David's Son is also David's Lord. But there are principally three meanings which the phrase *υἱὸς Θεοῦ* has in these Gospels. The first we may call the *physical* (Matt. i. 23; Luke i. 35), because He has this name by nature, and on account of the mode of His birth. Of John it is said, "He shall be filled with the Holy Ghost from his mother's womb" (Luke i. 15); where the existence of the person of John precedes the filling with the Holy Ghost. Of Jesus it is said, Because He comes into being through the power of the Holy Ghost (Luke i. 35), because He is conceived by the power of the Holy Ghost (Matt. i. 20), and so is from a Divine essence,

ii. 9, 14; 1 Tim. i. 16, ii. 5, 6, iii. 16; 2 Tim. ii. 8; Tit. ii. 12–14; Heb. i. 3, ii. 7, 10, 14, 17, 18, iv. 15, v. 1, 2, 7–9, vii. 26–28, ix. 11–16, x. 10, 14, 20, xiv. 20, xii. 2, 24, 25, xiii. 12.

* [*Einzigkeit.* We want an equivalent for this in English. Might one form a word, and express it exactly by "*soleity*"?—Tr.]

He has the name Son of God (Luke i. 35, 32); there is in Him *God with us* (Matt. i. 33); God has in Him redeemed His people (Luke ii. 11), yea, all mankind (Luke ii. 14, 31); and He has become the Sun of mankind, who brings a new morning (Luke i. 78), inasmuch as in Him God is historically present. And it is not one of the natures that has this name, but the entire Person. But what this is by nature and in itself, that must it become through a truly human development. So far as He verifies and morally realizes this His natural Divine Sonship, we have thereby the concept of the *ethical* Sonship of God (Luke ii. 52, 49, iv. 3, 9). That He also, in this sense, perfectly represented the Sonship of God, was, for the time preceding His public manifestation, attested by the utterance at His baptism (Matt. iii. 17). But as, without the physical Sonship as a presupposition, the ethical would be impossible, whereby He is the Holy One of God, the sinless man, come to bring, above all personally in Himself, the good, the Divine law, into actual manifestation (Matt. v. 17)—but even on that account, in a perfectly human way, in a progressive manifestation, advancing through conflict (Matt. xix. 16, 17; Mark x. 18; Luke iv. 13, xiii. 49, 50); so, without both, the physical and the ethical, the *third*, the *official*, would be impossible, which conversely is as naturally and necessarily the end of both these, as the ethical is of the physical. This third meaning of the phrase is indeed that commonly attributed to it as a designation of the Messiah by His cotemporaries; but this will not justify any in reducing the Christian idea of the Divine Sonship within the meagre limits of the Jewish ideas of the Messiah. If we would know what concept the Synoptists and the first Christian churches had of Christ as God's Son, we must not ignore the first two meanings; if we do, we shall not obtain the historical representation of their idea of Christ in its totality. It is when we view them together that we first come to conceive also His work. To those united to Him by faith (which He desires to be faith in His *Person*, Matt. xvi. 16, 17), He can, as He does, assure union with God only if in Him there is God-with-us.

According to the Synoptists, Jesus boldly announced Himself as the Son of God where it was necessary (Matt. xxvi. 63, 64, xvi. 16, 17); but commonly He did not so designate Himself; his favourite appellation of Himself was the Son of Man.

Certain as it is that He would not have so called Himself had He not known Himself to be true and perfect man,[1] it is nevertheless not enough to stop at the fact that He did so call Himself; we must ask, further, why He called Himself by a name which in some sense is common to all, and by which on that very account no one besides has designated himself? It is usual to refer to Dan. vii. 13, 14 on this head; but we are not thereby furnished with what is necessary for the explanation: at the utmost, this passage shows that Jesus might have used this expression also, but not why, among the many other names for the Messiah, He should have chosen just this as the standing one. That explanation will hit upon what is needful which avails to show that this designation was, and why it was, at once the most natural for His personal self-consciousness, and for use in respect of His office the most appropriate; neither without the other. Not through modesty, which conceals what is higher lest the charge of self-seeking should be incurred,—not from Divine love, which treats men as its equal, has this phrase been constructed or selected; for a modesty which concealed just what is most needful for men would have been wanting in love, and a favourite expression which should not at the same time be the natural efflux of His personal self-consciousness would have been wanting in truth. But this designation must be the product of a self-consciousness for which the fact of human sonship, or being the son of man, was not that which lay nearest to it, a thing of itself, a matter of course, but that which was secondary and superinduced. But if the self-consciousness of Christ were so modified that His being human was presented to Him as something secondary, then the primary thing in His consciousness must have been something else, that which is expressed in John xvii. 5; and the original wherein His self-consciousness knew itself immediately at home (comp. Luke ii. 49), must, at least from the time when He had Himself entire, when His innermost reality came into being, have been the Divine.* In this respect it deserves

[1] By this name, which never was lost from the remembrance of the Church (comp. even Acts vii. 54, Apoc. xiv. 14), Doketism is signalized as contradictory to primitive Christianity.

* [Das Ursprüngliche, worin sein Selbstbewusstsein sich unmittelbar heimisch weiss (vgl. Luc. ii. 49), muss, wenigstens von der zeit an, wo er sich

especial notice, that this apparently humblest name first occurs in the time of His maturest consciousness; first, therefore, when His personal self-consciousness has been perfected, and passes through means of the generic consciousness into the official.

Thus far only one-half of this appellation, namely, why He calls Himself a man, is explained. But He calls Himself *The* Man-son, or *the* Son of man. In point of fact, it is impossible that one, in whom the Divine was the primitive and constitutive, should be only one man among others, imperfect or, it may be, sinful like them. But in Him pure humanity must be presented as it nowhere else is; and that it may be so, even the *πνεῦμα ἅγιον* (*i.e.*, the Divine essence) forms the constitutive for the formation of His person. Since He calls Himself not a Man-son, but the Man-son, also not the son of a man, but the Son of man, there lies therein of necessity, along with a perfect equality with others in what is essential to humanity, at the same time the intimation that He corresponds more perfectly than the others to the concept of man, that He is man of a nobler extraction, the pure Son of man.[1]

Since He thus unites in Himself the Divine and human Sonship, He has the latter through the former; but so that first in the latter does the former satisfy its own proper concept. Or, inasmuch as He is both, God's Son and Man's Son, is He *The Son* simply (Matt. xxiv. 36, xi. 27 ff., xxviii. 20; Luke xi. 52; Mark xiii. 32; Matt. xxi. 36 ff.), is the Sonship in Him perfected and brought to light. We may thus understand why He so often, and in so many especially weighty passages, comprehensively calls Himself simply the *Son*, who stands to the Father in such peculiar relations that He never, as sharing with His followers, calls Him *Our* Father, but always *My* Father[2] (Matt. xviii, 10, 19, 35, xx. 23, xxvi. 53, xxv. 34; Luke xxiii. 46), from whom He, as the only and well-beloved Son (Matt. xxi. 37), received witness in words on the occasion of the Transfiguration,

selbst ganz hat, wo sein innerster Wirklichkeit geworden ist, das Göttliche gewesen seyn.]

[1] A thought which gives the Christian version of the doctrine of the Adam Kadmon, and is especially unfolded in the Pauline doctrine of the second Adam, who completes the creation of the first; 1 Cor. xv. 45-49; Rom. v. 14.

[2] The only apparent exception is in the Lord's Prayer; but this, more closely surveyed, proves anew what is above asserted.

and by His resurrection; but who not less stands among men as the Son of the House, the Freeborn and the Free among the servants, not that He may enjoy His dignity alone, but that He may make the servants brethren, to which, apart from Him, they are only *destined* without being able to get rid of the schism in which they are with their destination,—a schism which only He, through the overmastering power of His boundless love, is able to heal (Matt. xx. 28, xxvi. 28).

In proceeding to consider briefly some special passages in which this peculiar position of Christ as the Son of God and the Son of man is presented by the Synoptists, we shall not adduce the whole range of His miracles, since others as well as He wrought miracles, and the peculiarity of His miracles becomes apparent only in connection with His history in general. We may also pass by the fact, that, according to the synoptic account, He transferred His miraculous power to His followers; for something analogous to this may be drawn from the history of Moses and Elijah. But neither Moses, nor Elijah, nor the Baptist, imparted the forgiveness of sins; whilst He not only says that the Son of Man has power on earth to forgive sins, but makes use of this power, nay, places His miraculous power in the service of this (Matt. ix. 2–6; Luke v. 20–24), which is challenged by the Pharisees as a blasphemous pretension; and in this they would have been in the right had the Ebionite representation of Christ been the true one, the one answering to His self-consciousness and self-witness. So also, when He institutes the rite of baptism, not merely in the name of the Father and the Holy Ghost, but in His own name as well, He intrudes in a most unbecoming way into the sphere of the Divine, if His Person, after the manner of other founders of religion, is merely accidental or indifferent to the religion, and not rather that without which there can be no mention whatever of the idea of the completed religion. But the Synoptists also adduce the ground on which He places Himself so peculiarly in relation to the Father and the Spirit, and on which He assigns to His name a religious significancy (Matt. x. 32, 33, 36 f.; Luke xii. 8, 9; Matt. xviii. 19, 20). For "no man knoweth the Son but the Father, and no man knoweth the Father but the Son, and He to whom the Son will reveal it" (Luke x. 22; Matt. xi. 27). The Son hath the power of

sending the Holy Ghost; of baptizing not with water, but with the Holy Ghost and with fire (Acts i. 5, comp. Luke iii. 16; Matt. iii. 11; Mark i. 8); as He also not merely imparts the forgiveness of sins, but is also the Mediator thereof (Matt. xx. 28, xxvi. 28). As He in the passages cited ascribes to Himself the peculiarity of knowledge of the Highest, nay, calls Himself (Luke vii. 35, xi. 49, comp. Matt. xxiii. 34, xi. 19) the Wisdom (*σοφία*, comp. *λόγος* in John); as He ascribes holiness to Himself, setting Himself above the holiest thing in Israel (Matt. xii. 6, comp. iv. 5), and above the greatest men of the old covenant (Matt. xxi. 33 ff., comp. 37, xii. 41, 42, xi. 11; Luke vii. 28); as He, in fine, not only recognises it as His vocation to fulfil the law, but also has at the close of His earthly career the consciousness of having fulfilled His vocation: so He ascribes to Himself a power which extends infinitely beyond the measure of the human, and in this respect puts Himself on an equality with God (Matt. xi. 27; Luke x. 22; Matt. xxviii. 18): "All power is given to Me in heaven and on earth. Go ye therefore, and bring all nations to be My disciples, and baptize them for the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost." It is true that, according to the Synoptists, He recognises His appearance as a historical fact among others, as a revelation among others, and places it in close relation to these (Matt. xi. 11–14, xxi. 25–37, xvii. 11, 12; Luke xvi. 16, 29–31; Matt. v. 17 ff., xix. 8); but He no less recognises it as perfectly singular, and of eternally more valid significancy;—of such a kind, indeed, that the continuous development of mankind is not thereby consummated, but rather for the first time set rightly in motion; but this so *that He also resumes in Himself what is yet future.* This deserves closer examination. His appearance is set forth by the Synoptists as all-comprehending in respect of time and space, and as absolutely decisive within the highest sphere. This is declared negatively in the strongest manner by the representation that not individual forms of evil, but the principle of evil itself, the Prince of this world, comes into decisive conflict with Him (Matt. iv., xii. 27–29, xiii. 37–39, parall.); whilst Christ recognises it as His vocation to overcome this principle (Luke x. 18). Obviously here, there lies at the foundation the conception, that in Christ the universal principle of good itself has come into a struggle for life or death with the

universal principle of evil, and in dying has conquered. The same idea, that in Christ the good itself has become personally present, lies in the numerous passages which assert that no one can be judged before he has entered into that historical relation with Christ which belongs to the quickening of faith. By the acceptance or rejection of Christ, viewed as final, is the absolute worth or worthlessness of the man in an absolute manner decided upon; and this is explained only on the assumption, that in Christ there is accepted or rejected, not one of the manifestations of the good, but the good itself. Hence it is said, Matt. xxiv. 14, that the end (the judgment) shall come when the Gospel shall have been testified to the entire circle of nations on the earth (Mark xiii. 10). Hence is it held to be a sin never to be forgiven, to sin against the Holy Ghost; *i.e.*, to go on to an unsusceptibility of the operations of the Holy Ghost, without which no one obtains the bliss-giving faith in Christ (Matt. xvi. 16, 17).—If, for the universal significancy of His appearance, a particular place was in the first instance to be secured; if for the everlasting life on earth a firm historical centre had to be laid, in order that, spreading out from this on all sides (Mark xvi. 15), it might secure universality also outwardly and historically; yet in His kingdom universality in an inward sense intimately inhered from the beginning, and is involved in the universal significancy of Christ as the Son of Man, is also by Him in the strongest manner affirmed. The field for His sowing is nothing less than the world; and the whole mass is to be leavened (Matt. xiii. 38, 32, 41; Mark iv. 32; Matt. xxiv. 14, xxviii. 19; Mark xi. 17, xvi. 15, 16; Matt. xxvi. 13, xxi. 43, viii. 11; Luke xiii. 29). Not less comprehensive, however, is Christ's recognition, according to the Synoptists, of the significancy of His Person and His work in relation to *time*, than in relation to space or to the nations of mankind. He knows Himself as the final revelation of God; a larger, a higher, is not to be expected; so that, according to the judgment of the Synoptists, every pretended advance beyond Him is really a falling behind Him. This is, however, so understood by them, that they impute to the entire representation of Christ, to which they ascribe this all-decisive significancy, not only the features of His earthly appearance, but also the eschatological, in which, for the first time, their representation of Christ receives its decisive comple-

tion. During His appearance on earth, it was not yet made manifest what He was to be, nor was it until His ascension to the Father that the element was supplied, in which the doctrine of Christ reaches through Him the power of producing faith (Acts i. 2–5). This His exaltation (Luke xxiv. 51; Acts i. 10) to the right hand of the Father (Acts ii. 33; Mark xvi. 19), is in itself the power of *sending the Holy Ghost* (Acts i. 5, 8, ii. 33), which, designed for the entire race (Acts ii.), gives to it the certainty of true redemption, of absolute perfection (Acts iii. 15, 20–23). *Every* man who has faith is now a prophet, and knows with Divine certainty, as well that in Christianity the decision has taken place, the religion is completed, as also that the outward appearance of its triumph had commenced, and that no enemy was a match for it (Acts ii. 17, 21, iii. 21). As, however, the exalted Christ sends the Spirit, so to Him belongs in the general the ending of the world. His parousia will bring the final and also the public judgment. As He is the absolute Lawgiver, in whom is represented the unveiled and fulfilled holy and gracious will of God (Matt. v. 17); so will He be also the Judge of the whole world at His second coming, of which He so often speaks (e. gr. Matt. vii. 2–23; Luke xiii. 25; Matt. xiii. 41, xxiv. 31, x. 32; Mark viii. 38; Matt. xxv.; Luke xvii. 30, xii. 35 etc.), and at which His Person, which may still be misunderstood (Luke xxii. 68, 69), shall be revealed, so that no one shall be able to refuse submission. Now, since the Person of Christ gives to Himself and His work an actuality of value through His coming the second time to judgment, so faith in the eschatological discourses of Christ conveys, as nothing else does, a view of the absoluteness of the Christian religion, whose final momentum is objective actuality and supremacy, the kingdom of glory or power. To this Love, renouncing self and laying aside immediate power, must be restored if she is actually the highest and alone truly real, and if to her inner absoluteness belongs (Matt. xxvi. 63, 64, xix. 28, xvi. 27; Luke ix. 26; Mark x. 29, 30). As this is foreshadowed in Christ's Person, in the indissoluble connection of His resurrection and ascension with His death (Matt. x. 24, 38 ff., xvi. 24 f.; Luke xvii. 33), the same course is repeated in His believing followers, in His Church; and so firm is the tie which binds the *νυμφίος* (Matt. ix. 15, xxv. 1) to her, that He regards the time of her

servile estate, as well as all her misfortunes, as His own humiliation and shame (Matt. xii. 48, x. 14, 40, 41; Mark ix. 37, 41; Matt. xxv. 35 ff., xviii. 5, 20; Luke ix. 48), and will, out of the fulness of His majesty, bring it to an end. Then will He allot the kingdom to His followers who have believed in Him, as the Father has allotted it to Him (Luke xxii. 28–30)—the kingdom prepared for them from the beginning of the world (Matt. xxv. 34); then will He eat the new, the perfect supper with them (Luke xxii. 16–18; Matt. xxvi. 29).

"Taking the notices of the Synoptists together, it thus appears that for all eternity, also for the ζωὴ αἰώνιος in heaven, the Person of Christ, the Son of God and the Son of Man, forms the centre point of the Christian religion, in the trials and in the triumphs of individuals and of the Church. He is the perfect Lawgiver; He not merely reveals, but He realizes as well, the holy and just as the gracious will of God; hence is He also the Judge of the world. He has and exercises power over the whole world, even as He does over the spiritual; He communicates here the forgiveness of sins and the Holy Ghost, there eternal felicity; and the summit of the latter is ever formed by perfect fellowship with His Person. He has left His followers only in appearance; for wherever two or three are assembled in His name, there is He in the midst of them; and He is with His own always, even to the end of the world (Matt. xviii. 20, xxviii. 20). To know Christ in this nearness, belongs consequently, characteristically, to the *Christian worship;* and the meal of His institution is appointed as the highest means for the enjoyment of this nearness for the Church on earth (Matt. xxvi. 26–28).[1]

It may be boldly affirmed, that the entire representation of Christ given by the Synoptists may be placed by the side of the Johannine as perfectly identical, inasmuch as faith, moulded by

[1] Those who reject the Gospel by John on account of its glorifying of Christ, can hardly have set themselves in clear relations with the synoptic Christology; otherwise must this have either covered that of John, or drawn more decidedly upon itself that one-sided dissent expressed towards the latter. This would indeed have been a breach with the united tradition of primitive Christendom; but it is on all sides better that this, where it exists, should come into consciousness, and so to examination, than that it should abscond through, e. gr., a falsification of the historical relations of things.

means of the synoptic tradition, must have essentially the same features in its concept of Christ as the Christ of John has. The passages in John which speak the most loftily of Christ, are those to which the Synoptists supply exactly the closest parallels, whilst some of the strongest traits in the latter find no parallel in John; comp. Matt. ix. 2–6 with John v. 14 (viii. 11), Matt. xxviii. 18–20 with John iii. 5. But as these latter synoptic traits are assuredly capable of being without difficulty incorporated with John's representation of Christ; so, on the other hand, may what John, with Paul and the Epistle to the Hebrews, advances that goes beyond the Synoptists—that, namely, which has relation to the element of Pre-existence—be brought into relation to them. The Christ of the Synoptists stands already so high above the Ebionitic Christ; He is, especially through His eschatological aspect, so linked with the world-idea; that to the synoptic faith there needs to be added not so much a new object, as simply a stronger interest of Gnosis; and so also it is that this faith can find satisfaction in no narrower utterance concerning Christ, than in such an one as the dogma of His Pre-existence will enunciate. In point of fact, there are not wanting in the Synoptists themselves the beginnings of such: comp. Luke vii. 35, Matt. xi. 19, where Christ calls Himself The Wisdom, with Prov. viii., Matt. xi. 27; especially, however, Luke xi. 49 with Matt. xxiii. 34, Matt. xiii. 17, Luke x. 23, 24, with John viii. 56 ff.

It is deserving of notice, that, as respects the argumentative force of what has been said, it is matter of indifference which of the leading views regarding the origin of the three first Gospels is most generally embraced. For suppose, e. gr., that they owe the form of their historical narrative, wholly or in part, to oral tradition—nay, suppose that this has determined also, in part, even the substance of their contents, they thus remain as the common possession of the primitive Church, to attest incontestably the character of its belief as neither Doketic nor Ebionitic. If it be assumed, also, that all *later* heresies are to be viewed as results of the Church agitation of the dogma itself, faith in Christ as the Son of God and of man, in the meaning proved, did not first arise out of an Ebionitic or Doketic tendency and its prevalence, but precedes both these, nay, is presupposed by them both; since they, according to what has been adduced, become Christian here-

sies only through this presupposition. But whether this Church faith itself, which is presupposed as well in the case of heresies as in respect of the construction of dogmas by which these were overcome, has operated much or little on the formation even of the contents of the Gospel tradition followed by the Synoptists, this much sober historical inquiry must hold fast, that just the weightiest and the highest, *i.e.*, what is most characteristically Christian, cannot have been the product or the projection of this alleged Church faith; for, in order to be able to produce, it must first be, and Christian faith itself comes into being through what is characteristically Christian, and not antecedently to it. A faith of individual Christians, or of a Christian community, which is devoid of the Christian element,—a faith which deposits the Christian element rather than apprehends it, is an intellectual nonentity, a monster of perverted thought. The Church cannot have contrived the representation of Christ, because the rise of the Church was conditioned by the antecedent representation of its Lord.[1] Thus, exactly that in the Synoptists which is chiefly new in relation to all pre-Christian ideas (*i.e.*, the highest Christological utterances), is necessarily to be viewed as most surely the historical, faith-establishing impulse, to be presupposed in order to the mere existence of the Church.

We have still James and Peter to consider, who, in a Christological respect, are most allied to the Synoptists. As Luther complained of the Epistle of James, that it was not occupied with Christ, so in more recent times an inclination has been exhibited to regard James, as he appears to us in his Epistle, as the representative of the faith of the earliest Christians, and hence it has been deduced that the Ebionitic doctrine was the primitive. A conclusion in every respect over-precipitate! For, *first*, the design of James is such, that it does not fall to him to set forth in order the faith and its contents, but to maintain the πίστις rather according to its ethical significancy, and to contend against all antinomianism. The πίστις he presupposes; he does not seek to plant it for the first time; and hence it is incompetent, nay, unjust to him, to treat his Epistle as if he began with the beginning, and meant to set forth the fundamental principles of Christianity, which as yet were not in dispute.

[1] See Hanne, Der moderne Nihilismus, S. 176.

But, *secondly*, it would be still more hazardous from this short Epistle—which, according to its avowed design, aims to unfold the ethical and not the dogmatical aspect of Christian truth—to form an estimate of James universally, of whom we have no right, since in other respects he is at one with the synoptic tradition, to assume that in respect to Christological ideas he stands opposed to it. *Thirdly*, utterly untrue is the assumption, that James is to be viewed as the representative of the faith of the earliest Christianity. Rather is his letter, with its polemic against a one-sided faith, an evidence that there was another tendency in the Church, which laid chief stress on faith not in its ethical purifying power, but viewed principally as an object of *knowledge*, σοφία; consequently, more in respect of its dogmatic import, and that in a fruitless way, and which held participation in Christianity in this sense for justifying. Over against this theoretical faith[1] he places that which is practical. Still more weighty is what we would adduce *fourthly:* viz., that it cannot be denied, that to the individuality of James the ethical was the most congenial, and hence drew him to give especial effect to the refutation of this false tendency (for by the ethical, as by nothing else, is the presence or absence of the Pauline πίστις tested, to which, also, it is only by the severity of the law and repentance that one can be led [redacted]. But his ethic is the Christian ethic, and proves itself to be such, not merely through the apprehension of the law as a complete whole (ii. 10), and as the perfect law of liberty (i. 25), so recognised because to it love is the royal principle of what is ethical (ii. 5, 8); but also by the founding of this love in faith (ii. 22), of which it is the most perfect fruit, or in the new birth through God's free grace

[1] Which is not that of Paul, but rather the approaching gnosis which Gnosticism proclaimed (i. 13, 14, 17, iii. 1, 15, 16, iv. 1, 2, 10, i. 9, 10, v. 19, 20). For already there appears in it a parting asunder of that immediateness of faith, and an entrance one-sidedly on the tendency to the contents of the faith as it is for knowledge. Though this tendency names itself by the faith, not by the γνῶσις, the faith is yet made but a mere means to the σοφία, and Christianity is viewed rather as illuminating than as sanctifying. It is true it always regards Christianity as redemption, and for this uses the Pauline expression δικαίωσις, as well as the name πίστις for its theoretical tendency; but evidently it is no longer the Pauline πίστις and δικαίωσις. We may rather say that in James i. 13-17, there is a position refuted which reminds of the gnosis in the proper sense.

(i. 17, 18, 21). Not every man, however, is born of God (i. 18); but Christians are so, in whose souls Christianity, the word of truth, is implanted (i. 21), and who by this word are transformed, so that they become the first-born of creatures, the crown of creation (i. 18). The law also was a *word*, λόγος; but it was not λόγος τέλειος, not a plastic word, like the word of God which brought forth the world; for it was only imperative, and to the *shall* was wanting the *be*, the willing, and as the shall still remained, though the will was opposed to it, the will was consequently not free.* The Christian Logos, however, is λόγος ἀληθείας, νόμος τέλειος τῆς ἐλευθερίας, *i.e.*, in Christianity is given *the* Word, which corresponds to the concept of the word of God; for the word of Christianity not only prescribes, it also is powerfully operative and creative, so that now within the spiritual sphere the same is effected as the creative word effected in the physical, and now in the highest sphere it is not merely said, He speaks, He commands, but also, It is done and stands fast. But in the birth which is effected by means of the creative word is the creation of man himself perfected, and the dignity of the First-birth, to which he was by his creation destined (iii. 9), comes now to be perfectly realized (i. 9, 18, ii. 1). The Christian principle does not improve in this or that particular, it embraces and forms the *whole* man, and perfects him (i. 21), and elevates him to a height at which all earthly distinctions disappear. The author is therefore full of the essential equality of all Christians,[1] and he indignantly casts from him whatever tends to infringe on this; in which again we trace the consciousness of the absoluteness of Christianity, before which all earthly distinctions sink as it were into nothing. Hence he exhorts the lowly to a consciousness of their highness and absolute dignity, in order that they may not, through false modesty, fall in with a divisive inequality, which would rob them of their due; those of high estate, on the other hand, to humility (ii. 1–9).

What has been said already shows that James had before him the Christian presupposition in anthropologic and soteriologic form; and were there nothing more in his Epistle, there would be enough here to exempt him from the charge of

* [Dem Sollen fehlte das Seyn, das Wollen, und weil das Sollen doch blieb, obwohl der Wille ihm entgegen war, so war der Wille nicht frei.]

[1] Appendix, Note V.

Ebionitism, especially as he says nothing against the higher idea of Christ's Person. But there are not wanting in him strong Christological features. He calls himself (i. 1) δοῦλος κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ; and this, on the supposition that he was "the Lord's brother," is worthy of double notice. He calls Him κύριος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς Χριστός (ii. 1, v. 7, 8), so that He is to James Lord and Messiah; κύριος τῆς δόξης (ii. 1), which in any case expresses a majesty akin to the Divine, even though communicated. But a reference to the λόγος ἀληθείας carries us still further. As this word of truth is the Christian word, Christ is, in the view of James, the bearer of this word of truth. And as this word partly communicates the truth and the wisdom (i. 25, 18, comp. i. 5, iii. 17), viz., that from above, and so is a Divine revelation, partly also is operating, powerful, and creative (i. 18), he thus ascribes it to Christ, the bearer of this truth, not only that He is a revealer or teacher, but also that there is in Him a creative kingly word. The prophetic and kingly offices furnish the chief features of his representation of the Messiah; and these two are well discriminated by him, for he recognises a knowledge of Christianity in which the word has not yet become powerfully operative to liberty (i. 22–24), as well as royal functions of Christ, which relate not simply to regeneration through the word of truth (v. 7, 8). How high he exalts Christ as a teacher, appears from the many passages in his Epistle which cite Christ's words, chiefly according to Matthew. These words are principally, yet not exclusively, of an ethical kind. As respects the royal office of Christ, the acknowledgment of it lies already in the recognition of Him as Χριστὸς and κύριος τῆς δόξης. But the royal function of Christ is expressly presented in the second coming of the Lord to judgment (v. 7–9). He is not only the bringer of that law which is to form the standard of judgment (ii. 12), but He also gives the final decision. The blessedness of the one party, the condemnation of the other, is His deed (v. 8, 9). If Christ, as Lord of glory, has the full power (comp. also ii. 1, 5) to communicate the highest boon, blessedness; if the last decision is His act; then it is not to be denied that James also recognises in Christological form the absoluteness of the Christian religion. Elsewhere he expresses himself so as to show how near, in his estimation, Christ is to God. For he calls both God and

Christ, κύριος, and he says (iv. 12), "One is the lawgiver and judge, who is able to save and to destroy."* Now, as by lawgiver here he evidently intends God, and as he imputes to Christ full power to judge, power σῶσαι καὶ ἀπολέσαι (v. 7–9), his doctrine concerning the oneness of the lawgiver and the judge can be reconciled with the doctrine of Christ's eschatological position, only on the supposition that in the kingly might of Christ there is present that of God. All the more certain is it, then, that though he says nothing expressly on the subject in this Epistle, he would have placed regeneration in connection not merely with Christ's prophetic office, but also with His kingly office; consequently, that in the creative power of the word is to be seen also the act of Christ.

It is true that in James there is no reference to the high-priestly office of Christ. He mentions the death of Christ, but only according to its exemplary significance (v. 11). On the *mediation*, consequently, of the forgiveness of sins and redemption, which he certainly finds in Christianity, he does not enlarge. At the same time, there are indubitably acts which he (v. 14 ff.) desires in the name of the Lord (especially prayer), desires in the name of Christ; and in this is involved the thought, that Christ is our intercessor with the Father, the Paraclete, through whom our prayers are acceptable unto God, and are heard by Him. There is thus a recognition of the one side of Christ's high-priestly office.

Near as James approaches to the Old Testament, which he sees only fulfilled in the New, with the design and inner essence of which he as a Christian finds himself fully and freely at one, yet the Christian element which he has, presupposes an immense revolution in the ordinary consciousness of a Jew. The seeking of the Old Testament law is in Christianity, by the word of truth which proceedeth from Christ, brought to that at which it aims: all unrest of the Shall is brought to the Be,† all schism

* [The received text gives only εἷς ἐστιν ὁ νομοθέτης; but all the critical editors, from Griesbach to Tischendorf, give, on the authority of the best witnesses, εἷς ἐστιν ὁ νομοθέτης καὶ κριτής as the correct reading.—Tr.]

† ["Alle Unruhe des Sollens zum Seyn" is the author's expression. The meaning I take to be, that what Kant calls the categorical imperative produces a state of unrest until it eventuates in act; all law disturbs until it is fulfilled.—Tr.]

to unity (ii. 12, i. 25). What the law could not bring together is now conjoined; the Spirit has attained from the external plurality of laws to inner unity, as well with itself (i. 5) as with God (i. 21, 18). For Christians are partakers of the Holy Ghost (iv. 5).

If James attaches himself more to the *Law*,—yet not to the ceremonial law, but to what is eternally ethical therein, the formerly mere ideal existence of which now through Christ reaches actuality in free men, in love,—Peter sees in Christianity, above all, the fulfilling of Old Testament *prophecy*, as is indicated both in his discourses in the Acts of the Apostles and in his Epistles.[1]

From this stand-point, however, on the other hand, the ceremonial law also receives its due; for as it is not merely symbolic, but also typical, it in its way predicts Christ, especially as respects its centre-point, the sacrificial service. In this respect Peter occupies the same ground as the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews.

The discourses of Peter in the Acts, having for their object the establishment of the faith among unbelievers, all present the Christology as their centre-point. This, however, as is natural, is at first so treated that preponderance is given to the historical starting-point, and the individual elements of Christ's history are set forth; whereas in his Epistles these individual elements are collected into the unity of one complete representation, and in it pervade the whole. Further, the Christology of Peter in the Acts is expounded more in the Old Testament form. To this belongs the appellation, Servant of God, παῖς Θεοῦ,[2] which is taken from the Prophets, and the assertion of the anointing with the Holy Ghost.[3] As respects particulars, the fortunes of Christ are, according to Peter, predicted by the Prophets (Acts i. 16, ii. 16, 34, iii. 18, 22–26, x. 34; 1 Pet. ii. 7, 22–25, i. 10), as well as the outpouring of the Holy Ghost (Acts ii. 16, 23, 31, i. 16). Christ Himself is anointed with the Holy Ghost and with power (x. 38); by God is made both Lord and Christ (ii. 36), as God hath glorified Him (iii. 13), appointed Him to be Prince and Saviour, the Judge of the

[1] See next two notes; Acts ii. 23–31, 34, 35, 39, iii. 13, 18, 21–25. iv. 11; 1 Pet. i. 10–12, 20, ii. 7, 10, 25, i. 19, ii. 24, iii. 20, 21.

[2] Acts iii. 14, iv. 27. [3] Acts x. 38, coll. iv. 27.

living and the dead. Here everything, in accordance with the historical starting-point, proceeds from the humiliation of Christ: His exaltation and glorification, in accordance with this, are represented supremely as the act of God, as a reward for His sufferings. But the end at which this representation aims from the first is, that He is the Prince of Life (Acts iii. 15), whom the bonds of death could not hold; who has gone up into heaven (ii. 33, xxiv. 31), and is now Lord of all (x. 38), as in His name rests the power of miracles (iii. 6); and His glory shall be shown by His coming again to judge the world (iii. 20, 21, x. 42). Now the heavens have received Him glorified (iii. 13, 21), until the time of the final completion of all things. From the right hand of God He commenced the outpouring of the Holy Ghost on the day of Pentecost, and continues it through holy baptism (Acts x. 47, xi. 15, xv. 8–11). But baptism takes place in the name of Christ, and in no other is there salvation (iv. 12). Now, since the representation, setting out from the humiliation, thus ascends till it reaches Him, the exalted One, who is at the right hand of God, it must from this be advanced that faith not merely says, Though or since Christ was humiliated, so is He also exalted; but the idea of the glorified Saviour is primarily the true idea of Him, from which, conversely, the humiliation of Christ is to be conceived from the first on to its consummation on the cross. From the apprehended idea of the living and ever-abiding word of God, which was in Christ personally (1 Pet. i. 23, 25), and in which idea faith finds first her resting-place, she looks back and recognises that, in such a being as Christ, suffering is to be conceived as a free act, and humiliation as an operative element of His self-manifestation and of His work. A step towards this is already made when His resurrection and exaltation are represented as not simply God's act towards Him, but as, according to the concept of His Person, necessary development and self-manifestation (comp. Acts x. 40, ii. 31, coll. iii. 15 and ii. 24). But this comes out in fuller clearness in the Epistles. There it is not merely, as in the Acts, said that Christ's death came to pass by wicked hands through the fore-purposed counsel of God; not merely that the Prophets who had predicted Him had to be fulfilled; but as this mode of representation always leaves it still possible to present Christianity onesidedly, as the completed birth of the Old Testament, and to

place the external historical dependence of the one on the other too high, by treating Christianity as a mere child of the Old Testament, there is added to it in the Epistles the complementary, though apparently contradictory position, that the Old Testament, in its highest functions, is a product of that which is the principle of Christianity (1 Pet. i. 10, 11). In the Prophets the *πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ* was operative; it wrought in them its own preparation, foretelling the grace in Christ, His sufferings, and the glory that should follow. Thus is Christianity of old, eternally founded in the world-idea of God, which by it is from eternity determined and overruled. For in Christ are we chosen from eternity (1 Pet. i. 2); we are eternally contemplated by the Father as standing in the sanctification of the Spirit; as destined for obedience and for purifying through the blood of Jesus Christ (1 Pet. i. 20). With this it is already taught that the Christian principle, though as such not revealed until the last times (1 Pet. i. 20), was yet pre-existent and operative from the beginning, and is thus eternal, not merely in the Divine predestination, but as really operative (1 Pet. i. 11, *ἐδήλου τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ*). It is true that the doctrine of the Trinity, which is here glanced at, is not more fully developed by Peter; nor is personality ascribed to the pre-existent Christian principle: but so much the more certainly is it taken along with the Divine Spirit itself. As respects the historical appearance of Christ, there is ascribed to Him true manhood, according to the body (1 Pet. iii. 18, iv. 1, i. 24), and to the soul (1 Pet. iii. 19). Thus the Epistle is as far from Doketism as from Ebionitism, though it teaches nothing of a duplicity of nature. God appears in it as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ; and in this is involved that the latter is the Son of God (1 Pet. i. 3).[1] Christ is the Mediator of our regeneration by God (i. 3), from incorruptible seed (i. 22). In faith in Christ is *σωτηρία*, which is partly future (i. 5, 9), partly already present. Regeneration takes place from Divine seed, *i.e.*, from God or the Holy Ghost (comp. i. 12), but by means of the living and abiding word (i. 23). This living word is in this case not the *act* of preaching (i. 25), but that word whose contents are the means of regeneration by the Spirit. These contents are, indeed, also

[1] Though in the first Ep. *υἱὸς Θεοῦ* does not occur, we have it in 2 Pet. i. 17.

doctrine, truth; but they are eternal truth which has become historical; *i.e.*, Christ, as reconciler, is the substance of the joyful message. We have no right, in the place of a person, to put an abstraction, a neuter—redemption, for instance; but just in the Person, and nowhere else, have we, according to Peter, the eternally determined, and so eternally valid, though historically accomplished redemption (1 Pet. i. 19, 20). Thus the word is described as "living and abiding for ever," because Christ forms its substance, and is properly that which is operative in the preaching of the word. Nay, it may be asked whether we should not here abstract entirely from the word as preached, and should not rather view Christ as summarily designated the living and eternal Word of God. Peter will then have taken the term "word" as equivalent to revelation of God, since it, as spoken by God (as in Gen. i.), is determined to be the medium of the new creation.[1] In this case Christ is, according to Peter, not only the bearer and possessor of the word, as were the Prophets, but in Him is the perfect revelation apparent personally, and so as that the form (that of man, historical personality) corresponds to the substance of this revelation essentially. This leads to the assertion, that Christ, according to Peter, not only has God's word, but is God's Word (i. 18–20, ii. 7). As, however, He acts the part of God's Mediator to us by being a mission of God to us,—for He is the bringer of the Divine to us (i. 23),—so, on the other hand, He, as the sinless One, as the spotless and blameless Lamb, is He who represents us before God; our sins are slain from the Divine view in His crucified body (comp. 1 Pet. ii. 24, iii. 18, coll. Is. liii. 5), with the intent and the result that we through Him (reconciled, presented as holy) may be brought before God (iii. 18), and having suffered in Him for our sins, knowing ourselves punished in Him (iv. 1, comp. Rom. vi. 7), may desist from sin (i. 18, iv. 1). Thus He is Mediator on both sides; His death, however, forming the central-point of His mediatorial office, that which is the distinctive element (1 Pet. iii. 18, ἅπαξ ἀπέθανεν). Yet he shows the death of Christ so closely connected with His resurrection (iii. 18–21), that baptism also is first completed by the latter (comp. i. 3), which, in connection with what we have heard from Peter

[1] Appendix, Note W.

of the death of Christ, requires the meaning that he who, believing in Christ, has seen himself as punished, also rises again in Him; so that Christ shall be viewed as not only substituted for us in intention and effect, but as living in us. He who has risen again is the Lord, who hath passed into the heavens to the right hand of God, and to whom all powers are subject (1 Pet. iii. 22). Therefore He hath the power to convey the blessing of baptism (1 Pet. iii. 21, comp. i. 22), the Spirit, by which Christians are born again.

But, in fine, though Peter sees in Christianity the fulfilling of Old Testament prophecy, yet he represents what we in this life already receive from Christianity as only the earnest of the glorious inheritance, only the beginning of the Divine harvest. To him, therefore, Christianity is still a prophetic religion (the ἐπαγγελία and ἐλπίς); but the future is *its* future, *its* revelation. When that which is new comes, Christianity shall not cease, but shall become manifest, altogether different from the pre-Christian prophecy. This self-equality,* as well as the endless fulness which shall yet be exhibited, is again linked to the person of Christ, whose glory in the present is yet concealed, though already in itself perfect (1 Pet. iii. 22, i. 4–7). *His* second coming, however, will remove the contradiction which subsists between the real idea of Christianity as yet only in Christ (i. 8) and its full realization.

Jude also places Christ along with the Father in the formula of salutation (ver. 2), and in the doxology (vers. 24, 25): through Jesus Christ our Lord is God our Saviour, and is glorified; the being kept in the true and most holy faith (ver. 20), is a being preserved in Christ Jesus (vers. 1, 3), and in the Holy Ghost (ver. 20). Believers are ἅγιοι through their πίστις; and they are called to contend (ver. 3) for the faith delivered by the Apostles (ver. 17), and to keep it in faithful remembrance; that they may not be like those intruders who, holding themselves for spiritual (ver. 19), and, proud in their hearts, setting themselves above others, unite with the Christians outwardly, but only to be spots on their love-feasts, and to defile these by participating in them. The grace of God they turn to lasciviousness, to what is sensual (vers. 4, 10); and therefore shall the righteousness of God turn

*. [Sichselbstgleichheit.]

against them. The persons whom Jude opposes are not merely such as have practically swerved from the right way, they are also teachers of error (vers. 15, 8): they deny our only Prince and Lord Jesus Christ (ver. 4); a sin which is damnable, and from which there is scarcely deliverance by penitence and return to Christ (vers. 5, 22, 23). The second coming of the Lord to judgment (ver. 14), which to the believer is full of grace, and brings eternal life (ver. 21), shall be to them for a terror (vers. 13–15).

Similar, though somewhat more formal, are the Christological elements in the Second Epistle of Peter. Here the writer insists more on the side of knowledge, the gnosis, which, however, is not severed from the practical.[1] The Epistle has more definitely to do with errorists; hence it opposes the false views of Christian knowledge (ii. 1), which is described as a morning star that had arisen in their heart, as in a place formerly dark (2 Pet. i. 19), doubtless with reference to the fact that Christ is the substance of the ἐπίγνωσις (2 Pet. i. 2, 3). The Divine power bestows on us, through the knowledge of Christ, all that is necessary for life and godliness; gives the most precious promises, purifies, and makes to partake of the Divine nature (2 Pet. i. 4). For to Christ belong μεγαλειότης (i. 16), δόξα καὶ ἀρέτη (i. 3); He is the beloved Son of God, in whom He is well pleased. He is our σωτήρ (i. 1, 11, iii. 2), our Lord (i. 2, 8, 11, 16), who hath an everlasting kingdom (i. 11), and for whose exaltation there needs not cunningly-devised myths, but the history of Christ, attested by the Prophets and the apostolical tradition, are sufficient (i. 16–18, iii. 2). From this it comes to pass, that what they receive rises in their hearts like a morning star, and thus the history becomes a living knowledge, governing the life through and through (i. 5–9). The false prophets whom he assails are described as preachers of liberty (2 Pet. ii. 19), as Antinomians (ἄθεσμοι), who make their appeal to Paul, but wrest his words: they turn grace into indulgence in sinful lusts, dread not the judgment and second coming of Christ, but defile and entangle themselves again with the world, and live and teach as if all were to endure for ever, as it had been from the beginning of the world (2 Pet. ii. 3, iii. 4). The

[1] ἐπίγνωσις, as in the Epistles to the Ephesians and Colossians. As in the First Epistle, the leading idea is the ἐλπίς, so in this it is the ἐπίγνωσις. Comp. 2 Pet. i. 2, 3, 5, ii. 20, 21, iii. 18.

tarrying of the Lord is grounded in His long-suffering, which still seeks that many should be saved (iii. 9–15); but His day is coming like a thief in the night, to cause the fashion of this world to pass away, and to form a new heavens and a new earth.[1]

Thus fruitful were the germs which, by the representation of Himself given by Christ and the testimony of the Apostles, were planted among men; and yet there was neither thereby given nor withheld the framing of the Christian doctrine into dogmas. Not the former; for in the New Testament Christianity does not appear in exactly constructed dogmas, but in the form of Christ's witness of Himself by word and deed, and of the faith of the Apostles testifying concerning Him; with which witness that of the Holy Ghost is conjoined, to establish faith in those who have received it through the word, in whom a new life in union with God arises. But the further work of forming dogmas in unison with the objective Christianity, is not superfluous or forbidden. For it is the tendency of the Christianity, which has through the Holy Ghost become subjective, to penetrate the whole sphere of the soul; and the man who should attempt to except the knowledge department from that, and to abide in simple immediate belief, would subject belief itself, which has already knowledge as an element in it, and thereby consecrates the knowledge faculty itself, to similar infirmities with those which we see arise where faith does not pass over into practice, but seeks to hold this sunk in itself. It is indeed true that the *testimony*, though dogmatically indeterminate, can establish the faith in Christ, as this testimony also endures through all ages; but the historical vocation of Christianity will not be satisfactorily fulfilled where men rest contented with being firm in the faith, with the deliverance of souls from the world, but only there where Christian knowledge, or science, is also held to be the work and vocation of the Church along with that. This, itself springing out of the true Church, works back, enriching and fructifying, on the Church's testimony; and in this case is an absolute good in itself, and has an essential bearing on the full development of the Divine image in man.

[1] Appendix, Note X.

The most immediate problem of Christian Dogmatic History is to contemplate not the *Church testimony*, but the *Church knowledge* in its history. The former, standing nearer to faith as its immediate source, preserves in all ages more of essential identity with itself, and is less affected by fluctuations than the latter. This difference, this relative stability of the two, one with the other, exhibits a higher grade wherever both are rooted in the Christian faith, and remain conscious of their common relationship; but it begins its course in the Church only gradually. In the first centuries of the Church and of councils, both functions are to a great extent unseparated; and hence one can understand how, since the Church consciousness has been again more powerfully aroused, many among us desire from the History of Dogmas, that it should relate to us the development of the Church's belief, and not of its knowledge; that it should tell how the Church belief attested itself in the councils, the great gathering points of the Church faith-power, and conducted the further development of the dogma; that it, in short, should teach us to conceive historically the formation of the Church dogma in its present form. But here much confusion prevails. This view has its full right, as against those who put forth a claim for the consideration of what lies outside of Christianity, —namely, the philosophic thinking that was not determined by Christianity,—in the History of Dogmas; for at the bottom of this confounding of the distinction between the History of Philosophy and the History of Dogmas, without doubt, lies a fundamental want of clearness as to the essence of Christianity, and a flattening of the distinction between it and what is not Christian. Nor let it be denied that the problem thus proposed is worthy of being handled as a separate subject of inquiry; but for it there is an acknowledged science, Church Symbolik, which is sufficient. To seek to drag the History of Dogmas back to this, arises from a contracted ecclesiastical interest. The Church needs rather a history of the Christian *knowledge* of faith, as assuredly this knowledge itself, and the history of this knowledge in the Church, is the proper object of a History of Dogmas. Creed-forming epochs in this history are those in which the previously more detached attempts after a more definite knowledge of what was believed have so prevailed and been illustrated, that the doctrine, positively or negatively determined, has ripened

to a dogma, the common-good of the Church. The utterance or the confession of this attained conviction manifests it as a united conviction, as a common-good; and in the act of bringing this to pass, the advanced knowledge again coalesces with the Church belief, reverts, as it were, into it, and becomes thence-forward common belief, or belief of the Church, to which now the further development of the knowledge is joined. The dogma is not simply identical with the belief, but it is the belief as at the same time more fully thought out and more conceptually apprehended. And for this task there must be a place given in the Church, just as there is a place for the history of it in Church science.—In times when creed-making does not prevail (truly not only in our own days), the essays at faith-knowledge so diverge from each other, that to many all faith in the possibility of a concurrence of convictions will vanish. But at no time has a problem been proposed to Christianity which she has not, though amid the conflict of the sharpest antagonisms, been able to solve. And those who know best how to stand and act in our department hold fast, what all Dogmatic History teaches, that the most violent antagonisms amid which, often for many centuries, or for ever, the Church truth seems to be distracted in its progress towards becoming known, always, through a friendly sustaining hand, are brought to a point where they rest in a well-matured common conviction; whilst only the more ignorant, those who are less instructed in history or not firm in the faith, in place of working for a new step in the common consent of the Church, hold the point of transition for the conclusive position negative or positive,—the school or the previous step of faith-knowledge for the spiritual or Christian universe.

Thus to the Christian intellect, after Christianity had been planted in the heart of mankind, the pure initiatory impulse eternalized by the writings of the Apostles, and the objective documentary Christianity made sure to men for remembrance, there remained to give itself up to the nature of Christianity and of the founder of the Divine life in man, to understand more exactly and conceptually what had been diffused by Him over mankind. It must consequently be admitted, that at first a Christology in the strict sense was not delivered. It was the attacks on Christianity that contributed chiefly, in the first instance, to consolidate the doctrines, and give them a conceptual

stamp. But the Christian doctrine thus constructed is not, therefore, a mere human product, not something merely fabricated: on the contrary, the knowledge of the Church also partakes of the Divine Spirit; and the fact, that the cavils have always contributed to the consolidating of the doctrine, is a proof that, though at first there were wanting exact conceptual expressions, yet the thing itself is from the beginning present in another form, in the form of intuition, which is an element of belief; and to this original source science reverts from every negation of a definite form of doctrine, to receive a new impulse forward; as, on the other hand, in every stage where science has made a positive advance, and brought belief to its more adequate expression, this advance is elevated into a pure gain for the certifying of what faith possesses immediately, and to this is brought back.

If, in fine, we place before us the relations and laws of this development of the Christian knowledge, it will appear that since Christianity was set up in the midst of Judaism and Hellenism, this could not avoid being affected and defined by the surrounding world. This has been done both negatively and positively. In the former case, the chief weight was naturally laid on what was mostly opposed to the one or other of these two antagonist systems; in the latter case, what was analogous was borrowed from both to further the apprehension of the Christian system. For, as we have seen, however little the origin of Christianity is illustrated from either, nevertheless Christian thought clothes itself necessarily, at first, in previously found, antique forms, though only tentatively. To Judaism, for instance, is allied the idea of the primitive prophet and man in the Ebionitic tendency; to Hellenism, the doctrine of the Logos, which, in the second century, is seen to be most powerfully influenced by Alexandrian philosophy. The onesidedness of the Jewish element furnished the counterpoise to the Hellenic, and conversely. As, however, minds were, according to their training, prepossessed towards the Jewish or the Hellenic mode of representing Christ's Person, differences arose by which not only the riches of Christianity were exhibited, but, in the controversy they excited, the Jewish and the Hellenic element always more intimately interpenetrated each other, influenced by the Christian principle implanted in both, which proved itself

to be the higher common unity of both by this, that through it, by constant intercourse, both received completeness from each other. And this is only the other side of the above; and it is to be maintained, both that the being of Christianity is not to be accounted for from either Hebraism or heathenism, and that, on the other hand, it alone brings both to their truth. It cannot be derived from them, because it is a fact antagonist to both of them; nor, for the same reason, is it merely a doctrine of such a kind as that Judaism and Hellenism might, by their mutual interpenetration, have produced it; whilst, on the other hand, it alone presents the true substance of both religions in a higher unity, wrought out in the person of the God-man. The greatest thing in heathenism is the idea of the very close proximity and indwelling of the Divine life in free human form; but the Divine which comes to an indwelling in man is yet so predominantly thought as physical, that where only a more powerful form of life appeared, be it as strength or as beauty or as intelligence, there an apotheosis was the first suggestion of heathenism. Now, since this does not do justice to the distinction between the Divine and the human, and the Divine which is displayed in the world is not the truly Divine; on the other hand, that Divine Essence, more purely expressive of absoluteness, which is undoubtedly found in the background of the heathen religious consciousness, that impersonal existence which also soars above the gods, is, at the same time, partly of a predominating physical character, partly cannot come to a manifestation; and if it could, it would from the heathen view arrive first in Christ at personality, which it had not before; and this would have been theogony through the form of human life and human act.[1] Judaism had for its basis not something dim and selfless, no blank substance, but a subject, a personality; and this is conceived above all as just and holy. Through the ethical idea, however, was justice done to the distinction between God and the world, especially mankind. This is the great thing in the Old Testament religion. But the monotheism of Judaism is in itself powerless to reduce the distinction to unity; to it the man-becoming of God appears as a blasphemy.

[1] We may refer to Gnosticism, which so deeply wounded the Christian consciousness by presupposing a free personal God to all that comes into being, to all finitude.

Both the leading forms of pre-Christian religion, though when viewed from Christianity they represent opposite elements of the religious idea, yet cannot, unless they pass into a higher, maintain themselves before each other, but at last fall over into each other in fruitless alternation; and the same may be said of the heresies in which their principles predominate,—a proof that their mutually exclusive elements yet tend to be united, seek each other. This tendency produces, according to circumstances, alluring imitations of that unity of both which is found in Christianity. This may also be mirrored here and there in the Church. But, more closely viewed, this unity of the Divine and human passes in heathenism into dualism; especially in the department of thought, its unity is resolved into a schism as soon as that Absolute in the background of heathenism advances, and, as the physically conceived Infinite Being, excludes from itself all definiteness, recoils from all finitude, and so leaves the world absolutely outside of itself, as a phænomenon. Since this phænomenon is nevertheless indispensable to it, because it, though it is something positive, can itself be thought as something only in the negation of the finite, this infinite itself is essentially encumbered with dualism. Subjectively expressed, heathen thought ends in a dualism between ideal and empirical knowledge. Conversely, Judaism, when it is diverted from going on to something higher, by which its ethical category may be established and secured against falling back, sinks ever again into bare identity of God and the world, and thereby produces at the highest the imitations of what is Christian, already mentioned. This showed itself within the religious sphere even in the earlier times of the people, whilst as yet Prophecy, so essential to this religion, had not furnished the complement of that which the Hebrew intellect, in order to be itself, must have felt to be yet wanting. In the sphere of thought, however, this shows itself in the last period of Judaism, especially among the Alexandrian Jews; and not less in the unbelieving remains of Judaism in our own day. So long, indeed, as the holiness of God is only directive and lawgiving, God Himself is thought only as absolute Moral Law, not as yet as Love. From this there are only two possible ways of bringing the unrest of the "shall" to the "be." Either the Law tends forwards to Prophecy, is an imperative word of God to which entity [*das Seyn*, the being]

does not fail, but which announces a higher revelation whereby the idea of holiness is powerfully presented, and thus the revelation of the Divine holiness is for the first time established in the world and completed; or the world as it is, imagined to be good, the living pulse of historical progress, and the hope of a better future, is mortified; whereby, however, the ethical idea again sinks into the physical, where cessation has its home despite all movement of life.[1] The wisdom of God, thus deprived of its most hallowed sphere of manifestation, the history of mankind, finds responsive utterance to its purport hardly from anything else than from demiurgic thoughts: with holiness vanishes also the idea of rectitude; for if the former be degraded, the latter misses the Absolute norm, nay, with the Absolute end departs also the justification of the proofs of the Divine rectitude; and to a concept of God so mutilated, there remains nothing but a thought and a willing, which contains not itself as something spiritual and Divine, but only the world, physical *might* and *wisdom*. In this case, the distinction between God and the world, which had arisen in the ethical consciousness, is again lost, and the pagan unity of God and the world as a more presumptive step onwards is wrung out of the thinking which doubted of the progress of the world through manifestation. And even the third attribute, the Divine goodness,[2] at this stage so highly prized, which, as the higher attribute, is fitted to heal the ethical and religious schism which the Old Testament leaves unmitigated, is only an apparitional image of Christian love; for it does not communicate itself through the Divine rectitude and holiness, it has not these for its contents and end; and hence, instead of fulfilling these, it also receives a physical purport, and becomes a ministress of Eudaimonism. But, indeed, the thinking which seeks the reconciliation of dualism in a retrogression to the physical, in place of pressing forwards and upwards, cannot thus succeed in gaining unity. For in

[1] This tendency was exhibited practically, as it appears, by the Sadducees, theoretically by the Pharisees, especially Philo, who had no greater boast to make of the law than that it is at one with the creation, and who could assign no higher ideal to man, the microcosm, than that he was in order and beauty like the macrocosm, the great creation; whereby the distinction between man and nature is characteristically at once given and retracted.

[2] ἀγαθότης with Philo.

the domain of the one is found the exact and exclusive opposite of the other; and not less, as has been shown in the case of heathenism, is the physically-conceived Infinite the exclusive opposite of the finite. It is only in a higher sphere, in the domain of the Spirit, that the contradiction is solved,—a contradiction with which the nature-life is by itself encumbered, and in which a thinking in mere physical categories flounders, and to which even the law by itself does not rise superior.

This solution is found in Christianity: it is the truth of both these religions, since it truly and really presents in the incarnation of Christ as well the distinction as the unity of the Divine and human, as well the concept of God as that of man. Did heathenism long after the apotheosis of the human nature? In Christ this is given; for here is a *Man* who is also God. Did genuine Judaism seek the fulfilling of the revelation not completed by the law? did it strain after the love of God as the fulfilling of the holy law? In Christ is this given: here is the innermost revelation of the mystery, the fullest condescension of God; for *God* has in Christ become Man. Here is the point at which the bond of unity between God and the world, on which heathenism loved most to linger, is displayed, but in such a manner as that the ethical idea, that of rectitude and holiness, which forms the chief excellence of the Old Testament, receives its due; for that all *per se* are God's offspring, of which heathenism made so much, is in Christianity of so little moment, that it is reckoned among the humble elements, and finds its place in the first preaching to catechumens (Acts xvii.); for, according to it, this depends on the actuality of the human personality, on the divinity of actual thinking and willing; and this is so little implied in that *per se*, that therein rather lies only the determination to this, the as yet mere possibility of it, such as consists even with a complete disfiguring of the Divine image: a determination, consequently, which in and by itself is so indeterminate, that it may conduct as well to the judgment as to personal perfection. In Christ, however, appeared the Man who is not merely essentially Divine, but whose natural Divine Sonship finds its complement in an ethical Sonship through the Divinity of His whole human thinking and acting. He did not appear in order to be the

Son of God, as if this were the ultimate end; but the ultimate end was the glorifying of *man*, and therewith of God, in Him and through Him; and in the very conception of this, ethical personality is desiderated: with mere essence, or being *per se*, it is not satisfied. Hence His thinking and acting, as well as His suffering, in its ethical completeness, are also for us; He is also officially God's Son. On the other hand, His ethical and official Divine Sonship presupposes also a natural Divine Sonship in a peculiar sense; for it must correspond to its end, according to which the love of God united to manhood, as well as manhood united in full love with God, must come to a manifestation in Christ. As respects ourselves, however, we know that we are in our own life and being ungodly, whereas in Christ we come into a state of godliness, or sonship to God; and in this relation also Christianity becomes, in its principle, the solution of Jewish and heathen error: it removes their contradiction by the realization of the truth to which they tend. Heathenism desires physical sonship with God, without regard to ethical; Judaism desires ethical sonship with God, and overlooks the presupposition without which this never can come to pass,—the transformation of the spiritual condition through the "being born of Divine seed." Christianity makes the believers, both physically and ethically, God's children and brethren of Christ; but it desiderates for this, on the one hand, in opposition to heathenism, an ethical, on the other, in opposition to the legal principle, a religious process. In these ethical religious processes, sentence is passed on the fantasy of immediate deification and ethical perfection; and therewith is the old man judged and dies, and room is made for the new, which, participant of the Divine *nature* through grace, and thereby raised in the Holy Ghost to immediate participation of the natural Divine Sonship of Christ, advances, like Christ, to ethical Divine sonship, love to God in Christ; and, in fine, is also, according to *office* or calling, vitally inserted as a member in that body of which Christ is the eternal Head. This Christianity wills to be and to accomplish. We have also discussed the essence of the heathen and Jewish error, which is ever clothing itself in new forms.

From these premises it follows as of course, that not without strenuous effort, in many cases a continuous series of strifes and

victories, could the higher Christian principle, planted in the midst of the Jewish and heathen world, overcome both completely, *i.e.*, so as that the essence of both should be expelled from the Christian consciousness. Masses of heathen and Jewish error such as it encountered were not to be dispersed as by a magic stroke, but only by hard toil, even although, wherever Christianity was embraced, these were already in principle renounced, and deprived of their power of growth the more that Christianity built itself up on its own field of thought. But out of all the conflicts and agitations to which the Christian truth was exposed through the pressure of non-Christian principles,—nay, into which it voluntarily threw itself in order to become to the uttermost the property of mankind,—it ever emerged, through its inborn conquering might, to advancing clearness, and ever richer unfolding of its fulness.

Could we succeed in representing the dogma, on the one hand, in its undisturbed assurance of victory, yielding itself up to human development, to the process which draws it into divestments and disfigurements without number; but not less, on the other, partly also in its quiet work on the minds of men, into which it sinks deeper and deeper, partly when again the hour is come, in its grand victorious career, when, as if by a magic stroke, the band falls from the eyes of the Christian community, the clouds flee away, and the clear image of Christ in richer fulness than before stands before their view: then would the historical delineation of this dogma be faithful; for in that case the same pulse that beats through its history would be felt also in the delineation of that history. Where, on the contrary, the *development* of the dogma in the Church does not come to knowledge and representation, there must be unconsciously a deficiency of historical fidelity, whether the idea of development is negatived by a later acquisition being dated back to the early Church, whereby the side of the renunciation of the dogma is misapprehended, which were the Doketism of historical writing, or by that self-renunciation of the dogma being taken for the whole, whilst the development of its strength and fulness is regarded as an idle byework which has come in between; and this latter method, which changes the history of the development into a history of the evacuation of the dogma, would be the Ebionitic error. The dogma itself has forced its way through

the midst of both; it is for the historical delineation to follow as it best can.[1]

Accordingly, if we enter closely into the history of our dogma, it will divide itself into *three* periods.

In the *first*, which embraces the first four centuries, we have the beginning of the development in the consciousness of the belief that, in the Person of Christ, the Divine and the human are, in the general, conjoined. From this immediate totality of the Person of Christ, the Church development proceeds to the establishing of the concrete elements which belong to the concepts of Divine and human. But since now both sides stand over against each other, no longer merely in the general, but as concrete quantities, it becomes a possible and necessary problem to investigate the *How* of this union. Necessary; because the more justice is done to the recognition of both sides, the more is that immediate presupposed unity put asunder, and is to be anew restored to thought. Possible; because such an inquiry may be successfully pursued only when, and in so far as, that which is to be conjoined is thought as actually given according to its concrete distinction.

The *second* period advances to the problem for which the first has furnished the data, and works on these data. These are: the elements which belong to the concept of the Divine, and the elements which belong to the concept of the human, whose difference is comprised in the duplicity of the Natures. Setting out from this distinction, it has to investigate the *How* of the unity of both in the Person of Christ; for the *That*, or the actual existence of this unity, remains the first presupposition, always present, as vouched for by faith. So long, however, as either the concept of the Divine or that of the human is so thought as that the one, if it does not exclude, yet prejudices the other, their union in the Person of Christ can only imperfectly be understood,—that is, in such a way as shall fail to do justice alike to both sides. According as in any epoch the preponderance falls on the one side, will the other be necessarily depreciated. Now it is a feature of the dogmatic thinking of the time before the Reformation, that in it the Divine element had a onesided preponderance; and, on the

[1] Appendix, Note Y.

contrary, in the century after the Reformation, anthropology was elevated to a false preponderance over theology. Thus the second period falls into two epochs, between which the Reformation stands; and that not merely outwardly, but so as to denote a real transition-point in the history of the world, inasmuch as it, by resuming the truth taught in the old time, opened a free course for the right knowledge of the human side. Thus the time of the Reformation itself shows how a new beginning, which unites in itself the essential elements, must rise above the onesidedness which characterized the second epoch, and form the direct reverse of that of the first.

The *third* epoch, in fine, which begins with the present century, has to do with the problem, to cognise the Person of Christ as the unity of the Divine and the human, in the equipose and distinction of both sides.

THE FIRST PERIOD,

TILL THE YEAR 380.

IN the first period, the elements of the Person of Christ are to be established; the faith which accompanies the theoretic process always presupposes their unity; this is for faith immediately certain, though not as yet narrowly defined, not as yet mediately cognised through the knowledge of the distinct elements, which in it are combined. Indeed, to any form of Christology, there must be attached from the beginning the attempt to bring again into union, somehow, the elements which have been thus far wrought out; but it is also true that every such attempt can have only a passing and momentary significancy, so long as, on either side of the Person of Christ, perhaps essential elements are left out of account. Hence it is only in the rational and necessary course of the matter, that the Church, during the first period, should above all have undertaken the problem of shaping forth, element by element, both sides of the Person of Christ, so as to allow these at first to separate from each other as widely as possible, that it might hand over to the second period—both sides being completely established—the task of closely cognising the mode and manner in which, in the Person of Christ, these extremes are brought together.

If, further, we compare the *epochs* of the first period together, we shall see that the first asserts the real Godhead and the real manhood of Christ only in the general. As respects

the latter, the outermost limit, the true human *body* of Christ is most decisively asserted; and, indeed, not only its actual existence generally, but also its functions and natural affections; and along with that, the truth of the principal weighty facts of the earthly life of Christ—His resurrection, His death, His growth from childhood upwards, even to the most difficult of all, His real birth by Mary—formed the common conviction of the Christian world. But still the second element on this side, the *soul* of Christ, remained undeveloped; and with this there was, for a great part of the history of Christ, room left for a Doketic mode of treating it. This was the case especially with reference to the sufferings of His soul in the history of His passion, as well as His baptism and temptation; nor could the post-existence of the manhood of Christ, or its indissoluble union with the Divine nature, be established so long as the Church had not a secure consciousness of His true human soul; and this was the case neither in the first nor in the second epoch. Likewise, as respects the Divine side, in the first epoch there was not merely, in opposition to Ebionism, the recognition of the truly Divine in Christ generally,—not merely the admission of a momentary or a permanent prophetic endowment with which the Church was furnished; but the Christian community knew itself to be eternally reconciled and united with God in Christ, in whom was manifested the absolute religion which, *a parte post* and *a parte ante*, is the final end of the world. This consciousness the earliest Christians had at first in an eschatological form, or in the belief in the *return to judgment* of *Him who had come*,—of which judgment the turning-point is the position of each individual in relation to Christianity; and thereby, in the consciousness of the Primitive Church, the *kingly* office of Christ was conjoined with the prophetic; and this could and must be conceived from the extreme end back to the beginning [so as to cover the whole manifestation of Christ], or to the development of the position, that all must be made by Him for whom all has been made. But from these works of judgment and creation the Church returned to the earthly life of Christ, and now learned to understand this in a new and higher light as Divine history. His death, the result of love, was recognised as the radiative central-point of the manifestation of God in Christ; by this death God reconciles mankind to

Himself, with a view of bringing the race, at the end of the days, to that perfection which was the eternal purpose of their creation. Thus the reality of the death of Christ becomes, through the recognition of His Divine nature, the reality of the reconciliation; and the high-priestly office of Christ, in which *righteousness* and *love* are mediated, and thereby the strenuously ethical character of Christianity is established, is added to the other two offices, in which *might* and *wisdom* are displayed. But however certain it is that Christianity must recognise the truly Divine in Christ, and however much this consciousness is enriched and confirmed to Him by the elements, already named, of His entire work; yet, just because in Christ personal truth and wisdom, love and might, are recognised, there is only the more decidedly a pressure towards the yet undetermined question, how the Divine in Christ stands related to the Divine of the Father—to the idea of God generally, to which unity is essential. The significancy of Christianity showed itself grasping even deeper: there was an irresistible pressure towards a commutation of the pre-Christian, nay, the Old Testament concept of God. This extreme and boldest task Christianity undertook, but unwillingly; for a long time she resorted to palliatives, the character of which may be briefly described thus: There was no disposition to abridge in the least, in the doctrine of the office and work of Christ, His Deity, because it was only through this that its adequate expression could be given to that which the Christian consciousness carried in itself as divinely assured of; but, on the other hand, in view of the unity of God, concessions were permitted in regard to this, which, if they were not forgotten again in effect, could not but seriously impair it. But in the *second* epoch, after what has been noted was won, the Church would be drawn irresistibly to the conscious, Christian constituting of the concept of God. Besides the positive impulse which lay in the Christian principle itself, the Church was constrained to this problem, which was solved in the second, the Trinitarian epoch, by the great heresies of the third and fourth centuries, in which these palliatives were consequently carried out into great systems, and therewith weakened the nerve of the Christian consciousness. It is the thoroughgoing *Monarchianism*, which, in ever clearer and firmer systems of an antagonist, a deistic or pantheistic

character, following each other stroke upon stroke, opposed itself with all its force to that concept of God to which the Church was tending; whilst at the same time it could not but hasten the birth of that concept in the clear consciousness of the Church. For this great stride, the work of the second epoch, —which had for its object to set aside entirely the unity of God as it had been previously held, and to substitute for that a unity mediated through diversity, in other words, the Trinity,—the work of the first epoch had not only given strength, but had made precise preparation. For one thing, it had established the base-lines, by help of which Christianity could assume its proper position with ease, even in the most difficult and recondite of its elements. Then, in particular, the Christological labours of the first epoch had secured for the concept of God also the *Christian doctrine of the Divine attributes.* The threefold office of Christ, which had its higher Christian significance only in virtue of the Divine side of His Person, contains already the *stamina* of the concept of God, because the attributes ascribed to Christ on account of His work, cannot be otherwise than referred to God. Towards the end of the second century the first Christian teachers held fast, *first,* that to God belongs not merely *omnipotence* and *wisdom,* such as He has displayed in the creation of and the sure completion of the world; for these attributes may in themselves allow of a monistic, heathen construction, without departing from the heathen principle, the *physical* concept of God, the stand-point of natural religion; and on this a Divine history of an ethical or teleological character, such as Christianity is, would be impossible. They held, *secondly,* that not even *rectitude* satisfies the concept of God; for on that the unbelieving Jewish world could stand, which, in accordance with its juridical stand-point, could set God and the world over against each other, and could arrive at no other union between the two than that of the relation of the Lawgiver or Obliger to the obliged; and, on the other side, the relation of service and debt to the sentence of the Judge by whom reward or penalty is apportioned. But in place of this *deistic* stand-point of Judaism, the Church found it needful to seek room in her concept of God for *grace,* of which she felt herself to be the recipient: in place of the mere God-and-the-world-discriminating rectitude, to permit the uniting *love* to

enter. But in fine, *thirdly*,—and this is the weightiest point of all,—these Church-teachers recognised the fact, that this love is not to be viewed as exclusive of the physical and juridical element in the concept of God, but is rightly recognised only when in it the physical as well as the juridical concept is preserved,—is in it, as it were, regenerated; inasmuch as love without creative power and wisdom would be either egoistic, or blind and powerless; whilst a love without rectitude, or without the liberty and independence of creation, would of itself neces sarily relapse into a physical thing, of an emanistic pagan character, even although under the most plausible show of what is Christian. They knew that all these elements are rather to be *combined* in the Christian concept of God, and are combined in the doctrine, that one and the same God is the Creator and Lawgiver, the Redeemer and Perfecter; not distributing these, with Gnosticism, among different principles, or denying the one or the other of them. Now, the more consequent was the development of the Monarchian heresies of the third and fourth centuries, above referred to, which were most obstinately opposed to the representing of the Divine unity as a trinity, the more definitely was it made apparent that, in following out their course, they must, with the denial of the Trinity, strand either on the pantheistic confounding of God and the world, or on the purely physical idea of God, or, in fine, on the purely juridical, *i.e.*, the one which deistically separates God and the world. Hence it became for the Church manifestly impossible to abide by one or other of the forms of Monarchianism, the way to the Trinity being laid down, and the difficult stride from the pre-Christian to the Christian concept of God already taken. We shall see what essential fruit in reference to the basis of the doctrine of the Trinity, *i.e.*, the Christian doctrine of the Divine attributes, was contributed by the struggles of the Church with the different forms of the Gnosis.

As respects the Trinitarian epoch itself, it was inaugurated by the great heresy of Patripassianism, which gradually evolved itself into Sabellianism, *i.e.*, by the Hellenizing, ethnic mode of viewing the love of God in Christ. Leaving out of sight other elements favourable to it, there comes to be considered especially the result by which it was arrived at by the Church. After the latter had already, in the earliest times, obtained from the

primitive eschatology the most definite views of the pre-existent hypostatic form of the Divine in Christ (in which, however, there was inherent in the Divine hypostasis of the Son, viewed from the terminus of the Person of Christ, the condition of finite personality, which in this form could not be introduced into the Godhead itself), the concept of the Divine hypostasis came to be more and more, since the doctrine of the Logos became the common property of the Church, stripped of that in it which was inadequate; and not less was the subordination-theory, which we find still clinging even to Justin, for instance, more and more put away; and, in fine, His distinctness from the world, and therewith that of God, was more and more brought out, and He was recognised at length, not any longer predominantly as the *spoken* Word of the world, or as the Ideal-world, or as the Divine Idea of the world, but in self-substantiality as the *One who speaks* in relation to the world. His purport and significancy ceased to be summed up in relation to the world: He found His meaning in Himself; for the Beloved, spoken of or witnessed to by the Father, who is Wisdom and Power, glorifies and loves, according to Irenæus and Clement, the Father in turn, who is in Him and He in Him. But if the distinction between the Logos of God and the world was thus more sharply defined than by the older apologists, and thereby a barrier was erected, or an advantage won, against a physical or Hellenizing representation of the relation between God and the world, yet was that purchased by a previous enfeebling of the hypostatic distinction between the Son of God, who as Logos is simply the Divine reason and power, and the Father, to whom both these must be ascribed; so that, consequently, at the end of the second century the state of the question in the Church favoured Monarchianism under the form of Patri-passianism.

Whilst the Church of the third century, occupied with the refutation of this heresy, was, by the labours of Tertullian, Hippolytus, and Origen, determining more precisely and putting together the elements of the hypostasis of the Son, and, in order to be secured against a relapse into the ethnic principle, was emphasizing the distinction of the Son from the Father, whilst their unity was less attended to; there arrived the favourable time for the second of the great heresies above named, which,

deistic in its principle, having begun in weak, already superseded, Ebionitic forms, now grew to a frightful extent. Allied with ethnic elements, it set over against the decisive point at which the Christian dogma of the Trinity should come forth clear and an object of consciousness, and which aims to be the higher unity of the Jewish and heathen principles, an imitation of the Christian truth, a mingling of the Jewish and heathen. But with the Council at Nice, by which the third epoch was introduced, this heresy received its death-blow; and therewith was one of the sides, which in the first epoch had remained in one leading point undetermined, Christologically established, viz., the Homoousia, or hypostatic equality of essence of the Son and the Father. Great and severe as was the struggle of the next fifty years, it established finally, not merely the Church's acquisition in respect of the Son, but this also led to the doctrine of the Holy Ghost as well.

And now, after the second epoch had been occupied almost exclusively with the higher nature of Christ, and the weighty utterances of an Irenæus, a Tertullian, and an Origen, which might have served to the completion of the doctrine of Christ's perfect manhood, had been laid aside, there arrived for this also a time in the third epoch. The Sabellian tendency, which had entered the Church as antagonist to Arianism, sought a final tenure, on the ground that it answered in the negative the hitherto open question of the true human soul of Christ. The pregnant system of Apollinaris furnished the Church with the occasion of entering more fully and exactly into this question; and the decision, that Christ could not without a true human soul be the Saviour, placed the topstone on the doctrine of the second, the human side of Christ, about the year 380. From this time forward the Church returned with full Christological force, and more definitely, to the task of determining how the two natures, now posited in their perfection, but also in their entirely unconfounded separateness, could be combined. And this forms the object of the Second Period.

FIRST EPOCH

THE AGE OF THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS, TILL A.D. 150.

CHAPTER FIRST.

EVIDENCE OF THE FAITH OF PRIMITIVE CHRISTIANITY IN CHRIST.

THERE is undeniably a very significant distinction between the written productions of the Apostolic Age and those of the age immediately following; and it is hardly possible to represent the relation of the one to the other more erroneously, than when the Apostolic Age is called, in a dogmatical respect, a germ and beginning, whilst the age of the Apostolic Fathers is regarded as the fruitful unfolding of that germ. It is true that, to a certain extent, on one side an advance was to be expected in the later age; for this is according to the law of history. But if we try each of these ages by the standard of its Christian knowledge, we shall find beyond all doubt a serious falling off in the age following that of the Apostles. What was in the earlier age the actual spiritual possession of the distinguished men whom the Lord chose, trained, and equipped, was far from being all retained by the succeeding age; much less was a higher stage of Christian knowledge attained. Such a retrogression, following times of unusual spiritual elevation and expansion, is quite in accordance with the laws of historical development, as we see in other cases,—in the time of the Reformation, for instance; and if at first sight this seems to be something surprising, it is better to endeavour to conceive it as a phænomenon which is altogether in order, than to cover over the inconvenience which lies therein—arising from the appearance of an interruption of the dogmatic progress, on the assumption of the genuineness of the principal books of the New Testament—by artificial palliatives, be they exegetical or

be they critical, which, at the best, can minister only a momentary satisfaction.[1]

The solution is this. The Apostolic Age is full of primal fire and spirit; in it occurs the greatest spiritual revolution which has ever happened to man; and it is, besides, an age rich in ideas, fruitful of classic-Christian works. But as the ideas which Christianity has implanted in men are of an essentially practical kind, assure the long-cherished desire of final satisfaction, and aim at the renewal and sanctification of life; so there followed on that first age, which enjoyed also higher illumination, an age of a predominantly practical tendency, in which the Christian idea strove above all to operate in the world, in the depths of men's souls, to remove the contradiction between its intensive nature and its as yet restricted appearance by extensive growth of the Church. This age, rejoicing in having secured religious satisfaction, emancipates itself from the stain of having a sinful community of life with the pre-Christian forms, and thus assumes something of a world-shunning character, a trait of practical dualism; at the same time that it burns with zeal to convey to others, as much as possible, the enjoyment of its own blessings. According to all the accounts which delineate to us the Christian community of this age, its most characteristic mark at first was not the Christian gnosis, but a holy, divine life, whereby it shone forth as a light in the midst of Judaism and heathenism. At first this was sustained, negatively, through antagonism with the κόσμος, positively and principally, through the same holy common spirit; but latterly, as that antagonism was weakened through the pressure of worldly, schismatic, or heretical elements, and the Church was

[1] To these palliatives may be referred Dr Baur's attempt to reduce by some degrees the dogmatic height of the Apostolic Age; and when, with this view, he subjects one of the apostolic chiefs, Paul, to an exegetical treatment which does not commend itself by its correctness (see Trinität., p. 81 ff.), whilst the Gospel of John is, on account of its doctrine of the Logos, extruded from the Apostolic Age by a critical operation. After, by this most artificial way, a dogmatic poverty has been adjudged to the age of the Apostles, it is easy to get rid of the distinction between it and the following age; and thus room is made for postponing the higher representation of the Person of Christ, *i.e.*, the rise of Christianity, for a century later. Whether it is history itself, or the hitherto used method of history, that is damaged thereby, must be seen from what follows.

thereby robbed of the clearness of self-consciousness, she betook herself to protective, sustentative, prefinitive forms, which at first had in them nothing mechanical or hierarchical, but were only the pure expression of the organizing instinct which dwelt in this new historical power, at first so formless, but which carried in it a principle of overwhelming strength, capable of restoring to society its youth. It would be a mistake, consequently, to construe that relapse as if the growing Christian community were a do-nothing, spiritually purposeless mass, on no side advancing or operative. Rather does primitive Christianity resemble a young, vigorous, well-directed tree, which, however, is rather occupied in growing than in bringing forth the fruits of Christian knowledge. There is no lack of parallel cases, which prove that in circles where no particular attention is devoted to the side of Christian knowledge, but which are practically alive, the Christian ground-ideas may be long propagated incorrupt.[1] For such circles may possess the most lively interest for what produces a Christian living faith, and so may carry with them, if not in a mediated scientific form, yet in its original guise, that Christian knowledge of divine things, which is always immanent in faith, and without which, indeed, faith cannot exist. And though what they thus originally carry in them they may not make the object of mature reflection, yet as little can it be said that they propagate Christian truth only traditionally, and without a spiritual appropriation of it; but what they believe, that they *testify*. In this testifying they have their free life, their free action, whether it find scope in hymns and odes, or in forming Christian usages and worship, or, in general, in life and conduct; to which thoroughly adjusted formation, in particulars and on the whole, such an active period advances all the more energetically and irresistibly, the more firmly the as yet undisturbed faith is held as a guiding assumption.[2] There is no poverty, withal, in this age; but, as ever where activity predominates, a vital fulness and sense of inner satisfying wealth. What characterizes it, is not dependency and passivity, but a sense of freedom, which practically operates in common life no less than in martyrdom. And thus there is

[1] Thus the Waldenses in the Middle Ages; so the Moravian Brethren and the Herrnhuters.

[2] Appendix, Note Z.

no standing still: in the first century after Christ the Christian principle is seen advancing still, though chiefly on the practical side; and it leaves to the following age, as a significant legacy, as the future development of the dogma's sustaining and leading power, two principal works of the Church's common spirit, the forming of an ecclesiastical organism, and the collecting of the New Testament canon, both of which works stand in the closest mutual relation.

Further, the retrogression of this age from that of the Apostles, must not be wholly regarded as worthy of blame. Rather, when Christianity is one whole, which is either there or not, it follows that an age which regresses in respect of dogmatic culture, nevertheless possesses fully in its faith that out of which, in due time, dogmas may be constructed. If, as is indeed certain, it be the business of Dogmatic History to consider, not so much what is faithfully handed down, as when there occurs what bears the trace of a free Christian spirit,—free, yet in unison with objective Christianity, so that it may really be held as a valid gain and attainment of the Christian intellect; nevertheless it is not to be overlooked, that just in this practical direction does the Christian intellect first set itself to work according to its inner freedom and independence of mere tradition; there it produces works which, though practical, yet presuppose an intellectual significancy and a definite *consciousness*, which in its own time will become clearer and more immediate. And thus, though this age, dogmatically viewed, presents only the rudest form, yet there is in it a foundation gained for all dogmatic development, the actual existence of an independent Christian common faith. Be its testimony poor, yet it comes out of the living fountain of the heart; be it only elementary, yet it is the vocation of the age just to lay foundations, on which the process, advancing from what is most general—theoretically viewed, most abstract—to what is more definite, may rest so as to be solid and continuous; and the entire dogmatic structure may yet be really the free work of the Church, from which the Holy Spirit has never retired.

We shall view this primitive Church, which may be pre-eminently called the *witnessing* Church, under the different aspects which belong to our subject. First, we shall adduce all the written documents which have been preserved to our time so far as they are connected with Christology, and thus endea-

vour to construct for ourselves a complete representation of the dogmatic stand-point of the existing leaders of the youthful community. We shall, after that, consider the features of the spiritual life which furnish to us keys to the collective Christological faith of the Church of this age.[1]

We name, first, *Clement of Rome.* Judging from his First Epistle to the Corinthians,[2] his characteristic is especially a soul full of harmony and clearness; and in this respect his epistle has a close resemblance to that to Diognetus. "Let us," he writes, "fasten our regard on the Father and Former of the Universe, and adhere to His excellent and surpassing gifts of peace and benefits. Let us contemplate Him in thought, and behold with the mental eye His long-suffering [gracious] counsel. By His command the heavens moved, and in peace are they subject to Him; day and night complete their course ordained by Him, and impede not each other. Sun and moon, and the choirs of stars, evolve their courses according to His command, in unison, without error."* This harmony he sets forth again in detail (c. 20), specifying how therein goodness is manifested towards men. In chap. 53 he resumes this description, and advances to man, thus: "But besides these, He hath with holy and pure hands formed man, the most excellent, by dignity of intellect the loftiest of animals, as an impression of His own image (*χαρακτῆρα τῆς εἰκόνος ἑαυτοῦ*); . . . and after He had adorned Himself by His works, He rejoiced. . . . The multitudinous throng of angels stands ready to do His will; and so ought we to be gathered together harmoniously in one (c. 34), and as with one mouth we ought to cry unto Him. . . . But in the world of men there is hatred, envy, pride; it alone does not harmonize in the general chorus of creation."

But through Christianity, harmony has been restored not only between man and man, but also between man and the rest of the world; and Clement could remind the Corinthians how they

[1] Baur has, in his work on the Trinity and Incarnation, as good as passed over this inquiry; and yet it must be viewed as the decisive basis of all further investigation.

[2] Its authenticity may be regarded, in the present state of the inquiry, as settled.

* [Ep. ad Cor. I. c. 19, 20.—Tr.]

had become, through Christ, called and sanctified. "Holy and honoured, your name is beloved by all men (c. 1). What stranger but must acknowledge your firm faith, rich in virtues? but must admire your Christian piety, full of discretion and gentleness? but must praise your abundant hospitality, and joyfully celebrate the perfection and stability of your Christian knowledge? How you did everything without respect of persons, according to God's command; subject to the president, and showing the presbyters fitting honour; teaching the young moderation and uprightness, women to live in all respects in a blameless, honest, and pure conscience, to love their husbands according to the order of subjection, and to administer their household affairs in all good morality! (c. 2.) Ye were all of an humble spirit, without self-exaltation; preferring to be subject rather than to rule, to give, than to receive: satisfied with the viaticum which God gives, and pondering His word, you were rich in compassion,* and had His sufferings before your eyes. Thus was a deep and precious peace diffused over all; and along with that, a boundless desire to do good; and the fulness of the Holy Ghost was poured out on all. And, full of holy purpose, ye stretched out your hands in joyful, trustful confidence to God Almighty, beseeching Him that He would be gracious, if ye had involuntarily committed sin. Day and night ye strove for the united brotherhood, that the whole number of the elect might be saved. Upright were ye, and without deceit, thinking no iniquity against each other. All division and schism was an abomination to you; ye mourned over the sins of your neighbours, their defects ye looked on as your own; of no good deed did ye repent, ever ready for new good works. Thus adorned by a walk rich in virtues and demanding respect, ye did all things in the fear of God, and His commands were written on the table of your hearts."

* [The original is ἐστερνισμένοι ἦτε τοῖς σπλάγχνοις, which is rendered in one Latin version, "dilatati eratis in visceribus," ed. Colomesii, Lond. 1687; and in another, "intime recondita in visceribus servabatis verba ejus," ed. Dressel, Lips. 1857. Mr Faber translates it thus: "Ye received them into your very breasts and bowels." (Apostol. of Trinitarianism, I. p. 151.) The rendering given by Dorner accords with the first of these; but seems wholly unauthorized. The verb στερνίζομαι, "I embrace, take into my heart," especially with the addition ἐν σπλάγχνοις, conveys very much such a meaning as Mr Faber has given.—Tr.]

Such fruit of a holy, godly life had the Corinthians to thank Christianity for, before the discords which then reft them had sprung up. And since they could return to their first honourable estate in no other way than by a return to that which had at first produced this change in them, he reproaches them with that from which they had partially fallen, for the sake of humbling them. We thus have an opportunity of learning clearly from Clement what his *preaching of Christ* contained. It is rather Christ's work, especially His death, than Christ's Person, of which he treats at length in this epistle.

A glance at the sufferings of Christ consumes pride, teaches us humility, draws us in the death of repentance (c. 7) under His gracious yoke (c. 16), and to follow Him. It is therefore a principal work of the Christian, and a necessary occupation for him, to have Christ's death always before his eyes.[1] His opinion is not simply, that Christ has in dying set us an example of humility and patience, and has thereby acquired a right to be exalted (comp. Phil. ii. 6)—though this thought also is not foreign to him (c. 16)—but the death of Christ is with him the principle of true operative repentance, *i.e.*, it produces repentance which in faith obtains the remission of sins; for "His blood has been shed for us, for our salvation; He has, according to God's will, given His body for our body, His soul for our soul." Every interpretation of this passage is forced which does not recognise in it the idea of substitution, and that as well subjective, Christ's substitutionary design, as objective, the actual fulfilment of that design, and its objective results. There is connected therewith the fact, that with Clement, as in the Ep. to the Hebrews, the name "High-Priest" is frequently applied to Christ. Comp. chap. 36, 58 (*ἀρχιερεὺς τῶν προσφορῶν ἡμῶν, προστάτης, βοηθός*).

Now, in this there is a recognition not only of Christ's sin-

[1] C. 2. *καὶ τὰ παθήματα αὐτοῦ ἦν πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ὑμῶν.* C. 7. *ἀτενίσωμεν εἰς τὸ αἷμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ ἴδωμεν, ὡς ἔστι τίμιον τῷ Θεῷ αἷμα αὐτοῦ, ὃ τι διὰ τὴν ἡμέτεραν σωτηρίαν ἐκχυθὲν πάντι τῷ κόσμῳ μετανοίας χάριν ὑπήνεγκεν.* C. 16. *ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν Ἰ. Χ. οὐκ ἦλθεν ἐν κόμπῳ ἀλαζονείας οὐδὲ ὑπερηφανίας, καίπερ δυνάμενος, ἀλλὰ ταπεινοφρονῶν.* C. 21. *τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰ. Χ. οὗ τὸ αἷμα ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἐδόθη ἐντραπῶμεν.* C. 49. *τὸ αἷμα αὐτοῦ ἔδωκεν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ὁ Χριστὸς ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν ἐν θελήματι Θεοῦ, καὶ τὴν σάρκα ὑπὲρ τῆς σαρκὸς ἡμῶν, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ψυχῶν ἡμῶν.*

lessness, but also of an entirely peculiar relation to the Father. For this One is for the salvation of the whole world (c. 7); He is well-pleasing to God in His offering; it took place according to God's will, and God has received it (c. 49). But He is not simply man as we are. He has, it is true, body and soul (c. 49), which is elsewhere expressed in the one word σὰρξ;[1] but this is only one side of His being:[2] that there belongs to Him also a higher, is certified in the faith that we are reconciled to God in Christ. As respects this latter side, I would not adduce the passage in chap. 2 as a proof that Clement calls Christ God: "Giving heed to His (God's) words, ye were rich in compassion, and His sufferings stood before your eyes:" for a mere carelessness of style may be the cause of his placing, as in one series, and as if speaking of one subject, what belongs to God, and what is peculiar to Christ. Still, such an omission of the name of Christ in connection with His sufferings becomes rightly explainable only by the fact, that in his view Christ is approximated to God, and God's work towards men is the doing of Christ. This lies plainly in many passages of the epistle. Thus, near the beginning, it is said in the salutation, after the manner of the Apostles, that we are called and sanctified by God through Christ; in two passages,[3] a doxology seems to be addressed to Christ, so that He is therein placed on an equality with the Father;[4] at any rate, He is included in the doxology, and it is even said (c. 59), "Through whom (Jesus Christ) be to God glory, honour, might, majesty, and dominion, for ever and ever." The Apostles have their words from Christ; Christ has His from God (c. 42). His words all are bound to obey. In Him is the complete revelation, the truth and the gnosis, communicated (c. 35). He is the first-fruit of those raised from the dead (c. 24), and has a kingdom (c. 50) in which there shall be no decay or passing away. Already we have great and wondrous blessings even here (c. 35): an immortal life in us, righteousness, truth with freedom, faith with confidence. But what no eye hath seen, no ear hath heard, is reserved for those who shall reach the land of

[1] C. 32.

[2] Same place: ἐξ αὐτοῦ (τοῦ Ἰακὼβ) ὁ κύριος Ἰησοῦς τὸ κατὰ σάρκα. Comp. Rom. ix. 5, i. 3

[3] C. 20; 50.

[4] Comp. c. 32.

the godly at the time of the revelation of the kingdom of Christ, because they shall be perfected in love (c. 50). Until then, Christ is the High-Priest of our offerings,[1] who brings our thanks and praise, our offerings before God, and not less conveys the Divine grace to us. For He is our advocate and helper in our weaknesses.[2] "Through Him," exclaims Clement, "we fix our glance on the height of the heavens; through Him we behold His spotless and lofty countenance as in a mirror; through Him are the eyes of our heart opened; through Him our ignorant and darkened mind effloresces to His marvellous light; through Him it is the will of the Lord that we should taste immortal glory,—Him who, being the radiance of the Divine glory, is as much exalted above the angels as He hath obtained a more excellent name than they."[3] In this passage lies not only the affinity of Christ to God, not merely that He is the revealer of God, but also the essential equality of His higher nature with God. From what has been said, light is cast on the difficult expression in c. 16: "Christ our Lord, the sceptre of the majesty of God." In the term *σκῆπτρον*, indeed, one may find the meaning of *property, inheritance* (as the Heb. שֵׁבֶט also means; see Ps. lxxiv. 2), and thence infer that, as in c. 29 and c. 30, Israel is called God's inheritance, so it suits to call the twelve sons of Jacob, who in chap. 31 are mentioned as *δωδεκάσκηπτρον*, His inheritance, His befitting *κληρονομία*. But the forced character of this is manifest; and in c. 32 the *σκῆπτρα* are decidedly the tribes (comp. Test. Patri-

[1] C. 36; 58.

[2] Same place. This passage assumes Christ's nearness to His people in all their necessities, and His power to help. Comp. Matt. xviii. 20.

[3] C. 36. It is partly from this passage, where Christ is called the *ἀπαύγασμα* of the Divine majesty, partly on account of the relation of this treatise to the Ep. to the Heb. generally, that it is probable that also in the passage above cited (c. 33), under the expression *εἰκὼν Θεοῦ*, whose *χαρακτῆρα* man bears, we are to understand the Son. The words, c. 36, "Through Him (Christ) we behold His pure and lofty countenance as in a mirror," may be referred to *God's* countenance; so that here we have only the converse of what we have in the second chapter. The passage before us, however, shows why, for Clement's Christian intuition, this transition is so easy: Christ is for him the mirror and the radiance of the Divine majesty; in God's image, *i.e.*, Christ, he sees God's countenance (comp. 2 Cor. iii. 18, iv. 6). On *ἀπαύγασμα*, wherein effulgence of essence lies, see Bleek on Heb. i. 3.

arch. IV. 24), which in the δωδεκάσκηπτρα are viewed as unity. When in this 16th chapter, then, Christ, who according to the flesh is of them, and thereby honours them (c. 32), is set over against them as the σκῆπτρον of the Divine majesty, the better interpretation is that which regards Him as the true stock, the Son of the Divine majesty simply. Nevertheless this interpretation is not probable, because the antithesis to the δωδεκάσκηπτρον (c. 31) would have been here (c. 16) more extensively enunciated. The connection of the passage before us excludes every interpretation which does not find Christ's supreme power as the leading idea. For Clement is seeking to exhort them to humility by the example of Christ, who, though He might, as the sceptre of the Divine majesty, have come in splendour and power, yet did not so come, but was humble-minded. The sceptre is the symbol of government; in it rests, and by it is transferred, the royal majesty. In Christ, consequently, rests the Divine majesty—that lies in the word; He is the organ and the personal representation of the Divine imperial majesty. In the words, "though He was able to have done so" [καίπερ δυνάμενος], compared with Phil. ii. 6, there lies an allusion to His pre-existence, [Clement's belief in] which is evident from another passage,[1] where it is expressly said that in the O. T. Christ had spoken by the Holy Ghost. There is thus room for asking whether the passage in c. 27[2] is not also to be referred to the pre-existent nature of Christ. In the much-canvassed passage, c. 34 [33], something analogous is said of the creation of man; if under the image of God, whose character or impression man bore, Christ in His higher nature is to be understood.

The *Second Epistle* shows less peculiarity and another spirit. Though I do not regard it as genuine, but hold it to be later than Clement, yet it bears on it a character of high antiquity, and hence may be here legitimately considered. Its doctrine concerning Christ is somewhat more developed, as already there are Christological opponents to be encountered. "My bre-

[1] C. 22: τὰῦτα δὲ πάντα βεβαιοῖ ἡ ἐν Χοιστῷ πίστις. Καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς διὰ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ ἁγίου οὕτω προσκαλεῖται ἡμᾶς: after which, passages are quoted from the Psalms.

[2] Ἐν λόγῳ τῆς μεγαλωσύνης αὐτοῦ συνεστήσατο τὰ πάντα, καὶ ἐν λόγῳ δύναται αὐτὰ καταστρέψαι. See Appendix, Note AA.

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thren," says the writer (c. 1), "we must think of Jesus Christ as of God, as of the Judge of the living and the dead; and not think little of our own salvation. For if our thoughts of Him be low, our expectations also will be little. If we esteem Him lightly, and act as we think, we sin, and are unmindful whence we have been called, and by whom, and to what, and how much Jesus Christ hath endured on our behalf." Their former heathen state is then described; after which he says: "We had no hope of salvation but from Him; He called us when we were not, and willed that we should come out of non-being into being." This is uttered against Judaizing teachers, who would not acknowledge the newness of Christianity, and the dignity of the Person of Christ. Hence, also, in chap. 2 he sets the Church over against the Jewish community, and already hails her as the more fruitful mother of the two. But the author also opposes those who deny the resurrection; and the representation which the epistle gives of Christ under an eschatological aspect is especially prominent. "He will appear as God." (Comp. c. 1, 12). Also, in order to prove the worth of man's body, he speaks (c. 9) of the pre-existence of Christ. "Let none of you say that this flesh comes not into judgment, nor rises. . . . Christ our Lord, who hath saved us, was at first spirit (comp. Rom. i. 3; 1 Cor. xv. 45–47), and became flesh, and so called us; and so in this flesh we shall receive the reward.[1]

According to ancient testimonies, preserved by Eusebius (Ecc. Hist. IV. 23, III. 16), the epistle which Clement wrote to the Corinthians was long preserved in Corinth, and publicly read in the Church. At the time it was written there appears to have been peace and unity in the Church at Rome (comp. also the salutation in the Epistle of Ignatius to the Romans, where he calls this Church well-ordered and χριστονόμος). The *East* presents a totally different picture. Here the desire of knowledge was from an early period lively, as is shown in the productions as well of the Church as of the heretics; and here the heretics brought the doctrines of the Churchmen to a quicker development. The half-mythic forms of Simon Magus, Menander, Dositheus, Saturninus, prove, at least, that in the

[1] See Appendix, Note BB.

Syrian regions there were, at an early period, movements connected with Gnosticism: Asia Minor, the earliest seat of the higher Christian culture (and especially Ephesus, where even in the first century Cerinthus with his doctrine of the Logos opposed the Apostle John), was at an early period agitated by various partially heretical tendencies: Acts viii. 9 ff. 19; Col. ii. 18–23; 1 Tim. i. 4–9, 20; 2 Tim. ii. 17–23, iii. 7–9, 13, iv. 3 ff. 14; Tit. i. 10–16; 1 John ii. 22 ff., iv. 2, 3; Jude 4, comp. 1 John iii. 4; 2 Pet. ii.; Ignat. ad Eph. 9, etc.; as also the appearance of a Cerdo before Marcion, and, at a later period, of Montanism, attests. In Syrian Antioch especially, where Peter and Paul had been,—the town of the heathen Christians, the antipole of Jerusalem in the Acts of the Apostles, the seat of an unusually numerous congregation, rich in men who were well qualified for various offices, the chief staple-place for missionary activity in the primitive Church,—there could not fail to be various tendencies at an early period; and there was thereby communicated, as well as through means of the heretics,—who seem especially to have been gathered together in this city,—a much stronger occasion for the more rapid development of the Church than elsewhere. Here, at the beginning of the second century, was Ignatius (who, according to ecclesiastical tradition, died in the year 117), a man of remarkable spirit. In him there appeared in the early Church a talent for organization; full of living sympathy with the presentative element in worship and polity, ardent, eloquent, inspired with enthusiasm for the idea of his life. Excited in many ways from without,—tempted, as he himself says (ad Philad. 7), by errors on the one hand, on the other hand enriched by the spirit of John, and still more by that of Paul,—he assumed in respect of doctrine a high, nay, the highest place among the Apostolic Fathers: but his soul was bent on the organization of the Church, and to that he devoted all his strength; so that with him the practical predominates,—nay, it is through his practical bent alone[1] that he has been conducted to a higher view of the nature of Christianity. For as, according to him, participation in the faith of Christ is a participation in his theanthropic manifestation, so, in turning his mind with

[1] See Appendix, Note CC.

special energy to the idea of the Church, there was presented to him, as the problem which the community of believers had to work out, How to set forth an image and a continuance of the Divine-human life of Christ. In the Church, Christ is brought to be eternally present; it has the power, above all, of setting Him forth in worship, life, and polity, where alone, pneumatically and corporeally, can appear the unity in which the plurality of the believers first realizes its idea.

Thus there are with him two sides, the Divine and the human, in respect of Christ, and in respect of the Church, His image, alike important; so much so, that in his view neither is anything without the other. As Christ is one with God, so must the Church be one with Christ (comp. John xvii.); and He must dwell in it as His temple (ad Ephes. 9, 15). But in this is implied not only one spirit and mind in undivided hearts, not only the absence of all schism and all strife from amongst them; but, as in Christ, so in His Church, the ἕνωσις must have a spiritual and a bodily side (ad Magn. 1, 13; ad Eph. 2; ad Polyc. 1, 2).

It is only thus that the ἕνωσις of σὰρξ and πνεῦμα which was in Christ, and in which manhood reaches its truth, can be exhibited; only thus is Christ in it, the principle of all unity of the Divine and human. This unity is realized only in progressive presentations or reflections. As Christ according to the flesh was subjected to the Father, so is the company of the Apostles and the whole Church subjected to Christ, and to the Father, and to the Spirit. Christ is, consequently, again the animating, vivifying principle for the Church as His σάρξ. But in the Church itself, also, again is this relation propagated after the original type; for otherwise there would be a unity of the members with Christ, but not with each other; there would be only a πνευματικὴ ἕνωσις, whereas this should be also σαρκική. Hence there is an office there invested with Divine authority and power, the office of the bishop, who is the teacher, liturgist, and leader of the Church, and whose it is to represent her in her unity in and beyond the worship, to verify and realize her true ideal corporate will, as well as her unity in doctrine.[1] To this bishop the Church again stands

[1] Appendix, Note DD.

related as the human side of Christ does to the Divine; for he is the source of action in the Church, and the Church has in the willing and thinking of the ideal bishop of Ignatius alone her own innermost sense and volition objectively present, she recognises herself in him according to her unity and truth. The bishop, however, on the other hand, is not to be thought of without his congregation, as Christ is not without the Church (ad Trall. 11: "The head cannot be born without the members, since God wills the unity which He Himself is"); but each side desiderates the other,—the congregation is not actually, but only potentially, a congregation by faith: it becomes actual first by love through the ἕνωσις; and this union in love first becomes firm, orderly, and general by the Church giving itself to the bishop. On the other hand, the bishop first becomes what he is when he stands in the midst of the congregation as the animating spirit, as the impersonation of the common will of the united congregation. With this view, the latter makes him permanently her bishop, who without her, as she without him, is a latent power. But the truth of both is the union of both; and where this is, there is a representation in pattern of the union of the two natures of Christ, or His relation to the Church in the whole (ad Trall. 11). In both parties, however, Christ lives; and He, or rather the union which He typically exhibits, is supremely the creative principle, which further and further propagates this union of what is congenial, and brings it about, in all relations, that all bear God and Christ, and exhibit a theanthropic character. Thus a further mirror of this unity is the relation of the bishop to the presbyters (ad Magnes. 6: "They are fitted to him as the strings to a lyre," ad Eph. 4), and of the latter to the deacons, the relation of marriage (ad Polyc. 5), of the believers to each other (ad Magn. 13); and, in fine, it is also reflected from Christians in their individual being (ad Magn. 5), only that the individual being is, according to him, in a state of untruthfulness unless it is at the same time incorporated with the congregation.

Now, since the theanthropic life-unity of Christ thus propagates itself throughout, it follows that Christ is throughout present,—all Christians are χριστοφόροι, θεοφόροι (ad Eph. 9, 15; and Trall. 3); and naturally the bishop must be chiefly so, since he officially represents to each congregation the rela-

tion of Christ to the Church universal (*τύπον* ad Magnes. 6). And it is characteristic that he postpones to this presence of the objective Christ in the Episcopate the Gospel itself, *i.e.*, the Scripture (ad Philad. 8, Smyrn. 5, 7), and the Lord's Supper. He, indeed, calls the Gospel *σάρκα Χριστοῦ* (ad Philad. 5 comp. ad Smyrn. 5, 7: "I flee to the Gospel as to the flesh of Christ, and to the Apostles as to the presbytery of the Church;" *i.e.*, the Apostles, by which he means, as the context shows, the apostolic writings, are for the Church as a whole what the presbytery is for each congregation); and even so the Gospel infers the objective Christ in all times, brings Him nigh to the Church. Further, he also views Christ as present in the Supper (ad Smyrn. 7: "The heretics abstain from the Eucharist and from prayer, because they confess not that the Eucharist is the flesh of our Saviour;" he calls it "a medicine of immortality, an antidote against death, operating so that we live eternally in Jesus Christ," ad Ephes. 20). But, 1. He founds little on the *Scripture;* and though a collection of Christian writings had begun to be made in archives, and many in his time laid stress thereon (without doubt also with a view of contravening his episcopal idea), he has yet done nothing for the canon; he shows little confidence in the archives; and though he recognises apostolic writings, he opposes those who betake themselves to these: "An archive to me is Christ; my incorrupt Bibliotheca is Christ's cross, death, and resurrection" (ad Philad. 8).[1] This is not to be taken as if he were indifferent to the historical side of Christ's appearing (*σὰρξ*); on the contrary, he lays great stress on this being kept pure for all times. But the more the Church becomes a united historical power, so much the more is there for him in it, in its confirmed organism, an eternalization of the historical side of the appearance of Christ, whilst there is room for a falsification of the apostolic testimony in the Church Bibliotheca. To other forms of this eternalization, for instance the *εὐαγγέλιον*, he allows weight as auxiliary; but his ideal, in which all requirements are in his view satisfied, was ever the Church Unity, represented as also acting by a per-

[1] This passage bears the stamp of high antiquity; it is, however, intelligible only in connection with his whole style of thought. On its negative side it has quite the same tone as the well-known word of another apostolical father, Papias.

sonality filled with God. To this he ever reverts also, 2. with respect to *the Lord's Supper*. For the many places where he speaks of it (ad Eph. 5; ad Trall. 8; ad Rom. 7; ad Philad. Introduction; ad Smyrn. 7, 8, where he likewise treats of baptism) show that the high value he set on it arose from his regarding it as the means and organ of Christ, whereby He communicates the spirit of unity to His people, makes His Divine-human life to be the life of the Church, nay, partly, and this almost especially, because he regarded the Eucharist as the most flourishing representation of the unity and love of the Church, as the altar (*θυσιαστήριον*) on which the Church, acting in the bishop, and represented as Unity, presents the offering of its praise and thanksgiving,—with Christ, and under Him enters together into a Divine-human unity; as one body with many members by one Spirit.

The same is clear from the free use which Ignatius allows himself of the words "flesh and blood of Christ," but which from his point of view is quite natural. See ad Trall. 8; Rom. 7; Magn. 1; Philad. 1, 5; Smyrn. 1, 7, comp. 6. The *σὰρξ* of Christ, he says, is Faith, and the *αἷμα* is Love; both in their unity, Faith and Love, are the All (ad Eph. 9, 14). Both, *σὰρξ* and *αἷμα*, stand inseparably united. Since, looking at the subject from another point, he conjoins *σὰρξ* and *πνεῦμα*, one must presume that between the *αἷμα* and *πνεῦμα* he found a close relation. His thought is this:—The flesh (*σὰρξ*) of Christ, *i.e.*, His objective and historical manifestation, corresponds to Faith (for it begets this in all the various forms in which it can be presented), but the blood of Christ answers to Love. He does not mean by this that the soul or inner being of Faith is Love, but he rather compares Love with the blood of Christ because it circulates as the common life's blood in the veins of the Church. But the expression has, moreover, a definite relation to the death of Christ. It is a favourite thought of Ignatius, that Christ's death draws us into fellowship with Him, and likewise is continued in mankind. With him the death of Christ is the principle of Love in the world, because it draws all to death, in order that all may rise again as new creatures actuated by love. Now, of this Love-principle we become partakers only by means of the Supper; there are we drawn into His dying love; there His love becomes our love. And

thus Christ's blood, primarily that shed on the cross, afterwards no less that which is present in the Supper, is the objective principle which founds love, as Christ's historical appearance in the general founds faith. Naturally, to him as to Paul, this is furnished by Christ's death in combination with His resurrection. The love which Christ's death operates, however, is presented by him under two phænomenal forms: on the one hand, that which tends to unity, and is represented continuously in the worship as in the constitution of the Church; on the other hand, as the sentiment of substitutionary love which Christ awakens in His own. In the latter he shows himself thoroughly of the Johannine school (comp. Euseb. H. E. iii. 23: "I will give account to Christ for you. I will give my soul for yours," says John to the fallen youth). Not only was the union of the σὰρξ and πνεῦμα, constituting the Person of Christ, typically and as a creative principle of like unity in the world, ectypically represented in the Church, but also His office, especially His substitutionary love. The death of Christ on the cross is, indeed, the principle of this substitution for men; but there remains for Christians also a substitution, though only in the sense that in this continuous offering of love for others, the self-offering love of Christ is continued (ad Eph. 18, 21, 8; Smyrn. 10, 13; Polyc. 6). He calls himself ἀγνισμα, περίψημα, ἀντίψυχον, for the Christians.

What has been said may suffice to indicate the fundamental idea of Ignatius. Only from this can we arrive at a just understanding of what he says concerning the Person of Christ. For, as we find it, he has constructed his view of the Person of Christ precisely so as throughout to subject it to the practical thought, that the idea of the Church is to carry forward the Person and work of Christ as His continuous living copy; and that in such a way as that He ever abides immanent in it as the uniting principle of the Divine and the human.

This also is, by consequence, with him, the fundamental concept for the Person of Christ; in Him is the ἕνωσις of the σὰρξ and πνεῦμα absolutely complete. "He was conceived by the Virgin Mary according to the counsel of God, of the seed of David and of the Holy Ghost" (ad Eph. 18). "In Him is the ἕνωσις σαρκὸς καὶ πνεύματος (Magn. 1, 14, 15; Eph. 7; Smyrn. 1, 3); He is the Lord, who is truly of the lineage of David according to the flesh, but the Son of God according to

the will and power of God; born really of a virgin; baptized by John, that He might fulfil all righteousness; really crucified under Pontius Pilate in the flesh; to whose fruits we belong.* He hath lifted up a standard for all times, by His death and resurrection, for the unity of the Church (Smyrn. 1). He is the new leaven (Magn. 10), the new man, the Son of man and Son of God" (Eph. 20). With this definite distinction of the σὰρξ and the πνεῦμα in Christ, of the human and Divine sides, he links himself closely to the Apostle Paul (Rom. i. 3, 4, ix. 5). It is likewise quite Pauline when he describes Christ as born only in respect of His humanity (comp. also Gal. iv. 4), whilst His higher nature is called υἱὸς Θεοῦ (hence γεννητὸς καὶ ἀγέννητος, Eph. 7). God has manifested Himself in a human form in Christ (Eph. 19; comp. 1 Tim. iii. 16); hence he calls Him also Θεὸς (Eph. 1, 15; ἐν σαρκὶ γενόμενος Θεός, ib. vii. 18; Rom. *init.* 3), which can be regarded only as the more indefinite expression of what υἱὸς Θεοῦ is to him. For he says (Smyrn. 3), Christ is our true, inseparable (Eph. 3; Magn. 15), immortal life (Eph. 7, 19, 20): "Three mysteries have been prepared in the silence of God, and remained hidden to the prince of this world,—the virginity of Mary, the birth of Christ, and His death. . . . All the bands of the wicked were dispersed, ignorance was abolished, the old kingdom upset, when God appeared in human form to bring a new eternal life to light"[1] (Eph. 19). According to his fundamental view, however, the union of the πνεῦμα and the σὰρξ in Christ must

* ["Zu dessen Früchten gehören wir." The words of Ignatius are, ἀφ' οὗ καρποῦ ἡμεῖς, *from whose fruit are we; i.e.*, as Pearson explains it, from Him crucified, as the fruit of the tree on which He hung, are we,= we are members of the Crucified. The whole sentence reads thus: "From which [or whose] fruit are we by His divinely-blessed passion, that He might rear a standard [a rallying-point, σύσσημον] for ever, by His resurrection, for His saints and believing ones, whether among the Jews or the Gentiles, in the one body of His Church."—Tr.]

[1] What this passage further says concerning the star of the Magi could have been so set forth only *before* the formation of the canon, and *after* the more sober representation of Matthew. [The passage is as follows: "A star shone in the heavens beyond all that were before it, and its light was unspeakable, and its novelty caused surprise in all who saw it. All the rest of the stars, along with the sun and moon, became a company (χορὸς) to the star, but it excelled them all in brightness; and men were troubled to account for this novel phænomenon."—Tr.]

be regarded by him as one not to be dissolved through all eternity, since it must be every moment the living principle of the unity of God and man in the world. This he expresses (Magn. 15; Smyrn. 3): "I know and believe Him to be in the flesh even after His resurrection" (comp. Eph. 11; Philad. 9). Not less, in fine, does he, with Paul, go back to the time before His earthly appearance. The denial of the one or the other side of the Divine-human being of Christ, rendered it necessary to make the one objected to an object of more definite thought than before; and though Ignatius still abides by generals, and only expresses in the gross the integrity of the two sides in their difference,—the union of which is also the principle of Christianity,—yet the more precise fixing of both sides has already constructed a sort of confession of faith for him (Eph. 7, 17; Mag. 9, 11; Trall. 9; Smyrn. 1). As respects the *human side*, he concerns himself not with the special parts of the human nature, but with the confutation of the denial of a human life of Christ at all, the denial of the leading facts of the history of Christ, in which His course of life is represented. Already had opposition directed itself against three essential elements of His human life,—against the birth of the Son of God by a woman, against His sufferings, and against His resurrection. On the affirmation of these three elements as historical facts, Ignatius establishes the humanity of Christ, without, however, attempting to determine what goes to the concept of the truly human. Of these three, again, it is the two latter on which he lays the principal stress, as well for the refutation of the heretics as for the establishment of Christianity (comp. Magnes. 9; Trall. 10; Smyrn. 1, 2, 7), on account of their relation to Christ's work, and because the immediate life-unity of the Divine and human had not reached its idea until it was thoroughly perfected by death and the abolition of the same. On this point it was that his zeal was chiefly excited. Thus he says (Trall. 9, comp. 10 ff.): "Stop your ears when any man says aught against Christ, who was truly born, truly crucified and dead, truly raised from the dead by the Father. But if any godless persons, *i.e.*, unbelievers, say that He suffered only in appearance, they themselves having only an apparent being, why am I in bonds? why do I desire to contend with the wild beasts? I should thus die without reason, and lie against the

Lord. Wherefore shun the wicked parasitic weeds, which produce deadly fruits. He that eats thereof dies, for they are not plants which the Father hath planted. Had they been so, they would have appeared as shoots springing from the cross, and would have been imperishable." Likewise, Smyrn. 2–7: "They who turn the sufferings and resurrection of Christ into an appearance, are themselves bodiless. Beware of them, as of beasts in human shape; only pray for them, that haply they may repent. Though their conversion is difficult, yet is it possible, through Christ our true life. If Christ has only apparently existed, my bonds are in vain. But near the beasts and in bonds, I am near God." The heretics teach otherwise than Ignatius and the Smyrnæans know. "They will not be convinced by Moses, the Prophets, the Gospel itself: but he who believes not in it, is partaker in the guilt of His death. They loved the martyrs, but deny that Christ was in the flesh: he that believes not this, has utterly denied Him, and bears death in himself." He could mention names, but will not, until they are converted to the suffering which is our resurrection.* "They are not to be spoken of privately or publicly; but regard is to be paid to the Prophets, and especially the Gospel, wherein the suffering is depicted, and according to which the resurrection of Christ is accomplished." Since he has confessed that the mystery of Christianity consists not in that there is a Divine and a human, but solely in the *union* of the two, he is necessarily led to say, that whosoever denies that Christ came in the flesh has wholly denied Him, *i.e.*, affirmed that there is no Christ; and these heretics are, consequently, only in appearance Christians, in reality unbelievers. The same would naturally be the case with those who denied the Divine side: The only thing that is remarkable here is, that after the first glance he speaks no more of such; besides these Doketæ (who probably were also Jews), he directs his strictures only against the Ἰουδαϊσμὸς of holding the Sabbath-laws, and the like. Magnes. 10: "Not Christianity believes in Judaism, but Judaism in Christianity. It is inconsistent to call Jesus the Christ and to Judaize (as if the Messiah had not come)."

* [Μέχρις οὗ μετανοήσωσιν εἰς τὸ πάθος ὅ ἐστιν ἡμῶν ἀνάστασις, "*i.e.*, donec resipiscant, et Christum reapse mortuum esse et e mortuis resurrexisse credant." Dressel.—Tr.]

Rather is Christianity a new leaven: "Put away from you the bad leaven, which has become old and sour, and be changed into the new, which is Jesus Christ." But the letter to the Magnesians speaks of some who acknowledged in Christ only the Teacher. "He *is* our Teacher," says Ignatius (Magn. 9), "but He alone is; and so little is He merely one of the teachers, like Moses and the Prophets, that, on the contrary, He superintends them as their Teacher. They were His disciples, and waited on Him in spirit as their Teacher. Therefore did He, when He came, awaken them from the dead" (Matt. xxvii. 52). "If we live still according to the Jewish law, we acknowledge thereby that we have not yet received grace" (Magn. 8). We see here, also, how the Christian spirit, by an inner necessity, tends to fall back upon the pre-existence of Christ. The historical dependence of Christianity on Judaism impeaches the independence and newness of the former. If it be dependent, it has no peculiar principle. How then can the Church seek to differ from the Synagogue? In this way it soon comes to be brought out that the Christian principle is not posited by Judaism, but Judaism by that principle which is older than it, which as Divine truth is eternal. And since the Christian principle is personally given in God's Son, who has been already definitely discriminated on the human side, the expression thereof comes to be this: As there is one God, so also in all revelation there is one Revealer, His Son, by whom also the Old Testament was given. "He is the Door to the Father, through which Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and the Prophets, and the Apostles, and the Church enter. This one Revealer, the Son of God, is His eternal Word, not, as Jewish errors and myths teach, sprung from silence.[1] Before the Aeons was He with the Father, and appeared at the end (Philad. 9; Magnes. 6.) He timeless, viewless, is for us visible; impalpable, impassable, for us suffering" (Polyc. 3). Among the New Testament writings, it is in the Epistle to the Hebrews that we find this way of developing the pre-existence of the Son of God out of the Christian faith most clearly maintained. Nevertheless, though Ignatius speaks of the Logos after the manner of John (John i. 1 ff.; 1 John i. 1; Apoc. xix. 14) only in two places (Smyrn. Introd.

[1] See Appendix, Note EE.

and Magnes. 8, comp. Eph. 15), it cannot be denied that, besides the decided influence upon him of Paul, there was also an influence from John affecting him; especially, there are found in him so many allusions to passages that belong to Johannine tradition.

How much the mode of thought of Ignatius is spontaneous, bears out and out a character of originality, and announces a significant transition-point in the primitive Christian Church,—at the apex of which there is presented in him a peculiarly gifted and powerful mind,—is apparent, still further, particularly from his relation to the expectation of the speedy coming of Christ. By him this is greatly thrown into the background. The very characteristic reason will be announced afterwards. The sincerity of his Christian piety, the fervour of his love to Christ, opened for him also a higher understanding of the nature of Christianity. "It is pleasant," says he in his letter to the Romans, "to set to the world in God, that I may again rise to Him. In the wild beasts I shall find my grave; I will be an offering of God. Suffer me, hinder not my death; were I there, I should have light and be a man of God. Suffer me to imitate the passion of my God. My Love is crucified; there is no fire in me desiring earthly fuel: that which lives and speaks within me says, Home to the Father!" Above all, it is especially the death of Christ in which his love and contemplation is absorbed. Christ's sacrifice is with him a world-sacrifice; on His offering, things in heaven, and on earth, and under the earth looked (Trall. 9). It is to him the altar where the flame of love is kindled in mankind. In the innermost heart of humanity he would have the objective history of Christ received; as Christ-bearer, humanity ought to copy Him, not merely in individuals, but in an organic being in which He ever renders Himself present.

By *Barnabas* also are his Christological positions drawn from Christ's works, among which His death is to him of chief moment. His line of remark is determined by the antagonism, not of Doketism, nor of Gnosticism,—to neither of which is there any allusion in his epistle,—but of Judaism, and that too in a practical form. By setting forth the meaning of His death, he attempts to raise Judaism above itself; and in so doing, resorts, as does Ignatius, to the assertion of the now

revealed principle, that Christ is the creative principle also of Judaism, or the assertion of the pre-existence of the Son of God. The doctrine of Christ's second advent, however, is much more strongly presented than by Ignatius; his eschatology is more complete; and the significance of the historical appearance of Christ is concluded by him to be found, not merely in reconciliation by His death, but also in the announcement of eschatological *hopes*.[1]

"It is a sin and accumulation of guilt," says he, "to assert that the old covenant is binding also on Christians. Christians should labour to attain deeper knowledge, so as to understand the difference. Christ has indeed instituted a law; but it is a new one, without the yoke of constraint. The tables of Moses are broken, that the love of Jesus may be sealed in our hearts.[2] Sacrifice and circumcision are abolished; their meaning was not outward: a broken heart is the sacrifice with which God is pleased, and his is the circumcision of the heart and the ear (c. 4, 9). The true temple (c. 16, 4) are men in whom God dwells; the true place of promise is Jesus (c. 6), who is manifested in the flesh." As, however, he does not deny the Divine origin of the Old Testament, the question arises, how so much that is imperfect and transitory could be ordained by God. This reconciliation of the Old and New Testaments he holds to be the special problem of the gnosis. For himself, he takes refuge in the antedating of the New Testament in the time of the Old, and in partly regarding the Old Testament saints as already looking on the Son, and thus, by believing anticipation, living under the New Testament, partly by means of allegorizing interpretations, reading the New Testament in the Old, as its deeper and indeed only meaning.[3] Christianity itself, however, he

[1] The author abides much more than Ignatius by individual Christianity; and as the idea of a continuance of the Divine-human life of Christ, of which the Church is to be the image, is quite foreign to him, so he approximates, in the general, rather to the Petrine model of doctrine than to the Pauline or the Johannine. With thoughts borrowed from Peter, he opposes Judaism within Christianity.

[2] C. 4. The Judaists, consequently, to whom he refers, are deficient in gnosis; and the writer exhorts, without indicating any abuse in this direction, not to rest content with πίστις, ἵνα μετὰ τῆς πίστεως ὑμῶν τελείαν ἔχητε καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν.

[3] Comp. c. 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17.

thus describes: "Christ worked that we might obtain another type—might become in soul as children; He transforms us. The last formation, however, must be as the first: a holy temple for the Lord shall the house of our heart be; though the dominion over the world, which man has, shall be complete only in the future (c. 6). How can God dwell in us? By His word that calls to faith, through His call to promise. He Himself predicts, He Himself dwells in us, opening the door of the temple, which we are, *i.e.*, the mouth; granting us repentance, He carries us into the everlasting temple (by which he understands the inner man, to which also he ascribes self-legislation and self-counsel, c. 21). This new man the forgiveness of sins begets (c. 6); to which holy baptism brings us (c. 11). All our salvation we owe to Christ; He gives eternal life, through the tree, His cross (c. 11). He has given His body, that through the forgiveness of sins we might be sanctified, *i.e.*, through sprinkling with His blood (c. 5). The Son of God, the Lord and future Judge of living and dead, could not suffer except on our account,[1]—in order, that is, that His wounds might procure salvation for us. For our sins, Christ presented the vessel of the spirit as an offering" (c. 7). He refers Isa. liii. to Christ's substitutionary death. As the perception of the necessity of a forgiveness of sins conducted him beyond the mere prophetic office of Christ, and in His high-priestly office presented to him also a higher representation of His Person, so, on the other hand, the death of Christ receives a higher significancy from the dignity of His Person. "The Son of God," says he, "could not suffer, save on our behalf" (c. 7). His death has a special value, because He is Lord of the world, to whom God said, on the day before the completion of the world, Let Us make man. From Him had the prophets their gifts, and they prophesied of Him; but it was not till later that He manifested Himself as the Son of God. All is in Him, and of Him (c. 12): He is the Son of

[1] The Judaists could not be familiar with the relation of the death of Christ to the forgiveness of sins; they would regard it as a martyrdom which He endured *through* the sin of the Jews. In his opposition to them, Barnabas delights to present this latter aspect of Christ's death, so as to make it part of His design to complete the sins of the Jews, the murderers of the prophets, and so to bring the κρίσις.

David and the Son of God; hence also David's Lord, having all things under His feet. Him, who hath redeemed thee from death, shalt thou glorify" (c. 19). The incarnation, on the contrary, is in itself, according to his view, not an element of independent significance: so far is he from viewing it as the culminating point of the manifestation, that he says, "Had He not come in the flesh, how could we men, seeing Him, have remained unscathed? For even the sun, which is one day to cease to be, and is His work, is such that we cannot look on in the brightness of its radiance."[1] High as is the representation here given of the majesty of the incarnation of the Son of God, it is, nevertheless, rather as a veiling than as a revealing that this is viewed. And it is in the death of Christ that he sees the manifestation of Divine love, as in His miracles that of Divine power; and finds in His discourses and His resurrection the announcement, that He shall effect the resurrection, and act the part of Judge.[2]

Among the Apostolic Fathers, *Polycarp* of Smyrna also deserves consideration,—the more that, from the high respect in which he was held in Asia Minor, and from his long and distinguished service, he may be regarded as the representative of a large circle.[3] In the salutation of his epistle he wishes "mercy and peace from God Almighty, and the Lord Jesus Christ, our Saviour" (comp. c. 12). "He is our Saviour; for we are justified by grace, not by works (c. 1; Eph. ii. 8, 9). He has for our sins submitted even unto death, has become a servant of all (c. 5); and by His death for us is our hope, and the surety of our justification (c. 8, 9). His death begets love to Him (c. 9, 3), awakens the desire to glorify Him, whilst we tread in the footsteps of His suffering (c. 8, 9). This honour from us is due to Him, for God hath also raised Him from the dead, given Him glory and a seat at His right hand (c. 1, 2, 12);

[1] C. 5.

[2] To this belongs his view of the great world-Sabbath, and the world-days or world-ages thereto corresponding (c. 15). And here his opposition to Judaism comes out in the fact, that it is not the seventh but the eighth day, consequently the one corresponding to the Christian Sabbath, that he says will be the beginning of another world; a world in which there is no wrong, where all is new, where we, made holy, shall sanctify for the first time the whole day.

[3] See Appendix, Note FF.

to Him all things are subjected in heaven and on earth; Him every living thing worships; He is coming as Judge of the living and the dead (c. 2, 6). The worst sin is unbelief in Him; His blood has been shed for the unbelieving; for those, to whom the Son of God, Christ Jesus, the eternal High Priest (c. 12), does not bring the forgiveness of sins, which His death procured, is His death a source of condemnation. The incarnation is spoken of by him, after the manner of John, as ἔλευσις τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν (c. 6), ἔλευσις ἐν σαρκί (c. 7). What forms unbelief had assumed within the Church at the date of this epistle, are shown by the passage (c. 7): "Withdraw from those who bear the name of the Lord in hypocrisy, and seduce vain men. For whosoever confesses not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is an Antichrist, and whosoever acknowledges not the martyrdom of the cross is of the devil; and whosoever accommodates the λόγια τοῦ κυρίου (here, probably, as with Papias, the history and sayings of the Lord) to his own lusts, and says there is neither resurrection nor judgment, is the first-born of Satan."[1] "The faith delivered unto us is the mother of us all; her eldest daughter is Love, her second, Hope (c. 3). If we walk according to the Lord's truth, and are well-pleasing to Him in this world, we shall obtain the world to come, as He hath promised to us to raise us from the dead; and if we walk worthy of Him, we shall also reign with Him (c. 5). Ye believe in Him, though ye see Him not; and, believing, ye rejoice with the joy unspeakable and full of glory, into which many long to enter."

It is evident from these quotations how strictly and word for word applicable to Polycarp, in this epistle, is the testimony of Irenæus (Adv. Haer. iii. 3; Euseb. E. H. iv. 14), that he "ever taught what he had learned from the Apostles, and what the Church still delivers;" to which also, as Irenæus, himself a Minor-Asian, says, all the Churches of Asia and Polycarp's successors bear witness. He himself was called in his lifetime the Teacher and Father of Asia; daily were his earnest prayers

[1] Irenæus also, *adv. Haer.* iii. 3, adduces this concluding phraseology as what was peculiar to Polycarp; also, the conclusion of the fragment of the letter to Florinus shows the same form of thought, which has undeniably a Johannine hue. The word μαρτύριον, moreover, so used, is from the Johannine sphere of speech.

presented to God for the peace and rest of the churches throughout the world; and it would appear that he laboured also by means of great journeys, especially to Rome, to promote the unity and purity of the Christian doctrine.[1]

In Asia Minor we find, during the two first thirds of the second century, the prevalence in general of the liveliest Christian life. This district had been long cultured by two of the most distinguished of the Apostles, Paul and John; and both had left deep traces of their spirit behind them. Christianity had here struck its roots most firmly at an early period; here we find the first traces of a living endeavour to establish the Church; here it can be proved (Euseb. E. H. v. 25) that as early as the beginning of the second century there were bishops. Polycrates in Ephesus, who, when he wrote to Victor, had been sixty-five years a Christian, and who, from among the seven bishops who were his relations, mentions several whose successor he was at Ephesus, evidently had no other arrangement than an episcopal one in his mind; and he even calls John a ἱερεὺς who bore the priestly badge.* Here was the earliest combination of churches, with the earliest synods. Here also, in the region of dogmatics, was the greatest movement of minds. Asia Minor is the birth-place both of Marcionitism and Montanism. Both of these, however, which began to excite attention about the year 150, were preceded by preparatory appearances, of which we need mention here only Marcion's teacher, Cerdo, and the prophets and prophetesses who even before Montanus were known in Asia Minor to Christian antiquity (Euseb. E. H. iii. 37; v. 25). But, still further back, the letters of Ignatius are a proof that at the earliest period Hellenism and Judaism were at war here with each other, within the Church; and already the excommunication of Cerinthus, and the abhorrence with which the memory of his Ebionism was held in the Church, must satisfy us that in Asia Minor Ebionism cannot have been prevalent or dominant, not even before Montanism or Marcionitism. On the other hand, the First Epistle of John, which was known to both Papias and Polycarp, shows knowledge of Doketæ; but

[1] Iren. iii. 3. See Appendix, Note GG.

* [Ὃς ἐγενήθη ἱερεὺς τὸ πέταλον πεφορικώς. On this singular statement, see the learned note of Le Moyne in his Varia Sacra, vol. II. p. 25.—Tr.]

from such these teachers knew themselves to be essentially separated.

If now we turn to cast a glance on Greece, we not only find *Dionysius* in Corinth about the middle of the second century, whose epistles Eusebius was acquainted with, and for whose orthodoxy he vouches, but we know also even more precisely that he held the epistle of Clement in high esteem, and used it in his church,—nay, that, according to ancient custom, it was read there from time to time (Euseb. iv. 23). Eusebius has, further, preserved to us a trait of him, which is a proof to us how far he was from Judaistic leanings. Pinytos, bishop in Cnossos, laid great stress on celibacy; and opinions allied to Montanism were strongly prevalent there at that time. There was no intention in this to fall back to what was Jewish: on the contrary, there was rather a belief that the Church had lived long enough on milk (*i.e.*, without a severe asceticism); and that now at length was the time of its maturity, when the Church must enter on a higher and more perfect career. Now from this Dionysius kept himself; as also he did not approve of extreme severity against those who had fallen (Euseb. iv. 23). This affords us a glimpse into the spirit of the Christian Church before the middle of the second century, inasmuch as the friends of a severe asceticism and a new legalism did not appeal to Christian antiquity as on their side, but, on the contrary, felt that they were in opposition to it, and sought to introduce a new and more perfect form; by which, however, they were so far from wishing to coalesce with Judaism or Ebionitism, that they failed to perceive how with their high perfection they had only fallen back to the legal stand-point, the Jewish *principle*. We have thus listened to an accordant testimony, though with different measures of knowledge, against righteousness by works, from the lips of Clement, Ignatius, Barnabas, and Polycarp.

Take along with this what Dionysius further says of this early period of the Church, as lying nearest to him. In his letter to the Athenians, fragments of which have been preserved to us by Eusebius, he reminds them not only of Dionysius the Areopagite, but also, that after the martyrdom of Publius (whose death must have happened at the time of that of Ignatius), Quadratus obtained the bishopric of Athens, and quickened anew their faith.

But Quadratus delivered to Hadrian an apology for the Christians in the year 20 of the second century, which Eusebius had read, and of which he says, that it affords illustrious proofs of the genius and apostolic orthodoxy of the man. He was esteemed in the second century as a man full of the Holy Ghost.[1] In his apology he has referred to the miracles of the Lord, which he contrasted with the pretended cures of his own time: "Some," says he, "of those healed by our Saviour (σωτὴρ) have survived to our time." At the same time Aristides, "a faithful man, and zealous for our religion," gave to his contemporaries a similar apology, which also Eusebius knew. Both of these were taken by Justin Martyr as his model soon after (Euseb. E. H. iv. 3). Both are especially worthy of notice, as they were highly cultivated men. Like Justin, who came later, Quadratus calls Christianity a philosophy, and even as a Christian wears the philosopher's cloak. Thus we have, at the very time when Gnosticism began to be powerful, a tendency within the Church itself to combine Christianity with the Hellenic philosophy, without thereby becoming Gnostic. It would be interesting to know whether they are the first who combined the Hellenic doctrine of the Logos with Christianity. But their writings are not extant; and all that is certain is, that Justin, in whose apology (about A.D. 139) the Hellenic doctrine of the Logos plays an important and already familiar part, made use of both as his models. The way also in which Justin uses the doctrine of the Logos, shows strikingly that he does not introduce it as a novelty, but regards it as something already naturalized in the Church, as even Zeller (l. c. p. 60 ff.) is impartial enough fully to acknowledge.

There are still two men whom we must notice here, Agrippa Castor, and Aristo (Aristion, according to Maximus, Comment. in c. 1 Pseudo-Dionys. Areop. de myst. theol.) of Pella. The former (Hieronym. de viris illust. 21) was an opponent of Basilides, and, according to Eusebius (H. E. iv. 7), lived in the time of Saturninus in Antioch, and of Basilides in Egypt. We still possess two fragments from him, both directed against the Gnostics (Eus. iv. 7; Hieron. l. c.). Eusebius ranks him among the ecclesiastical men who, chiefly on grounds of reason

[1] Comp. Routh, Relig. Sac. I. 74. See Appendix, Note HH.

(λογικώτερον), contended for the apostolic and ecclesiastical faith, and left to posterity in their writings prophylactic aids against that heresy. With his work, which could not thus bear an Ebionitic character, Eusebius was acquainted. Aristo likewise flourished under Hadrian and his successor; and of him Origen (c. Cels. iv. 52), Eusebius (E. H. iv. 6), and Jerome (Comm. ad Gal. iii. 13) make mention. His writing, entitled, "Disputation between Papiscus and Jason," was known to the philosopher Celsus; and Origen testifies of it (l. c.) that it was ably executed, and that the part of the Jew, who disputes with the Christian, is well sustained. He proves particularly the divinity of Christianity from the Old Testament, and especially the Deity of the Son; and though he was a Jewish Christian,[1] he not only held the pre-existence of the higher nature of Christ, but also ascribes, as in the Proverbs, a share in the creation of the world to this higher nature, which he calls the Son of God.[2] He seems also to have defended the propitiatory death of Christ against the Jews.[3]

Aristo conducts naturally to the *Jewish-Christian tendency*, which, so long as there were no Gentile Christians in Jerusalem (*i.e.* till about A.D. 130, Eus. H. E. iv. 5), found in this city a centre, along with the keeping up of Jewish nationalism. But after the second war of extermination against the Jews, Jewish nationalism was broken up, and retained no longer any place within the Christian Church. Even in Jerusalem, after this begins the series of Gentile bishops. The principle of Judaism, indeed—its legalism, and what arose out of that—was not thereby annihilated; but this arose from its being not purely a Jewish element, but rather a principle of as general a significancy as paganism, and into which mankind is ever prone to sink as a religious malady. Hence, even from an early period, may be seen a legalistic tendency among Gentile Christians, especially among the Romans; which furnishes no proof of the prevalence of a Judaic Christianity in the Gentile world. At the same time, it must be admitted, that up to Hadrian's time the legalistic tendency, wherever it showed itself in Christianity, had always a certain dependence on the Jewish-Christian com-

[1] As appears from his doctrine concerning the seven heavens; comp. Maximus l. c. and Test. Patriarch. iii.

[2] Appendix, Note II. [3] Appendix, Note JJ.

munity at Jerusalem. We shall now consider the monuments which have been handed down to us, either of the Jewish-Christian tendency itself, or of the tendencies within Gentile Christianity which stood principally related to it. We may class these, in the general, under the name of attempts to make good the unity of the New Testament with the Old. Here we have to notice the Shepherd of Hermas, Papias, and Hegesippus. —In passing, we shall cast a glance on the ancient Christian eschatology and its course of development, with the relative apocryphal and other writings, as well as the apocryphal gospels hereto appertaining. But as it will be seen by this investigation that even within this tendency there was an advance, which succeeded in clothing all the elements that went to constitute the Hellenic-Christian doctrine of the Logos in an Old Testament form, though in a different order; so, in fine, the Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs shows us how this tendency advanced from the royal office of Christ to His priestly, and thereby began to construe conceptionally the innermost vital point of Christianity, and to lay a basis for the Deity of Christ which excluded all danger of a relapse on the part of this tendency into what was Judaic and Ebionitic. With this, moreover, was the inner union of the *realistic* with the more Hellenic or *idealistic* tendency, as respects the work no less than the Person of Christ, completed, as the succeeding flourishing epoch within the Church shows. The former tendency, issuing from eschatological considerations, goes back to the beginning; the eschatologic Christ is pre-existent, is the Creator-Word, is the Wisdom. Conversely, the second, the Hellenistic, setting out from the eternal reason, advances to the Creator-Word, and combines more and more its ideal principle with the real, and especially with the history of the Person of Christ. For both tendencies, however, the union of the ideal and real aspects of this Person is effected, and the two pressing dangers of Doketism and Ebionitism overcome, only after the necessary historical manifestation of the Eternal* in the Person of Christ, and conversely the eternal significancy of the historical in Christ, begins to be recognised; and this is effected by the propitiatory work of Christ being viewed as the centre-point of His work

* [Das nothwendige Geschichtlichwerden des Ewigen.]

on earth, whilst the opposite views, which rest satisfied with His kingly and prophetic functions, are excluded.[1] We now pass on to particulars.

If Clement of Rome appears as a disciple of Paul, Ignatius, with Polycarp and the author of the Epistle to Diognetus, as of the Johannine and Pauline school, and Barnabas as most allied to that of Peter, the Shepherd of Hermas may be viewed as approaching nearest to the style of James,[2] though belonging to a later age.[3]

According to it, Christianity is the true law, but implanted in the hearts of those who have believed (Simil. viii. 1–8). By means of this law, the Son of God is preached to all the ends of the earth. To despise Him, to deny the name which is called upon us, to become an apostate from and a betrayer of the Church, is deadly sin. By such persons the seal (of baptism) is dissolved; they are dead to God, and they never come to repentance (Sim. viii. 6). Next to them stand those who introduce vain doctrines: yet for such repentance is possible; but if they do not repent, they perish. Vides igitur in pœnitentia peccantium inesse vitam: non agentium vero pœnitentiam mortem paratam. Now penitence, which he seems to have viewed in part as a good work (Vis. 2), is viewed by him, on the other hand, also as a gift of God (Sim. viii. 6): it is bestowed on those whom God foresees to be sincere and of a true heart. Penitence, however, with him becomes a Christian characteristic through connection with baptism; and by a severe penitential discipline, which gathers around baptism as its centre, and a severe doctrine, on the other hand, as to the necessity of baptism, he seeks to unite inseparably the two, baptism and penitence. No penitence, no righteousness even, that is without baptism, saves from death; but if baptism do not constitute a point of conversion for any, there is no repentance afterwards, and consequently no salvation (Simil. ix. 13, 15; Vis. ii. 2, iii. 7; Mand. iv. 3). "The Church is the Tower, built upon the water (of baptism); your life is

[1] Appendix, Note KK.

[2] Comp. Jas. v. 16 with Vis. ii. 1, iii. 1; Jas. v. 1 ff. with Vis. iii. 6, Simil. i. and ii., ix. 20; Jas. iv. 5 with Mand. v. 3; Jas. iv. 7 with Mand. vii.; Jas. i. 6–8 with Mand. ix.; Jas. i. 5 with Mand. ii.; Jas. iv. 12 with Mand. xii. 6.

[3] Appendix, Note LL.

saved by water. For it is founded by the word of the almighty and glorious name; it is upheld by the invisible power of God" (Vis. iii. 1 ff.). The Church is imaged by him as an aged woman (Vis. ii.), because she is the first formed of all, and for her sake has the world been made. In the Church is the renewal of the spirit (Vis. iii. 8) by the Holy Ghost, who dwells in them that believe (Mand. v. 1, 3; Mand. x. 12).

But in what relation does the Church stand to Christ? By the glorious name (שֵׁם), whose word formed it, is to be understood the Son of God (in Vis. iii. 3 He is called verbum omnipotentis et honorifici nominis, invisibilis virtus Dei, and is referred to in connection with baptism), who is consequently so designated as God in the Revelation. Hermas does not see (Simil. 9) the Son of God Himself, which is also a proof that he regarded Him as a superhuman being; but He appeared to him as a spirit in the form of the Church (ix. 1: Ille enim spiritus, qui loquutus est tecum in effigie ecclesiæ Filius Dei est). It is only by especial strengthening from above that he is enabled to bear even the intelligence that it is the Son of God who has appeared to him in this form. This has sometimes been understood as if Hermas identified the Son with the Holy Spirit; but he knows also other spirits, nay spiritus sanctos, besides the Holy Spirit (e. gr. Sim. ix. 13: hac virgines, inquit, spiritus sancti sunt. Mand. v. 1). If Hermas, indeed, calls the higher element in Christ only Holy Spirit, he cannot have seen in Christ anything beyond humanity filled and perfected by the Holy Spirit. But it would be more correct to say that the Holy Spirit is not presented distinctly by him, as the Son of God is. The virgins, who clothe those who are to go in through the door in white raiment, he calls holy spirits (spiritus sanctos), collectively spiritus (Sim. ix. 13; comp. Vis. iii. 8); and, in fact, the virtues which these virgins represent, are, according to Mand. v. 1, viewed as effects of the Holy Spirit (comp. Sim. v. 7). But of these it is also said (Sim. ix. 13) that they are the powers of the Son of God. "He that bears the name of the Son of God must bear their names also, for the Son also bears their names." There is thus the appearance of teaching that the Holy Ghost is retracted into the Person of Christ, and is not discriminated from Him; but there is not the slightest ground for the opinion (asserted by Baur and others), that by Hermas the Holy Ghost

is set forth in the place of the Son. Rather does the matter stand thus: The Son of God is, according to Hermas, also a "spiritus;" an assertion which has nothing dubious about it, for John [Jesus] calls God also a spirit, and Paul says, "The Lord is that Spirit" (2 Cor. iii. 17, 18; comp. also Rom. i. 4); and yet both distinguish the Son and the Holy Ghost; and so does the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews distinguish the Holy Ghost and the πνεύματα. The appellation "spirit" is certainly a very indefinite designation; but on that very account is it wrong to identify every spiritus sanctus with the Holy Ghost of the Trinity, or to believe that the distinction between Son and Spirit is thereby excluded. Hermas himself does not adhere to this appellation: in the only instance in which he calls the Son a spirit without a figure (Sim. ix. 1: Ille spiritus, qui tecum locutus est, Filius Dei est), there follows the closer description, "this Spirit is the Son of God," and Christ's common designation by Hermas is Filius Dei. See this repeatedly in the same Simil. ix. Hence it remains to ask, 1. In what relation does the Son, according to Hermas, stand to the Father? Is He hypostatically distinguished from Him, and that before His incarnation, or only, according to the Ebionitic view, after that? And if the former, in what relation does He stand to the other spirits,—above them, or beside them, or under them? 2. In what relation does he place the Holy Ghost to the Father and the Son? Has he only one Holy Spirit who is identical with the Filius, hypostatically distinguished from the Father; and is, consequently, the Holy Ghost of the Trinity by him retracted into the hypostasis of the Son, of whom also it is predicated that He is a Spiritus; or is the Spiritus, termed Sanctus collaterally with the Spiritus who is Filius Dei, presented as a distinct hypostasis by Himself?

As respects the former of these questions, the Son of God is by Hermas definitely and hypostatically distinguished from the Father, and there are ascribed to Him the predicates of the Old Testament Wisdom. By the word of the Son of God has the Church been founded, which is one spirit and one body, and of one colour (Sim. ix. 13). He has redeemed it by His sufferings, and is therefore exalted by God (Sim. v. 6). He is thus, of course, distinguished from the Father, and that as one who has suffered and been rewarded; whereby a patripassian view

is excluded. But at the same time the Ebionitic distinction of the Son of God from the Father is not that of Hermas. This is most clearly attested by the mention of His sufferings for the taking away of our sins; and still further by what Hermas teaches concerning the pre-existence of the Son of God. Previous to His incarnation He is represented as distinct from the Father, and as exalted above the sphere of other beings. The same who founded the Church, is with the Father the Creator of the world. It is said of Him (Sim. ix. 12), that He is antiquior omni creatura; in consilio patri suo adfuit ad condendam creaturam; 14. totus orbis . . . omnis Dei creatura sustentatur ab eo. It is, however, worth while to consider more closely the ninth Similitude, in order to see whether he whom, notwithstanding his singularities, some would make the representative of the apostolic Fathers, may be adduced as a witness for the alleged Ebionism of the early Church. In this Hermas sees a huge white rock rising up out of the middle of an extensive plain, encompassed by twelve hills. The rock is higher than these hills, and such that it can bear the whole globe. "It appeared to me to be ancient, but it had a new door, that seemed newly cut out, and whence came a lustre brighter than that of the sun (comp. Barnab. 5); and at the door stood the twelve virgins" (c. 2). The meaning is this (c. 12): This rock and the door is the Son of God. "Wherefore," asks Hermas of his conductor, "is the rock old, and the door new?" "Because," is the reply, "the Son of God is indeed older than any creature, so that He was in the counsel of His Father at the creation of the world; but the door is new because He hath appeared in the world in the latter days,[1] that they who desire salvation may through Him enter into the kingdom of God." "He that enters not by the door, *i.e.* believes not on the Son of God who hath appeared, and is baptized into Him, so that thenceforward he bears His name (that is, the nomen honorificum), cannot enter into the kingdom of God" (same place). "On the rock and on the door," he continues (c. 14), "the tower (the Church) is

[1] I regard the reading, which has also the authority of MSS., of *apparuit* for *apparebit* to be the right one, from its connection with what follows. According to Hermas, there is an entering into the kingdom of God, *before* the second advent of Christ, through baptism and conversion; and it is of *this* he is speaking in the context.

built, because the rock and the door is the Son of God, whose name is great and infinite; and the whole earth, every creature of God, especially those who bear His name with all their heart, are sustained by Him. He consequently is their foundation, and sustains them willingly."[1] That Hermas regarded this pre-existent Son of God, exalted above all creatures, as distinct from God, and yet as on an equality with God, is expressly declared by him thus: "The Lord hath sworn by His Son, him that denieth the Son and Himself, *They* also shall deny in the days to come."[2]

That Hermas, then, in his doctrine concerning the Son of God, followed an Ebionitic mode of thinking, is an utterly groundless hypothesis, at which no one can arrive who does not ignore the passages adduced.[3] However it may be with the doctrine of the Trinity in Hermas, his Christology recognises in the Saviour a real hypostasis, distinct from the Father, Divine, which was present at the creation of the world and took part therein, whose name is great and infinite, and by whom the world is sustained. *This very Divine nature* has appeared in Christ; He Himself will judge the world.[4] From such a union of the pre-existing Filius Dei with the man Jesus, who is also Filius Dei, because He "plurimum laboravit, plurimumque perpessus est, ut aboleret delicta eorum" (Sim. v. 6), it cannot be doubted that Hermas saw in Christ the incarnation of his pre-existent Filius Dei: the only thing admitting of question is, whether, according to him, this Divine being, which in himself and in Christ is personal, had only a theophany in Him, *i.e.* a body without a human soul (as Baur assumes), or whether the union with Him was an abiding one. In the former case, Hermas would not (as Baur thinks) deserve to be reckoned among the Ebionites, but evidently rather among the Doketæ; for it was not in the Divine but in the human that there was in this case a shortcoming. But this is not in itself probable; for the human part of Christ,

[1] Appendix, Note MM.

[2] Vis. ii. 2. By this passage they are doubly confuted who find Judaism in Hermas. If the Lord here swears His highest oath by His Son, then is His Son also His other self, and hence the term, putting them on an equality, "They." In the beginning of this chapter also, compared with the close, it appears that the Son is called Gloria Dei.

[3] Appendix, Note NN.

[4] Appendix, Note OO.

which in the fifth Similitude is called corpus (σὰρξ?), is in Sim. ix. 6, 12 designated "Vir."[1]

But it is more easy to settle the question concerning the Ebionitism of Hermas, than to determine with security what answer to give to the second of the above questions, namely, whether the Holy Ghost is represented by him as definitely and hypostatically distinct from the Father. On this point it is the fifth Similitude that comes principally to be considered.

There is so much difficulty about this Similitude, the text of which is partially corrupt, that all we can say with certainty is, that as in Similitude ix. the Son of God is distinguished from God, so in this God and the Holy Ghost are distinctly introduced separately; whilst, on the other hand, the relation of the Son to the Spirit remains obscure, because the Similitude has to do, not with the pre-existent Son of God, but with His state of humiliation, and with the Sonship of Christ only as it was a reward conferred on the suffering humanity of Christ. If on this account this Similitude cannot, from its place, give a satisfactory answer to the question how the Holy Ghost is related to the Son, who "antiquior est omni creatura," or in general to the Divine nature of Jesus; so neither has any one the right to draw conclusions from it against the presence of this Filius Dei in Christ, and to hold what is said in the passage concerning the union of the Holy Ghost with Jesus for the sum of Hermas's doctrine of the incarnation; nor can the relation of the hypostasis of the Son to the Holy Ghost be unfolded with certainty from the passage. Against the former we have the decisive fact, that in that case Hermas would contradict himself; for in Similitude ninth he would enunciate the Church doctrine concerning the pre-existent Son of God, and in Similitude fifth would speak only of an infusion of the Holy Ghost into the humanity of Christ. It has been proposed to restore the balance here by supposing that in Similitude fifth the subject of discourse is an incarnation of the Holy Ghost. But this cannot be maintained, because it would involve the unsuitable notion that the Holy Ghost counselled with the Father concerning His body or human nature, and the reward thereof; besides, since according to Hermas the Holy Ghost dwells in all Christians, it would be

[1] Appendix, Note PP.

inconceivable how in that case Christ should have obtained the pre-eminent position elsewhere assigned to Him by this writer. In fine, it must in this case have been naturally expected that here or elsewhere Hermas should have said, that by the Divine which is both the ancient rock and the new door, *i.e.* the Divine which became man in Christ, is to be understood, not the Son of God, but the Holy Ghost.[1] On the other hand, the explanation, according to which the passage is understood as touching upon the relation of the incarnate Son of God to the Holy Ghost, is not without harshness; still, as it alone harmonizes with Sim. ix., nay, since it alone makes Sim. v. consistent with itself, we feel constrained to give it the preference. We now pass on to the Similitude itself.

It must be well considered, before everything, that the proper object of this Similitude is not Christology; and hence we are not to expect to find here the author's doctrine concerning Christ in a connected and complete form. The proper object is *Fasting* (Sim. v. 2) and its true idea; what is dogmatical, and particularly what is Christological, comes into consideration for the most part only casually, and as something conceived for another end, and fully intelligible only from it; consequently, the Similitude, already complete, can receive a Christological meaning only as something supplementary, and by an artificial turn. A man, so runs the Similitude, entrusted his vineyard to his most faithful and approved *slave*, and promised him freedom if he would, during his absence, bind the clusters to the stakes. The faithful slave not only did this, but more besides, and had the vineyard in the best condition. When the master came, he was pleased, and called the *Son*, who was dear to him and his heir, along with his friends, to consult. He told what the slave had done, and they rejoiced with him. Then he made known his purpose: I have, said he, promised freedom to the slave if he

[1] In place of this, we find the converse; for Hermas says expressly, that what in the Similitude he has called the Son of the Lord is not the Son of God, but the Son of God is Christ; only figuratively, or, in the Similitude, he calls that the Son of the Lord of the vineyard, which properly is called the Holy Ghost. Reuter (Repert. R. F. 1845, iii. p. 213) thinks that we must admit a contradiction on the part of Hermas. For the rest, he repudiates as a prejudice the opinion that Hermas identifies the Son and Holy Spirit (p. 214).

followed my command; but he has done more, and filled me with much joy. Therefore will I make him joint-heir with my son. This pleased the son and the friends. Immediately thereupon the householder sent from his own table costly viands to the slave, who took only what was enough for him, and divided the rest among his fellow-slaves, to the great delight of the latter, who wished he might come still more into favour with the master since he acted so towards them. On hearing this, the householder again summoned his son and friends, and announced to them what had occurred, which made them still more approve of his making the slave joint-heir with his son.

The meaning is this: First keep the commands of God; then add thereto some good beyond what God has required: so shalt thou acquire the greater merit, and be honoured by God. If thou keep the commandments, art pure in heart and mouth, and fastest so as to give to the poor, then is thy fasting good, an offering well-pleasing to God (c. 3).

As a supplement to this interpretation, there is another which seems to have been a sort of after-thought, arising out of the remembrance that the self-sacrificing love of Christ presents the most perfect doctrine respecting the true fast. According to this, then, the Lord of the vineyard is God; the servant is the Son of God, who has done and suffered much to take away the sins of men,—consequently, Jesus Christ. But if by the servant in the Similitude we are to understand the Son of God, who is the son of the householder? This cannot be the Son of God, Christ; for the Father takes counsel with him respecting the servant, *i.e.* Christ, who, according to other passages, as according to the interpretation of Sim. v., is the Son of God in a peculiar sense, on account of the pre-existent Son of God in Him; and to make Him in any sense enter into consultation about Himself would be incongruous. There remained, therefore, nothing else than to assign the remaining part in the Similitude to the Holy Ghost, already known to every one by the baptismal formula.[1] It is certainly unusual to apply to the Holy Ghost the title of Son; but He is called

[1] Orbem terrarum fundus ille significat qui in Similitudinem est positus. Dominus autem fundi demonstratur is qui creavit cuncta et consummavit et virtutem illis dedit. Filius autem, Spiritus Sanctus est. Servus vero ille Filius Dei est. C. 5.

Son of the Father in the Similitude, whilst in the *interpretation*, consequently, properly speaking, it is the servant who is the Son of God.[1] And that even in the Similitude this discourse contained what was unusual in his time, is acknowledged to superfluity by Hermas himself, who seeks to guard against the misunderstanding into which moderns also have fallen.[2] "Why," he asks, "is the Son of God in this Similitude put down in the place of a servant, since He is the Son of God, and consequently, in the more correct interpretation of the Similitude, behoves to be the Son of the Householder, that is, of God; whilst in the Similitude the Holy Ghost appears as the Son with whom the Father takes counsel concerning His proper Son, Christ?" "He is not placed in the rank of a servant," is the reply, "but in great power and majesty; for over those whom God hath given to His Son hath He placed presidents to protect them individually," as the servant in the Similitude binds the clusters to the stakes. "But He Himself hath toiled and suffered much to take away their sins.—After the taking away of their sins, He hath showed to them the ways of life, inasmuch as He gave to them the law which He had received of the Father. Seest thou, now, that He is Lord of the people, and hath received all power from the Father?" (c. 6). So far is Hermas from Ebionism, so contrary is this to his time, that he rather seeks in part to retract the representation of the Son as a servant in the Similitude, and even to represent His earthly work as power and majesty; whilst what remains of His humiliation, such as His sufferings, he treats as the work of His free love, as the means of the taking away of our sins, and as the point of passage to a higher perfection. Such exaltation, indeed, cannot be conferred on the pre-existent Son of God, in Himself; but it may be on humanity forming with Him one life-unity. On this the conclusion reflects; and this point gives then occasion a

[1] Baur, l. c. p. 134, interchanges what is similitude and what interpretation of the similitude, when in the place, loosely considered, he finds proof that Hermas recognises only one Son of God, the Holy Ghost; whereas, conversely, as in the Similitude the son of the householder and his servant are distinguished, so in the interpretation are the Holy Spirit and the Son of God.

[2] With which, however, we ought not to have met, after George Bull's setting forth of the distinction.

second time to settle the arrears, and thus to show wherein the connection between the Holy Ghost (called in the Similitude the son of the householder) and the servant who is the Son of God consists; a connection which must be presupposed when the Holy Ghost is brought into council by the Father regarding the Son in the form of a servant, nay, when the Holy Ghost has in the Similitude the name which, strictly taken, even upon earth belongs to Christ, unless the latter has, in assuming the form of a servant, wholly laid aside His Divine Sonship. We shall consider both these points.

The former, the exaltation of Christ, relates, according to Hermas, to the *body;* for so he designates Christ's humanity: so that it cannot be understood of the pre-existent Son of God in Christ, but only of that part of Him which was capable of exaltation. Of the body, and of it alone, he says that He stands to the Holy Ghost in a relation of subordination, and in that of a servant; but also, since He always obeyed the Holy Ghost, used His body righteously and purely, never defiled it, never was subject to it, that body, though it went forth subject to weakness and like a servant, was yet, through union with the Holy Ghost, evinced to be mighty and well-pleasing to God. "This powerful course, therefore, pleased God, because He (Christ) was without spot on the earth, since He possessed in Himself the Holy Spirit in counsel."[1] "Hence he (the Householder) summoned the son and the good angels to him, that also to this body, which has served the Spirit without complaint, might be given some place of abiding, that he might not seem to have lost the reward of his servitude."[2] The Holy Ghost is thus summoned by the Father as a witness and judge, along with Himself, of the holy walk of the body of Jesus; only to this does the humiliation relate, and the elevation for reward.—As

[1] Placuit igitur Deo hujusmodi potens cursus, quia maculatus non esset in terra, possidens in se Spiritum Sanctum in consilio. Since the word used is not *maculatum*, it cannot be referred to "corpus" in what goes before; nor can it to "cursus," since to that the words "possidens," etc., would not fit: consequently it must be understood of Christ, in whom the Holy Ghost is thus a *co*-counsellor (Sim. v. 6).

[2] Ut et huic scilicet corpori, quod servivit Spiritui Sancto sine querela, locus aliquis consistendi daretur, ne videretur mercedem servitutis suæ perdidisse. This place has a clear reference to that Doketism which separates the Son of God from the body in death, and so gives up the body itself.

respects the *second* point, the union between the Holy Ghost and Christ, it is clear from what goes before that Hermas cannot intend to say, as Baur thinks, that the human body filled with the Holy Ghost is Christ; for, as we have seen, the Holy Spirit is by him distinguished from the Son of God, and hence he must also, as he sees in Christ an appearance of the Son of God, have left a place for Him also in Christ (Simil. ix. 14; note 4, p. 127). To this also other things point. For in one place he says that Christ hath possessed the Holy Ghost in Himself as co-counsellor (Sim. v. 6, possidens in se Spiritum Sanctum in consilio). "As He was co-counsellor in Christ's walk, so it is proper that He should be also joint-judge of the worth of His walk." But still more: "The Holy Ghost stands also from the beginning in the closest relation to the body (the humanity) of the Son of God, but not so as that He has appointed that body. He becomes (it is said) co-counsellor, in the Similitude, concerning Christ's manhood, because he is co-worker of the same according to its designed propriety for the indwelling of God." "The revealer of God," who is also called in the Old Testament sense, as by Justin, ἀπόστολος, the Nuncius, *i.e.* the Maleach κατ' ἐξοχήν (as in Vis. iii. 1, the majestic name; perhaps also in Vis. ii. 1, the gloria Dei), "hears that Holy Spirit which has been infused first of all into that body in which God should dwell."[1] Here the dwelling of God as the end and object is distinguished from that whereby it was prepared: the preparation is ascribed to the Holy Ghost; the indwelling of God

[1] Nuncius audit illum Spiritum Sanctum qui infusus est omnium primus in corpore in quo habitaret Deus (Sim. v. 6). The passage is probably corrupt. Baur makes no attempt to explain it. A good sense, however, is obtained if by nuncius be understood the Filius Dei, as Gieseler also suggests. Comp. Sim. ix. 1; Mand. v. 2; Sim. viii. 3; which passages clearly show how variously Hermas uses the term Nuncius, and what a high significance it has with him, since in Sim. ix. 1 it is also used of the Son of God, who, according to ix. 12, 6, stands in the middle of the six highest nuncii, excelsus, higher than the tower, the Church itself. Now this Nuncius *s. i.* draws the Holy Ghost into counsel and aid in reference to the body in which God should dwell. The aid which He receives from the Holy Ghost is in the preparation of the body of Christ for the indwelling of God, *i.e.* of the Son of God. [In Dressel's edition of the Pastor, the correct reading of the passage above cited is given from the Palatine Codex, thus: "Spiritui illi sancto qui creatus est omnium purus in corpore, in quo habitaret, Deus fundavit atque statuit electum corpus quod ei placuit."—Tr.]

itself must consequently be ascribed to the revealer, or the Son of God. Rather by far than say that the indwelling God is here described as the Holy Ghost (in which case the "first of all" and the "should inhabit" would be meaningless), one might mark it as a defect here, that a moment seems to be supposed in which the body of Christ existed, and was consecrated by the inpouring of the Holy Ghost, while as yet the indwelling of the Son had not taken place. But this also is relieved in the principal matter by the connection. The Holy Ghost is poured in by the revealer; the latter has, by the inpouring of the Holy Ghost, Himself made the preparation for His indwelling, *i.e.* made the humanity capable of, and strong enough for, His indwelling (Sim. ix. 1),—consequently, in the operation of the Holy Ghost, established the first element of His indwelling in the man, of His incarnation, Himself.[1] Similarly, also, elsewhere (Sim. ix. 13) the Son of God is designated as He who goeth forth by the power of the Holy Ghost. All this has been admirably presented,[2] thus: The Holy Ghost is in the Similitude the one drawn into counsel with the Householder, because He is, *first*, the ground of the possibility of the dwelling of God in man; *secondly*, the norm to which man has to be faithful; and, *thirdly*, the measure of security for the fulfilling of this norm.[3]

Putting all together, it appears that Hermas represents the absoluteness of Christianity in the pre-existence and eternal post-existence of that subject which is the personal bearer of Christianity, the Son of God; and treats the connection into which He entered through the co-working of the Holy Ghost as an indissoluble one. According to him, He is higher than the whole Church, higher than the highest angels, and, as He took part in the creation of the world, so is He the Founder of the Church; and this not simply as Lawgiver, but primarily as the bringer of the remission of sins to those who repent. By His sufferings He hath taken away sins; and holy baptism in His

[1] This is the meaning of the passage in the larger text, which is probably taken simply from the Greek: Collocavit enim eum (sc. Spiritum Sanctum) Intellectus in corpore, ut ei videbatur. As the revealer or Son of God is above (Sim. ix. 12) identified with the Wisdom of the Proverbs, so is He here called Intellectus (see Fabric. Cod. Pseudepig. V. T. p. 1154-55).

[2] By Wolff in the Zeitschr. für Luth. Theol. 1842.

[3] See Appendix, Note QQ.

name assumes the forgiveness of the sins of those who henceforward walk in the new law which He hath introduced into the world, and who defile not the Holy Ghost whom Christ sends (Sim. ix. 13). However little he has sought to reconcile these Christological positions with the Unity of God, which he so strongly asserts (Mand. 7), he nevertheless has the former no less than the latter. Of that which was characteristic of heretical Judaism, namely, the rejection of the ablution of sins by the sufferings of Christ, and the retention of only His prophetic and royal office, we find no trace in him, but the very opposite. And it is only in the roundabout way formerly noticed (Appendix, Note LL) that he, in the same way as Montanism, falls back into Judaizing, not in reference to the Person of Christ, but rather in the relation of justification to sanctification. Something analogous is found where no imputation of Ebionism can be made; as, for instance, in the case of Cyprian, and in the Catholic Church. It especially, however, deserves to be noticed, that from the way in which the supernatural in Christianity is with him concentrated especially in baptism, the foundation is laid for giving a magical aspect to this act; and in this an entrance was given to a similar treatment of the laying on of hands in ordination. In the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies both are still more strongly set forth, as well as the Pelagian element which always goes by the side of the magical.

The realistic tendency of Hermas is shared, in somewhat different ways, on the one hand by *Papias*, and on the other by *Hegesippus*.

Papias, according to Irenæus, adv. Haer. v. 33, was the hearer of John and the friend of Polycarp; but Eusebius (H. E. iii. 39), who in this case is especially critical, and had before him five books of Papias (entitled ἐξήγησις λογίων κυριακῶν), found no hint of intercourse on his part with the Apostle John: and on this, had it happened, Papias would certainly not have been silent. Papias, however, collected with care the information which the disciples of the different Apostles were able to give him concerning their doctrines; nay, he even knew two men who seem to have been disciples of the Lord Himself. His high antiquity is evident from his relation to the Christian writings. Besides the first Epistle of John and the first of Peter, he knew also the Gospel of Mark and a Gospel

of Matthew (*Ματθαῖος τὰ λόγια συνεγράψατο*,=Discourses and Histories, for both are included in the similarly entitled work of Papias, as appears from Eus. iii. 39); but he looked for more benefit from the living testimony which still existed than from the reading of books. But this oral tradition contained, besides the fundamental stock of the Gospel-tradition, parables and teachings of the Lord, and, as it appears, also narratives which were not introduced into our Gospels.—It is probable, as Eusebius also hints, that the Chiliastic positions which Irenæus advances at the end of the last book, and which he ascribes to an ancient presbyter (v. 36), are taken from the work of Papias, as well as those for which he expressly cites Papias (v. 35).[1] For all these positions Papias himself has referred to presbyters who were disciples of the Apostles (Eus. iii. 39), especially Ariston and the Presbyter John, whom probably Irenæus has confounded with the Apostle John.

First, then, as respects his Christological views: the faith of Papias can in no case have embraced less than is expressed in the Gospel by Mark, for this he fully acknowledged (Eus. iii. 39). The same may be concluded also from the citation by him of passages from the first Epistle of Peter and of John (ibid).[2] In particular, we know that he taught in his books the death of Christ and the treachery of Judas;[3] that Christ is the Redeemer, who hath been exalted to heaven.[4] He referred the work of the six days allegorically to Christ and the Church,[5]

[1] Routh also, Reliquiæ Sacræ I. 9, 10, is of a similar opinion.

[2] The Apocalypse also he held to be Johannine; comp. the passages of Andreas Cæsar. Proleg. Comment. in Apocal. in Routh, Rel. Sac. I. 15; also the Catena in Epp. Cathol. ed. Cramer, Ox. 1840, p. 360, 361, 176. Nay, he knew also the Gospel of John, according to the fragment of the Bodleian, Cod. MS. 2397, Grabe Spicil. II. 30, Routh, Rel. Sac. I. 16: Maria Jacobi Minoris mater, uxor Alphei, soror fuit Mariæ matris domini; quam Cleophæ Joannes nominat, etc. Comp. John xix. 25. Also the quotation of the passage John xiv. 2, in the discourse of the Presbyter in Irenæus v. 36, belongs in all probability to the work of Papias.

[3] According to Apollinaris of Laodicea in Œcumenius, Comm. in Acta c. ii.; Routh, l. c. 9.

[4] *Μετὰ τὴν τοῦ Σωτῆρος ἀνάληψιν.*—Euseb. iii. 39.

[5] Anastasis Sin. Contempl. in Hexaëm. L. I. in Routh l. c. 15. This is to be understood in connection with the fact, that, like Clemens and Pantænus, he took the six days' work as symbolical of the six world-ages (comp. Ep. of Barnabas), which are to be followed by the Millennium Sabbath.

and also paradise;[1] and says that in heaven, in paradise and the kingdom of God, Christ will be seen according as those who thus see Him shall be worthy of it. "This is the appointed order and division in the triclinium of the guest-chamber (Matt. xxii. 10) of those who shall be saved, say the presbyters, the disciples of the Apostles;[2] and through these three stages do the believers advance,—through the Spirit to the Son, through the Son to the Father, because the Son yields up His work unto the Father," as also the Apostle says, 1 Cor. xv. 25–28 (Iren. v. 36, 2). We must presently speak continuously of the Christological significance of the doctrine concerning the Last Things, as it appeared in the second century. Here we only remark, that in the eschatology of Papias, Christ is represented as the King, the Bringer of blessedness, which, on the other hand, is consummated in Him or His appearance, whence He is represented as the Highest Good of Christians. The millennial reign is as little with him as with Irenæus the closing scene: had it been so, it might with justice have been said, that the highest end was conceived by Papias after a material fashion, and so, that Christianity was not recognised on the whole in its ideal import; but the last end, according to him, is God the Father in the Son and the Holy Ghost.[3]

Hegesippus (about 150; see Euseb. ii. 23, iii. 16, 20, 32, iv. 22) takes nearly the same stand-point as Hermas. He deserves notice more particularly, because with him an edifice of opinion, to the effect that in the former half of the second century the Ebionitic view was virtually that of the Church, stands or falls. Hegesippus, a converted Hebrew, who bestowed particular attention on the divisions of the Jewish sects, and saw many of their errors clothed in the form of Christian heresies, in his zeal for unity of doctrine (the ὑγιὴ κανόνα τοῦ σωτηρίου κηρύγματος, Euseb. iii. 32), travelled to most of the bishops to discover what the faith was, and found in all churches the same faith as the Law, the Prophets, and the Lord had proclaimed to him; and this unity he set over against the heretical

[1] See Appendix, Note RR.

[2] This reminds of the words of Papias in Euseb. iii. 39: τοὺς τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἀνέκρινον λόγους, τί Ἀνδρέας . . εἶπε . . . οἱ τοῦ Κυρίου μαθηταὶ λέγουσιν.

[3] Appendix, Note SS.

varieties. The fruit of his studies was his five books called Hypomnemata, of which valuable fragments have been preserved by Eusebius. The questions raised thereupon are, first, What, according to Hegesippus, belongs to the sound canon of salvation-bringing announcement? and next, How far is his testimony regarding the accordance of the churches trustworthy? If we are in circumstances to show that he was not an Ebionite, his testimony becomes very weighty, provided he be worthy of credit; for there is no doubt as to the historical fact of his journeys. If, however, he was an Ebionite, it remains at least a problem to show how he could declare what was so untrue. For untrue, it may be assumed at the outset, his testimony would be, since it would be in contradiction with himself. For how could he contrive, for instance, to think as an Ebionite, and yet to treat the first Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians as Christian (which he did, according to Euseb. iv. 22, comp. iii. 16)? or how would his position be before Polycarp, Justin Martyr, Quadratus, Aristides, who are far from leaving the impression that they were only the representatives of a small party, which stood opposed to the pretended Ebionitic Church? Or how shall we account for his position at Rome, and his visit to Anicetus, considering how strongly an anti-Judaizing order of things, especially in respect of Easter, at that time agitating the Church, was rooted there, so that out of the Jewish Passover a Christian festival of Easter on the Sunday had been instituted?

It must be acknowledged that it may be almost included among the axioms of recent Church History that Hegesippus was of Ebionitish views; and in the opinion of many, he was so in a Christological respect. The grounds of this are these:—

He represents the piety of James the Just in an Ebionitic manner (Euseb. ii. 23). But however great might be his reverence for James, it does not follow that the piety of the latter was the exact expression of his own; for in this case we should have in the portrait by Hegesippus one which, in its essential features, did not rest on genuine ecclesiastical tradition; in which case his testimony as to the unity of the Church belief with his own would have little weight. But further, James the Just himself must be otherwise judged of. What, in 150 after the overthrow of Judaism and the dissolution of connection with Jewish customs, would have an appearance of Ebionism,

is in the first generation of the Church entirely consistent and innocent. What though James the Just did not hold the observance of the Jewish law as necessary for salvation (of which Hegesippus says not a word), and consequently did not impose on the heathen, whom Hegesippus tells us he converted, the yoke of this, whilst yet he himself, as a Nazarite, and since the Jewish people were thereby more accessible to him, did not feel called upon, so long as the temple stood (and he died before its destruction), openly to break with the law and customs of his nation?[1] The picture which Hegesippus gives us of him is in perfect accordance with what we gather from the Epistle of James, and with what is recorded concerning him in the Epistle to the Galatians and the Acts of the Apostles (see ch. xv.); the one, indeed, completes the other. That he could keep that perfect law of liberty of which his epistle speaks, who can doubt? But more than this: if, according to the history of the Acts, James regarded the law as not abolished for Jewish Christians, but ascribed to it, if not a dogmatic, at least an historic right, in accordance with which he exhorted even Paul to present an offering in the temple, which the latter also did (Acts xxi. 18); the statement of Hegesippus, at least concerning James, is shown to be credible, and that without its following either that James was an Ebionite, or that Hegesippus, who treats him with the utmost reverence, as his wisdom and piety deserved, should be regarded as intimating that this form of piety was the only right one, or was that which he himself professed (Eus. ii. 23).[2] Or must he be held to be an Ebionite because he was a Hebrew by birth? because he has narrated more of the Church at Jerusalem than any other? or because he probably used the Hebrew Gospel, as did also Ignatius, Papias, and Origen, and which was, to say the least, closely allied to that of Matthew? or because he recorded Jewish traditions of which we know not what they

[1] We should rather expect the opposite, if, for instance, we compare the History of the Reformation. Sulpicius Severus (Bk. ii. 45) informs us how on the Church at Jerusalem, though acknowledging the Divinity of Christ, there lay, till the destruction of the city under Hadrian, a certain pressure, because they could not free themselves from the law; and how, on the other hand, the dispersion of the Jews brought deliverance from the bondage of the law.

[2] Appendix, Note TT.

were, or whether he himself believed them or not? or, in fine, because he included among heresies (though he wrote no proper Heresiology) the Jewish sects? This last he could have forborne to do, only if by these sects truths which formed tenets of Christianity were not attacked. It is true that on this ground he might also have included heathen errors; but his not having done so may be accounted for by the consideration, that he was both better acquainted with, and more deeply interested in, the Jewish sects. Still more; he did not speak of them as sects of Christianity, but, according to Euseb. iv. 22,[1] expressly distinguished between the Jewish sects which are against Judah *and* Christ, and those which carried false doctrines into the before unsullied Church.[2] We shall now collect the Christological elements out of the few remains that have been preserved to us; whereby (according to the witnesses adduced in Appendix, Note TT.) we are entitled to ascribe to Hegesippus a higher representation of the Person of Christ than the fragments show of him.

It will not be denied that his Christological faith must have embraced those elements of the idea of Christ which he represents James the Just as expressing. Now James, according to his account (Eus. ii. 23), was asked by the Jews, *τίς ἡ θύρα τοῦ Ἰησοῦ τοῦ σταυρωθέντος;* This may mean either, What is the key to the right judgment concerning Jesus? or *θύρα* here may be equivalent to שַׁעַר, What is the right appreciation of Him? or *Ἰησοῦ* may be the genitive of apposition, What is to be understood of Jesus when He is called the door? The latter interpretations accord best with the answer; the third, however, like the first, is linguistically harsh, though Ignatius, Philad. 9, Hermas, Simil. 9 (comp. John x. 9), and Routh, l. c. I. 217 ff. 220, support it. James answered, "Jesus is the Christ, the *σωτήρ*. He is the Son of Man, and sits in heaven on the right hand of Supreme Power, and will come again in the clouds of heaven. When He comes, the judgment will take place; He will be the Judge of all." He preached to heathen and Jew, as a true witness, that Jesus is the Christ. The second advent of Christ appears to have formed a leading article of the creed of the Church at Jerusalem, for the Jews were wont to designate the

[1] Appendix, Note UU. [2] Appendix, Note VV.

becoming a Christian as "a waiting for Jesus Christ." Still it is not expressly stated what it is through which Christ is the Saviour. Hegesippus held Him for the *Teacher* by whom the Law and Prophets had been fulfilled but not destroyed, comp. Matt. v. 17 (Euseb. iv. 22); also for the King who sits at God's right hand. But that he also attributed to Him the forgiveness of sins is probable, from that faith in the Crucified which, according to him (ii. 23), belongs to Christianity, and is an offence to the Jews. Had he, like the Ebionites, regarded Him as a mere man, he would not have laid any stress on this. But that he did not so regard Him is most evident from his calling (iii. 32) the contemporaries of Christ the *γενεὰ τῶν ἀὐταῖς ἀκοαῖς τῆς ἐνθέου Σοφίας ἐπἀκοῦσαι κατηξιωμένων*. If Christ is to him the Wisdom (comp. Matt. xi. 19; Luke xi. 49), and that *ἔνθεος*, it is not too much to conclude that Hegesippus viewed the Person of Christ in connection with the "Wisdom" of the Proverbs, which was with God as His counsellor at the creation of the world, and that in such a way as to regard the wisdom which was with God as appearing in the Son of Man, so that the latter might be called the personal Wisdom, the *σοφία ἔνθεος*. This conclusion, which in the case of a converted Hebrew is in itself highly probable, is expressly authorized by Eusebius, who (iv. 22) relates how highly Hegesippus esteemed the Proverbs of Solomon, and how he, "with Irenæus and the whole choir of the ancients, called them the *πανάρετον Σοφίαν*."[1]

Hegesippus (as well as, according to his account, the leaders of the Church at Jerusalem) had not by any means a carnal, Judaizing concept of the second coming of Christ. His kingdom and parousia were, indeed, looked for as nigh at hand; and this brought persecution on the relations of Jesus who were presidents of the Church in Jerusalem. But when they were asked before the tribunal concerning Christ, and of His kingdom, of what kind it was, when and where it was to appear, they replied that it was not in any respect an earthly kingdom, but one heavenly and angelic, which was to commence at the end of the world, when Christ coming in His glory would judge the living and the dead, and assign to each according to his service; whereupon Domitian dismissed them with contempt (Eus.

[1] Appendix, Note WW.

iii. 20). Notwithstanding, however, this spirituality in his representations of the Messianic kingdom, we are not entitled to presume that he denied its visibility; even Paul held this along with the former.[1]

Putting all together, we conclude that Hegesippus cannot at all be reckoned among the more noted and gifted or dogmatically productive men: his Hebrew origin betrays itself in his speech, as well as in his prejudice in favour of his people and of the Christian Church in the midst of them; but as respects his Christological views, the charge that he was an Ebionite is utterly unfounded. He has intercourse also with churches of heathen Christians, nay, is made happy by his reception among them, and finds himself at one with them in belief. From his fragments, we are led to concur in the judgment of Eusebius, that he was a man of the simplest faith, but at the same time a representative of the sound doctrine of apostolic preaching. The Son of Man is with him the personal Wisdom who appeared on earth, and is now exalted to the right hand of God. And now we are entitled to take what he says of the universal concurrence of the Church, in which he approvingly sympathised, as a weighty testimony at least to the fact, that the essentially Christian doctrine—that of the true manhood of Christ and His Divine pre-existent being—was, about the middle of the second century, the prevalent doctrine in the leading churches; though it does not follow from this, that there were none of another way of thinking. Hegesippus himself knew of heretics; uniformity in all points was not yet in the Church: still his testimony is weighty in favour of the unity of the principal churches in fundamentals, especially Christology.

What has been said may suffice to subvert the principal supports of the hypothesis of the original Ebionism of the Church, which have been afresh adduced by some recent writers; nay, the very men who are brought forward in support of it we recognise as witnesses against Ebionism in Christology. It only remains that we should consider the Christian apocryphal writings, and the eschatological expectations of the ancient Church; on which it is the more necessary that a thorough and well-grounded judgment should be reached, since many mistakes have been

[1] Appendix, Note XX.

entertained, especially on the latter, from the time of Corrodi, and since some have adduced these Christological expectations as a leading argument for the alleged Ebionism of the ancient Church, whereas, rightly viewed, they form one of the clearest proofs of the contrary. It may be permitted, for the sake of connection, to go somewhat beyond the limits of our epoch.

In the outset, it is to be asserted that Christian antiquity, as a whole, possessed an eschatology, nay, that during the second half of the first century as well as the second century, especial care was bestowed on this subject. All were at one,—men of the Johannine school, as Polycarp and Papias—of the Pauline, as Ignatius and Clement of Rome—of the Petrine, as Barnabas—of that of James, as Hermas and Hegesippus,[1]—all were at one as to the fact that a return of Christ was to be expected, when He should raise the dead and hold the judgment, and when the Church should be perfected by the separation from it of the evil. The source of interest in this subject, it may be at the same time remarked, was not the same in all; just as we may observe it down to our own day. And in this respect, it is characteristic that those who were more deeply impressed with the secular vocation of Christianity, or those who more profoundly recognised the eternal life appearing in Christianity, were less interested in the developing of the eschatology. This is apparent even with John in the Gospel, as compared with the Apocalypse; a comparison which also affords a very instructive hint as to the fact and the reason of the existence in the Church of a predominantly eschatological age, preceding that stand-point of Christology which the Gospel possesses. It is self-evident that in the beginning Christianity was, to the majority, rather the precious pearl which the heart finds, than the leaven which is to penetrate mankind and revolutionize the world. The first form of Christian piety must loosen itself from the preceding world of the spirit which was the product of another principle—must concentrate itself on itself; and the tendency to association and the formation of relations, to which Christianity certainly prompts, must at first be, for the most part, overruled by an aiming at the separation of Christians from non-Christians, as well in worship

[1] Clemens Roman. 21, 50; Barnabas 7, 15, 20 ff.; Herm. Simil. 8 and 9; Hegesipp. ap. Euseb. iii. 20, ii. 23; Ignat. ad Ephes. 11; Polycarp, Ep. 5, 6. On Papias, see above.

as in Christian manners. Over against the huge unchristian world the young Christianity stood as an almost invisible planet, and the most unpleasant relations possible subsisted between its intensive essence and the utterances to which this necessitated, and which it justified, and its extensive value. The few Christians felt themselves to be the soul of the world;[1] and yet it was a soul as it were without a body, or rather, the carnalized world did not as yet obey the soul. Even the moral law would be impotent, and not the alone enduring Divine truth, were it satisfied with perpetually presenting its demand, and at the same time perpetually remaining unperformed, renouncing every other reality except that of requirement. In like manner Christianity could not do otherwise than assert with absolute certainty its future universal supremacy. To this confidence there are so many discourses of Christ which give a right; but besides, every individual who had become a Christian, had thereby become a partaker of that absolute union of the ideal with the real which appeared in Christ prototypically. If under the Old Covenant the prophetic spirit which announced the completion of the kingdom of God was communicated only sporadically, under the New Covenant there was given, with the being a Christian, also the absolute certainty of the victory of Christ over the world, and the prophecy had become a general one. And thus had the history of Christ come to be viewed as a type for the history of the Church. Not power first, but endurance and suffering. Not the immediate sovereignty, which as such would have been carnal and physical; but first the dying a death of love, after that the glorification, in order that holy love might be recognised as that which is higher than immediate power, and then that from this power might be again born; so that to love, the spirit's truth, nothing should be wanting to its being made to appear as the highest thing in the world, as the innermost and abiding power of the world, to yield to which brings eternal felicity, to oppose which, eternal condemnation.

The eschatological expectations undoubtedly contained many traits from the Old Testament and Judaism. This has been made to serve as a proof of the Ebionism of the ancient Church; but in this has been forgotten only the principal

[1] Ep. ad Diog. c. 7; Justin Mart. Apol. ii. 7.

thing, namely, that the pre-Christian age expected the Messiah, but that the Christian Church in its eschatology hoped for the return of no other than Him who had already come. The Christian hope of the Coming One grew entirely out of faith in Him who had come. It may as well be said that it was the Christian principle which by an inner necessity sketched out for itself an eschatology, that spontaneously concurred in its essential lines with the Messianic representations of the Old Testament, as it may be asserted that the purer representations of Messianic eschatology were of necessity transferred to Him who was recognised and believed in as Saviour of the world. The absolute reconciliation with God, the completion of *Religion*, is made known by Christianity as *come* in Christ; and therein also the completion of the world or the kingdom of God as certainly to come, through the second coming of Him who has already come.

But what meaning has this preponderance of eschatological representation, which is shown as well in Christology, in the importance which, at first especially, was attached to the resurrection of the Lord, and His exaltation to royal dignity at the right hand of the Father, as in what is closely connected with this, the living interests for the final history of the Church, which is itself again a part of the history of Christ? What, in short, is the significancy of this for the development of doctrine?

We find that in all scientific systems the popular thinking, in order to gain a conception of them, asks before all, not so much what is the principle or beginning and the processes, as what is the end, the result. So it was with the entrance of Christianity into the world. The disciples always sought most readily after the end, the result; for it was thereby that they had the summary of the momenta which were to be distributed before their eyes only in process of time. Eschatology, consequently, in which the circle of these momenta first becomes defined as a whole, is that in which the full idea of Christianity is first presented to the mind; just as religions of a less ethical character look back to the beginning, to Paradise. Eschatology may thus be justly called the succulent swelling germ from which, as from the whole, from the matured, completed idea of Christianity, one momentum unfolds itself towards another; in

which all dogmas are included, yet ever so as there is a regression from the last to the first.[1]

In eschatology the Christian principle celebrates its absoluteness, its apotheosis; for the entire universe is determined by it. What is not an integral part of the eternal kingdom shall be absolutely cast aside at the end of things, as powerless and worthless. In this there already lies the principle, that in it, or rather in Christ, who is not now viewed as He that is come, but rather as He who is to come again, is that which absolutely confers worth; for by faith in Him who has appeared, is determined blessedness or rejection through Him who is to come again. Hence it is clear, that wherever this identity of Him who is to come again, and who as Judge and Perfecter of the world must be regarded as exercising Divine prerogatives, with Him who has appeared, is held fast, there Ebionism is impossible; and that this can exist only where this identity is denied and perfection is expected from another principle, or where the idea of perfection is stript of its absoluteness and rendered inept, in which case Christ is brought into only a loose relation to it. To the latter Cerinthus must have had a leaning; to the former the old Montanism, in so far as it anticipated a new state of things in the dispensation of the Holy Ghost. Where, on the other hand, neither of these is the case, as with all the Fathers hitherto considered by us; where eschatology is placed in the closest relation to the Person of Christ; and where it is held fast that the perfection which He brings is not of eudæmonistic, but of absolute worth, and brings the spirit to its truth; there Ebionism has become an impossibility, or at the utmost can exist only in faint traces. In this case there is rather, conversely, found in eschatology the complement of Christology, by means of which that which in Christ's state of humiliation remained latent is connected, for the anticipation of faith, with that which has been already manifested, so as to form the entire image of the Person of Christ, with the out-

[1] In respect of this, it is noticeable how during the ecclesiastical development of the first age there was a greater tendency towards what is last, eschatology; whilst in the Gnostic development, the tendency was to the beginning, to cosmogony, nay, to theogony. Both, however, in their progress must meet and mingle. In this also is mirrored the difference between the idealistic and the realistic tendency.

lines of which the knowledge of the historical Christ first became a reality in the mind.[1] Now, as surely as the Church, in its independent construction of Christianity, had to begin with the end, and to be assured of that, so surely did this initiatory preponderance of the eschatological exert a dangerous influence in a dogmatical respect, which could be avoided only by proceeding vigorously in Christology from the end to the now newly illustrated construction of the intermediate momenta. The dangers incurred are of an Ebionitic and Doketic kind.

If regard is fastened only on the exalted Lord, the King, the central point of His earthly life—His propitiatory agency—may be almost overlooked; and in this case there remains only the Teacher, and the returning Lord of glory, who is to rule over all. Such an Ebionitic, outward, and unethical view of His *work* may easily pass over to an Ebionitic view of His Person, for Pelagianism and Ebionism are internally allied. Still more immediately is Ebionism brought in when the mind turns to eschatology in the narrower sense with so unsatisfied a longing, that it feels as if by the first advent of Christ nothing was done or ameliorated essentially, but that all depends on His second coming. In this case Christ becomes merely the prophet of His own future, a work which another might have discharged, and for which no peculiar equipment was necessary; this, consequently, if it became necessary at all, would be resorted to only afterwards. So was it with Cerinthus, who maintained that the resurrection of Christ itself is to be referred to His second coming. Doketism also may obtain a point of egress from this preponderance of the eschatological, and may penetrate into the Church even where, from its realism and its eschatology, it might seem closed against such Doketism as came from the Gnostic side. For if the idea of Christ is formed only one-sidedly from an eschatological point of view,—if He is regarded only as the exalted Lord,—there is a danger of His Divinity, which in eschatology comes forth with peculiar glory, though in union with humanity, being too exclusively regarded in connection with His appearance on earth. This dissipation of the true humanity of Christ appears especially in several of the apocryphal writings (see further on); but the tendency to this may be discerned at a very early period. Thus

[1] Appendix, Note YY.

Doketism on realistic grounds, and from an undue preponderance of eschatological considerations, was introduced in reference to the beginning and the earthly life of the God-man. But the same risk of Doketism arose only in another quarter, namely, in reference to the end, when the longing after the return of the Lord led in the manner described to a depreciation of what had been already done, and referred all to a second advent of a totally different character. Such a view of Christ has in itself something of a Doketic character; but this is greatly strengthened when over against the world as it is now a dualistic variance impends, and the entrance of the kingdom of God and the returning Christ is not conceived as historically mediated, but as abrupt. The magical entrance of the reign of God of necessity has a Doketic effect also on the Christology. This latter form of Doketism is especially instructive, from its explaining what at first sight is an enigmatical phænomenon, namely, that the ancient Ebionism is at least partially coupled with Doketism, and *vice versa*. For it is evident that this Doketism of the end has an Ebionitic view of the earthly life of Christ as its presupposition (see above); so that the peculiar drama of the alternation between Ebionism and Doketism may be exhibited in one and the same mode of thought. Both sides of the Person of Christ are acknowledged; but in place of being simultaneously interpenetrative, they are severed, they are presented one apart from the other; and as the one side becomes prominent in consciousness, the other retires into the background, or is excluded. To this also the ancient Montanism must have come, had it taken a Christological direction instead of confining itself to the work of Christ. For if it looked on the historical work of Christ, the result of this could not satisfy its impatient longing after the other world, its dualistic view of the world, but must appear poor in comparison with what was yet to come. If it looked on the new Jerusalem, the historical being and work of Christ would evanish before the suddenly-working, the absolutely new-creating power of the glorified, returning Christ. The old world would be annihilated, the new would come in its place. This dualism is the fundamental view which is common to both Montanism and Gnosticism. In Montanism, however, both sides appear successively: in Gnosticism the dualism is not of a successive, but of a simul-

taneous kind; and this is in accordance with the fact, that its point of issue is rather theory, while that of Montanism is practice. To Gnosticism, the position, that the resurrection has happened already, is essential; it has no toleration for an eschatology. On this the old Montanism concentrated its entire Christianity.[1] Hence these two so violently clashed. As, however, the Christian truth, which was then making way in the Church, unites the theoretical and the practical, and does not allow the one to exclude the other, so in eschatology it atoned the contradiction between Gnosticism and Montanism; as it did not deny either the presence of the Eternal in Christ or His impending return, but assigned their rights to both by removing the dualism on which both stand, and rendering possible such a historical mediation as posits both a future end and an already present power, objectively realized in Christ, to accomplish that end. And thus both the Gnostic joy over the already present light of truth, a joy approaching to haughty triumph, and the longing after a more perfect state of things, approaching to sadness and depression, were morally united in the joyous activity called forth in the furthering of the design of Christianity to be *a leaven of the world.* Hope has assumed an ethical character, or seeks to reach the perfecting of the world through a love which ensouls the world; and the ethical has as its basis the reconciliation as already accomplished (not in theory merely, but for the innermost life),—that is, it has *faith* for its basis. Without this advance to the ethical, faith ceases to be faith, and must pass over either into Gnosticism or Montanism, according as those in whom it is are of a more theoretical or of a more practical cast of mind.[2]

As before the time of Gnosticism and Montanism there were not wanting men in the Church (see p. 143, note 1) who were not only free from a fantastic scheme of eschatology, but who did not exclude either of the two sides,—either the presence of the Divine in Him who had appeared, or the hope of His return;

[1] The difference and analogy of the two may be thus stated: Both have to do with an ideal world; but Gnosticism construes it as the highest truth, Montanism as the chief good.

[2] Philastrius casts on the old Montanists the taunt of a "vitæ tempus vanum et infructuosum" (Hæres. 21). Similar reproaches are much more frequently cast on Gnosticism.

so also, during this time itself, there were those who discriminated the two sides in order to unite them again in a higher and more intelligent manner. It is Irenæus, however, in whose works especially this reconciliation is shown, with the advantages which the Church derived from the preceding conflict.[1]

It is undeniable that Christianity first sketched out from its principle its theory of the world in its eschatology; in this is the *consummatio* of the world's history, and consequently this, as well in respect of its final end and aim as in respect of the reality of this end, is fixed. In it the anthropological side, the perfected manhood, is united to the Christology, so as to be seen by the mind. Having fixed the definitive aim and secured its reality, all that preceded has unity, connection, regularity; and on this side it is impossible to mistake the speculative element of eschatology, though presented in a preponderantly historical form.[2] Passing on from this to cast a glance on the New Testament Apocrypha, and that as well on the apocalyptic as on the rest which have been handed down to us, the most important of the former which come before us are the Sibylline Books, the Book of Enoch, and the appendix to it, the Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs.

Of the Sibylline Books, it is the fourth and the fifth we have here especially to consider; of which the former belongs to the first century, the latter to the beginning of the second. The fourth book exhorts men to be baptized, and, raising their hands into the air, to implore forgiveness. If they do not that, fire shall consume the world; whereupon God shall raise the dead and institute the judgment. The earth shall again cover the impious; the pious shall again live on the earth; God shall give them spirit and life; and they shall all again find themselves (Oracula Sibyllina cum variorum commentariis, ed. Serv. Gallæus, Amst. 1689, pp. 530–539) Of more importance is the fifth book. In the oracle against Memphis (p. 556, v. 60–72) it is said: "Thou hast raged against my God-anointed children (*παῖδας θεοχρίστους*);[3] thou shalt weep, and see the eternal, the immortal God in the clouds.[4] A strong king sent

[1] Appendix, Note ZZ.

[2] Appendix, Note AAA.

[3] At p. 641, the pious are called *λαὸς θεότευκτος*.

[4] That this relates to Christ (Matt. xxiv. 30) cannot be doubtful; at the same time, however, it proves that eschatology is not secured against Doketism.

forth of God shall sustain all great kings.[1] A world-conflagration, and a battle of the stars with each other, will bring in the end." Then shall there come (p. 600, v. 257 ff.) again from the air a distinguished man, who on the fruitful tree stretched forth His hands, the best of the Hebrews, who once for all established the sun, who spake in pleasing discourse and with holy lips. "There has come," cries the Sibylle in a passage further on, in prophetic anticipation, "from the heavenly regions the man who went home, holding the sceptre in His hand which God hath delivered unto Him. Gloriously does He build up Jerusalem and the holy temple; even unto heaven reacheth His building."[2] The author of this oracle shows himself to have been a Jewish Christian;[3] but already we find great stress laid by him on Christ's death, and he does not confine his regards to Him as risen. The cross is to him the wood that brings much fruit.[4] On the other hand, the coming of Christ in the clouds to judgment is directly called by him the manifestation of God.

It is almost more difficult to pronounce judgment on the Book of Enoch. Is it the production of one author or not, of a Jew or a Christian? In any case, eschatology so predominates in it, that the Christ of history is forced entirely into the background; and so that comes to pass here which we have

[1] With especial fervour does the oracle speak against Rome and Italy, because through them many of the saints, the believers, and the true temple (*i.e.*, the temple of the true God) have fallen.

[2] At p. 628, God is called κτίστης ναοῖο μεγίστου. For the rest, it is doubtful whether the temple is thought of as a spiritual one, consisting of holy men, though this has much in its favour (p. 623: οἶκον ἀεὶ θάλλοντα, Θεοῦ τηρήμονα ναὸν, ἐξ ἁγίων γεγαῶτα, καὶ ἄφθιτον αἰεὶ ἐόντα). What follows, also, seems to me to refer to a temple consisting of the souls and bodies of men, to a worship without clay or stone or gold, consisting wholly of the offerings of the God-inspired.

[3] As in the description of the holy city and the holy land, which shall in the time of the Messiah show the heavenly Jerusalem and Canaan (θειογενής, p. 602) also in visible reality (ἔνσαρκον, p. 627); further, at p. 598, where the Jews, who enter the Messiah's kingdom, are called a godly race, holy inhabitants of heaven; and in fine, pp. 600, 601, where the Messiah is called "the best of the Hebrews." On the other hand, the passages above cited forbid our regarding the author as a Jew. See a dissertation by Bleek on the Sibylline Oracles in the Theologische Zeitschrift of Schleiermacher, De Wette, and Lücke, H. ii. p. 188 ff.

[4] Appendix, Note BBB.

above noted, that a one-sided eschatology approximates to Doketism. Nevertheless there is much that favours the conclusion, that it is on the whole a Jewish product, which probably owes some touches to the hand of a Christian.[1] The entire standpoint of the book is essentially Jewish. Of what is peculiarly Christian—the incarnation of God, the name Jesus, His earthly life and death, His resurrection and ascension, the work of redemption as a whole, Baptism and the Lord's Supper—not a trace is found, whilst the Sabbath is represented as an eternal ordinance (c. x. 23). The Messiah, indeed, has a high place: He is called the Elect,[2] the Son of Men,[3] the Man's Son,[4] the Woman's Son,[5] the Son of God;[6] His name was called before the sun in the presence of the Lord of spirits;[7] He sits next to Him on the throne, in the hidden place, from the beginning to the end of days;[8] but He shall be manifest then, when as Judge He shall utter the decisive word which God approves on the day of judgment (lx. 10 ff., lxviii. 39), which is the chief object of the book. Hence the author knows not of any appearance of the Son of Man besides that to judgment (lx. 17). Then shall the saints dwell with the Son of Man, and eat, and lie down and rise up with Him, for ever and ever (c. lxi. 17). There is no doctrine of a Trinity in the book;[9] the Messiah is not called the Word nor the Wisdom.[10] And when

[1] Appendix, Note CCC.

[2] C. lx. 7, 10, 16, lxi. 1, 10, xl. 5, xlv. 3, 4, xlviii. (xlvi.) 2, 4, l. 3, 5, li. 5, 10, liv. 5.

[3] C. xlvi. 1. 2, lxi. 13, 17, lxii. 15, lxviii. 38, 39, lxix. 1, etc. Noah also is called this, lix. 11; perhaps also Enoch, lxx. 23.

[4] C. lxviii. 40, 41. Enoch also is thus addressed, c. lxx. 17: "Thou art the man's son, born to righteousness."

[5] C. lxi. 8–13, especially 9. [6] C. civ. (cvi.) 2.

[7] C. xlviii. 3–5.

[8] C. lxi. 10, xlviii. 5: "The elect and the hidden one was in the presence of the Lord of spirits before the world was, and evermore."

[9] See Hoffmann on lx. 13, lxx. 9.

[10] Yet He judges the spirits *by* the word of the name of the Lord (c. lx. 11), or by the word which is a sword of His mouth (comp. lxi. 4, lxii. 15). Wisdom, on the other hand, is ascribed to Him as an attribute; but He Himself is not called Wisdom. His peculiar characteristic, under which the book thinks the Messiah, is rather righteousness (ch. xlvi. 2, xlviii. 16, xlviii. (xlvi.) 3, l. 3); and it is almost only for the judgment that wisdom comes into consideration. The Messiah is not the world-

he calls Him the Woman's Son, there can be no doubt that the author, had he been a Christian, would have referred that to His birth of the Virgin: as used by him, it has its full explanation if we either take it as a circumlocution for "man" (as in Matt. xi. 11; Luke vii. 28), or, what is better, regard it as referring to the seed of the woman in the Protevangelium, and understand it of the Messiah. His speaking of the Son of Man as existing with God before the creation of the world, and as worshipped by all being, receives an explanation of a striking kind from Daniel's Son of Man; from Persian or allied ideas, which are elsewhere found in the book; in fine, from the place which the doctrine of angels holds in this book, and other similar performances. The passage from Daniel (vii. 13, 27), on which we have already commented (see p. 44), hovers before the author's mind; but the term, Son of Man, is more definitely applied to the Messiah by him than in Daniel. He is, without doubt (and to this, Persian ideas may have contributed), regarded as the Primal Man, who precedes the rest of creation as its idea. The doctrine of angels, when brought to such validity and extension as it must have been at the time of the writing of the Book of Enoch, could not but ally itself, in the mind of a Jew who adhered to the prophecies of his people, with the idea of the Messiah; and this took effect in the Messiah being conceived of, after the manner of an angel, as the Primal Man (xlvi. 1). But the Messiah, who exercises judgment on all evil, and consequently on evil angels,—a subject on which this book greatly dwells,—must, on the other hand, be placed above angels. Thus His pre-existence was implicitly asserted. There is no ground for regarding this representation as a general one in pre-Christian Judaism; on the contrary, the dialogue of Justin with the Jew Trypho rather shows (e. gr. c. 48) that the mass of the Jews were expecting a Messiah who should be simply a man from among men, and who should receive a higher personality through the anointing of Elias. But more than this: even if the representations of the Book of

creating Wisdom of Proverbs, but the world has been created by an oath (*i.e.*, by God's powerful word, which is not to be identified with the Messiah; c. lxviii. 21-29). So little is this oath (*i.e.*, God's word) the Son of God, that it is rather of the rebellious angels that the discourse is, who availed themselves of that oath as a powerful form of incantation.

Enoch were general among the Jews, against which is the testimony of the Gospels (which represent the opinion of Trypho as that of the nation, Matt. xxii. 41 ff., ii. 4 ff.; John vii. 41; and only make a few allusions to any other view, John vii. 27, conf. Heb. vii. 3), still we should be far from having in them the Christian idea of the Person of Christ. Especially, we have not there the right view of the humanity of Christ: we have only the eternal, immutable idea of Manhood hypostatized without passing into the state of becoming (*werden*), consequently no incarnation. This Son of Man of Enoch is only the abstract, rigid Logos of Philo evolved out of Daniel; and hence more definitely hypostatized than by Philo, who nevertheless calls his Logos the Primal Man. Moreover, this Son of Man has no true Deity. Righteousness, not love, is his fundamental characteristic; and as respects his essence, he does not belong to the inner circle of the Divine, but he stands, if as first, or, if it be preferred, as king and representative, yet still only among the cherubim, seraphim, and ophanim,—all angels of might and majesty,—and praises, in unison with them, the name of the Lord of spirits to eternity (c. lx. 13, 14). He is an attendant of the Head of days, the Father of spirits (e. gr. c. xlvi. 1).

Whilst, however, we regard this book as wholly a Jewish production, and though the Messiah whom it describes, in spite of analogies to the Christian, is not thought of as having come in Jesus, or even as promised by Him, still an evidence may be drawn from it of how the momentum of pre-existence in the concept of the Messiah is not only not difficult to reach, but in the universality of its significancy the trait is most readily acknowledged, since already implicitly it lies there. Not less is the early diffusion and recognition of the writing a proof how early, in Christianity also, the idea of the pre-existence of Christ must have found general acceptance.[1] This brings us to the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs.*[2]

Judah and Levi are appointed protectors of the people till God come, to dwell in the midst of Israel (Levi 4; Judah 23). With the *light of knowledge* shall Levi enlighten, and stand as the sun in Israel (Levi 14), until the Lord bring home all the

[1] Appendix, Note DDD. [2] Appendix, Note EEE.

heathen in the compassion of His Son for ever. Judah, on the other hand, is entrusted with the *sceptre*, the rod of righteousness, which in the day of the Messiah shall ascend to judgment and salvation over all Jews and heathens (Judah 24). In the union of both offices consists Israel's salvation (Dan 5). There shall not be two heads; for all that God has made has but one head, and one head all the members of the body obey, though they be double (Zeb. 8). The royal, however, is lower than the priestly dignity; God has subjected the former to the latter: to the former He has given what is on earth, to the latter what is in heaven; and as the heaven is exalted above the earth, so is the priesthood above the kinghood (Judah 24). Grievous, however, as the sin is to rise up against Judah or Levi, and to set up a double kingdom or priesthood, yet the perfection of both shall be reached only when the Lord shall raise up a man who shall be of Levi as high-priest, and of Judah as king; a person who combines the earthly and heavenly, as Θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος (Simeon 7). The author does not mean by this, that the Messiah is in any way to spring bodily from the two tribes (see rather Judah 23), or that Mary sprang from the tribe of Levi, as several later heretical sects averred, especially the Manicheans. But the Messiah is to be born of a virgin of the tribe of Judah (Joseph 19); who, however, is seen in Joseph's dream in clothing of byssus (c. 19);—a thought which, it may be remarked in passing, is more fully wrought out in the Protevangelium Jacobi, where it is stated that Mary descended indeed from the family of David, but was brought up in the temple, and was by her parents from her youth dedicated to the Lord; where one may discern the same effort to unite in the king of Israel also the glory of the priesthood. From the virgin, who wears a stole of byssus, Joseph sees proceed a lamb without spot, and at her right hand was as it were a lion. All the beasts attack it, and the lamb vanquishes it. Since, consequently, Mary, though not by birth, yet by inner and outer consecration, sustains something of the priestly character, it is said, Out of Judah and Levi shall be born to you the Lamb of God, with whom the symbol of the kingdom is most intimately bound up (comp. Sim. 7; Jos. 19; Iren. Fragm. ed. Massuet, 345). Other tokens of the appearance of Christ on earth are given, as

follows:—The salvation of God (σωτήριον τοῦ Θεοῦ) will arise on you in Him who is God and man (Sim. 7; Dan 5; Benj. 9). The Lord, the great God of Israel, appears on earth as a man, assumes a body (Sim. 6); God visits (ἐπισκέπτεται) all peoples through the compassion of His Son (Levi 4); dwells among men amidst Israel (Levi 4, 2; Naphth. 8), and eats with them (Sim. 6; Asshur 7). His advent is unspeakable, and He is as a Prophet in His aspect and habit (Levi 8). God plays the part of a man (Θεὸς εἰς ἄνδρα ὑποκρινόμενος, Asshur 7). Though His appearance is the visit of the Only-begotten (μονογενής), yet is He to appear on earth as a man of humiliation (Benj. 9, 10). But in this humiliation He is nevertheless God come in the flesh (Benj. 10), on account of whose birth men and angels, and the whole earth, rejoice.[1] He is the Saviour of the world (Levi 10, 4). His baptism points to His sacrifice. The heavens are opened above Him,[2] and Jacob sees the consecration (ἁγιάσμα) come upon Him out of the temple of the Divine Majesty, with a voice from the Father such as was that of Abraham to Isaac. Hence it is He who renews the law in the power of the Highest (Levi 14); He is the shoot of the Most High God, and the spring of life for all flesh (Judah 24). In Him is the Lord Himself present (Zeb. 8); He is God in the form of man; the light of righteousness arises in Him, salvation and compassion are under His wings. He must, however, suffer much through the sins of men, especially the Jews, and be crucified. He must fight with Beliar; visible and invisible wars must He carry on (Jos. 19; Dan 5; Reub. 6). He dies as the Lamb of God (Benj. 3), or Mediator between God and men (Dan 5). He who is without fault is given up for the transgressors, and the sinless dies for the godless (Reub. 6), that His blood may establish the covenant, and lay a basis for the

[1] The author describes (Levi 19) the star which appeared at Christ's birth in the same way as Ignatius, Eph. 19. Also there is much resemblance between these two in the signs which they give of the incarnation of God, as well as in the doctrine of Christ's death and priestly office.

[2] That this passage relates to Christ's baptism (comp. Jud. 24) is undeniable. Grabe finds something Jewish or Ebionitic in the words μετὰ φωνῆς πατρικῆς, ὡς ἀπὸ Ἀβραὰμ πατρὸς Ἰσαάκ. But the meaning is, that the relation of Christ to the Father is as close as is that of a human son to his father. There thus lies in the words rather the equality of Christ with God the Father.

salvation of Israel and the heathen, and that Beliar and his servants may be vanquished (Benj. 3). By the sufferings of the Highest shall Hades be enriched (Levi 4; Benj. 9). The vail of the temple is rent asunder (Benj. 9; Levi 10). A new priesthood is instituted (Levi 8, 18); He Himself is the High-Priest without succession (Levi 18). And now is He exalted after having been humiliated (Benj. 9, 10). The Spirit of God is transferred from the synagogue to the heathen, and is poured forth, as fire (Benj. 9; Jud. 24), by the water and by faith (Levi 14; Assh. 7). There is hope again for Israel only after the heathen (Benj. 10; Jud. 24). But he that believeth not in God who hath come in the flesh, the Saviour, to him will Christ be a *judge* after the resurrection from the dead (Jud. 25; Benj. 10). His shall be an everlasting kingdom (Jos. 19); and men shall, through the Spirit sent forth by Christ, the spring of life, become truly sons of God (Benj. 9; Jud. 24; Levi 18). For under His priestly agency all sin shall die, the pious rest in Him, and He rejoices in His beloved. The gates of Paradise He opens; the sword by which Adam is threatened He sheaths; and He grants to the holy to eat of the tree of life (Levi 18).

The author of this book shows, by the way in which he expresses himself, that in his view the personal and active in Christ was God. Though he does not in so many words assert the pre-existence of the Son, yet this must be regarded as assumed by him, partly because of his constant reference to the Book of Enoch, where this is undoubtedly taught, and partly because of the use of the term *μονογενής*. But he does not direct his attention very closely to this more speculative side. He does not connect Christ either with the "Word" or with the Wisdom, which, as we have seen, was the case with the forms of Christianity which were developed in unity with the Old Testament; but rather adheres to the anthropological side, and is marked by this, that he represents to us the advance within Jewish Christianity from the kingly office of Christ and the Christian eschatology to the priestly office. It is true, as we have seen, that those who attached special importance to the eschatological concept of Christ, did not deny His higher being and the absolute significancy of His Person. But in the book now before us, though somewhat Judaistic, there is a ten-

dency which, not satisfied with the royal office of Christ, evolves from it, what is nevertheless bound up in it, namely, that not only the consummation, but above all, and that for the sake of the consummation, reconciliation is given in His Person. And this momentum the author of the Testament has apprehended with such decisiveness, that in his view the Divinity of Christ appears to be denied if He is not regarded aboye all as the Mediator. The kingdom (power) seems to him to have only an earthly (physical) significancy: it is the mediatorial office, the high-priestly work of Christ alone, that is, in his esteem, heavenly and divine. And so he advances to show, in the dying Lamb, in the sufferings of the Highest, above all, the agency of the Divine in this Person. There is thus elicited from the concept of the perfected Lord of glory, that momentum which gives His *history* an essential and eternal significancy. And not only may the historical Christ thus receive His full rights, but His Church also, where it is still entangled with national Judaism, may attain to a history of which that undue preponderance of eschatology hindered it. The Jews of Palestine did not venture to break that integument which hindered the free formation of the Christian principle, and kept it from constructing a world of its own. The creation of such a world they did not acknowledge as their vocation; but bore the yoke of the law, looking for the speedy return of the Lord. Those who were enlightened, of whom there were not wanting some (Acts xv.), acknowledged, in that they exempted the heathen from the law, that the law had now sunk to a subordinate significancy, and that salvation did not come through legal righteousness. But since they dared not altogether break with the law themselves, especially venerated as it was by their contemporaries, as was the case till the time of Hadrian, there remained nothing for them but to give up the untying of the knot of the Saviour's speedy return, and in order to maintain the Christian character, despite outwardly unaltered customs and modes of life, to wait with stedfast gaze for the Lord, who was not to tarry long. But the length of the tarrying, the influence of intercourse with their people, custom, the power which the outward so easily resumes over the inward, nay, the afterworking of inborn Jewish pride, caused others to think that they would, by means of a strict observance of the law, attain at least a higher grade of righteousness than the hea-

then converts to Christianity; and thus they assigned to the law again a part in justification, and thereby ascribed to it again a permanent significancy even within Christianity. By this, indeed, was loosened the attent longing after the returning Lord, but this in such a way that they again tended to Judaism, became more zealous for the law, and depreciated the intrinsic newness of Christianity. In this state of relapse Paul already found the Church at Jerusalem on the occasion of his last visit; and the Epistle to the Hebrews, which was composed shortly before the destruction of Jerusalem, is directed to this state of things. The Hebrews to whom it is addressed had, in some cases, deserted the assemblies of the Christians entirely, whilst in others, though they still professed to be Christians, yet by holding up what belonged essentially to the ceremonial of Judaism as of perpetual validity, and thereby depreciating the propitiatory work of Christ, they found themselves inclined to undervalue also the newness and greatness of Christianity, and to think less highly of the Person of Christ. This mongrel state, which afterwards led to decided heresies, was indeed, for a season, interrupted; the leaning to Judaism became less decided than before. This we infer, partly from the impression and effect of the destruction of Jerusalem; partly from the extrusion of Jewish-Christian heresies which made their appearance at this time, which was a time of sifting; partly, in fine, from what has been above referred to, the spiritual and revivified eschatological expectations in the Church at Jerusalem towards the end of the century. But up to the time of Hadrian the suppression of Christian liberty by the law continued. For the Christians in Palestine, and especially in Jerusalem, still lived in society with the Jews, and under bishops of the circumcision. And thus the ever reviving danger of a relapse into Judaism could be effectually counteracted only by the Jewish ceremonial being set aside by the *priesthood* of Christ, and abrogated by the prominence given to the propitiatory death of Christ. In this the Christian principle was reponed; with the eschatological development of the royalty of Christ, there came to be assigned to Christianity as her task, now that the ancient system was fallen, to construct a new world out of herself. To have conduced to this result is one of the services of the work we have been considering, which, in this respect, follows in the train of

the Epistle to the Hebrews.[1] The manner, however, in which it does this, by so decided a repression of the royal office, and by signalizing the priestly office as the properly divine, could hardly have found place at a later period; rather as soon as the latter was acknowledged in its independence, the royal office, which had for the moment been put in the background, would be again developed out of the priestly, and so reinstated in its rightful place, as we find to be already the case, in the second half of the second century.[2] For the rest, the book stands not alone in its time; but in Barnabas and Aristo of Pella, whom we have previously considered, we see a similar tendency.

Other Apocryphal writings, in so far as they may come into consideration for the period now before us, however much that is fabulous and however much that is Judaistic they may contain, equally enunciate the acknowledgment of the truly divine nature of Christ.[3]

If at this point we look back on the path we have followed, it will appear that the hypothesis of the Ebionism of the primitive Church is on all sides untenable. Even the evidence adduced in support of it, when more closely examined, proves the opposite. Among those we have considered, there appears no small diversity, but not one of them is an Ebionite. Viewed as a whole, they are rather, so far as respects their rank in a Christological respect, only a feeble copy of the Apostles, each

[1] That form of Jewish Christianity which did not advance to the high-priestly office of Christ, relapsed ever more and more, in the course of the second century, into an exclusive regard to His prophetic office, and came to ascribe to His kingly office little more than a casual significancy. This party of Jewish Christians, however, perished after the manner of sects.

[2] In this development of the knowledge of Him who had come, there is a recapitulation in rapid current of the history of the development of the prophetic Christology of the Old Testament. For this also started with the kingly state of the Messiah, then advanced, and this was the most difficult step, to His condition as a servant, and attained in His deepest humiliation the highest spiritual elevation, the yielding up of Himself in vicarious love, or His office as a propitiation. But hardly had this been reached, when in Isaiah we see His power and kingdom born again from his high-priestly love; and thus the end returns in higher manner to the beginning. In Zechariah there is already the presupposition of the like authorization of the kinghood and priesthood.

[3] Appendix, Note FFF.

of whom numbers among them his representative, who is at the same time a witness of his influence. Nay, we may say that those who are most akin to James, have, in a Christological point of view, something higher than the Epistle of James expressly contains.

However much there was in Judaism that tended to hinder a free development of Christology, and however much that tended to further it lay in the peculiar endowments of Hellenism, the Church, in order to attain a higher representation of Christ than the Ebionitic, had not to wait for an influx of Hellenistic ideas. But, as the New Testament proves that a form of Christology preceded Ebionism of which the latter fell far short, so we have seen that, even independently of Hellenic philosophy, that very tendency which, in closest connection with the Old Testament, abode within the Church up to the year 150, had completed a higher development along two lines, both of which set out from the cultivated eschatology which preponderated in it. The one issued from the completed eschatological concept of the *Person* of Christ, or, by a retrogressive process, from the end to the beginning, and constrained to the positions that He is to be thought of first as the Creator-Word, and next as the eternal Wisdom of God. The other, however, more deeply immersed in the religious element, unfolded from the royal *office* of Christ, which is presented to the view completed in eschatology, his propitiatory, mediatorial office. And as the earthly manifestation of Him who is the Word and the Wisdom is thereby recognised in its essential significancy, and consequently is rendered capable of being established to consciousness, and as this opinion recoils from the former path, which was scarcely a match for Doketism, to *history*, or the true manhood of Christ; so, by the course it pursues, a deeper basis is found for the *divinity* of Christ, than was to be found lying in His kingly office. At the same time, it must not be conceived that, even where both lines or paths meet, as was the case with many of the Apostolic Fathers, and where there was posited by them in a definite manner the absolute Deity of Christ, which existed in Him essentially, not simply as power, it is nevertheless left very indeterminate whether His humanity was not a mere apparition of God, who was perhaps thought of as corporeal and patible, and consequently how the Deity of Christ, the Son of God, was conceived of in relation to the Father.

With this result accords also the testimony of those who were the opponents of Christianity. However variously they have misunderstood the nature of Christianity, and hence have brought the most contradictory accusations against it, yet all stedfastly concur in what they represent as the faith of the Christians in respect of the Person of Christ. The opponents of Christianity in the second century, heathen and Jewish, attest with one mouth that the Christians reverenced the crucified Jesus of Nazareth as God. Celsus, who wrote his λόγος ἀληθὴς against the Christians soon after the middle of the second century, lays it down as a well-known fact, that the Christians held Jesus for God, and the Son of God;[1] and only seeks to show that He was not what they took Him to be. The reasons, also, which he adduces in opposition to this, are of significancy for us. That He was God, and God's Son, cannot, he says, be proved from the deeds which are recorded of Him (ii. 30). In a case where it would have been of avail, when a sign was demanded in the temple (i. 67), He performed no miracle; and when He appeared after His decease, it was not to His judges and enemies (ii. 63, 67). If He were God's Son, why did He not avenge His disgrace, at least at the last moment (ii. 35)? What rational man would have endured such things if he could have helped it (ii. 17)? God's Son would not have suffered Himself to be so mishandled. The Christians, indeed, hold Jesus for God's Son, because they know that the punishment He endured was for the vanquishing of the father of evil.[2] But he makes the Jew, whom he introduces as the bitter foe of Christianity, speak thus: How shall we hold him for God who fulfilled nothing that he promised, who hid himself and fled, who was shamefully bound, and by those whom he called disciples betrayed? God is not subject to flight, nor to be carried away in bonds: he who would be credited as the Saviour, as God's greatest Son and Messenger, must not be forsaken and delivered up (ii. 9). Why did he not suddenly disappear from the cross (ii. 68)? Celsus, consequently, plainly intends his Jew to insinuate that Jesus was a mere man (ii. 79). The

[1] Orig. cont. Cels. i. 26, 28, 41, 66; ii. 9, 30, 36, 47, 67; iii. 41, 34; iv. 2; vi. 47, 74, 75.

[2] The Christians say, ἴσμεν τὴν κόλασιν αὐτοῦ ὑπὲρ καθαιρέσεως τοῦ πατρὸς τῆς κακίας γεγονυῖαν: ii. 47.

reality of His manhood, which was shown in His sufferings and in the blood which flowed from His side, and which was not ἰχωρ (ii. 36), nay, which was manifest from the beginning, is of itself, to Celsus, a proof that he could not be God and God's Son. Why did His parents flee with Him into Egypt? God is not in danger of death (i. 66). Different as He is from us in voice, speech, behaviour, still He cannot be believed to be God (vi. 75). A being in mortal body cannot be regarded as God: the Christians, however, hold themselves to be religious in that they reverence Jesus as God (iii. 41), and shrink not from doing as the barbarians do—worship the dead (iii. 34). So zealous does his Jew become, that he addresses Jesus Himself, and blames Him for asserting His Godhead and supernatural birth (i. 28, 38, 41). Amidst the many fables which Celsus and his Jew allege, there is not the slightest trace of their regarding it as a fable that the later Christianity had ascribed to Jesus the honour of being God and God's Son; and yet, had it been possible to assert this, nothing would have been more fitted to bring a stain on the Christians, by putting them in antagonism with their own antecedents, nay, with Christ Himself, and so to demonstrate the arbitrariness and groundlessness of the Divine honours which they offered to Christ. In place of this, we find a man who, to conclude from the objections here collected from all quarters, possessed intimate acquaintance with the opponents of Christianity, especially the Jews, and who had knowledge of many Christians and their books, adducing no objection more constantly and more directed against the Christians as a body than this, that they regarded Jesus as God and God's Son. They say sophistically, exclaims his Jew (ii. 31), the Son of God is the Logos itself (αὐτόλογος), and do not set forth the pure and holy Logos as the Son of God, but as a man of humble estate who was put to death.[1] He is not, indeed,

[1] The Jew continues, εἴγε ὁ λόγος ἔστιν ὑμῖν υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπαινοῦμεν. On this Origen says, that though he had met with many Jews who were esteemed wise, he had never heard this from one of them. Celsus seems here, therefore, to have represented the Jew incorrectly (comp. Justin, Dial. c. Tryph. 48). Be this as it may, it is the immediate application of the doctrine of the Logos to Jesus which the Jew cannot admit. The Christians, however, had, in the middle of the second century, generally made this application, which again presupposes that the Christians hitherto had not been of Ebionitic tendencies.

ignorant that the Christians universally regard the death of Christ as the propitiation for the world; but as he treats sin in the general as indifferent, and is surprised that Christianity seeks not holy men, but sinners, he attaches naturally little weight to that (ii. 47). Moreover, he knows well (ii. 67) that the Christians distinguish between a state of exaltation and a state of humiliation for Christ; that it is only since His death that they call Christ Θεὸς in the full sense, regarding Him at first as so sent into the world that His Deity was hidden. But the Cross, on which the Christians lay so much stress, is to him foolishness; standing on the ground of mere natural religion, self-offering love appears to him an exhibition of weakness, a mere piece of impotency.

Up to this point, Celsus is at one with the Jews; but he breaks off from his allies at a most decisive point. Genuine Judaism is susceptible of progress, through its ethical character; and this progress is viewed in the general as effected through revelation. Heathenism is not secure or master of its own domain, the stand-point of a nature which remains always essentially like itself; unless the possibility of a progressive revelation is excluded. Hence Celsus attempted a decisive blow, which should overwhelm both Judaism and Christianity—a blow which should settle the impossibility of any such appearance as that of Christ. Neither God, says he, O ye Jews and Christians, nor God's Son, has come down hither, or can come (iv. 2). The reason is assigned in ii. 31: because then the Logos would be no more the spotless and pure; there would be, in a word, the Neoplatonic dualism, according to which the finite as such is evil and hostile to the spirit. Celsus, indeed, on the other hand, ascribes to the world what he refuses to man, which—and here he is inconsistent—is in contradiction to the above. A man cannot be God's Son; but the world is God's son: and, indulging in bold conjecture, he suggests that the Christians, in calling Jesus God's Son, have preserved that from the ancients, who gave this name to the world as a whole (vi. 47). In this sharp conflict between the old world and Christianity, it is apparent that even heathenism, though to it the idea of a sonship of God is more familiar than to Judaism, is yet as much offended by the Christian idea as Judaism. Affinity of nature between man and God is not altogether

foreign to it; but this is conceived of physically, and without the thoroughgoing ethical distinction. An incarnation and a manifestation of the divine in the pure spiritual form of self-renunciation, is altogether as strange to heathenism as to Judaism. It deserves especial notice, however, and this is as clear as possible, that Celsus not only adduces belief in Christ as God, and as God's Son, as characteristic of Christianity, but is as good as ignorant of such as thought otherwise of Christ; so much must Ebionism have become, even in the middle of the second century, an almost vanishing, if not lost element, in the great body of Christianity. His Jew maintains (ii. 1, 3, 4; v. 61) against the Christians, especially, that they properly depend on the Old Testament, issue from the Law and the Prophets, which they are bound to hold as divine; "if any one has prophesied of Christ as God's Son, then there hath a prophet gone out from us:" and he blames the Christians, not for believing in Christ whilst they maintained the binding obligation of the Law (*i.e.*, being Ebionites), but for having rejected the law of their fathers, and of their own arbitrary choice adopted another name and another mode of life.[1]

Other opponents of Christianity, such as Lucian, a contemporary of Celsus, and the Stoic Arrian, furnish us with a picture of the Christians of the second century wholly corresponding to that given by Celsus. (See Lucian's Peregrinus, and Arrian Diatrib. iv. 7; Neander, Gesch. der christliche Kirche, I. i. 268–273, Eng. Trans. vol. i. p. 214–218.)

But we are carried still further back, even near to the beginning of the second century—that is, close on the limits of the apostolic age—by the famous letter of Pliny to Trajan (about A.D. 110).[2] It is here testified, that the Christians of that day were accustomed on a certain day to assemble before sunrise, and to utter responsively among themselves a song of praise to Christ as God.[3] The letter also of Hadrian to Servianus,[4] whilst representing the Egyptian polytheism as

[1] Appendix, Note GGG.

[2] Ep. Plinii, x. 97; Olshausen, Histor. Eccles. Veteris Monumenta Præcipua, 1820, I. 23 ff.

[3] Affirmabant autem [the Christians brought before him] hanc fuisse summam vel culpæ suæ vel erroris, quod essent soliti stato die ante lucem convenire, carmenque Christo quasi Deo dicere secum invicem.

[4] Olshausen, l. c. 27–29.

meaningless and frivolous, contains evidence, that though the Christians are monotheists, they yet worship Christ.[1] Most embittered against the Christians were the Jews,[2] but not against all of them alike: those who continued to adhere to the Mosaic institute, and wished to regard themselves as Jews, they suffered in their synagogues, because in their case the difference did not appear so important as what remained in common. The expectations of a Messiah were among themselves so variously formed, that they were not turned into a dogma, but were in a way left as an open question, a free theologoumenon. Whilst many were, on the one hand, endured in the synagogue who had quite given up the hope of the Messiah—and many diversities in this respect at a later period divided them,—so, on the other, there was no necessity, from the Jewish point of view, to eject from the synagogue those who were willing to leave all else unaltered, and only to stipulate for permission to believe that Jesus, whom the Jews had crucified, was the Messiah. There would, indeed, have been a weighty point of difference here, had they viewed the appearance of Jesus as the advent of the new age itself, and thereby have appreciated His historical significancy. But this was not the case: there happened here what has been already noted,—they laid stress only on His second appearance. His first advent thus sank into little more than an announcement of His second; His prophetic office became that of most importance; His royal office was the object of hope, while His priestly office was cast into the shade by the retaining of the righteousness which is by the law, and to which saving power was ascribed instead of Christ. Such a nominal Christianity was the more likely to please the Jews, from their having at a later period, perhaps in connection with these Ebionites, adopted a distinction between a Messiah Ben Joseph and a Messiah Ben David; and in this case it was of no moment whether the former, to the idea of whom obscurity was attached, had appeared historically or not. Even to the

[1] Ipse ille patriarcha cum Ægyptum venerit, ab aliis Serapidem adorare ab aliis cogitur Christum.—Unus illis Deus est, hunc Christiani, hunc Judæi, hunc omnes venerantur et gentes.

[2] It is not without reason that Celsus brings in a Jew as speaking against the Christians. The same is apparent from Justin's Dialogue with Trypho, and from Aristo's work above mentioned; comp. also Euseb. iv. 15.

identity of this double Messiah much weight could not be attached, if the former was only the forerunner and announcer of His real advent, not the personal appearance by which the Messianic kingdom was to begin. This much is clear, that such a Christianity was at war with itself, and was not only not dangerous to Judaism, but was really little else than a Jewish sect itself. But the very fact that this was endured in the synagogue whilst the Christians were persecuted by the Jews with the bitterest hatred wherever they had the power,—as, e.gr., under Bar Cochba, and in many of the Christian persecutions,—affords the clearest proof, even on the side of Judaism, that Christianity was at no time, as a whole, Ebionitic, but that Judaism recognised in Christianity a principle antagonist to itself.

In closing this investigation, we may cast a glance on those tendencies in the Church which sprang from a definite Christological idea. Here three points deserve special attention: 1. The formation of *liturgical* elements in the Church; 2. The gradual setting apart of *holy times*, where the Christian principle, as opposed to that of Judaism and that of heathenism, was the directive power; and 3. The beginnings of *Christian art* and characteristic customs.

1. Under the first of these we may begin with the Lord's Supper and Baptism. That the former has always been observed by the Christians, no man doubts; but that in the earliest age its central-point was the Person of Christ,—that it was regarded by the heathen as a sort of mystery, and by the Christians as the sacred mystic meal, by means of which we come into union with Christ,—appears as well from the New Testament itself, as from the writings of Clement of Rome, Ignatius, and others.[1] Now, for the higher view of the Supper, and still more of Baptism, the presupposition of the propitiatory effect of the sufferings and death of Christ is necessary; and that this was never wanting in any age of Christianity, nay, that even the Jewish Christians were ever more and more definitely forced on this, we have above seen.[2] We shall, therefore, not say too much if we designate the Supper the climax

[1] Höfling l. c. Rheinwald, Archæol. § 93, 114. Besides the Ignatian letters, see Justin Apol. i. 65; Dial. c. Tryph. 210; Iren. iv. 18.

[2] The Ebionites, on the other hand, mutilated also the Supper; Epiph. Hær. l. 16.

of the ancient Christian worship, in which the congregation celebrated its reconciliation with God in Christ, the Mediator between God and men; and find in its uninterrupted celebration the first proof of the stedfast faith of the Church in the divine nature of Christ. As the second we may mention *Baptism*. Numerous as were the washings which found place both in Judaism and heathenism, there has always been, so long as the Church has existed, a Christian Baptism essentially different from them. First of all, there was included in this rite, not merely a baptism for repentance, but also for remission of sins; and thus it stood connected with the higher estimate of Christ's Person, inasmuch as the basis of remission was laid in Christ's propitiatory work. Secondly, Christian Baptism is, above all, not mere water-baptism, but in its truth spirit-baptism; and we have seen that men of the age now before us, even when inclined to Jewish modes of thought, ascribed the sending of the Holy Ghost to Christ alone, and connected the communication of the Spirit with faith in Christ. Thirdly, and this conducts us to the liturgical element in the ancient Church, Baptism has always been administered in the Church in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, according to Matt. xxviii. 19. How ineradicably this usage was fixed in the Church, appears most clearly from the fact, that even those to whom the formula was dogmatically unsuitable, the Ebionites for instance, did not venture to dispense with it.[1]

This baptismal formula, which expresses the substance of the Christian confession according to its concept, must necessarily, from its express discrimination and parallelizing of Father, Son, and Spirit, and on the other hand from the conjunction of these in the one Baptism which was done in their name, have given occasion, we may say impulse, to the construction of the

[1] In the Ebionitic system (see Hom. Clem. iii. 72; ix. 19, 23; xi. 25: ἀπολουσάμενοι ἐπὶ τῇ τρισμακαρίᾳ ἐπονομασίᾳ), this formula has the appearance of a remnant, which clearly enough shows their later advent, and that they carried with them as a dead heirloom the poor remains of a richer ecclesiastical inheritance; for no one will venture to say that this formula is the adequate expression and product of the higher-standing, later Ebionism of the pseudo-Clementines. This formula never could have been constructed from this tendency: all it could hope for would be, by retaining this, to pass for Christian; and in this supposition there is proof of an opposite common spirit of great power, to which it could not but succumb.

Christian doctrine of the Trinity. In order, however, to see more definitely how there was secured in the words of the baptismal confession a higher conception of the Person of Christ, it must be remembered that the mention of the Son was the most indispensable among the three, and that a baptism which was not in the name of Christ was not held to be Christian Baptism; as also in Acts viii. 37 a baptism is mentioned in which the Father and Holy Spirit are not named. Through the Son alone, as mediating on both sides with the Father and the Spirit, can a baptism into these be obtained.

Besides the baptismal formula, we find in the New Testament many short compends of the Christian dogma intended for doctrine: Matt. xxvi. 64 ff.; Heb. vi. 1, 2; Acts xxvi. 22, ii. 33, iii. 20, 21; where always an important place is assigned to the eschatology. Paul dwells especially on Christ's death and resurrection (1 Cor. xv. 3, 4); John, on Jesus as the Christ, the Only-begotten, come in the flesh (1 John ii. 22, iv. 2, 9; John xvii. 3). Each of the Apostles had something peculiar, though not exclusive, and these peculiarities have manifestly been adopted into the Apostles' Creed, which grew out of the baptismal formula, and these wrought into a combined form; so that the old tradition, that each of the Apostles contributed his share to that symbol, has its truth, though this incorporation was the gradual work of the Church. We have no need to revert to heretics in order to explain how the Christians came to expand the few words of the baptismal formula (which may have remained unaltered in the baptismal act itself) into the sort of commentary form, out of which the Creed arose. The impulse to add to the baptismal formula a second, developed out of the former, the subsequent Apostles' Creed, was produced by the necessity of collecting the elements of apostolic preaching for the ends of doctrine and confession, and thereby to whet the consciousness of the faith characteristic of Christians in such a way as beseemed an entrance into Christianity. Now, as every self-consciousness has as a momentum for itself the distinction from others, so also the Christian; and the more determinedly that which is foreign to it sought to penetrate it, the more would a reaction from the innermost Christian consciousness in unity with the apostolic doctrine be produced, and so much the more would those parts of the confession by which

the corruption or renunciation of the points of faith was guarded against, become a weighty constituent of it. Such a symbol, which, as the confession-formula and recognition-badge of the Church itself, became as a rule of faith a bulwark against and a test of heresy, was by no means formed for the first time in the Nicean Council; but had long before had a gradual growth, as necessity demanded. The Synod against Paul of Samosata appealed to an ancient symbol (Euseb. E. H. vii. 30). Even in the second century it was a reproach cast on the Artemonites, that they had violated the rule of the ancient faith (Ib. v. 35). Tertullian and Irenæus frequently, in their controversial writings or dogmatic investigations, refer to the rule of faith, which they in a certain way acknowledge as a judge above them.[1] This rule of faith does not correspond word for word as given by different writers, nor does the same writer always give it the same form in different places; the rule of faith of the Oriental family is also more copious than that of the Occidental, which arose from the greater frequency of occasions among the former of opposing heresies, and from the early peculiar constancy, especially of the Romish Church (Tertull. de præscr. hær. 36), in preserving the same forms. But no man who reads these rules of faith can deny that their substance is the same throughout, and that of this identity the doctrine of the true divinity and true humanity of Christ forms in a special manner an element.[2] "And this faith," says Irenæus (i. 3; iii. 4), "the Church preserves, though diffused

[1] Iren. adv. Hær. i. 2, 3, 19; iii. 4, 20; Tertull. Præscr. adv. Hær. c. 13, comp. 36; de velandis Virg. 1, comp. adv. Marcion. i. 21; iv. 36; Const. Ap. vii. 41; Cypr. Ep. vi. 12; Orig. de Princ. Pr. 2 ff., ed. de la Rue, IV. 47 ff. For the rest see Hahn, Bibliothek der Symb. und Glaubensregeln 1842, p. 63, B. 1 ff., and his Zeitschr. 1842; Rudelbach, Das Apost. Symbolum, 1844. The expansion of the baptismal formula into a formula of confession and the rule of faith cannot be definitely discriminated in the olden time; but the former may come in the place of the latter. Later, the former became the Apostles' Creed; in place of the latter came the decrees of Councils. Comp. Ter. de cor. 3; de bapt. 6; Iren. i. 9, 4 ff., ed. Massuet.

[2] See Bull, Judicium Eccles. Cathol. de necessitate credendi quod Dom. nost. J. Ch. sit verus Deus, Lond. 1703; c. 4, De Symbol. primævæ Eccl. p. 30; c. 5, De Symb. Apost. p. 35 ff; c. 6, De Symb. vet. Orientali, p. 47, with the annotations of Grabe, p. 61 ff. Hahn and Rudelbach l. c. Bingham, Orig. Eccl. vol. iv. Bk. x. c. 3, 4.

over the whole world, carefully as dwelling in one house; she believes it as with one heart, proclaims it as with one mouth. Though the languages be different, the tradition is one and the same. The German Churches do not believe differently, nor the Iberian, nor the Celtic, nor the Oriental, nor the Egyptian, nor the Libyan, nor those built up in the middle of the world (the Palestinian). As the Sun, God's work, is one and the same for the whole world, so does also the preaching of the truth illuminate all places. And even where apostolic writings have not reached, as among many of the barbarous nations, there have those who believe in Christ salvation written on their hearts, by the Holy Ghost, without paper and ink, preserving carefully the ancient tradition, believing in one God, the Creator of heaven and earth, through Jesus Christ the Son of God;" and to this he appends the article of faith concerning Christ, almost exactly as we have it in the Apostles' Creed. It is possible that Irenæus may have described a unity which is too ideal; but this at least is certain, that to him, the far-travelled and well-read, it was without doubt that the great mass of Christians of all times unanimously believed and confessed what was in his esteem the essence of Christianity, the doctrine of the true divinity and true humanity of Christ. That, moreover, all the leading parts of the Creed had been handed down before the time of Irenæus, is proved, partly by the Oriental character of his rule of faith, partly by the circumstance that several clauses of it are intelligible only as antitheses to heresies which were in vogue only in the second century.[1]

The rule of faith extant at an early period along with the baptismal formula, and perhaps, in a somewhat altered form, also suited for the baptismal act (Iren. 1, 9, 4), proves, of course, that the Christological element in the ancient Church was essentially the same as in the later Church; an identity which is not less demonstrated by the writings of the New Testament and of the Apostolical Fathers, which at an early period passed into use both privately and in the public service

[1] See Bull and Grabe l. c. The Christological element of the Apostles' Creed was the germ round which what was added grew, and is found already formally, and almost wholly, in Ignatius ad Trall. 9; Smyrn. 1; comp. 1 Tim. iii. 16, vi. 13.

(Justin, Apol. i. 67; Euseb. H. E. iii. 16). The same identity of the older and later Church is attested by the old *Doxologies* to Christ,[1] which exhibit one type from the beginning, and that the apostolical, as already lying in the writings of the New Testament. In these we have just the baptismal formula and the rule of faith thrown into the form of worship. The doxologies are thus the answer, the repercussive, reverberative echo, by which the believing Church utters the revealed word of the Father, Son, and Spirit as the blessed word of its own faith.[2] And the same thing is to be observed in these doxologies as in the baptismal formula, that if any of the three Persons is omitted, it is least of all the Son; a fact which, on evident grounds, is even more significant in this case than in the case of the baptismal formula. In Christ the soul rests as its highest good and end, not in the Father alone. (Comp. Ignat. ad Ephes. introd. and c. 21; and Magnes. introd. and c. 15; and Trall. introd. and c. 13; and Rom. c. 9; and Philad. c. 11; and Polyc. introd. and c. 8; Barnab. 17; Clem. Ep. ad Cor. introd. and c. 59; Polycarp ad Phil. introd. comp. c. 14.)

2. The setting apart of *Holy Seasons*, as already in the second century was the usage, has also a dogmatic, a Christological significancy. In the ordering of festivals among the Hebrews, the Sabbath, the festival of the creation of the world, constituted the central-point and the regulative principle. For the New, the central-point was the first day of the week, the memorial of the second creation, the day of the Lord's resurrection.

[1] See Socrat. vi. 8; Ignat. ad Magn. 7; Euseb. v. 28; Iren. i. 1. Bingham, vol. v. l. 13, c. 5.

[2] See Polycarp's prayer, Euseb. iv. 15; Ignat. ad Rom. introd.; and Philad. introd.; and Smyrn. introd.; Clement ad Cor. 1, introd. and c. 59; Justin, Apol. i. 67; even Clement. Hom. iii. 72. In relation to the matter before us, the oldest doxologies may be ranked in two groups, the one of which contains those which ascribe glory to the Father *through* the Son, the other those which ascribe glory to the Father *with* the Son and Holy Ghost. But, as already in the New Testament both forms occur with the same writer, and consequently the former indicates no lower Christology than the latter, but only glances at Christ's mediatorial office, whilst the other, adhering more closely to the baptismal formula, rests more on the exhibition of His Person,—the same variety in the oldest Churches is to be looked at in the same way. See Bingham, vol. vi. l. 14, c. 1, § 8; c. 2, § 1.

As the early Church, with or instead of the daily assembly, with or instead of the Sabbath, observed the Sunday, they were led to this by a conviction that with Christ's resurrection a higher world had its beginning, a divine life had arisen for mankind. Whether, indeed, in the time of the Apostles, consequently in the first century, the Sunday was kept as a holy day, cannot be certainly gathered from Acts xx. 7; 1 Cor. xvi. 1, 2; Apoc. i. 10. But even if the Sunday were an institution of the later Church, the proof would be the more striking that the oldest post-apostolic Church was not Ebionitic. Not only the contests, however, about the Passover, and the frequent celebrations of Easter on the Sunday from the year 150, presuppose a much earlier weekly observance of that day; but we have other and express proofs for the keeping of Sunday as early as the first half of the second century. Barnabas says (Ep. c. 15), "The Sabbaths that now are, hath God said, are not pleasing to Me. The beginning of the eighth day I will make to be a Sabbath, which is the commencement of another world. Wherefore we keep the eighth day as a day of joy; on it Jesus arose from the dead, and, after He had showed Himself, ascended into heaven."[1] Thus consequently, and quite naturally after the earlier, did that Christological momentum which, though containing already the dawn of a new world in Christ's appearing, nevertheless is mostly inclined to eschatology, obtain from the beginning its expression in the order of Christian worship.

Christ's death and resurrection mutually condition each other; there cannot be assigned to the latter a place of such significancy, as we have seen, without in equal measure also the recollection of Christ's death being thereby quickened, especially since Christ's sufferings were regarded by all, the Ebionites and several Gnostics excepted, as sufferings for our reconciliation. Now, as we have seen that even where a tendency in the Church approximating to that of Judaism has dogmatically evolved out of the idea of Christ the Lord of glory, the idea lying therein as in germ of Christ as the Mediator and Saviour; so also in public worship, from the celebration of the resurrection of Christ there was developed the celebration of His death by fasting and penitence. "If we die with Him, we

[1] Appendix, Note HHH.

shall also live with Him." But there are two ways in which that may be done. It may be done by men setting out from the idea of the Christian Sunday (on which, as Justin informs us, the Lord's Supper was already observed, Apol. i. 60), and making every week a memorial of the Passion Week of Christ (of which we have already some traces in the Shepherd of Hermas); and hence, when at a later period there was added to this weekly observance a more solemn annual festival, it was natural, in order to continue in harmony with the previous weekly festival,[1] and with the day of the week on which—on the 14th of Nisan—Christ's sufferings had happened, to select a Friday for the special *annual* festival of Christ's death, and to make the following Sunday the Feast of Easter. The other way in which the festival of Christ's death was introduced, was that every year the exact day of the year on which He died, the 14th Nisan, was observed, on whatever day of the week it chanced to fall; and two days after, the resurrection of Christ as an annual festival was kept. This Christian festival, consequently, synchronized with the Passover, of which, indeed, it took the name. But though the Jewish custom of eating a paschal lamb had continued in the Church from the days of the Apostles downwards, there came to be attached to the Christian Passover a polemical aspect in relation to that of the Jews, from the circumstance that Christ was regarded as the paschal lamb, of which the Jewish Passover was but the type; that out of the festival of the temporal deliverance from Egypt was established the festival of the spiritual deliverance by the death of Christ. And this opposition was made still more pointed from the annual festival of the institution of the Lord's Supper being very naturally connected with the festival of the death of Christ.[2]

At a pretty early period in the second century,[3] there was added to the Feast of Christ's resurrection the Feast of Pentecost. An inducement to this lay in the Jewish feast which followed the Passover (Acts xx. 16); but there is also to be seen

[1] Traces of this are to be found in Hermas, Simil. v. 1, 3; Victorinus Petav. in Routh, Relig. Sac. iii. 237; Bingham, l. xxi. c. 1.

[2] Appendix, Note III.

[3] Irenæus, in the fragment of his λόγος περὶ τοῦ πάσχα, ed. Mass. p. 342; Tertull. de Idolat. 14; de Bapt. 19.

here prominent the transforming power of the Christian principle. A festival of fifty days, as a *continuation* of Easter, was dedicated to this feast; these seven weeks, commencing with Easter and ending with our Whitsuntide,[1] were the festival week, as it were, of the year. Now, as the resurrection of Christ was viewed as the beginning and the principle of the Feast of the Passover, which already lay in the outward arrangement, there is indicated, in the common conviction and feeling which led to the adoption of this usage, again that view of Christ which regards Him as the source whence the Holy Ghost is poured forth, and every heavenly blessing comes.[2]

Finally, the rise of the Feast of the Epiphany belongs to the epoch now before us. It originated in the East. This festival was of various significancy, and in its full import gradually included the commemoration—1. of Christ's baptism, or the manifestation of His Messiahship; 2. of the manifestation of His miraculous power at Cana, or also in the feeding of the multitude of five thousand; 3. of Christ's birth; and 4. of the advent of the Magi from the East. All these four indicate weighty momenta for the Person of Christ; the first and third are, for the older history of this festival, of especial importance. On what principle of order the one is joined to the other, it is not so easy to say; this much, however, is certain, that the Church at a later period came to keep a festival of Christ's birth as a baptism festival.[3] And this corresponds to the full with the dogmatic progress of development which we have learned to recognise in what we have already considered: first, the eschatological form of the Christology, or that of the result, then that of the beginning (the pre-existence). From the stand-point thus attained, they advanced to the historical life of Christ, and contemplated it. The birth of Christ, however, could not be first fixed and celebrated from its own momenta; but in the foreground there required to be placed Christ's office, His work of propitiation, or that which He is for us. His work and office, however, gave the impulse to an ever-progressive knowledge of his Person; and just so in the festival it was not

[1] The former from the beginning, the latter of a later date. The Feast of the Ascension is also of later origin.

[2] See Neander K. G. i. 1, p. 517 ff., ed. 2 [Eng. Tr. vol. i. 409].

[3] Appendix, Note JJJ.

merely the gift or the work that was celebrated, but in the gift the Giver, *i.e.*, the Person of the Saviour.

Thus, under a constant impulse from the office of Christ, or from Christ for us, the festival advanced from the last *momenta* of the historical Person of Christ to the *first;* and the retrogressive movement in the history of the festival may be taken as a true picture of the order in which the dogmatic importance of the individual momenta of the life of Christ entered into the consciousness of the Church. The first, as we have seen, was the *resurrection,* from which, as a continuation, Pentecost was developed. The second was Christ's *death.* In both, regard was had neither simply to the Person, nor simply to the office; but the royal and priestly offices of the Messiah were celebrated, because in Christ they had become historically realized, and the Person of Christ was celebrated, because in His sufferings and resurrection it had an official significancy. The third, by a regress to the momentum from which the absolute union of this Person and the Messianic office was fully realized in consciousness, was His *baptism, i.e.*, the commencement of the official life of Christ. It is possible, also, that the historical impression of the important moment when Christ appeared as the Messiah may have conspired to cause this festival to be observed at an especially early period; and this is favoured also by the fact, that among the Jewish Christians, and the Churches lying nearest to them, it seems to have been among the earliest. In this beginning there was celebrated by the Church the unity of the momenta previously celebrated, and at the same time the introduction to the offices as a whole. Christ's baptism is His inauguration to His Messianic office by the Father Himself. He is thenceforward the manifested Son of God,—no longer merely the King of the new dispensation, but He who, in the baptismal symbol, is also consecrated to death and resurrection. But not merely was Christ's inauguration to His priestly and royal office celebrated in the commemoration of His baptism; when with this was combined the commemoration of the first miracle at Cana, it was not a celebration of the miracle as a thing of itself, nor of the power of working miracles in the general, that was intended thereby, but of this power in its connection with the Messianic office, of which it was an illustrious revealing manifestation (John ii. 11); so that, in

point of fact, it was a celebration of what we include in the prophetic office. And thus was the baptismal festival rounded off: in it the Church viewed the entire fulness of the Messianic office in its unity, as present in its commencing point. From this, again, it is but a short step to the festival of Christ's birth, because already in the baptism the various historical and official momenta are brought together in the unity of the Messiah's Person, in which all these momenta were prefigured, and at the same time brought to a simultaneous, self-penetrating present. The Church, which thus observed the baptismal festival without a birth festival of Christ, did not thereby intend, by any means, to date the presence of the Divine in Christ from His baptism: this would have been contradicted by the Gospels, which are older than the baptismal festival, and also by Paul; indeed, even by the doctrinal type of the Apostolical Fathers, as we have found. Rather in the baptismal festival there was celebrated the commencing point of His Messianic *office*, and this as a manifestation of His higher personality, which had been from the beginning. But to the Doketæ, no less than the Ebionites, the temptation and inducement was great so to remain by the baptismal festival, as that there should not be an advance to the festival of the birth, *i.e.*, to make it a festival of the birth of the Messiah, in place of the festival of the manifestation of the already born and concealed Messiah. We find, also, that, in fact, they laid the greatest stress on the baptism of Christ and the baptismal festival; they chose to see in the baptism the absolute beginning of the Messianic personality of Jesus. In this they could not be consentaneous with the Church; and the more a baptismal festival without a birth festival laid the Church open to Doketism as well as Ebionism, and was calculated to obscure its true opinion of the meaning of the baptism of Christ, so much the more requisite was it that a regress to the beginning-point of the earthly life of Christ should be hastened, in conjunction with the suppression of Doketism and Ebionism. The first trace, however, of a festival in celebration of the birth of Christ, occurs in the second century, and in Alexandria; and that as arising from an impulse communicated by Doketism towards the setting forth of this festival as one peculiarly opposed to this heresy. This regress from the beginning of the Messianic *office* to the temporal

commencement of the *Person itself*, was, however, also necessitated by the conviction that the union of the divine and human in Christ would be incomplete, and that His Messianic office, as appropriate to His Person, would be without basis or ground, if His Person were, anterior and up to His baptism, hardly different from other men, and was then, no one knows why, chosen and appointed to be the Messiah; so that already the incarnation of God is in itself of the highest import for faith. In a double way, however, was this regress to the first step of Christ's life on earth completed. On the one hand, the existing baptismal festival became also the birth festival;[1] and this was only a more thorough carrying out of the original idea of this festival, inasmuch as the Epiphany or appearing of Christ was intended to be therein celebrated. In the child Christ, it is true, the Divinity was for the most part concealed; it was there in essence, not in actual manifestation. But on that account was the visit of the Magi, and their adoration, readily recognised; and thus the birth of the child Jesus was celebrated as the appearance of God, as the birth of the Saviour. This was the course pursued in the Oriental Church. In the Western, where the order of the annual feasts was more gradually formed, the baptismal festival was not, at least for a long time, introduced at all. As in this part of the Church there was a tendency to consecrate a festival to the beginning, as formerly to the end, of the historical life of Christ, Doketism and Ebionism had been already there and been worsted, and Christological knowledge had been advanced by the fact, that in it that middle-point, the baptism of Christ, had been overleaped, and so the regress had been at once made to the true beginning, the birth of Christ.[2] It is possible that in it, as with the Passover festival so also with this, an arrangement entirely independent of the East may have developed itself, and local influences and opposition to heathen festivals may have operated upon it. But as this independence, in its free, and as respects the time of the festival, diverse re-

[1] Epiph. Hær. li. 16; Expos. Fidei 22; comp. Bingh. l. xx. c. 4, 2.

[2] We know that in the time of Chrysostom the 25th of December came to be regarded as the day of Christ's birth in the East, through the influence of the West; but we do not know either how old this Christmas festival was in the West, nor when the festival of Christ's baptism, which cannot be shown to have existed there before the time of Jerome, passed over into it from the East, and how far the observance of it spread.

sult, affords an illustrious proof that the Occidental Church was the seat of an independent development, not of a Jewish Christian, but of a heathen Christian character; so is the essential identity of the result in both great sections of the Church (*i.e.*, the tendency of their order of festivals to the same beginning, the birth of Christ) an evident proof that it is essential to the Christian consciousness, to think the divine and the human as perfectly united in all the steps and in all the momenta of the historical life of Christ. Of this Irenæus, who was the first to unite the East and the West (see under), was conscious; and this he has expressed, anticipating at least the festival-order of the latter.[1]

3. In fine, we have to speak of the beginnings of Christian art and characteristic usages, so far as appertains to our subject. Little as the primitive Church was friendly to art properly so called,[2] and little as its holy symbolism can lay claim to the name of art in the strict sense, there is nevertheless here a beginning of the same; and this is for us the more important, inasmuch as the dogmatic idea is more openly displayed in the art-symbol than in properly artistic work.

Among these symbols,[3] that of the cross may be expected

[1] If we survey the course of development of the Christian festival-order, we shall find the extreme Christian East and the Christian West forming the opposite poles. In the former, the impulse to an order of festivals goes forth more from the historical stand-point, the positive or negative is more closely bound by a regard to Judaism; in the latter, especially in the Roman Church, heathen Christianity fashions itself more freely. Between the two, in Greece, and especially in Asia Minor, both tendencies came into collision; here are the earliest deep-going struggles of an ecclesiastical and dogmatic kind. In these struggles, both tendencies seek and find, under influences of a Hellenic kind, that equipoise which is exhibited to us in the Second Epoch, rich and flourishing in great men.

[2] That there is nothing unfavourable to the *idea of the beautiful* itself in Christianity; that, on the contrary, it rather provides for it a place in the higher region of perfection, only that in this secular state, in a world which deifies the beautiful, there is prescribed for the Christian toil and suffering —appears plainly from what has been already said about Chiliasm; not less from the picture which Christianity has always kept before it of the glorified Saviour. Here Münter is inexact (s. u.), H. ii. 6.

[3] See Munter, Sinnbilden und Kunstvorstellungen der Alten Christen, Heft I. und II., 1825; Schöne, Geschichtsforschungen über die kirchlichen Gebräuche und Einrichtungen der Christen, u. s. w.; Bingham, l. c., vol.

to be the oldest.[1] Wherever this occurs in ancient Christianity, it must be taken as the symbol of salvation through Christ, through His suffering and death. The idea of the suffering Saviour, however, lies outside of Ebionism, as well as of Doketism and Gnosticism, and would never have been conceived by any of these. A favourite emblem of Christ's Church was a ship sailing hence: the mast which sustains and expands the sail is the cross; Christ is the steersman (Munter, l. c. i. 99). An especial favourite was the figure of the Good Shepherd and the lamb (same, p. 60 ff. 80 ff.), either represented, according to John x. 11, as the Shepherd who gives His life for the sheep, or, according to Luke xv. 4, 5, as the Shepherd who seeks the lost sheep, and brings it back to the fold with joy. If the latter symbol, as well as that very old one of the Fisher (l. c. viii. ix. pp. 48, 52), expresses the idea of salvation more in the general, the Shepherd who gives His life for the sheep is identical with the Lamb dying for the sins of the world. This Lamb alternates with the ram, which appears as a substitutionary offering in the history of Abraham: frequently the Lamb is found with the cross. But by the side of the longsuffering love of God stand power and royalty: He who is figured as a Lamb is also the Lion out of Judah (Apoc. v. 5).[2] In fine, I mention the Lyre, the emblem of Christian hymns. The finest monument on which it appears, a large Christian sarcophagus, assigned by Münter to the time of the Antonines (l. c. xx. 84, represented Tab. III. 61), is remarkable not only from the figure of the Shepherd (Luke xv.), but especially from its representing the whole of a Christian family service of worship in this age. On the one side are three women standing round a virgin, who

iv. and vi.; Bellermann, Die christlichen Katacomben; [Maitland, Church in the Catacombs, Lond. 1846.]

[1] Münter, l. c. i. 33, especially pp. 68–79. "The sign of salvation was supremely hallowed to the primitive Christians. We find it so regarded at so early a period, that it may be reasonably presumed that it belonged to the oldest symbols and signs, from the days of the Apostles. The Christians saw it as a sign marked on all nature." Comp. Justin Mart. Apol. i. 72; Tertull. Apol. 16; De Orat. 19; De Cor. Mundi, c. 3; Barn. Ep. 9. Probably there is already in the Apocalypse, xxii. 4, a trace of this symbol. Comp. xvi. 2, xx. 4.

[2] This symbol is seldom found among the Christian antiquities (see Münter, i. 87). Still other symbols of the second century are mentioned by Clement of Alexandria, Pædag. iii. 11, ed. Potter, p. 289.

is playing on the lyre; on the right are four men, with several rolls in their hands, from which they seem to be singing. If Münter's suggestion be correct, this monument is a proof that already in the second century there were collections of Christian hymns, which were in use even in domestic life. At any rate, this is historically certain: the author of the Small Labyrinth could, towards the close of the second century, appeal, against the Artemonites, to a number of ancient poems, the object of which was the praise of Christ (Euseb. E. H. v. 28). "How many psalms and odes," says he, "are there not, which have been written by the Christians from the beginning, and which theologising celebrate Christ as the Logos of God?"[1] Already in the New Testament there are not only promptings to Christian hymns and odes—Eph. v. 19; Col. iii. 16,—but even traces and beginnings of such; Eph. v. 14; Apoc. xv. 3. (ᾠδὴ ἀρνίου), xix. 1–8, v. 8 (the Hallelujah of the Apocalypse gives honour to Christ, who is the Alpha and the Omega, along with the Father; the twenty-four elders, with harps in their hands, fall down before the Lamb, and sing to Him; in fine, it is said in Eph. v. 14, "Awake, thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall give thee light"); and so also the young teeming Church sends forth its praise and thanks to Christ in numerous songs. Among the oldest portions of the Sybilline verses above referred to, are to be found pieces of the nature of hymns to Christ; and, what is deserving of especial notice, there is already in the Christian songs a type very different from ours, and reminding rather of the Hellenic odes and hymns in the Mysteries, as also of those of Synesius and of the old Christian hymn which Clement of Alexandria has preserved for us. What abundance of Christian song there was at this time, earliest and most refined, as it appears, in the Syrian Church, especially in Antioch, where Ignatius laboured,[2] may,

[1] Comp. the Ep. Synod, and Dionys. (Mansi, i. 1098) against Paul of Samosata, whose assertion, that the hymns to Christ are the work of recent writers, as it proves itself to be a pretext for the removing the use of these from the Church, so is it refuted by the passage from Eusebius above quoted.

[2] Ignatius is mentioned by Socrates, E. H. vi. 8, as the inventor of the antiphonal hymns in the Christian service; which, however, is destitute of internal probability. See for the rest Rheinwald, l. c. p. 264; Bingham, vol. vi. Bk. xiv. c. 1, § 11.

amongst other evidences, be seen by the fact, that the Gnostics Valentinus and Bardesanes were hymn-writers. On the other hand, it may be regarded as characteristic that we hear nothing of the sort from among the Ebionites. The old Christian hymnology, according to the traces of it which we possess, had for its chief object the praise of the Divine Son (Ep. Plin.). As in the Psalms of the Old Testament we have the most instructive monuments of ancient Hebrew piety, and thereby ascertain what passed over from the ancient revelation into joy and life, what filled the heart and burst forth from it in song, so may we regard the old Christian hymnology. On this account the commencement of the oldest Christian hymn which has come down to us in a complete form may be cited here :[1]

Bridle of untamed colts,
Wing of unwandering birds,
Never-wavering Rudder of youth,
Shepherd of the royal flock,
Thy blameless
Children gather
Holily to praise,
Sincerely to laud
With consecrated lips.

Leader of youth, Christ,*
King of saints ;
Of the Highest Father,
All-administering Word ;
Dispenser of wisdom ;
Support of the suffering ;
Lord of immortality ;
Saviour of mortals ; O Jesus !
Shepherd and Father,
Rudder and Bridle,
Heavenly Pinion
Of the consecrated flock ;
Fisher of men,
Of the heirs of salvation,
Whom Thou from hostile flood,

[1] It is preserved by Clement of Alexandria, Pædag. iii. 12, fin., ed. Potter, 311.

* [In Potter's text this line reads παίδων ἡγήτορα Χριστόν, and ought therefore to be connected with what goes before, as containing the object of αἰνεῖν and ὑμνεῖν. I know not on what grounds Dr Dorner has preferred a different reading. But the rendering he has given, which is that of Münter, does not adhere to the original in several places.—Tr.]

In sea of evil,
With sweet life,
The pure fishes catchest:
Lead us on, O Thou,
Shepherd of rational sheep!
Lead us on, O Holy One!
Prince of youths undefiled.

We sucklings,
Fostered by soft lips,
From the spiritual breast
Filled with sweet song,*
Sing sincere praise,
Genuine hymns,
To Christ the King:

Sing sincerely
The mighty Son.
O peaceful choir,
Ye, the Christ-begotten,
Thou holy people,
Praise together the God of peace!

If, along with these witnesses of the inspired feeling, we take the witnesses of inspired deed and self-offering for the Christian faith, which are to be found in their purest form in the first two centuries; if we consider that martyrdom was viewed as a higher act of worship,[1] a baptism of blood; that denial of Christ, and apostasy from Him, was regarded, not as falsehood and unfaithfulness towards a man, and towards what was to be held as a sacred remembrance, but as a renunciation of eternal salvation and fellowship with God,—as a death-sin, from which recovery was hardly possible; we shall conclude, taking into account all that has been adduced, that the Church, up to the middle of the second century, deserves the title, not merely of the witnessing Church, but particularly of the Church witnessing *for the true Godhead and the true manhood of Christ.* This is impressed upon us, whether we look at the Church's writings, or its liturgic elements in public worship, or the principle of its arrangement of festivals, or the beginnings of

* [Lieblichen Oden erfüllt. I suspect a misprint here of *oden* for *odem.* The original is πνεύματι δροσερῷ ἐμπιπλάμενοι, *filled with a dewy spirit.*—Tr.]

[1] Comp. Euseb. v. 28; Ep. Plin. 97; Letters of Ignatius.

Christian art and characteristic usage. Here the Churches of the East and the West are at one. One faith essentially, even that which is ours, and was that of the Apostles, is enunciated by the mutually independent life-systems of the young Church; for one soul besouls it, the Spirit of Christ. And this free inner concurrence of the most diverse regions may be conclusively viewed as the most decisive proof of the unity of the universal view of faith in Christ, and of the existence of a new creative principle in the Church, through faith in the Son of God. The Church of the epoch now before us has not only received and kept what she obtained from the Apostles and their immediate disciples, and what was ever anew given to her by the reading of the apostolic writings, and especially the Gospels[1]—a practice early introduced, but has put out to usury the treasure entrusted to her.

[1] Justin. Apol. i. 67; Bingham, vi. c. 3.

CHAPTER SECOND.

OPPONENTS OF THE DEITY OF CHRIST.

CHRISTIANITY, having its fundamental doctrine in the perfect *union* of the divine and human accomplished in Christ, came in consequence of this into antagonism alike with Judaism and heathenism. The principle of Hebraism abides by the distinction of these; that of heathenism by their amalgamation. Christianity presents the distinction brought to unity, or a unity of which the distinctions are the presupposition and abiding elements. Where, therefore, heathenism or Judaism does not transcend its essence, a Christian heresy is not at all possible. It is not peculiarly Christian to believe that Jesus was a man, though the true manhood of Christ is an essential momentum of Christianity, for Jews and Mohammedans also believe that; nor is it peculiarly Christian to believe in a divine in the general, or indeed in a supreme being distinct from God as the ὄν, without an incarnation of this divine, and that in Christ; for we find what is akin to this, as we have seen, beyond the pale of Christianity; and even the name Christ, which may through the historical influence of Christianity be given to such a higher being, does not in the least alter the thing itself. Doketism and Ebionism, when both are consequent, stand thus on the outermost verge, to go beyond which is to cease to be Christian, especially when there did not, through a wholesome inconsequence, lie preformed a higher Christology in a purer construction of the work of Christ. They are rather phenomena of heathenism or Judaism, rendered apparent perhaps by Christianity, but not penetrated by its radiance; attempts, perhaps, which both made to transcend themselves in order to oppose Christianity, but empty and without result; if they refract the penetrating beam of Christianity, they take from it only what they already have or may have, whilst at

the same time they hold that which is common to them with Christianity otherwise than it is in Christianity. Hence we must discriminate such forms as have resting on their core only the shadows of the pre-Christian world, from such as already, though in a yet imperfect manner, recognise the union of the eternal and divine with the historical, the human in Christ. Where also there is only a holding by that union given in Christ or His work as by a delicate thread, there we have not what is unchristian, though it may be that there we have Christian heresy. Among the forms of the former kind which do not at all belong to our object, are to be reckoned the doctrines of the Simonians and the like, the Ophites and Elkesaites, which stand within the sphere of Paganism. To Hebraism run wild, the nearest resource was a relapse into a pagan form of dualism: it is the ethical principle in union with the Messianic idea alone which has power to bind this dualism, and to reconcile the Hebraistic principle with itself in its completion. Several of those named show their Paganism also by their Polytheism, and set over against or by the side of the revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth, themselves or others as revelations of the supreme power.[1] To this class also belongs Carpocrates.[2] According to him, Christ was a religious Genius, to whom he erected a statue along with Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle, and to whom he assigned a place in his Genius worship. Born of Joseph and Mary, Jesus, according to him, was like all others; only he was distinguished by virtue and good conduct. Since, however, his soul was of unwonted elasticity (εὔτονος), it remembered what it had seen when it circled in the train of the unknown Father. This same Father had sent powers into Christ's soul, in order that it might remember what had been seen, and be strengthened to contemn the world-creating angel and the law, to pass through all acts and conditions of men without being defiled or entangled, through any possible contact with this world, and, being delivered, to ascend to the Father

[1] Here also might be placed the Phrygian Montanism, were it sufficiently attested that Montanus sought to be reverenced along with the Father and the Son as perfect divine power, as the incarnate Paraclete, and not simply as the prophetic organ thereof.

[2] Iren. i. 24. He lived pretty early in the former half of the second century. His scholar Marcellina came to Rome in the time of Anicetus. See Epiph. Hær. 27; Euseb. iv. 7.

above. And in like manner kindred souls with his fly up to freedom, so soon as they have performed all, and in all proved their freedom. If later writers cast on him and his school the reproach of licentiousness, it is to be borne in mind that they are not supported in this by Irenæus, the oldest source of information concerning Carpocrates.[1] But the place which he assigns to Jesus among other human geniuses[2] might lead us to place him among heathens, as, for instance, Porphyry has done. The pre-existence which Carpocrates allows to Jesus is that of Plato's souls; his higher endowment is resolved into a merely more vivid recollection of what others, with more of imperfection and confusion, know from their ante-mundane state. And this recollection he owes partly to his virtuous soul, the energy by which he contemns and negatives this world, partly, but secondarily, to divine powers such as the Father refuses to none who are virtuous. This tendency were to be designated Ebionitic (in a dogmatical sense) had it somewhat pantheistically represented all men, and so Christ, as essentially divine in respect of their soul;[3] and indeed, as it retains nothing even for the work of Christ,[4] it is Ebionitic in the sense of the negative limit of what is Christian.[5]

In like manner, at the outermost point of what is Jewish and not yet Christian stands the tendency which, on the one hand, not only commends the observance of the Mosaic law as allowable, but holds it for necessary and saving; with this view continues the observance of circumcision, Sabbaths, new moons, etc., after the manner of pharisaic Judaism, despises the heathen Christians who did not concur in this as unclean, and pursues a Paul, as in life, so after death, with reproaches and excommunications: on the other hand, though receiving a powerful impression from Christ's historical appearance, especially His miracles and moral teaching, and holding Him to be the Mes-

[1] Appendix, Note KKK.

[2] An eclecticism which Hadrian justly censures. Ep. Adriani ad Serv.

[3] This Carpocrates might have affirmed in accordance with his doctrine.

[4] Comp. Epiph. Hær. xxvii. 2.

[5] Iren. Bk. I. c. xxvi. 2. Hierosolymam adorant quasi Domus sit Dei.—Justin, Dial. c. Try. ed. Col. p. 266. Perhaps to this also belongs the second class of the δίττοι Ἐβιωναῖοι of Origen, by whom a natural birth of Christ was asserted (Χριστὸν γεγενῆσθαι ὡς τοὺς λοιποὺς ἀνθρώπους). Epiphanius also knows such, Hær. 30; Orig. Hom. xviii. in Jerem. c. 12.

siah, yet maintains that He was the son of Joseph and Mary; denies His supernatural birth and special Divine endowment, since it regards the birth of the Son of God from a virgin as heathenish; views his exaltation to Messianic dignity, consequently, as a reward for His legal righteousness and holiness; and in the general expects and desires in the Messiah, not the union of the divine and human (which are rather markedly kept apart), but only the bringer of outward felicity. For this party the Messianic age has in truth not appeared; but all is to be expected only from the eschatology. The appearance of Jesus descends into an announcement or prophecy of the coming Messianic age, and is, in its obscurity and humiliation, not essentially different from that Theologoumenon, which still finds place even within Judaism, according to which the Messiah may have already appeared somewhere, but as yet only in obscurity. For, the identity of the Person of the Messiah in both appearances, which the former hold, is yet only apparently a prejudice, so long as they know not to gain a spiritual significance either for the historical Person or the work of Christ. Hence they are justly regarded by Origen and others as scarcely to be numbered among Christians.[1] The less that they were attached to Christ by a spiritual gift, in which they had the pledge that the consummating Messiah must be the same as had already appeared in Jesus—the less they thought Jesus to be peculiarly endowed, so much the more indifferent did His appearance become, so much the easier also was a relapse into Judaism, in which also there wanted not a prophecy of that which is yet to come.

After this glance at the extreme limits, we advance to Ebionitic *heresy*. It admits, that in a sense the divine was in a peculiar manner united to the human in the Person of Jesus; but so as that this divine remains only an accident of the Person of Jesus. What is accidental here shows itself in this, that it is either not fixed for itself, or is thought as not essential to this person, *i.e.*, as not from the beginning and for ever, or not in a peculiar manner, united to it. Ebionism views the divine in Christ doketically, as Doketism does the human. It deserves notice, that this party from the beginning has the character of a certain ignobility in it. We can neither ascer-

[1] Appendix, Note LLL.

tain in what age it was formed, nor has it an historically significant personality under it, nor, in fine, does any historically ascertained person stand at its head. It had, indeed, its original place within Judaism. Whether it be viewed as a relapse or a remnant, it has been already shown in the first chapter that it cannot be regarded as Judaic Christianity, but only as a fraction of this. Rather, from its position, may it be concluded that it unintentionally and unconsciously might become from a Christian heresy a Jewish sect, which plainly could not be said of Judaic Christianity in the general.

If we seek after the traces of this tendency, we shall find the most ancient in the Epistle to the Hebrews. From that zeal for the law, with which Paul had to contend, the Judaizing spirit was led not at first to impeach the Christology, but rather the Soteriology, or the work of Christ. But the consequence of the legal stand-point soon showed itself. The party which the Epistle to the Hebrews has in view must have over-estimated the law of the Old Testament regarding holy times, places, acts, and persons alike, and have been wanting in the Christian knowledge which knows how to secure to the Old Testament its abiding significancy, which it has as a Divine institute, without imperilling the newness and conclusive completeness of Christianity. They have already by baptism tasted of the gift of the Holy Ghost; nor are they yet fallen from Christ, but are willing still to hold by His Person. But it could not fail that the significancy of that Person should ever be diminished the less there remained for it to accomplish, *i.e.*, the more the law was regarded as sufficient and permanent; and hence the Epistle shows, that in the law there was not revealed the innermost being of God (*it* was given by angels); that it was transitory, because internally unsatisfying, inasmuch as it did not secure eternal reconciliation, and was therefore permanent only in respect of its typical character. As a type, it was set aside by the appearing of Christ, the pre-existent Son of God, who is higher than angels, the Word of revelation itself, the true Reconciler, but at the same time the Judge. The author thus seeks, by vivifying their view of the Son of God, to preserve them from extremities,—from that entire apostasy from Him to which they were exposed, if they retained the old world, which was constructed upon another principle, unaltered, along with

the new principle, which they had not yet renounced,—refused to this development, thereby assailed, its very existence, and made it only apparent. How far their view of Christ had been already lowered by the vitiating influence of the old world theory, cannot be decisively gathered from the Epistle; very likely it was different in this respect with different persons. But it is certain that a higher view of Christ than that which is suited to the legal stand-point must have belonged to them at an earlier period,—nay, that such was still recognised by them, and afforded to the writer of the Epistle a firm point from which to operate; and with this, therefore, he begins. His Christology might, indeed, be higher than theirs; still he must have been sure that he was not saying to them what was wholly strange and unknown in what he advanced on this head, as he could remind them that they had through faith in Christ received the gift of the Holy Ghost, and had tasted of the powers of the world to come. We know not, however, of a single name which we can mention as connected with this tendency, unless Thebuthis, who belonged certainly to this age,[1] is to be reckoned as such.

The destruction of Jerusalem brought, according to Epiphanius, many Christians from Judea and Jerusalem to the district of Pella. We find, indeed, soon after this, Jerusalem again the centre-point of the non-heretical Jewish Christians (see above, p. 159); but from this it cannot be concluded that the Epistle to the Hebrews, or the destruction of Jerusalem, had annihilated even for a season the heresy attacked by the former. But whilst the kernel of the Jewish Christian Church assembled, after the ancient fashion, in Jerusalem up to the time of Hadrian, many remained in Pella and the surrounding region, under leaders without name, proclaiming their want of consequence and coherence by their coalescing with the Essenes, and even in part, as was especially the case with the Elkesaites, falling into heathenism. Elsewhere also was Christianity grafted upon such a Judaism decaying and tinged with heathenism; as in Phrygia, Asia Minor (comp. the Epistle to the Colossians and the Pastoral Epistles), and Alexandria. Out of this amalgamation arose the families of the gnosticizing Ebionism, which Epiphanius especially describes.[2] Nevertheless it

[1] Euseb. iii. 32; iv. 22. Comp. for the rest, Schliemann, p. 459 ff.

[2] Epiph. Hær. 30; Homil. Clementinæ.

must not be assumed that all who dwelt in the Decapolis were of this party. As little, conversely, must we conclude that the society of Jewish Christians who returned to Jerusalem, and who observed the law, held thoroughly by the apostolic type of doctrine; the same danger which the Epistle to the Hebrews indicates, must have arisen from continued intercourse with the synagogue. As under Hadrian it was forbidden to the Jews to enter the sacred city, there must have emerged a crisis;[1] and the question must have come before the Church at Jerusalem, whether to adhere to the Jews, who must depart, or to the Christians, who might remain. The answer seems in point of fact to have been threefold. Some, and these not few, as Sulpicius Severus intimates, renounced the bondage of the law; and they had no other resource than to join the society of a purely heathen Christian character, which soon after was collected at Ælia Capitolina. Others left Jerusalem; but as they did not sever themselves from the synagogue, and did not unite with heathen Christians, they became withdrawn from the life of the Church and its motives, and gradually became a sect. Among these, however, some held faithfully by the supernatural birth of Christ; they wished to remain Christians without giving up the hope of seeing their Jewish brethren collectively converted to Christianity;[2] whilst others, following out the legal principle which they firmly held, were thereby drawn into concessions to unbelieving Judaism, and to a lowering of their position concerning Christ. Of these, the former disappeared among the heathen Christians; the latter could not submit to

[1] If I do not attach to this catastrophe, which betook the national Judaism, as much weight in conducing to the rise of Ebionism, as Schliemann does, p. 406 ff., inasmuch as undoubtedly earlier traces of Ebionism are to be found, on the other hand, I think Neander (K. G. i. 2, 953 [Eng. Tr. vol. ii. 12.]) has under-estimated its significancy.

[2] Hieronym. Ep. 112 ad August. c. 13. Quid dicam de Ebionitis qui Christianos simulant? Usque hodie per totas Orientis synagogas inter Judæos hæresis est qui dicitur Minæorum, et a Pharisæis nunc usque damnatur, quos vulgo *Nazaræos* nuncupant, qui credunt in Christum Filium Dei, natum de virgine Maria et eum dicunt esse, qui sub Pontio Pilato passus est et resurrexit, in quem et nos credimus; sed dum volunt et Judæi esse et Christiani, nec Judæi sunt nec Christiani. But they deserve not this harsh sentence; they sought to be Christians in respect of faith, to be Jews in respect of nationality. Epiph. Hær. xxix. 7, 9, comp. Iren. i. 26; Orig. c. Cels. v. 61, 65; Euseb. iii. 27; Pamphil. Apol. i.

the sacrifice which was laid upon them—and which was required, alone of all nations, of the converted Jews—the sacrifice of nationality, and lived as *Nazarènes*, called by the Jews Minæans, at first among the Jews, afterwards also with them;[1] whilst the last, who might be strengthened from other quarters, though they did not relapse into Judaism, degenerated in various ways, —e.gr., they might approximate to the sect above delineated, which is properly to be called a sect of Judaism,[2] or come nearer to gnostic Judaism.[3] These last are the Ebionites, properly so called.[4] We give the precedence to the Nazarenes, who held by the supernatural birth of Christ, though they would not go the length of admitting the pre-existing hypostasis of the Son. The most fully developed form of these, on the other hand, are the *gnosticizing* Ebionites; whilst between these two extremes of Judaizing Christology there are appearances which we shall shortly term *Cerinthian*, because they all concur in dating the higher nature of Christ from His baptism.

A. The Nazarenes.*

The Nazarenes could not justly be designated heretics, were it not that to abide by the first elements of doctrinal development, and to arrest its progress, must unconsciously and invo-

[1] Comp. Hieron. de viris illustr. 3.

[2] Epiph. Hær. xxix. 7; xxx. 1, 2.

[3] Comp. Orig. c. Cels. v. 61, 65; Euseb. iii. 27; Epiph. Hær. 30.

[4] The names Ebionite and Nazarene have probably a similar history, namely, that originally they were nicknames which the Jews gave among themselves to the Christians, and which afterwards the Jewish Christians appropriated and kept as what they received from the heathen Christians, from whom they stood aloof (comp. Neander, K. G. i. 2, 596 ff. 603 [E. T., vol. ii. p. 13 ff.]). Frequently all are called Ebionites who still observed the Mosaic law; but where greater precision is observed the Nazarenes are distinguished from the Ebionites, because they did not, in fact, share the Christological heresy of the proper Ebionites. Irenæus does not exactly apprehend and discriminate the different kinds of Ebionites; but this is done by Origen, Eusebius, Jerome, and in part by Epiphanius.

* [Before entering on this part of the book, the reader may with advantage refresh his memory by reading Neander's account of these early heretical sects, as Dr Dorner presupposes in his readers a somewhat familiar acquaintance with them.—Tr.]

luntarily lead to an alteration of the truths which, if left to their natural course, would be the principles of a development. Continuing till at least the fifth century, they presented to the Church the picture of the first commencement of Christological knowledge; but only as a child that has grown in years without growing in size, and from the impeded growth of its limbs cannot save itself from being crippled. But we must set out from this, as well because among those named they are the purest outshoot of the post-apostolic Jewish Christians, as because they are the stock from which the two forms of proper Ebionism grew, misled by the attractive power of foreign principles.

The Nazarenes had the Gospel of Matthew in the Hebrew tongue, and that complete (πληρέστατον), as Epiphanius and Irenæus attest.[1] As they consequently did not want the first two chapters of Matthew, they accepted the supernatural birth of Christ.[2] They thought of Christ as born of the essence of the Divine Spirit, or as the Son of the fountain of the Holy Ghost.[3] But they did not hold a pre-existing hypostasis of the Divine in Christ, but only His pre-existence in God generally and His Spirit (Euseb. iii. 27). We might thus even venture to ascribe to them a belief in an hypostasis of the Divine in Christ from His birth or His baptism; for this could not be avoided where the רוּחַ יְהוָה was hypostatically distinguished from God. Most probably they called God the fountain of the Holy Ghost (fons omnis Spiritus Sancti) on account of the baptism, and with reference to Is. xi. 1; and in so far as Jesus knew Himself to be born from this Divine Spirit, He might figuratively, according to them, call it His mother. But, as Neander shows, the strongly poetical passages in which this is stated cannot be permitted to furnish ground for constructing a

[1] Epiph. xxix. 7, 9; Iren. i. 26. Appendix, Note MMM.

[2] Appendix, Note NNN.

[3] Characteristic of the three classes that are to be bespoken is the form in which each of them represents the baptism of Christ (comp. Schliemann, p. 508). The Nazarene gospel narrates (Hieron. Com. in Jes. xi. 1): Factum est autem cum ascendisset Dominus de aqua descendit *fons* omnis Spiritus Sancti, et requievit super illum et dixit illi Fili mi, in omnibus prophetis exspectabam te, ut venires ut requiesurem in te. Tu es enim requies mea, tu es Filius meus primogenitus qui regnas in sempiternum. The object spoken of is not called "Spiritus Sanctus," as according to the interpretation of recent writers one might suppose, but "fons omnis Spiritus Sancti."

dogma of the Nazarenes respecting a special hypostasis and pre-existence of the Holy Ghost. They thus stand nearer to the so-called Patripassians of the second and third centuries, who also dwelt in the same district, than to the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Logos and Pneuma. Jerome relates (Comm. in Hab. iii. 3) of a Nazarene, that he explained the passage thus: Quod Bethlehem sita sit ad austrum, in qua natus est Dominus salvator, et ipsum esse, de quo nunc dicatur Dominus ab austro veniet, hoc est nascetur in Bethlehem et inde consurget.—Et quia ipse qui natus est in Bethlehem legem quondam dedit in monte Sinai ipse est sanctus qui venit de monte Pharan.—Ipse qui natus est in Bethlehem et qui in Sina, *i.e.*, in monte Pharan legem dedit, semper in universis beneficiis autor est et largitor. From this passage one would certainly conclude that He who gave the law on Sinai was the same as He who was born at Bethlehem; but whilst there is nothing in the language of the Old or New Testament to support the idea that the law was given by the Holy Ghost, as little can we say, with Schliemann, that Christ is, according to this passage, identified in His pre-existence with the Holy Ghost, but rather with *God Himself* (comp. Schliemann, p. 455). In fact, and this deserves special consideration, they seem also to have taken no offence at Christ's death on the cross, but rather to have attached special importance to it, as also to His resurrection.[1] But certainly their Christology has still something indefinite and fluctuating in it, and thereby they are distinguished from the Patripassians. It is certain that with them Christ stood personally distinct from God. The Divine had come into Him in an abiding operativeness, had come to an objective mode of being in Christ; and the expressions they use sound strong enough to lead us to think that they regarded the Divine in Christ as personal,—not, indeed, as a proper power, but that God Himself, in so far as He is fons omnis Spiritus Sancti, abides and rests in Him. On the other hand, however, these strong expressions do not necessarily go beyond the assertion of a distinction between the manifested and the concealed God, which by no means posits a hypostatic distinction in God, but only involves a leaning to that. Moreover, this entire elevation of Christ dates only from His baptism; so that His

[1] Appendix, Note OOO.

human personality, wonderful indeed, and proceeding from the Holy Ghost, was already there before it became participant by baptism of that highest indwelling of God.[1]

B. Cerinthian Ebionites.

Whilst the Nazarenes placed the physical God-sonship first, and made the ethical to follow thereupon or therefrom,—which, we cannot determine with certainty,—and gave to the baptism of Christ a marked importance in reference to His equipment, the Cerinthian Ebionites decidedly set the baptism of Christ in the place of His supernatural birth. They first obtained a sufficient motive for giving pre-eminence to the baptism of Christ, as the Nazarenes also partially did, from their conversely making the ethical Sonship the cause of the physical, so far as they held this. According to their view, it was His baptism which first made Jesus the Messiah, not His birth; for such a distinction could be conferred only on one who by his righteousness and virtue had made himself worthy of it. The period before His baptism, and an existence of Jesus before His exaltation to be God's Son, were consequently necessary, in order that God might remain just,—that He might not arbitrarily make a person holy, and then reward him for that which was not his desert, but the effect of his nature. Thus this class stood most markedly over against the preceding. They were constrained, from avowedly ethical, but more strictly from legal grounds, to utterly deny the supernatural birth of Christ: they must regard Him as not more perfectly endowed than other men, in order that He might, in the season of trial before His baptism, approve Himself by virtue, and then be endowed with grace, *i.e.*, be rewarded.

In support of this legal motive there came, in close connection with the preceding, to this second stricter Jewish class, a Judaistic more than an Old Testament concept of God, which markedly separated God and the world, and to which it seemed a heathenish fable that the Son of God should be born of a virgin. The preceding also found, indeed, no distinction in God, no doctrine of a hypostatic Trinity, but still a living,

[1] Appendix, Note PPP.

self-manifesting God. Here, on the contrary, God was conceived only in His infinite supremacy over the world, not in His condescension; the religious interest was repressed; the abstractly understood made itself valid; although still the main things were not theories or speculations, but what was practical, *i.e.*, moral or eudæmonistic, had the preference. As through this the doctrine of the Gospels concerning the original endowment of Christ was necessarily denied, so through this also the kind of higher endowment which they actually allowed to Christ was determined. Of a personal indwelling of God—from assenting to which the Nazarenes were not excluded, nay, to which there were many features of their system which inclined them—these could not so much as speak; and so there remained for them only to maintain, either the communication of Divine power, or, what was more consequent on their deistic concept of God, the union with Jesus of a power not Divine, but created, and which could thus without difficulty be represented hypostatically.

This class attached itself more to the law, approximated to pharisaic Judaism, and was hostile to the Apostle Paul. It clung firmly in the general to the Old Testament, and thereby was obviously distinguished from the third class, which was retrogressive to a primitive religion.[1]

At first their doctrinal system had naturally a very undeveloped, transient form; they issued only from a tendency within Judaic Christianity, which had no existence save where the law was still held to be binding. Among such, some would still stand aloof from the Christological conclusions, whilst others would advance to them, but that in a sadly infelicitous way; and a while must elapse before they, after giving up the supernatural birth, could again firmly plant their foot and settle themselves on a doctrine which secured to them the name of a Christian, and not merely, like those above excepted, a Jewish sect.

With this concurs wholly the account above, taken from Hegesippus, of the initiatory covert accumulation of the heretical poison, until under Thebuthis (of whom we know nothing beyond this) heresy appeared with uncovered front. The end of the first, or the beginning of the second century, seems to

[1] Appendix, Note QQQ.

be the time when this form of Ebionism assumed a more definite shape.[1] New strength was conveyed to it by the relations under Hadrian (see above, p. 190).

a. As the first representative of name of this tendency, appeared Cerinthus in Asia Minor. He, on account of his chiliastic views, cannot be reckoned among the Gnostics, though he, with the entire class to which he belongs, marks a middle path, which, on the one hand, conducts to gnosticizing Ebionism, and on the other, to a proper Doketism and Gnosticism, with which he had much in common, especially his concept of God.

According to Cerinthus, Jesüs, the child of Joseph and Mary, was not at first the Christ. The Father, who, infinitely exalted above all world-creating powers and angels, is by a long series of beings separated from us, ἄγνωστος, was at first also unknown by Jesus. Nevertheless the latter, by virtue, wisdom, and righteousness (Iren. i. 26), was so distinguished from all other men,[2] that the Χριστὸς—whom he conceived as akin to the Æons, but exalted above the angels, and called, according to others, also Λόγος—found Him worthy that at His baptism He should descend and sink into Him in the baptismal act, whereby He became the Messiah. After this Jesus knew the Father, declared Him, the Unknown (Theodoret, Hær. Fab. ii. 3), and performed miracles. Christ's principal work, according to Cerinthus, was not that of redemption, but that of revelation by doctrine. The Christ avoided the sufferings of Jesus, in which he saw no Messianic act, but only human sufferings; to which, consequently, he attached no value in relation to redemption. With this is connected the

[1] Appendix, Note RRR.

[2] Comp. Euseb. iii. 28; Iren. i. 26; Theodoret, Hær. Fab. ii. 3. Irenæus says, Non a primo Deo factum esse mundum docuit, sed a virtute quadam valde separata et distante ab ea principalitate, quæ est super universa, et ignorante eum qui est super omnia Deum. Jesum autem subjecit non ex virgine natum (impossibile enim hoc ei visum est); fuisse autem eum Joseph et Mariæ filium similiter ut reliqui omnes homines (cf. Origen c. Cels. v. 61), et plus potuisse justitia et prudentia, et sapientia ab hominibus. Et post baptismum descendisse in eum ab ea principalitate quæ est super omnia Christum figura columbæ, et tunc annunciasse incognitum Patrem et virtutes perfecisse; in fine autem revolasse iterum Christum Patrem de Jesu, et Jesum passum esse et resurrexisse, Christum autem impassibilem perseverasse, existentem spiritalem.

fact, that he, or at least many of his disciples, taught, that though Jesus indeed died, Christ did not participate in that; and that Jesus has not arisen, nor will he arise, until the advent of the new kingdom (Epiph. Hær. xxviii. 6).[1] The work of Christ is rather, partly to make known the unknown Father, consequently to fulfil the prophetic office; partly—and this seemed to him the principal thing—to introduce the millennial reign, and so to fulfil the kingly office. But of the latter there came forth hardly a single ray during Christ's first appearing; this rather only predicted the true future, and on this side alone was it prophetic. There may be found, moreover, in the accounts of the sensuousness of his Chiliasm, something exaggerated, introduced from foreign interests; but his representation cannot have been very spiritual, because he viewed only power and rule as a worthy category of the divine, not love; otherwise he would not have thought of Christ as separated from the sufferings of Jesus.[2] Two things, however, are noteworthy of him: first, that in him Gnosticism and Ebionism manifestly crossed, and were not sundered; second, that Christ, distinct from Jesus, was viewed by him as a proper pre-existing hypostasis above the world-creating powers, not merely an impersonal power which descended upon Jesus.[3] Though by him Christ is introduced abruptly, and in a manner absolutely supernatural, his fundamental view of Christ's significancy remains Ebionitic. He did not attain to a personal union of the divine and human. Rather, with him, these mutually exclude each other. If the divine is there, the human is bound, and, as it were not there, overmastered by an extraneous power;

[1] According to Irenæus, i. 26, Cerinthus admitted the resurrection of Jesus. But if he did, it must have remained for him a meaningless fact. See Neander l. c., p. 688.

[2] Comp. Iren. i. 26; Euseb. iii. 26; Epiph. Hær. 28; Theodoret, Hær. Fab. 23. Caius and Dionysius maintain this Judaism of him only in respect of eschatology.

[3] From the character of the oldest heresies the hypothesis is proved to be unhistoric, that the Son of God (called by Cerinthus Christ) was not regarded as a proper hypostasis before the Montanists. The unity of God might have been easily held along with that by Cerinthus; for he could call in the aid of a Gnostic emanation doctrine. This, however, like his πατὴρ ἄγνωστος, who must be essentially one with σιγή, is again a sign that about the end of the first century there could not have been wanting significant beginnings of Gnosticism.

if the human is to perform its ethical functions, the divine must be excluded. The ethical is not conceived as a revelation of the divine; and however high it is apparently placed, yet it is banished to the ante-Messianic region, as it cannot be regarded as an end to itself, unless it be equally a revelation of the divine. Hence it becomes, consistently with him, in the last reference only a *mean*, as also becomes apparent in his eschatology.

b. The Ebionites, whom Justin Martyr names,[1] may well be joined with Cerinthus; for they appear also to have been in Ephesus, though many of them were spread abroad elsewhere, in the second century. In respect of his mild judgment of them, it is to be borne in mind, that at that time heretics were not cast out of the Church, where they did not exclude themselves; also, that dogmas had not yet been determined by any Church decrees, but that the sound faith had first to form itself from within, and through the labour of individuals to be brought to the objectivity of Church doctrine, and had for its task to prove, in free equal fight with opponents, its conquering might. Now, had the Ebionites of whom Justin speaks been only deniers of the supernatural birth of Christ, without offering any compensation on any other point, they could hardly be called Christians; and it is inconceivable how Justin could reckon them among Christians, since they would rather have belonged to the Jewish sects, which we saw reason above to mark out. But he could do this with justice if they were willing to regard Christ as nevertheless the true Messiah, made so by a Divine act. If they made this concession, they must have laid stress on Christ's baptism, and thus were allied to Cerinthus on the main point; and thus might the Christian truth which they already had, rise superior to what was unchristian in their views, and to the legal stand-point which, the higher and more divine the Messianic dignity was held to be, led to the conclusion the more strongly, that it could not be imparted to Him without respect to previous worthiness, and consequently could not come to Him by birth. In accordance with this, Justin also proceeds. He does not say that it is a matter of indifference whether the supernatural birth and pre-existence of Christ be denied (as this passage has often been understood); but, as he has already proved

[1] Appendix, Note SSS.

the higher Messianic dignity of Jesus, before which the legal stand-point must give way (c. 10–17), he sets out from that, and seeks to show, since *this is already established*, that the supernatural birth and pre-existence of Christ must be assumed, whilst he at the same time mentions that there are many who refuse to go this length. As the reason of this, he adduces their adherence to human doctrines. Against these are the Prophets, and the doctrine of the Lord Himself. It is quite clear from these passages, that they formed by a great deal the minority of the Christians. Justin's Ebionites can have differed, at least in part, from Cerinthus only in this, that they kept at a greater distance from Gnostic views, said nothing of a hypostatic Christ before baptism, but, resting on the passage Is. xi. 1, and on the narrative of the baptism, they assumed that in the baptism the seven *powers* of the Holy, *i.e.*, the Divine Spirit, descended into Jesus.

They were at one with the Jewish canon, *διὰ τὸ ἐννόμως καὶ τελείως πολιτεύεσθαι αὐτὸν κατηξιῶσθαι τοῦ ἐκλεγῆναι εἰς Χριστὸν*; but they also saw fulfilled in Jesus the Jewish expectation, that the Messiah should be unconscious of Himself, and without power, until Elias should come and baptize Him.[1] We have also an express witness for this in the history of Christ's baptism, as it is set forth in *their* recension of the Hebrew Gospel.[2] His baptismal day is His birth day as Christ (*σήμερον γεγέννηκά σε*); then did He, who was before but an ordinary man, become the Son of God. They concluded that, if His baptism had thus such significancy for Him,—if before He could enter as the Messiah He had to be anointed by Elias, and to be filled with the powers of the Spirit, of which Isaiah speaks (xi. 1),—then He must have previously wanted these, and so could neither have pre-existed nor been supernaturally born. (Comp. Justin, Dial. c. Tryph. c. 49 ff. 87; Hieron. Comm. in Jesai, 112.) The more, however, that they placed Jesus before His baptism on a perfect level with ordinary men, the more definitely did the conclusion press itself on them that Christ must also have had sins to confess to the Baptist.

[1] Justin, Dial. c. Tryph. ed. Col. 1686, p. 226: *καὶ οὐδὲ*, say the Jews, *αὐτός πω ἑαυτὸν ἐπίσταται, οὐδὲ ἔχει δύναμίν τινα μέχρις ἂν ἐλθὼν Ἠλίας χρίσῃ αὐτὸν καὶ φανερὸν πᾶσι ποιήσῃ.*

[2] Appendix, Note TTT.

Hence Justin Martyr seeks, conversely, to maintain the supernatural birth of Jesus as necessary to His sinlessness (Dial. c. Tryph. c. 23, p. 241 B.). This conclusion, it would appear, some amongst them also conceded.[1]

They had, nevertheless, no interest in ascribing sinfulness to Christ before His baptism, as a principle, and not simply as a consequence. Rather were they concerned to maintain the sinlessness of Him who is the Saviour; only they date this from His baptism, and hold it to have been produced by this. But if His moral worthiness becomes complete only with His baptism, they evidently break off from the principle from which they set out, namely, that not the special Divine equipment was the cause of the Divine Sonship, but, conversely, His holiness and wisdom rendered Him worthy to be exalted to be God's Son. It is quite manifest at this point, that they could not consequently carry out their principle. For, so long as they held by a sinless Messiah, consequently still kept within Christian bounds, and had not become a Jewish sect, they must do one of two things: *Either*, they must regard this sinlessness wholly as His own work, and not at the close have recourse again to a supernatural grace; in which case Christ has no religious significancy, and His baptism would sink, contrary to their wishes, to a mere epideictic act promulgatory of His holiness, from which men would reap small benefit, since they, even according to these Ebionites, stand in need of forgiveness of sins; and moreover that one, the child of sinners, should himself be sinless, would be to them an inexplicable riddle: *Or*, if they regarded His sinlessness as not wholly His own work, without help from God, but that its first operative cause was His baptism, they had no longer any right to offer objections to the doctrine of Christ's higher qualification from His birth on the ground of God's righteousness.[2]

This consideration might of itself have already conducted back to a supernatural birth of Jesus. To this, however, was added, that this Ebionism approximated to Gnosticism not by

[1] As also the author of the Κήρυγμα Πέτρου and Basilides. Comp. note 2, p. 194. Whether Cerinthus also, as Schliemann, p. 259, note 21, and before him Neander, Leben Jesu, p. 76, note 2, ed. 3, suppose, I venture not to say decidedly, since the προκοπή does not lead us to infer sinfulness.

[2] Appendix, Note UUU.

the form which saw in Christ's baptism the equipment with the powers of the Holy Ghost, but rather by the other which saw in Him from His baptism a union with a higher Spirit, a Christophany, which is found in Cerinthus as well as in other Ebionites (Epiph. Hær. xxx. 3; see last note). If nevertheless they attached to the reconciliation effected by Christ's death no such weight as would have led them to say more of His work than that He was a teacher and example of virtue, which of itself leads to the Gnostic stand-point, then speedily the abstract intellectual stand-point is raised to the theosophic or speculative desire of knowing. That they connected the forgiveness of sins with baptism into Christ, could not in that case any longer ward off the pressure of Gnostic influences, especially during an age impregnated with theories about angels and Æons. The magical character which they ascribed to baptism demanded no deep religious and ethical process, and was also at peace with Gnosticism. So also their external and poorly got up eschatology could not securely set the jejuneness of historical consciousness over against Gnosticism. Besides, an earthly-conceived king, who yet does not reign earthlily, is hardly to be called a king.

Now, this union with Gnosticism, which had been gradually introduced, is instanced by the precursors of the Pseudo-Clementine system, known to Epiphanius.[1] If the birth of the actual Son of God from a virgin was offensive to Ebionism, to which it appeared as a heathen myth, the Gnostic turn offered in lieu of this what seemed more intelligible, in that it maintained that not God Himself, but only a superior being, had appeared in Jesus. Thus might Ebionism—at the cost, indeed, of the truly divine in Christ, of which the other Ebionitic section itself had not entirely disowned the impression—resolve to return to a supernatural origin of Jesus, and to avoid the stumbling-block of the descent of Jesus from Joseph; and this the more easily, that it had been accustomed to regard the humanity of Christ from His baptism as only a veil, and that by replacing His higher equipment in the momentum of His origin, they obtained deliverance from the contradiction above noted. Whether, for the rest, any Ebionite, before the Clementines, had arrived at the form of the supernatural birth of Christ shared with Doketism, cannot be made out.

[1] Appendix, Note VVV.

C. The Gnostic Ebionism of the Pseudo-Clementines.

With the Pseudo-Clementines we find ourselves at once, though through the mediation of the preceding forms of Ebionism, upon another stand-point. These forms have something unsettled, and transitory, and are seeking for a firm scheme of doctrine; hence they are destitute of any notable impulse to production, in general of any significant life-power, and bear the character of stagnant or dissolving and perishing forms. Quite otherwise is it with the Clementines, in which the Judaizing principle, furnished with all the means of culture which the age supplied, collects itself as for the last stroke. But, indeed, there is indicated along with this a sort of desperation. They give up everything, even to the last fortress, in order to save the Judaizing concept of God as the pretended pure, monotheistic, primitive religion; they sacrifice even the best part of the Old Testament, that they may set out from this against the deity of Christ, with which they see the Church to be filled, but which they regard as the last delusion, more dangerous than the first, that of heathenism. The Ebionites already considered, Cerinthus himself not altogether excepted, retained still a sort of old Hebraism; and though the transition of Ebionism to Doketism had already commenced with them, they were yet far from paganism, they knew and loved the Old Testament. It is otherwise with the Pseudo-Clementines. In them the old Hebrew monotheism has already undergone a pagan decomposition, through dualistic and emanistic ideas.[1] They are pervaded by a feeling hostile to the Old Testament, especially to its prophetical parts, in which is presented the true living monotheism of the Hebrews, by which Dualism and the category of substantiality (*τὸ Ὄν*) are truly overcome.

If we take many passages of the Clementines by themselves, it may be doubted whether they belong to a Christian, or not rather to a Jewish sect. For they most zealously protest against Christianity being something new. He may be blessed who obeys Moses, though he knows not Jesus; and he also who obeys Jesus though he knows not Moses, or does not submit to

[1] This is seen in a still further degree in the Elkesaites: Epiph. Hær. xxx. 17, liii.; see above.

him, provided neither blasphemes Moses or Jesus. Both, however, deserve censure: the true doctrine is, that Moses and Christ are one and the same (Hom. xvii. 4; xviii. 4, 13, 14). There were righteous persons before the appearing of Jesus (xi. 25 ff.). The freedom of the will is inviolate (ii. 15; x. 4, 5; xi. 8). On the other hand, however, there appears in them the strongest form of supernaturalism, especially in their doctrine concerning the Prophets of truth and concerning baptism, *i.e.*, concerning illumination and the forgiveness of sins. In order to survey the connection of their system, we set out from their material and formal principle, for they carefully set forth both.

The *material principle* is God's absolute unity. The fundamental definition of God is, that He is pure being, rest (*ἀνάπαυσις*), and out of Him is only nothing (xvii. 7, 8). Thus He, thought as the *ὄν*, *ὄντως ὄν*, is Himself also the All. This would involve us in those dark absolutes to which the concept of God in perverted Judaism and heathenism gravitated, as to their common centre. The world, including man, stands over against this *ὄν* as the vacuum which has to be filled by the Being who is. But, with Philo, they do not abide by this definition of God as the *ὄν*; the Hebrew concept of God comes to the rescue of their chief definitions. God is *good*, and especially *righteous*. The goodness is thought as physical, and hence is justly placed deep under the ethical attribute of righteousness. Since, consequently, righteousness is the highest in God, God can reveal nothing higher of Himself than this; and He also, because He is righteous, cannot convey this revelation to the earlier races (xviii. 13 ff.). The great weight, however, which is thus laid on the (though imperfectly apprehended) ethical, conducts still further; it imposes the necessity of thinking God as personal. This is so done as that form (*σχῆμα, μορφὴ*) is ascribed to Him. He is the original beauty, thought under a human type. He has members—eyes, ears, etc.,—not because He needs these, for He sees and hears everywhere, but still He has them; and we can thereby come to Him, for the formless is unapproachable. As He has a body, however,—infinitely more glorious, indeed, than the living spirit is in us,—so He has also a soul; and this is wisdom in Him, or the Pneuma (xi. 22; xvi. 10 ff.). Thus He is not the abstract Simple, but the Living;

there is motion and distinction in Him; and here appears already a melting of the rigid monotheism, a leaning to a doctrine of the Trinity, though it be only an advance of the Monad to the Duad.

This motion, indeed, does not exist, if regard be withdrawn from the world of revelation; but God, viewed by Himself, is eternally united with wisdom as His spirit (xvi. 12), and His body all-outshining. But His revelation is a movement of *God Himself*, flowing forth in the double act of expansion and contraction of Himself, of which the heart of man is the type.[1] The Spirit of God (in this place, xvi. 12, called the wisdom), as He is internally, as the soul of God, eternally united to God, is externally the self-stretched-out hand which completes revelation, forms the world, etc. The world of revelation is consequently God unfolding Himself: under this aspect, there is finitude and time in Him. He does not, however, rise and set in the world; but sustains Himself in this self-expansion, which is also represented as the radiance of a sun abiding in eternal rest. To each act of self-expansion there is a corresponding retraction, the συστολή, whereby God is ever again the Monad. Of these expansions, the Clementines appear to establish six; to which correspond, in *time*, the six world-epochs, which in the seventh find their point of rest in God; in *space*, there correspond to these the six directions, right, left, above, under, before, behind. God, as the eternal rest in history and the world of space, is the eternal sabbath and the moveless centre. But though the world and revelation come into actuality only through the self-unfolding and communication of His essence,—nay, in a certain sense, the world is a momentum of the Monad, which *only* as a duad is the concrete God,—they nevertheless seek to maintain intact the concept of creation. God in His inner being remains unchanged, the eternal rest: He is, as has been said, under this inner aspect, not simply ὄν but personal; and this process of dilatation and contraction relates only to His superficies, is His actuality. As respects His inner essence, He is eternally different from all things that have

[1] A beginning for the position of a movement in God, though apart from revelation, lies in the predicate, hypothetically assumed indeed (and rejected by the Recognitions), that He is not simply unproduced, but that He is producing Himself (Hom. xvii. 15, 16).

come into being, or exist in space; that essence can coexist with no other being, but is exclusively peculiar to Himself—is thus His mystery.[1]

In the created world man is the highest; whose idea in like manner brings all antitheses of the world to a concrete unity in itself, as in the highest stage God does all antitheses in general, of which motion and rest, dilatation and contraction are the last. In the sphere of the world, however, the fluctuating position of the general in relation to the individual is repeated; similar to what was found in the relation of the resting God to His ἐκτάσεις, in which He as much is not as is, and which hence have as much a mundane independent existence, as on the other hand they must not have this, the latter, inasmuch as the world is again conceived as a momentum of the Divine self-movement. Entirely similar stands in the created world the idea of man, man simply—called also Adam, and Christ, and the Son of God—over against the particular individual.[2] Wherever the idea of man appears perfectly in an individual, there is rather only a form of the appearance of Christ, the created real idea of man; there the momentum of individuality and personality becomes μορφή,—Christ is lowered to be the garment of the eternal. On the other hand, freedom is ascribed to each man, and the choice personally to turn to God or not.

This brings us to the *formal* principle of the Clementines. Had they confined themselves to viewing the world as a self-unfolding of God, they could have had nothing to say of a world and revelation: there would have been nothing but a Divine life-process; world and history would have eternally retrograded into the Divine rest; all becoming and all motion would have become a mere appearance in the eternal God Himself. But as this Divine motion already contemplates the world as its end, so we have seen also that the Clementines, in fact,

[1] Hom. x. 19: To the Divine nature alone is it suited, and it is impossible it should dwell with another, that He alone, as the Creator of all, should excel all: excel in power, for He creates all; in greatness, as the infinite in contrast with the limited; in appearance, for He is the fairest; in holiness, understanding, etc.

[2] And that this was the case with Adam, is assumed as certain in the Homilies, as he proceeded immediately from the hand of God, not mediately through a finite agent.

propose to maintain the momentum of the independent existence of the world and of its distinction from God; and this independent existence culminates in the freedom, or the ethical destination of men. By the placing of this in men, the position that God alone is all substance, *the* Being, and that all out of Him is the nothing, the void, is not contradicted. For freedom is itself only the void; the form or the vessel for the substance which God must give (comp. xvii. 8 with viii. 4; ii. 14 ff.). He gives it, on the one hand, by nature, whose unity is the earth-spirit; on the other, by the Prophet of truth, that perpetual created idea of man = Christ.[1] The former moves down towards this world by all sensible phænomena in which it dwells; the latter, on the contrary, solicits man's free will to the choice of that which is to come. Both must God propound, that man may choose. Now were freedom nothing but the void, which may become full or remain empty, all would depend on what first entered to fill the void. Hence it is said "that the soul of man is invested with the Divine breath or spirit" (*πνοή*, *πνεῦμα*, Hom. xvi. 16); further, that God first calls men, and produces the good desire to hear His word. Thus this is not their *ἴδιον*, their meritorious act. Since, however, there is already something akin to the divine placed in them, and living in them, and likewise, on the other side, there are also earthly desires in them, they are beings who have to act under a twofold tendency, and which side they shall yield to is their own matter. If they had of themselves willed to act as reason dictated, there would have been no need for either Moses or Jesus. But the race of man is in a state of alienation from God; the earth has become like a house full of thick smoke, so that we can no longer see the sun; and the earth-spirit, in its thousand forms, is become the only, irresistible power over man, since man can no longer choose, as now only one object remains for him.[2]

[1] Appendix, Note WWW.

[2] By means of the Fall a reversal of principles has come to pass. Whilst at first, according to the law of the Syzygies (ii. 37; iii. 21, 23, 33), the first (Adam) was the right (*δεξιόν*), the imperfect left (Eve), which follows upon the perfect, was the second, now in the world it is the imperfect that is first, though unconsciously it mediates the perfect (see preceding note; Hom. viii. 10, 11). And this is the Divine side of the matter, which prepares the way for the opinion, that so the history of the world has

Hence, from time to time Christ appears, the eternal Prophet of truth in perfect men (Adam, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, Jesus). Particularly, there are seven columns (before Christ), placed like light-towers in the ages, which represent the presence of truth upon the earth, or restore it when lost. They have essentially the same always to announce; yet it is impossible for this system to escape a certain progress. Thus, before Moses, God was revealed more as the Good Being, by Moses as the Just One. Rectitude is the highest in God, and hence the revelation in Jesus cannot transcend this. But still there is an advance onwards, derived from Him. The limits of particularism are broken through; errors that have crept in, such as circumcision, sacrifice, and the like, are removed: on the other hand, the remission of sins, connected intimately with a definite institute, holy baptism (which here takes the place of circumcision), is always within reach of the penitent; and the conservation of truth on the earth is assured through the continuance of the office of that Prophet of truth. The priesthood, indeed, is wholly abolished;[1] but the Episcopate is the Divine institution by which, through means of ordination, the prophetic office is preserved on the earth, until Antichrist come, when Jesus the true Christ will again appear (ii. 17).[2]

Occasion is thus found for a supernatural revelation, from the absolute darkness in which the creation of God would otherwise be (ii. 6–10). This revelation is partly an inner, partly an outer one; though the relation of these to each other is not very clearly set forth. Both are under the direction of the everlasting Christ. On the side of the inner as well as the outer, however, by-paths are refused; neither visions nor the Holy Scriptures are the proper trustworthy vehicle of revelation. In both, the evil spirit is operative (ii. 38; iii. 8, 46 ff.). On the other hand, the deductions of reason do not suffice.[3] But

been willed by God. (What in God's thoughts or in the world must, as the highest end, be first, that is actually the second and last.)

[1] Hom. iii. 19; xi. 16, 32; iii. 26. The bishop is the visible representative of Christ (Hom. iii. 66 ff.). He unites with Christ.

[2] The Homilies know nothing of a propitiatory office of Christ. Christ's sufferings (xii. 7) are noticed only as a pattern of patience and service for others. Sins are partly atoned for by suffering (xii. 10) and virtue, partly forgiven by God without atonement.

[3] Hom. xv. 5: πολλὴ διαφορὰ μεταξὺ θεοσεβείας λόγων καὶ τῶν τῆς φιλο-

there needs the Prophet of truth, who, as soon as He has authenticated His claims, is to be believed in respect of all things remote. To this authentication it belongs, negatively, that He does not impeach the fundamental truth of the Divine unity and rectitude; that He does not deny that the world is God's work (ii. 16 ff.), and consequently that He says nothing against God's glory (comp. ii. 40, 51): Positively the criterion is, that He foretells what is purely contingent, not by means of natural knowledge, consequently supernaturally; and that He states simply what is full of mystery (iii. 12, 15). The mysteries, indeed, which He utters may not contain aught essential to religion;[1] for the essential doctrine is that of the unity and rectitude, etc., of God. "Faith in God's unity and rectitude," it is said, ix. 20, "forms a new creature; and as no man can do good if he does not know that God is just (iii. 31), so the man who is full of this faith is not in a condition to sin."

This knowledge, however, of the unity and rectitude of God cannot be revealed for the first time by the Prophet of truth, since it is rather the criterion by which He Himself is to be tried; all that His appearance can do, is to vivify what has been already delivered. We are thus referred to the inner revelation which is presupposed by the outer. The soul is divine breath, and invests with immortality, being capable of assuming God's image (xvi. 10). Nevertheless, this natural innate knowledge of God also is brought into relation with the Son, the ante-mundane Christ. Not that He is to be thought as the creator of it, for God alone creates (ii. 16, 10, 19); but He, with ineffable hand, reveals it to the inner sense which mysteriously lies in all men's hearts (xviii. 6); and thus He is the principle of the development of the inner sense. In this way He is in a certain degree the world-spirit, as Nature has its unity in the world-soul. By means of His pre-existence in hypostatic form, He corresponds in a certain degree to the idea of the Logos; but only on the ideal side of the Logos, not on its creative, actual side. He represents, in the

σοφίας· ὁ γὰρ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀπόδειξιν ἔχει ἐκ προφητείας, ὁ δὲ τῆς φιλοσοφίας καλλιλογίας παρέχων ἐκ στοχασμῶν δοκεῖ περιστᾶν τὰς ἀποδείξεις. Comp. ii. 6–10.

[1] The new thing which Christ reveals in Jesus is only the glory of the eternal kingdom (Hom. xviii. 17).

sphere of the formed, God as spirit, the world-soul nature in God.

The Prophet of truth has as His peculiar gift, that He always knows all, and can neither fail nor sin. Man could not see God without being blinded,—nay, not even a higher being, an angel or the Son of God; but the Son has showed God, for He Himself has a form which transcends what is gross and sensible (ἄσαρκος εἰδέα, Hom. xvii. 16). His eye is infinite, and His spirit eternal (iii. 12); from the Spirit of God He knoweth all things (Hom. ii. 6, 10; iii. 11, 12, 17, etc.). He is called the image of the Eternal King (Hom. iii. 17), and Himself King (iii. 19; viii. 21, 22). To the Son, who is from the foundation of the world (ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αἰῶνος), was it alone appointed to reveal to whom He will the Father (Hom. xviii. 13); in this world He has the kingdom of the law, *i.e.*, He is the ruler by doctrine as moral lawgiver. Still, high as the Clementines thus place Him, they nevertheless do not identify Him with σοφία, but hold Him to belong to the sphere of the created (xvi. 10 ff. 14–18). As, however, the angels, though ἄσαρκοι, can yet change themselves into bodies, so the Son also, to whom alone it is given to look upon the Father undazzled (xvii. 16). As often as He appears, His appearance as the Prophet of truth displays God's image for the age in which it happens. Thus Adam had the pure spirit of the Messiah in him, as he was born of the pure hand of God; and so in others has the spirit of the Messiah exhibited itself historically. It would be impious[1] to refuse that to the first man, and to attribute it to another, the product of sinful seed by the coition of the sexes. It is alone pious, however, to regard the Messiah-spirit not as associated with every individual of the species, but to vindicate this as the privilege only of that subject who, standing above individuals, runs through all time from the beginning of the world, changing His name with His form, until he fall upon His own age, and, anointed by God's grace, for His labours' sake shall find eternal rest. This being is proved worthy already in Adam to be a lord and ruler of all things.

It thus appears that His appearance also in Jesus is only one among others. The same thing is shown under another

1 Appendix, Note XXX.

aspect. As the active and the passive in God are distinct, and united as masculine and feminine, so does the perfection of the world consist in its being an image of this unity. Hence the active principle in the created world (the Son of God) seeks the passive, the human form, to determine it and fill it; and the soul of man correspondingly, as a bride, finds in the Son of God as it were her bridegroom (Hom. xiii. 16). These together in their union represent God's image. And this union of the masculine and the feminine is represented ethically in the fundamental virtue φιλανθρωπία. For this is compounded of compassion, which is passive, and Eros, the giver of the masculine impulse.[1] We should have thus a sort of general incarnation of the Son of God, not indeed in the immediate natural form, but where everything is presented under an ethical point of view. Still there remains hardly any distinction between the Just Men of the Old Testament, who are so reckoned by the Clementines, or even believers since the appearance of Christ in Jesus, and Jesus Himself. It is evident that the Son of God is thought here as the common spirit of the true Church; and that in consequence of His not being discriminated from the Holy Ghost—of whom also, in the doctrine of the Church, a sort of general incarnation is predicated—the author has been involved in the impossibility of vindicating for Jesus Christ an exclusive place. He feels himself, indeed, constrained to view the Son of God hypostatically; but in order to this, he severs Him from the divine, so that by becoming united to this All-Christ, we do not at all become united to God Himself. The last cause of this is, that he recognises in God and God's image—the world that is to become the Church—only a duadic, not a triadic process. He knows not, that is, to assign a place to the second, the mediating momentum, in which, on the one hand, the distinction of God from the world must culminate (not in sin, but rather in the highest act of free love); and on the other hand, the union of God with the world and the world with God is in its principle posited: he hastens to the goal, which, however, from neglecting to take the way that leads to it, he reaches only apparently, whilst in truth, and logically, he has not got essentially beyond the beginning. He contents himself with an

[1] Hom. xii. 6, 7. The φιλανθρωπία is ἀρρενόθηλυ. Comp. Hom. xvi. 12.

apparent mediator, a Christ who may as well be called the Holy Ghost, and yet is not the Holy Ghost of Christianity.[1]

As respects the death and resurrection of Christ, the Clementines know not to obtain for them any dogmatical significancy. Nevertheless, to the manifestation of the Christ in Jesus there still remains a place all its own. Were this wholly wanting, these Homilies could not be viewed as a Christian phænomenon. Besides what has been said above on Baptism (viii. 22, 23; ix. 19, 20, 23; xi. 25 ff.) and on the Episcopate (Hom. iii. 60–70), there belongs to this head the doubtful passage, which speaks concerning the metamorphoses of the Son of God, who pervades the duration of the world (iii. 20). For this manifestation shall not continue without end, but the Christ finds His goal and His time from which He has an abiding repose. The state of rest, however, He finds along with His last manifestation; and this last is that in Jesus. Jesus Christ is King of the pious; His virtue is rewarded with lordship (iii. 19, 20); the manhood of Jesus, consequently, must also endure; though it is nowhere said that He shall judge the world. In Jesus, the Son of God is the bringer of the universal law, which quenches the fire of altars, and brings peace, love, and remission of sins (iii. 19, 26). He endured temptations to sin (viii. 21); He also spared not His blood (iii. 19); as a father He cared for His children. He was endowed also with a firm, all-embracing will; and it would be heathenish to say that He, the Prophet of truth, as He proved Himself to be by His predictions concerning Jerusalem, possessed the knowledge that was peculiar to Him at one time, and had it not at another (iii. 11–17).[2]

The author is well aware that he has not, in what he has advanced, come up to what was held determined in the Christology then predominant;[3] he feels that he is at variance with the rest of Christians, and is peevish and vexed on account of this. Christianity cannot be satisfied with seeing in Christ only a semi-doketic middle-being; for, if the mediator is only a creature, the reconciliation between God and the world remains only half-accomplished: it is not a reconciliation which reaches to the being and to the basis of the human heart and the heart of God. But to the author of the Clementines it is an offence

[1] Appendix, Note YYY.
[2] Appendix, Note ZZZ.
[3] Appendix, Note AAAA.

that deity should be ascribed to Christ. The monarchy of God is for him the highest; idolatry is the summit of ungodliness (Hom. ii. 20, 19; iii. 6). It seems to him a small gain that the world should be converted from polytheism to a belief in the deity of Christ; on the contrary, in his view, the last deception thus propagated is worse than the first. Hence he endeavours to invalidate the grounds on which the Church rests the deity of Christ, and gives his own explanation of some of the principal passages on which that is founded. The utterance, Gen. i. 26, "Let us make man," has reference, according to him, not to Christ, not even to the Son of God from the beginning, but to the Spirit of God, or the Wisdom which created the world. The passage, Matt. xi. 27, "No man knoweth the Son but the Father, and no man the Father but the Son, etc.," Peter explains, in opposition to Simon Magus, who defends the deity of Christ, as meaning that Christ has brought nothing essentially new, no new idea of God. Jesus, it is true, says that no man knows the Father but He; but this cannot mean that the pious under the Old Testament did not possess the true idea of God; on the contrary, it means that the wicked live as if they knew not God,—the discourse being of practical knowledge; or, It is the Son of God from the beginning, the alone appointed revealer, and none other, through whom all pious men have known and acknowledged God; or, in fine, the words, "No man knoweth the Father but the Son only," mean, No man knows whose son I am,—they think I am David's; which is also the meaning of the words, "No man knoweth the Son but the Father." For the rest, there are endless ways of viewing the passage; and so the author lets the matter rest with the conclusion, that Adam, Noah, Abraham, etc., have known the Father (Hom. xvii. 4; xviii. 13, 14, 4).

He also, however, brings dogmatical reasons against Christ's deity. A prophet who seduced to other gods, was, under the law, to be stoned to death. It was consequently the mark of a false prophet, that he sought to introduce another than God into His place. It is true that angels are called gods, but only abusively. It was an angel who spoke to Moses from the bush, who wrestled with Jacob, and was born as Immanuel (Hom. xvi. 14). To the Magus Simon the author makes one say, "If

whosoever speaks against the just and only God is worthy of death, then was thy teacher deservedly put to death." To which Peter replies: "Our Lord neither taught other gods along with Him who made all things, nor did He announce Himself as a god; God, however, justly rewarded with blessedness Him who called Himself Son of God, who made all things." Simon asks, "Does it not appear to you that He is God, since He is of God?" Peter: "How that can be, say thou; for we cannot tell it to thee; we have not heard it from Him. It appertains to the Father not to be begotten, to the Son to be begotten. That which is begotten cannot be compared (*οὐ συγκρίνεται*) with the unbegotten, or, it may be, the self-begotten." Simon: "But they nevertheless are at one in this, that they are begotten, though not in the same way." Peter: "He who is not in all respects the same with any one, cannot participate with him in all his appellations. The One is self-begotten, or, it may be, unbegotten; that which is begotten cannot be at the same time this, even though he be of the same nature. Human bodies also have immortal souls which are invested with God's Spirit, and, proceeding from God, are of the same nature, but yet are not gods. If, however, any one will, nevertheless, on this account call them gods, then must all souls of men, the dead and the living, the born and those yet to be begotten, be gods. Wilt thou, then, from mere love of opposing me, affirm this, that they also are gods? In that case, what great matter is it for Christ to be called God? For He has that which all have (c. 16). We call Him God to whom just that is proper which no other can have."[1] In what, then, does this consist, according to him? In purely physical attributes. God is on all sides without bounds; hence He is also called Infinite. Now, since no one but He is boundless, it is absolutely necessary to call *Him* Infinite. He who denies that lies; for there cannot be together two infinites in all respects, as one would limit the other; and thus is one the Incomparable. "I seek not," continues Peter, "to denote to thee the name of God, for it is unspeakable; but it expresses, according to convention among men, a fixed concept. If thou give this name to another, thou wilt readily also ascribe to him the essential quality belonging to it, without intending to do so.

[1] What is peculiar to God is consequently incommunicable.

The spoken name is also the precursor of what at first was not wished to be said. In this way the exaggeration is extended to that which before had remained unsaid, and the honour belonging to God is transferred to that which was before unknown." Here we see clearly how this Monarchian accounts for the rise of the belief in the deity of Christ. Since he cannot believe in it, even though the words of Christ Himself lead to it, and since he has not found, or as yet known, in his religious experience, which fluctuates unsteadily between the Magian and the Pelagian system, the point of rest, the true reconciliation, in possession of which a man is constrained to think nothing less of Christ than that He is Mediator as God-man, he seeks to trace the origin of the belief in Christ's Godhead to the word "God," which had been applied to Christ; which is almost on a parallel with the wisdom of Anselm's Gaunilo, who seeks to derive the belief in God from the sound of the word "God."* And it is quite the same with the instance which is adduced from God's infinitude against the Godhead of Christ. For thereby the writer announces that, much as he speaks of rectitude, the central element in the concept of God lies not in spiritual, but in physical qualities, in an outward infinitude. It is worthy, however, of notice also, how he in this way comes into collision with himself. For when he, in order to view God as a person, and perhaps still more through the influence of the physical stand-point with which he is entangled, calls God the Beautiful, and ascribes to Him form and body, Simon retorts: "If God has form, then has He a place, and is limited." To which Peter replies: "God is the Existent One; His place is the non-existent. But the non-existent cannot be compared with the existent; for space, when it is not filled, is virtually nothing. Thus the non-existent comes to be space, or a containing thing, only through the Existent One. Moreover, that which is surrounded is often greater than that which surrounds; e.gr., the

* [Gaunilo was a monk who, in reply to Anselm's Proslogium on the being of God, wrote a tract under the title "Liber pro insipienti," in allusion to Anselm's use of Ps. xiv. 1 in his treatise. In this Gaunilo maintained, that from the mere fact that a certain fixed concept is attached to the word "God" in the understanding, it does not follow that God is so comprehended as to be realized, that is, to be believed in as an actual existence. In the text, the author seems to me to have fallen into some inaccuracy as to the position of Gaunilo in this dispute.—Tr.]

sun, which is surrounded by the æther. As it sends forth beams, so does God also, whose it is to send forth an infinitely diffused communication." But if, without prejudice to the Divine personality (*σχῆμα, μορφὴ Θεοῦ*), and the actual existence of the world of space, it must be possible to think God as infinite and unlimited, since the world is posited as the momentum of the Divine life itself, and this as surpassing all bounds, and yet ever abiding constant; this either amounts to nothing, or this solution of the antinomy in the relations of the definite and limited to the unlimited must tend to the advantage of Christology. If God is not actually immediately infinite, but if this is only a secondary quality in Him mediated by will, inasmuch as infinite extension is only possible in space, in a world, and this cannot be given Him, but only can exist through His will, so that the willing of a world and the willing of Himself in it must precede His endless existence in it: if this be so, one cannot see why there should not be for Christ as well as for God, who is conceived as of perfect beauty, an all-dominating, all-embracing infinitude, mediated through the inner intensive infinitude by an act of will; *i.e.*, why the author does not, in place of God endowed with beauty and form, present the idea of the perfect God-man.

But, indeed, as the principle of finitude, which in the doctrine of the Church is represented by the Son, is transferred to the Father as possessing form and shape, there remains for the Son no essential, independent position. As, however, this momentum of finitude is *immediate* in God as the beautiful, and is that in God by which the mediation of a transit to the world and the becoming man has been made possible, by which the fixed concept of the quiescent God has been embodied; and though then, by means of the *ἔκστασις* and *συστολή*, the rigid concept of God has been relaxed, yet, as we have seen above, the Son, who must represent as well as mediate the distinction, is thus shorn of His rights; and the same is true of the difference between God and the world in the simply dyadic process. The longing which conducts the soul to the idea of an incarnation of God—in which the difference is alike fully set forth, and the union is in principle begun—is here assuaged by the assumption that God is possessed of form and beauty in Himself; and with this there is left for Christ only a place

among the created. And yet this Adam-Christ, who is in a certain measure the truth in all the pious, fluctuates inconstantly hither and thither between Divine attributes, or the universal world-spirit, and a created hypostasis of the nature of an angel. One may state the matter thus: The tendency which conducts to Sabellianism and that which conducts to Arianism are as yet confused, muddily mixed together; just as in the beginnings of Ebionism, Ebionism and Doketism lay bound together in the mind of Cerinthus. They begin to separate in the beginning of the third century, as the Recognitions of the Pseudo-Clement prove.[1] The Ebionitic heresy has in the Homilies become so far developed, that it sets forth its reverse side, Doketism, and falls over into this. How loosely the two sides of Christ's Person were conceived to be united, is expressed, partly, in the multiplicity of the appearances of Christ, which of necessity renders the form as compared with the substance a matter of indifference; partly in the slight significancy which the Clementines attach to the human side of Christ. A similar career we shall see in Doketism, to which we now proceed; so that both, in so far as they are Christian heresies, pass over into each other, and only for a period flow on side by side as unconscious doubters of each other, till at length the necessity will arise to bring out a common principle of error in both, whose multiform variety and flexibility retains nevertheless this of uniformity, that it is always serviceable to the growing development of the Church doctrine.

[1] Appendix, Note BBBB.

CHAPTER THIRD.

DOKETISM.

EBIONISM, which took its stand on the history of Jesus as a teacher or prophet, a worker of miracles and a lawgiver, adhered as a *vis inertiæ* to the dogmatico-historic movement. Instead of this movement, it sought itself to be immanent as a momentum—to set itself up as an independent magnitude for itself—to subject the Christian principle to itself—to hold and bind it to itself. It met the development in the Church seductively, and received from it, in many points, support; as in the at first not yet vanquished disposition to overestimate the eschatological element, to lay too little weight on the reconciliation in Christ, as well as to abide too much merely by the prophetic and royal offices of Christ, the necessary result of which was a postponing of the Person of Christ, and of the act of His becoming man, to His baptism, by which He was inaugurated to these two offices. Nor was its seductive power broken, until, through the sound development in the Church, the possibility of Ebionism was excluded in all points. This development, however, was not a little furthered, both negatively and positively, by means of the Ebionitic heresy: negatively, because Ebionism in its separate peculiarity stood forth as a clear and significant warning beacon, teaching what the consequence would be if the principle of Ebionism was suffered by the Church to remain not wholly conquered; positively, because it represented a perfectly legitimate element of the Christology, and had a just ground against the Church so long as she neglected to incorporate, as an essential element in the Christology, the actual manifestation of Christ in His humiliation, of which it was never weary of reminding her, and to bring this into harmony with His higher nature; *i.e.*, so long as Doketism was still

capable of exerting power. And thus was Ebionism rendered by the Lord of the Church a blessing to her, so long as in her temporal manifestation an Ebionitic or a Doketic tendency remained unconquered. In fact, the development in the Church in the course of the two first centuries was not as yet secured in itself against Doketic lapses. There needs only to be recalled to remembrance here, that the one-sided inclination to eschatology, and to the viewing of Christ as the Lord of glory, already opened a door to Doketism. On the other hand, the sudden and convulsive impression which Christianity made by her entrance on mankind, bursting as she did like an illuminating and discriminating flash into the ancient night, with the new heavenly world which she unfolded, with the new concept of God which she brought, could not but have a similar effect upon minds recollecting themselves as from a chaotic dream-life, gathering themselves up above themselves, above the old world and the new; so as for a time to induce to a snapping asunder of all the threads of the historical past, in order the more purely to construct according to its nature the new supernatural state of things, so essentially different from the old. In the general, however, this is the especially grand thing in Christ's appearance, that in it the extremest ends and antitheses marvellously interpenetrate. But to the as yet unexercised Christian thinking there lay in this a temptation, since it knew not how to harmonize directly the extremes, to abide by that which seemed best to accord with the newness and greatness of Christianity, and rather to dispense with the lower, the human side, than to detract from the higher. It was impossible, certainly, altogether to overlook the former; for in that case the revelation in Christianity could not have been regarded as a reality, and such a thoroughgoing Doketism could, as little as the corresponding Ebionism (see above, p. 199), lay claim to be called a Christian heresy. But if we take our stand by those Doketæ and Gnostics who did not seek utterly to deprive the Christology of a historical basis, but were willing to allow that in Jesus the eternal idea of the Christ came somehow to reality, it may be said of them, that a higher strain of Christian consciousness was suffered to infuse its influence into this tendency, however dangerous it was in other respects. And this is shown, too, not only in its relation to the jejune and frigid Ebionism,

but also in the hymnology, which appears to have reached a flourishing condition soonest among them.

The most ancient trace of Doketism is found in the New Testament.[1] But it reached its higher significancy first in the more fully developed Gnostic systems. This is not the place to sketch these in their full extent; nevertheless, something by way of introduction must be premised. The common element in Gnosticism is opposition to the simple empirical faith, with which the Gnostics reproached the Church generally, as being founded merely on authority, and having for its contents not the inner truths of Christianity, but merely its shell; its aim was positively to apprehend the spiritual contents of Christianity in a spiritual manner. In itself, this is none other than what the Church doctrine aspires to; but the spiritual manner with which it has to do is primarily religion and religious experience, according to which the contents of that which must be taken up by the spirit are determined. In religion as such the point of issue is not spontaneity, but dependence on and receptivity of the reconciling grace; and it is from this, but only secondarily, that true spontaneity in knowing and doing is developed. With the Gnostics, on the contrary, if we omit Marcion and Apelles, the principal thing is not the religious interest, but that of *knowing*,[2] which in the sphere of religion is only one momentum among others. In the region of reconciliation they tarried only contemplatively; contemplation is their *ἀνάπαυσις*. The way to this eternal rest of contemplation is with them knowledge; in apprehension and knowledge, however, human spontaneity is already the principal thing. Where knowledge is constituted the supreme excellence of man, there results by consequence an intellectual Pelagianism, since no moral and religious regeneration of the man is desired by knowledge, but this itself is sought as perfection, just as a

[1] 1 John iv. 2. The heretics referred to here (*ἀντίχριστοι*) do not deny that Christ has come at all, but only that He has come in the flesh. The other passage, 1 John ii. 22, signalizes those who distinguish Jesus from the Christ; which may be either Ebionitic or Doketic, as in Cerinthus both are found in turn. The heretics also referred to, Col. ii. 8, 17 f., and those of the Pastoral Epistles, if they followed out their principles in Christology, were Doketic. That Ignatius and other apostolic Fathers mention this heresy, has been already noticed.

[2] Appendix, Note CCCC.

practical Pelagianism emerges where the dignity and worth of man are viewed as lying in work and ethical deed.

Viewing Gnosticism as thus a one-sided system, which has its correlate in the *ergismus* of Jewish Christianity, we may say that the simple New Testament Pistis, which combines the practical and the theoretic in a higher unity, is in these two divaricated very much as individual peculiarities existing previous to the reception of Christianity determined.[1] It would be a mistake here to seek to arrange according to nations; in Gnosticism, where men born Jews hellenize, etc., we rather see how the pre-Christian nationalities are reducible to mere types of certain one-sidednesses of human nature generally.

Gnosticism is one of the notable phænomena of the Christian Church. In it the interest in Christianity as the *truth* was aroused to the greatest extent, and the previously languidly advancing development of Christian knowledge received an impulse which operated through centuries. Looking at the age now before us, we may say that never had so powerful a desire for knowledge been sent forth upon Christianized humanity as there was then. It is true that before Christ a great process of religious philosophizing had been introduced upon many points, and in various ways; and to this, which evidently had a bearing on the preparation for Christianity, the initiatory Christian gnosis attached itself.[2] But it was in Christianity that, for the first time, the decisive ferment was introduced which completed that decomposing process which was going on confusedly in the pre-Christian religions and religious ideas, and at the same time also completely effected the separation and clearing off of what was heterogeneous. It may, indeed, certainly be said, that in

[1] It is to be understood that none of these one-sided views is altogether detached from religion itself; otherwise they could not form the subject of treatment here. What concerns us here is only the preponderance of the one over the other. The Gnostics sought a religious knowledge, the others a religious practice.

[2] To the *Philonian* religious philosophy, after a Hellenistic manner, there attached themselves especially Valentinus and his school; to the *Dualistic* in Syria and the surrounding country, represented, probably, already before Christ by an ophitic system (comp. Baur, Die Christliche Gnosis, p. 194, n. 36), Saturnilos, the Christianizing Ophites, the Secundians, Bardesanes, etc.; in fine, to a *Judaizing* theosophy, Cerinthus, Basilides, the Gnostic Ebionites about Pella and Arabia, and the Pseudo-Clementine homilies. See note EEEE in Appendix.

Gnosticism generally the still unsubdued remains of Paganism and Judaism pressed into Christianity and disfigured it; and this is to a certain extent true, as well as the conflict of the Christian principle against this disfigurement. But, on the other hand, the historian must here also recognise the great drama, that all that had been strong and great in the faith of those who lived before Christ pressed on all sides, in the various forms of Gnosticism, into the sphere of the Christian principle, that, freed from error, it might through the Christian principle survive for ever amid the decay of the ancient world. And from it Christianity itself became a great gainer. Now, for the first time, could it be proved the absolute religion for all mankind; for, by contact with all the principles of pre-Christian religious power, with which it had to do in the heresies that arose in its own bosom, and thereby as with itself, or a part of what it presented to the world, it learned for the first time to know itself *in concreto*, and proved itself to be the truth of all that was pre-Christian. Now the Church is constrained to show all the momenta which before were scattered and one-sided, as what she herself carries in far higher manner in her proper substance. The whole spiritual world of the pre-Christian period, rich but confused, drinks and draws into itself the Christian principle which has been historically displayed; there begins to be constructed out of the material of the old its own proper world of thought; and though the erection be at first fantastic, though it ethnicizes after a dualistic or Hellenistic manner, the Christian principle in it always remains true to its vocation, to be the religion which comprehends and encloses the truth of all that was pre-Christian in itself. One might even say that the whole process of religious *history* before Christ is rapidly recapitulated in Gnosticism; turned on all sides, there is in it an utterance that the Christian principle is conscious of, and it has to show that there is given in it the all-sided, the entire truth; that it is what are justly called religions in their truth. The ethnic desire to form gods had been extinguished: it is the aim of the Gnostic thinking to preserve these as categories clothed in symbol, and to construct a sort of Christian Olympus. But as a consequence of this, it follows that the Christian principle to which they were approximated overpowers them, or assimilates itself. A work certainly of boundless significancy, for the

making of Christianity, hitherto enclosed within narrow limits, actually a world-religion.[1]

If we regard the Gnostics only as those who completed this noteworthy fact in the world's history, the spectacle is indeed unsatisfying, for each of them appears too much in love with that form of pre-Christian belief which he undertakes to incorporate with Christianity, or to show to be in it; and so it is not the pure Christian principle itself which this work completes, and the advantage of which it promotes. If also there was with them a bringing of all that was pre-Christian into connection with what is Christian, if this was already raised above itself, and if the power of the Judaic and ethnic principle was already somewhat broken by the beginnings of Christian thinking,—still it was only when the full Christian principle co-operated in this, that the exclusion of the false and the reservation of the eternal were completely effected; when it links itself to the movement of these true momenta by which an entrance is promoted, and regenerates them out of itself. In the simple faith, neither Gnostic nor ergistic, but such as is to be presupposed as the unity of both of these, the purer Christian principle has always had its representatives, who came forward at the right time reconciling and uniting, and who confirmed and ratified the common faith as well by the conscious mastering of possibilities which had always been manifest, as by the conscious adoption and use of new momenta of what the faith contains. They did not, however, accomplish this by determining against the gnosis, but by the Church's entering into it; without giving up its peculiar religious character, the Church, after the momentarily distracting and stormy Gnostic period, entered upon that season of bloom which begins soon after the middle of the second century.

The tendency to gnosis, accordingly, viewed in the gross, was not an arbitrary undertaking of reason, but was one which, led on by the pre-Christian history, was for the first time brought into a right track by the Christian principle, and conducted to aim at an intelligence above Christianity and the pre-Christian religions.

[1] Comp. Baumgarten-Crusius, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, i. 131. "The Gnostics introduced studies, literature, and art into the Christian Church."

As the fruit of the common working of Gnosticism and the Church Fathers, less cannot be signalized than the conscious gain of *the essential momenta of the Christian concept of God.* Every religion is what it is through its concept of God. This is alike the signature of each. It is not the problem of evil, nor is it the cosmogony, which, on the whole, is the question Gnosticism proposes to deal with; but if we recognise in it an attempt to reconcile all the principles, all the concepts of God in the pre-Christian religions, with Christianity, we shall reach the point from which all the species of Gnosticism diverge, and may be recognised according to their actual significancy by considering what is the Christian concept of God, and what those were that lay beyond Christianity. As respects the latter, they were, when viewed in a religio-philosophic light, in their ethnic forms pantheistic, partly *dualistic*, partly *monistic;* which two are the reverse of each other, like joy and grief.[1] In all forms of both, the physical predominates: the concept of God remains bound in physical definitions. It is true, that since Hellenic science penetrated like a corrosive fluid all these religions, the ancient form of the collective nature-religions disappeared; the old deities, and polytheism itself, came to be reduced to the Ὄν, the absolute simple substance. But as this is not the one living God of religion, thought cannot rest here, but turns into the dualistic or monistic faith of Pantheism, as before the religious instinct had done the same in order to gain a concrete concept of God. The intellect before Christianity was, in all that it laid down positively, thoroughly fettered by ethnic presumptions.

Now, in the ethnic religions and systems of a monistic form, God is the absolute Being and Life, Power and Beauty, in some respects also Wisdom. If He is thereby also determined to be Goodness, still this has not ethical aims, but something finite for its substance, just as those other attributes are taken *physically.* Dualism, on the contrary, recognises in the φύσις the diversity which lies hidden in it from the beginning; and as it becomes more clearly apprehended by the mind, it enunciates this as the antithesis no longer simply of light and darkness, of friendly and hostile powers, but of spirit and matter; and this, whether in a more rugged form it repudiates all mediation, or

[1] Appendix, Note DDDD.

slips in something mediate (c. gr. the psychical). Here God is thought as a spiritual *Nature;* spirits are an emanation from Him; the world is also, nevertheless, as much a process of the Divine life and passion as an act of the Divine will. Dualism cannot be a teleological form of religion, though it is conceived in the effort towards this, but must always have a character rather æsthetic and fatalistic than ethical. In fine, the Hebrew religion is teleologic Monotheism. Its pre-eminence does not lie in its possessing unity in place of duality or plurality. For Pantheism also, the stand-point of substance has a unity, though a transient one. But its greatness lies in this, that in it the duality of the natural and spiritual physis is made to coalesce in the common dependence from a higher principle, which marks out for each its proper place, that, namely, of *rectitude*, which apportions to each its problem and its lot according to its worthiness. The idea of rectitude first established the Monotheism of the patriarchal religion, and it is the essential substance of the Law.

These three stand-points, which correspond to the three chief forms of the pre-Christian religions, stand over against each other in Gnosticism as religio-philosophic.[1] Some sought to abide by the view of Christianity which regards it as that by which the antithesis of *spirit* and *matter* was first fully brought to view, and the structure of a pneumatic world out of this hylic world, elevating itself to heaven, is begun; whilst the old world, including even Judaism, was hylic, and belonged to an evil, dark God. The Valentinian system sought hellenically to soften the wild, fantastic dualism in its oldest form, the ophitic, and by the extrusion of the pantheistic side in the dualism to produce unity. It recognises no absolute principle in matter, for it teaches its annihilation; in order to mediate the antitheses, the physical, according to the Platonic trichotomy, was interpolated. The idea of beauty retained its place. But the idea of rectitude and of ethical love was wholly excluded; for the object here is to remove the transcendence of God. On the contrary, the Divine is defined as the All-life in diverse forms and stages, as the world-forming, governing, and perfecting power,—above all, as knowledge.[2] The most strenuous efforts

[1] Appendix, Note EEEE.

[2] It is noticeable, that whilst the system distributes everything else to

are made to comprehend all being under thought, to represent it as different phænomenal stages of the Spirit as the thinker.[1] Knowledge itself is the highest form of *life;* and Christianity perfects and deifies life by the absolute knowledge which begins with it.

Against both these tendencies, in which we have represented to us only Paganism under the double aspect of a dualistic and a monistic Pantheism, the Judaistic form of the gnosis is fully valid. This brings forward the ethical problem, and holds fast by rectitude as the highest momentum in the concept of God; thus presenting a higher Monotheism than that pantheistic one is, such as essentially involves the concept of creation. Here also Christianity must be regarded as that which perfectly realizes the rectitude of God; partly, inasmuch as it perfectly, and without fail, announces to the world the will of God; partly, inasmuch as this revelation, along with the forgiveness of sins for those who better themselves, prepares and justifies the decisive eschatological judgment for the unworthy. So Cerinthus, and, after him, the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies.[2]

These three tendencies thus aimed to construe Christianity as it were by physics, or logic, or ethics, and to represent God as the pneumatic *nature*, or *thought*, or *rectitude*. Hence it was proposed to unite what was true in these systems; for the one stood in exclusive opposition to the others, and only the first two could in a certain way be viewed as homogeneous complements of each other. In these, however, the principle of nature-religion stood in direct opposition to the ethical principle of Judaism. Each was valid against the other, and each also had its weak point; for neither can rectitude be the highest in the concept of God, nor, on the other hand, can His physical attri-

so many hypostases after a mythological fashion, the full Divine consciousness is ascribed only to One, the Only-begotten. He alone forms wholly the original reason. He is in God Himself the Mediator of the Divine consciousness; and, as the perfect mirror of the Propator, takes without question the highest place along with Him.

[1] Appendix, Note FFFF.

[2] Basilides, on the other hand, only partially belongs to this class, through his doctrine of rectitude. His view of the universal ἀμαρτητικὸν in men, of the pneumatic ἐκλογή, and in general of grace fulfilling righteousness, would bring him nearer to Christianity, were it not that with him everything ethical is viewed physically. Comp. Grabe, Spicil. ii. 41.

butes. A rectitude which only claims, but does not effectuate, is impotent: a benevolent power which dispenses its gifts only arbitrarily, and which, treating sin as only apparent, leaves no place for rectitude, is unethical. Both sides are unable to instruct each other, and can only convert to the opposite error; for none of them, in so far as they speak of the supreme God, has in his gnosis the higher unity of the momenta in their equal validity, none has the pure Christian concept of God. Only a bold creation from the fresh source of Christianity itself could deliver the gnosis from its internal bonds.

Certainly there now appeared, as a rugged ergismus and antagonist to the proper gnosis, a reaction of the religious feeling, which was spread widely through many lands, in *Montanism;* but though in its earliest, enthusiastic form, in which it was hostile to clear knowledge, it was indeed an enemy to the death to the gnosis (though as onesided as itself), it could neither give a reason for it, nor by its ecstasy overcome it. In it there was threatened, in its religious definitiveness, an ergismus which erected piety into a good work. No sooner was it matured, than the religious spirit and force dwelling in it must needs come forth as productive and conflictive in the ecclesiastical course.

It is, rather than anything else, a new form of the gnosis itself, which attacks victoriously both those earlier principal forms by means of a higher principle. If they had obscured the Christian principle by recognising in it only the *perfection of the pre-Christian;* Marcion brought forward boldly and enthusiastically his *absolute newness* [of Christianity]. The newness consists in this, that therein a new concept of God is given: *God is love.* He is not, consequently, ethical goodness, not a pneumatic nature, not knowledge; but He is spiritual love. As against the Judaic principle, he says: God regards not desert nor service; but His greatness is His pre-eminent grace. Others, indeed, before him had viewed what preceded Christianity in the gross as the time of the dominion of an antitheistic, or, at least, not truly Divine power; but yet none of them had been able, from their stand-point, to do otherwise than assume the existence of pneumatic natures determined to gnosis before Christianity; so that Christianity could only awaken the slumbering germ, already posited, of these pneu-

matic natures, and thereby complete the pre-Christian. It could create nothing new, nor, consequently, transmute the old world into a new. And the Judaic principle also, according to which the revelation of righteousness must suffice, presupposes an incorrupt state of human nature, and thereby leaves for redemption only a precarious place. Marcion is the first more clearly to present the antithesis between the old and new world, as he is so filled with the new, the highest momentum in the concept of God, that he first, in the strength of this new positive element, love, sees across the cleft which separates the old from the new.[1] To him, heathenism and Judaism are so different from Christianity, that he believes he can describe the new thing that has risen upon his view only as a new God, who, as the alone true, is also the eternal, though not before revealed.[2] He lays no stress on a preparation for Christianity through the previous circumstances, development, or deed of mankind; but the more grace manifests itself without preparation, so much the more pre-eminent is it; the less it already finds of what is good and meritorious, so much the more divinely does love beam forth in it,—that love which is not ashamed to communicate itself to the unworthy.

As the pre-Christian religions were thus, in his estimation, very far below Christianity, so also were the chief classes of the gnosis, the ethnicizing (in both its principal forms) and the Judaizing, very far below the Christian gnosis, the knowledge of the unknown Father as He who hath revealed Himself in Christ, and His death as the freely forgiving love, and by justification and the remission of sins, as the thoroughly *perfecting* love. He will have neither the heathen, unethical concept of God, as his Doketic principles show, nor again does he recognise as in accordance with his view the Jewish God: it is only the Christian idea of God that he will have, and he believes that this can be preserved in its purity only as all that is pre-Christian is separated from it.

Though Marcion thus set forth the higher principle which is competent to the just union of all the momenta in the concept of God, still the conflict and antagonism within the gnosis

[1] Characteristic is the question to the Roman Presbyter: Tell me what means this—No man puts new wine into old skins? etc.—Epiph. Hær. xlii. 2.

[2] Appendix, Note GGGG.

itself was only thereby rendered the stronger. For he was able to construe the Christian concept of God only in its antithesis to the pre-Christian momenta, but not as the unity of these.[1] It was only Church Fathers like Irenæus and Tertullian who, by recognising as well the historical as the ideal aspect of Christianity, were able, from the stand-point which a living faith gave them, to deliver the gnosis from the antitheses in which it was put under bann, and to collect the different momenta of the concept of God, of which its various tendencies gave a onesided representation; and this they did, not in the way of mere summation, but speculatively, since, penetrating into these antitheses, they demonstrated in the inner unity of those which seemed especially antagonistic, righteousness and love.[2]

By what has been hitherto advanced, the picture of the Christology within the gnosis is sketched out.

What seems at first to most the common point of resemblance between the Gnostic forms, is *Doketism*. But this has not, as is often supposed, the same basis in all; on the contrary, in each tendency its basis is different. Though certainly in ultimate reference there abides in the Gnostic systems generally a dualistic fundamental trait, by which something Doketic is posited for Christology, yet is this dualistic element very differently construed in the different forms. The oldest ethnicizing dualism (which subsequently comes to unity hellenically in Valentinus, and was purified christianly by Marcion) views Christ as a being whose nature is light, and who cannot come into positive intercourse with the darkness, with matter, or their domain, to which also carnal humanity belongs, without being defiled.[3]

The Doketism of the school of Valentinus comes forth in another fashion. Here the ideal, the light of thought, is the alone true being; and hence in reference to all reality of the actual world there is a certain indifference. This school approximates most to a simply ideal Christ, whilst those just named sought to express the profoundest impression of the supernatural character of the appearance of Christ. Nevertheless the ideal Christ was so represented by this second class, that He was historically conceived of. He must have an objec-

[1] Appendix, Note HHHH.
[2] Appendix, Note IIII.
[3] Appendix, Note JJJJ.

tive historical significance in the process of the world's history, yet not so as to give Himself up to finitude, and relinquish His fixed position as opposed to the outward reality.

Marcion's Doketism has again another root. For he makes use of it to make evident the absolute newness of Christianity; and hence his prejudice in favour of the suddenness of its appearance. It is only thus that his laying so much stress on the death of Christ is to be accounted for; for as, according to him, all lies in the newness of Christianity, which consists in the revelation of love, to deny the death of Christ would be to lose hold of the highest proof of love; and accordingly he held fast by the death of Christ, without, however, supposing that with that the curse of the Almighty was in any way connected.

In fine, the Judaizing form of Gnosticism became Doketic from this, that, as in general it aims to resolve in its way the antithesis between freedom and grace, but knows only to place the human subject over against the divine according to its juristic principle, or to suffer both to alternate in their value, so it dealt also with the Person of Christ. Further, it arose from this also, that, in accordance with the same deistic standpoint, it could unite with the man Jesus, not God, but only one of the higher spirits; and thus there is given of itself a suppression of the true manhood, or a lowering of this to a simple Doketic form.[1]

As we have seen from what precedes, in the first place, what the different Gnostics sought to know as the peculiar essence of Christianity, and, along with that, what we owe to Christ (the work of Christ); from which it appears that all except Marcion place this work in his *doctrine*, whether ethical or theoretic (cosmogonic and theogonic); and as, in the second place, we have pointed out Doketism as what is common to all the Gnostic systems, and have deduced this from the principle of each; it only remains for us to consider the different forms of this Doketism.

Here, first, in reference to the *higher nature* itself, it appears that they felt bound to call Christ Saviour, and to view Him hypostatically;[2] that all, Marcion alone excepted, refused to admit that it was the Divine Being who appeared historically, but held that it was only an Æon, Christ. He is an emanation

[1] So in the Pseudo-Clementines. [2] Appendix, Note KKKK.

or προβολή of the Highest Being (e.gr. according to Basilides, Epiph. Hær. xxiv. 1). He is, indeed, a divine being; but that which is divine κ.ἐ. abides by itself, does not come forth; and, on the other hand, all the pneumatic natures before Christ, whose existence only Marcion ventured to deny, are in essence like Him. Certainly this Æon Christ is so preferred before all, that he can give the fullest announcement as well concerning the entire Pleroma as concerning the abysmal Divine essence itself. This has been worked out beautifully, especially by the Valentinian school (Iren. i. 2). No sooner (on the fall of Achamoth) was a link in the chain of the Pleroma broken, and, for the establishment of what still stood, Christ was brought forth and the Holy Ghost by the Monogenes (consequently after the fact which the creation of the world made good), than the whole Pleroma determined, rejoicing in the unity and harmony thereby established, to unite whatever each Æon had that was most beautiful and glorious, and thereby to produce for the glorifying of the Bythos a perfect beauty, a luminous star, the common effulgence as it were of the Pleroma. This was done in Jesus, whom they call also Soter, and Christ, and Logos, and All, since He is from all. And in this product of the common joy and unity the Pleroma shows and establishes its harmony. Christ is, according to this, the former of Nature; but it is Jesus, or the Soter, who brings the pneumatic element as hidden seed into the world, and, through the historical appearance of Christ, to form, in the perfect knowledge which He communicates.

They endeavour in various ways to set forth the Soter perfectly;[1] as, e.gr., when they see in Him a δύναμις itself, even of the Sigè or the Arrheton, not merely collect the forces of the Pleroma in Him, as Marcus (Epiph. xxx. 10), or when they identify Him with the primitive essence, or derive Him from this (see what is said of a party of the Colorbasians in Epiph. xxxv. 1, and the Marcosians, ibid. xxxiv. 8, 10). But, however various their efforts for this end, He always remains, in their judgment, an Æon who began to be, and is subordinate to the Supreme Being. And if some of them (as Heracleon, Epiph. xxxvi. 2, xxxv. 1) call the Supreme Father of the uni-

[1] See a multitude of these in Epiphan. Hær. xxxv. 1, xxxiv. 8, 10, xxiv. 1–3, xxxi. 7.

verse Himself, the First Principle, no longer Bythos, but primitive man, Ἄνθρωπος, and boast of it as a great mystery that the highest, the all-embracing, and over-all-existing Power, is called Man; still there is nothing in this, as we already have seen in the case of the Clementine Homilies, favourable to the idea of the incarnation. On the contrary, as seems to have been exemplified at least with Heracleon (see note KKKK), the universe being pantheistically conceived as an incoherent multeity of which God is the unity, there remains for the Soter nothing else than to be one of the powers of the primal man. It deserves also to be mentioned, that the gnosis, in none of its forms, ascribes world-creative power to the higher principle in Christ; but at the utmost, as in the school of Valentinus, only world-framing power. It is precluded from the former by its hostile position towards the Hylè. It is instructive to see how the gnosis, however high may be the flight it takes, always involuntarily sinks back again into what is particularistic: Christ's significancy is a limited one; it is valid only for the pneumatic class which it already is by *nature*;[1] with the hylic the divine itself can become ready only through annihilation. As, however, the gnosis has thus in it something of the nature of caste or aristocratic exclusiveness towards the one human class, so, on the other side, there is a just retribution and consequence, in that the highest divine in it alone retains something exclusive towards the pneumatic powers themselves. For, as they do not view God as love, they have not the God who can surmount the hylic, not the supreme God. But their highest God, who remains to them, has always something physically limited, remains always the strange, either exclusive or consuming Bythos,[2] if they do not, as happened to the later Gnostics, pursue the converse direction, transpose all that is divine into what is present, and so, with the abrogation of all self-existence in God, give up the highest good itself, the blessed communion with God in knowledge and love. It is self-evident that the Judaizing gnosis can receive no more favourable sentence. For, with the antagonism between God and the world, which is posited by the mere principle of rectitude, there is necessarily

[1] Comp. e. gr. Heracleon in Grabe l. c. ii. 237.

[2] The reader may remember the Horos and its activity (comp. Baur, Gnosis, p. 128).

thought a transcendence of God without immanence, and the innermost essence of God as incommunicable; so that in Christ there is not a truly Divine being.—A totally different position was assumed by Marcion through the Christian idea of love, which is not to him, as to the other Gnostics, a simply unmeaning word, but, inasmuch as the presupposition of his gnosis is a living Christian consciousness, is the fundamental category of his concept of God. With him, God as love comes in the place of the obscure basis, the Bythos, which never comes into manifestation; and thus in his view the revelation in Christ is not the revelation of a subordinate potence or emanation, but of the Supreme God Himself." The only contribution which he casts into the Gnostic treasury is, that he views religion exclusively by itself, as severed from nature and the creation, and thus falls into a religious particularism, as they do into a particularism of gnosis. Thus limiting the universal significancy of Christ by a sort of doctrine of predestination, he is able to think Him not as Creator of the world, but only as Saviour and Redeemer. He leaves it in the general doubtful in what relation the truly Divine, whose innermost essence Christ manifests and represents,[1] stands to God. That he thought it as a truly Divine hypostasis in God, is not probable; least of all could he represent it as a subordinated Æon. There remains only the patripassian or Sabellian representation; but we have no proof that he followed either. What is most probable is, that he did not follow out his peculiar principle of love further in this direction; and thus, that the first or third view was preferred by him as possible. His own gnosis lingered, like that of his favourite Apostle Paul, by preference in the anthropological region; in the theological gnosis he remained dependent from Cerdo (Epiph. Hær. xli. 1, comp. xlii. 1–3).

In what has been said we have gained the premisses for understanding the *relation* in which, according to the Gnostics, *the higher in Christ stands to the human.* In general, they, Marcion excepted, regard the humanity of Christ as the organ for the revelation of the Divine truth: it is the merely momen-

[1] Tertullian ad Marc. i. 19: Deus noster non ab initio—non per conditionem (*creation*) sed per semetipsum revelatus est in Christo Jesu. In i. 22, and i. 19, Tertullian calls the Marcionite Christ alterius Dei quam creatoris circumlator (comp. i. 11, iv. 7).

tary *medium* (ὄχημα) for the introduction of the eternal truth into history, which was afterwards, when this end was attained, allowed to perish; for the Divine which this was the medium for introducing is neither hylic nor psychical, but rather pneumatic. Were His real self-representation in concrete human guise recognised as an essential determination of the Divine, there would be extended an eternal significancy to the side of the humanity. The best developed Gnostic systems, however, secured to the humanity of Christ no other significancy than that of being a *symbolical* representation of the eternal truth.[1] Only Marcion assigns to the humanity of Christ an essential place.

Nevertheless there is an unmistakeable advance in the relation of the higher nature to humanity. As that *medium* of revelation the man Jesus was viewed by the older Gnostics,[2] whether He was supernaturally conceived or not. They thus first laid down that Jesus was a mere man (which we have above designated the Ebionitic element in Doketism); but then they instantly exalt Him above Himself for the time when He must be nothing but the *medium* of revelation.[3] This necessitates the fixing on the baptism of Christ [Jesus?] as the epoch when the higher Æon Christ came on Him, in order to reduce Him, for the time during which He must become the revelation of the truth, into a mere passive selfless organ of His. During this time the human in Jesus is submitted and restrained; and one might view this as a prophetic state of ecstasy, were it not that it is a permanent state, and the spirit that descended on Jesus is not a hypostasis, but merely the power or hand of the Divine Spirit. The Æon is personally and permanently abiding in Christ for a long time, and so a significant approximation to an incarnation is posited. Since, however, this Æon is not essentially united with the man Jesus, but only reduces him to a restricted personality, it thus becomes possible for Gnosticism to maintain, what is of so much importance to it, the

[1] Thus among the Valentinians, since to them the suffering Jesus is a type of the world-soul, which suffers outside the Pleroma.

[2] So the Ophites (if they are to be reckoned here), Basilides, Valentinus, Cerinthus, as well as Marcus, etc.

[3] The latter was held by some Valentinians (Orig. Ep. ad Tit. Opp. ed. De la Rue, iv. 695, vol. 1); probably also by Basilides, since he ascribed a ἀμαρτητικόν to Jesus.

excluding from the Pleroma what is concretely human, and the admitting into it only of what is pneumatic. After the dispensation, the time of revelation is passed; the higher essence can, without having been defiled by the Hylè, lay aside the man Jesus, who always remained outside of it, and return to the Pleroma; but the man Jesus, who through the Christ was rendered worthy of such elevation, is fully honoured in that he enters into the blessedness of heaven, after he has let drop the hylic. It thus appears that the double personality of Jesus and of the Christ, which are introduced as alternating, has for Gnosticism its importance; for the Pleroma is thus preserved pure from the concrete man, yet without its being necessary to set aside the humanity of Christ as an empty shell, which would have been altogether offensive to the Christian consciousness.

All these theories, however, are nevertheless Doketic, because, in proportion as they lay stress on the Æon Christ, to which they assign only an outward and transient union with a man, they assert only an apparent humanity. The Church Fathers consequently, who give them the name of Doketæ, were justified in so doing, and placed themselves on their own proper stand-point.[1]

But Gnosticism, however unessential and of only transient significancy the manhood of Christ was held by it to be, had nevertheless to advance to show that the *medium*, the man Jesus, was the fitting or adequate organ for this union of him with the Æon Christ. Here *three* paths lay open, and we find that all were followed. 1. It might be said: The man Jesus has, by his purity, virtue, wisdom, become pre-eminently capable of being made this organ, and so it is just he should be so made. Thus Cerinthus, from the Judaizing point of view; and this falls into Ebionism, unless the greater stress be laid on the supernatural descent of the Divine essence; and as this does not appear to have been done by Cerinthus, we have consequently ranked him among the Ebionites. 2. Conversely it might be said: That Jesus should become this organ, rests on the free Divine election; which is most strongly enounced in this, that though from his birth not free from the sinful nature common

[1] Appendix, Note LLLL.

to men, he was nevertheless for a season[1] destined to receive thus the Christ; and it is this Christ coming upon him, or into him (at the time of his baptism), who delivered the man Jesus from sin, perfected him, and so fitted him as a perfected organ for the purpose of his revelation. So Basilides. 3. Since a high degree of wisdom and purity presupposes a superior, natural, God-bestowed endowment, whilst it is not to be fundamentally perceived why the higher authorization of the man Jesus should be given so late, seeing the capacity[2] for the perfecting inworking of the Æon Christ already leads to the presupposition of something congenial to it in him, it was with greater consequence taught that his *birth was supernatural*, and that thereby he was fitted as no other was to be united with the Soter. So the Ophites and the Valentinians.[3] According to the latter, who alone deserve notice, this Soter of the Pleroma, to whom the forming of the world gave offence, had prepared for His perfect appearance among men by this, that a pneumatic germ from Him (concealed from the principle of the Psychical, the Demiurgus) had not merely been planted in the soul of the world, the Chochma, but had from it been communicated to men also. It might thus seem that redemption was not needed; for the Hylè cannot be redeemed, and the Pneumatic requires not to be redeemed. But, nevertheless, the Valentinian system seeks to leave open a place for redemption by representing the Pneumatic as in a germinal state, and so standing in need of development.—The Soter above described, the flower of the Pleroma, descended upon Jesus for the first time at his baptism, in the form of a dove; but found in him a point of affinity, in that he was already prepared for the full

[1] That is, up to the time of his sufferings, when the Æon left him, not only according to Basilides, but also according to Cerinthus and the Valentinians.

[2] The δεκτικὴ διάθεσις of the Valentinians, or the pneumatic germ dwelling from the beginning in human nature. Comp. Grabe l. c. 102.

[3] Comp. Heracleon in Grabe l. c. p. 99. Salvation comes from the Jews; not that Christ was born of the Jews (*i.e.*, of Mary, with a side glance at the unbelief of the Jewish people), etc. Valentinus himself (Epiph. Hær. xxxi. 7), Marcus (ib. xxxiv. 10), Saturnilos (ib. xxv. 1), Christ have come ἐν σχήματι ἀνθρώπου and ἰδέᾳ μόνῃ. Τὰ πάντα δὲ ἐν τῷ δοκεῖν πεποιηκέναι, τουτέστι τὸ γεγενῆσθαι, τὸ περιπατεῖν, τὸ ὀπτάνεσθαι, τὸ πεπονθέναι. Comp. Epiph. Hær. xxxvi. 10.

reception of the superior nature. But as the condition of the inferior Jesus is thus determined by the higher, and there is no more a mere man's becoming kindred and congenial to the revelation, there is removed what was a disturbing element in all the Gnostic systems, arising from the *hylic* element in Christ's manifestation. The Person of Christ is, indeed, more fully determined by the superior Christ, the Idea, than in the earlier forms of Doketism, but only in this way, that the corporeal, which in them remained undisposed of, is wholly allowed to drop, and the inferior Jesus is perfectly endowed so as to be the bearer of the Christ-spirit. For this end, the inferior Jesus received from the Söter a pneumatic germ; nay, this germ is here already more definitely viewed as a part of the manifestation of the Soter, by which, as the beginning and peculiar receptacle [of the higher nature], was announced beforehand the full advent of the Soter at the baptism. This germ was deposited in the psychical Messiah by the Achamoth; and him the Demiurgus was on his side led to promise and to form, through the blind impulse which draws the psychical to the pneumatic. The Demiurgus bestowed on his Messiah the best he has (not knowing, it is true, to what still higher end his work must become allied), creating not only a human soul, but for this soul a psychical body; a special work of art, not grossly corporeal, and yet such as that it was palpable and susceptible of suffering. Now, this man, fully adapted to the economy, with the pneumatic germ, the psyche and soul-body, undefiled by the Hylè, and yet bearing in it the first fruits of that which it was to save, passed through Mary as through a conduit, developed himself without sin, and from the time that the Soter united Himself to him at the baptism, he revealed God the unknown to men, and purified and cultivated men by wholesome doctrine.[1] This Christ, they expressly say, is the Holy Ghost that descended on Jesus, and speaks through him. By this economy the Soter has abolished death, and made known the Father.[2]

[1] Comp. on Heracleon, Grabe l. c. 100; on Marcus, Epiph. Hær. xxxiv. 8–10, 19. Another expression for this is the salvation of the Light spark (σπινθήρ), Epiph. xxiii. 1.

[2] So far do they bring the two—the Christ, whom they also call the Father of Jesus (Epiph. xxxiv. 10), and the inferior Jesus—together, that

This marvellous theory, which in the second century, however, was divided by many into various modifications, forms without doubt a notable advance towards the uniting and inner coherence of the two sides [of Christ's Person], the higher and the lower. The latter is no longer now a mere organ in the general, but a *copy* of the Christ who is present in his image as long as the economy lasts; and hence the acting and suffering of Jesus are construed as symbols of the higher world. But never does the man Jesus form a part of the Christ Himself; but intrinsically they remain separate; there is here a double personality. And in order to be in some measure a true image of the incorporeal Christ (*Χριστὸς ἄσαρκος*), everything hylic must be withdrawn from Jesus. One might, indeed, proceed to ask, since in the last reference it is only community with the Soter that is brought into consideration, and the latter (or Christ) is not psychical, what becomes of Jesus, the psychical organ and copy of Christ? In so far as he is psychical, he is not a true copy of the Christ; and how can he then conduct to Him? and in so far as he conducts to Him, he must be in essence like Him, must be pneumatic; and how then can he remain His organ and copy? Is not the superior Christ, whose very idea it is to shun and repel the psychical and hylic, necessarily only Himself Mediator? Must He not exclude all and every organ; or, if He assumes such, must it not be without mediatory function, and consequently without significance, and only as for appearance? In fact, the Gnostics of the Valentinian school[1] constantly are enforcing (Heracleon, for instance, frequently) that the Holy Ghost and the power of the Christ, but nothing external, brings the gnosis (comp. Grabe l.c. ii. 94 ff. 108). The psychical, indeed, serves the believers; but these were only psychical. It is not on the works of Christ, not on His sensible appearance, that men are to believe, but on the Logos (l. c. 110). This same question may be otherwise put thus: If the organ of the revelation has an essential significancy, wherefore is it, as organ at least, perishable?[2]

the latter is called also in himself an image (*ἐξομοιώσις καὶ μόρφωσις*) of the superior Christ, or of the Anthropos, who has to come upon him and from him (*χωρεῖν*).

[1] We have seen the same above in the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies, where we spoke of the *ἄφραστος χείρ* of their Son.

[2] Appendix, Note MMMM.

and if it has no essential significancy, to what intent is the whole artificial Christology; and why go beyond the eternal Christ without humanity, who, as none other, excluding the hylic and psychical, is the truth, and consequently must immediately reveal Himself pneumatically?[1]

It may certainly be assumed, that the powerful impression produced by the appearance of Jesus,—the consciousness that the higher consciousness, the consciousness of the Christ, and the absolute truth revealed in Him, had in and through Jesus come to pass historically, and become the common boon of mankind,—co-operated materially to produce this contradictory Christology. It may be further said, that though it did not concern these Gnostics to view the humanity as an essential quality of their Christ, or even to unite so much as his activity essentially to a humanity any way closely bound to him, they would nevertheless beware of regarding the *superior Christ Himself* as simply a projection of their subjective consciousness, and thereby as a subjective phantasma; so that with them Jesus, and the preserver of the Christ in him, had this significance, that it denoted the objectivity of Christ, and His real entrance within the domain of history. But the above question ever returns: for Jesus could accomplish neither of these, unless he is himself, as he is, an essential, not accidental momentum of the Christ; or it is possible to construe such extreme abnegations of the higher in Christ as birth and death into an essential manifestation of His love.

From what has been said, it may be easily conjectured how great was the further advance which, in this respect, was made by Marcion. He forms in Christology the decisive turning-point where the gnosis in principle, and within itself, overcame Doketism, and allied itself with the Church. To his course the future belongs; whilst Gnosticism, on the contrary, so long as it adhered to the ancient path, decayed, and passed over more and more to what was not Christian, as we have already seen, since it fell back into Ebionism.

[1] This thought is perhaps the cause of the opinion which Tertullian, De Carne Christi, c. 15, opposes, that Christ had a pneumatic body (comp. Origen, T. iv. 691, ed. De la Rue). Tertullian, it is true, names Valentinus as the person he has in view; but he knew to distinguish the psychical and pneumatic body (c. 10, coll. 15): so that probably scholars of Valentinus are meant.

At first, indeed, Marcion marched under the standard of Doketism. He did not allow that Christ was born of the Virgin Mary; for Christianity, the absolutely new, could in no wise be interwoven with the laws of the old world, of the Demiurgus and of matter: that would have been, in his view, a dependence upon things whose reign was rather now to end. In the fifteenth year of Tiberius, Christ descended suddenly from the hitherto unknown Father into the synagogue at Capernaum, and came forth with the doctrine of the good God. In Him appeared the Father, who revealed Himself in Him by Himself, not by mediation of the Virgin, or of a body composed of the elements of creation.[1] He says nothing more particularly concerning the origin of His body: in his view, however, Christ must have sprung immediately from the supreme God Himself; and Tertullian's censure, that he taught a phantasma, can refer only to the alleged suddenness of Christ's appearance, and to the fact that, according to Tertullian, what is not born is only apparently of our species. Irenæus says, more discreetly (i. 29), only that, according to Marcion, God has revealed Himself in hominis formâ. In any case, the body of Christ, according to Marcion, was so framed that it was adapted to serve for the manifestation of God, who is present in Him. The humanity of Christ is, in his view, nothing but an organ,—not, however, assumed from the world or mankind, but issuing from God, and that *essentially*; for, according to him, there belongs to the revelation of Love not mere *doctrine*, of which it may be thought that its subject-matter comes into consciousness in an inner manner through the ideal Christ, but *work* and *suffering*. The appearance of Christ among men is itself an act of love, since in Christ the Divine love wills to dwell with men and walk with them. And therewith is the human appearance of Christ already distinguished as the necessary essential organ of love; and any other organ than humanity would have been unfit for this. But still more is suffering an act of love, into which God could not without humanity have entered: the suffering of Christ, however, and His death—and therewith His humanity—are with Marcion integral momenta

[1] See Note, p. 233. Comp. also Tertull. adv. Marc. iv. 7; Epiph. Hær. xlii. 7.

in the idea of Redemption.[1] In general, Marcion holds by the truth on the whole of the evangelical history of Christ (as given by Luke), apart from the history of what preceded, and has, throughout, no interest in seeking to depreciate the perfection of the humanity of Christ, from the time that He descended, so long as it does not impeach the newness of Christianity, which with him is everything. He concedes to the Church that Christ continued His work even in Hades; and since he accepted His actual death in the body, which was capable of suffering (see preceding note), as well as His resurrection after three days, and probably also agreed with the Church in holding that during the death of His body Christ went into hell, it is possible that he also ascribed to Christ a human soul.

By the principle of love, Marcion obtained once for all a quite different bond of union between the two sides in Christ. Nor does this principle remain with him without effect in this respect. The double Christ whom the others hold is not found with him: he knows nothing of a pure human nature of Jesus before the descent of Christ on him; and by this the last Ebionitic remnant of the other Gnostic forms is removed, and no overweening importance can any longer be attached to the baptism of Jesus. By means of love, which with him is the supremely, most intrinsically divine, God on the one side, and humanity, so far as it is adapted to receive the divine, on the other, are united in this person.

Now, on the other hand, it certainly seems as if through the omission of the inferior Jesus, by means of whom the Doketic stand-point of the other Gnostics was insufficiently concealed, this Doketism comes into view much more openly in the case of Marcion; so that Tertullian says (de Carne Christi, c. 1): Marcion, ut carnem Christi negaret, negavit etiam nativitatem, aut ut nativitatem negaret, negavit et carnem, scilicet ne invicem sibi testimonium redderent et responderent, nativitas et caro; and he thinks that, after the example of others, he may, in virtue of the licentia hæretica, satisfy himself with the denial of either of the two, either the flesh of Christ or the birth of Christ. But this Marcion could not do; on the contrary, there is shown here, that it is the approaching higher uniting principle which first sharpens the antitheses, and dis-

[1] Appendix, Note NNNN.

misses all merely mediatory and apparent solutions[1] before it can surmount these. Marcion deepened the antithesis in which Gnosticism wearied itself, the Dualism which it alternately insisted upon and concealed, and above which the pre-Christian stand-point could not, either in Judaism or Heathenism, be raised; for he set over against the whole old world that which is absolutely new, Christianity as the Divine love actually become matter of fact. By this there is instituted a much sharper and more real antithesis than between the highest extremes of the Gnostics, the *obscure basis*, the *Bythos*, and its extreme *Matter* or *chaos*. For, in truth, when closely viewed, these two, the obscure basis and the chaos, coalesce; the Bythos is really not the highest, but the lowest, because the merely physical category of the concept of God. The distinction is not so much in themselves (the Bythos and unformed Hylè) as it comes up in the subject [the thinking mind], which unweariedly affronts the attempt to determine the Bythos as the ideal, and yet believes it must relinquish the attempt (on account of its μέγεθος) to reach determinations by which alone the physical can be transcended. The concrete emanations are in truth higher categories than itself; but the subject knows it not, and chooses it not, and so these are not truly recognised according to their worth, but are ever threatened again with the physical.

But by the same stroke which in the manner shown deepens the previous antithesis, is also gained the principle of union, as well of the earlier as of the new. For the whole pre-Christian world of actuality and thought is now combined in one, over against which stands what is new. And only so far now is a distinction in it acknowledged as it stands diversely related to the new, that is, either as obstinately opposed to it, or as receptive of it. But right as is the major premiss here, nevertheless in the subsumed minor premiss Marcion is gnostically bound; for, though he views the psychical and no longer the hylic as capable of redemption, the overstraining of his principle of the absolute newness of Christianity must on this side necessarily produce and relapse to the earlier, by which, as even the overstrained antithesis proves, his principle was nevertheless negatively bound. But the negative determination by the earlier stage is one thing, the positive is an-

[1] Such as are to be found especially in the Valentinian school.

other; and since his Divine love is certainly not yet truly free, since it excludes the hylic from itself, and cannot absolutely surmount in conception the antithesis,—hence finds also this world too low to be framed by the supreme God; yet must the *limited*, the physical, by which the Marcionite concept of God and Christ is fettered, be regarded not as what was willed and enunciated by him, but as an after-pain of his age,[1] which must pass away of itself, if only that be held firm and cultivated on which everything for him depends. In fact, this had been already prepared even in his school, which thereby, so far as a more healthy impulse to development was in it, fell in with the Church tendency. So with Apelles (comp. Euseb. v. 13);[2] nay, with Marcion himself; for there is no ground for doubting Tertullian's statement (De Præscr. 30), that at a later period he desired reconciliation with the Church; and when it was proposed to him as a condition that he should bring back his adherents to the Church, it was only his death which prevented this being accomplished. Apelles, however,[3] who was less important, did not rise altogether above Dualism, which also clung to Marcion—that is to say, he did not thoroughly evolve the Marcionite principle; but through a mediate apparent solution, by an approximation to Valentinianism (Tertull. De Præscr. 30; De Resurrec. 2), only softened his Dualism. For if he had followed out the principle of love, he could not have regarded Christ's body as without birth or sidereal. But his

[1] As is already shown by the fact that he viewed the pre-Christian world as capable of receiving Christ, and consequently recognised in it something akin to Him; and also the Demiurgus has not merely an attitude averted from God, but a certain right remains with rectitude, only it shall not will for itself to be the highest. Had Marcion reflected on this kindred element in the pre-Christian time, which his system presupposes, he would, with the Church, have referred it to the same source as has appeared in Christianity, not to an evil principle, or to any other good one than Him who alone is the good and highest God.

[2] The above shows why it does not appear to me probable that the later Marcionites have developed, as true disciples, what was in the esteem of Marcion the essential. The Marcionites rather appear to have let slip the positive, what in his view was the highest, the goodness and love of God, and, on the contrary, to have attached themselves to Dualism, which was the birthmark of his age, and hence to have allied themselves to Manichæism.

[3] Tertull. De Carne Christi, 6–8, and De Præscript. Hær. 30; comp. 51; Euseb. v. 13; Epiph. Hær. 44.

eclecticism proves (Epiph. Hær. xliv. 2) that he did not feel himself at ease in Marcion's Dualism; and his saying to Rhodon (Euseb. v. 13), "He is blessed who believes on the crucified, if he be found in good works; but the obscurest of all is the question concerning God: the Scripture could give no explanation here, and he acknowledged that he had no *knowledge* that there is a first principle, a God; but his feeling declared to him there is,"—proves that he viewed faith as the basis of everything Christian, and even that he held by that momentum through which Marcion had gained an *essential* significancy for the humanity of Christ, viz., His death. He thereby rose far above a momentary angelic appearance,[1] and also, on occasion of the vision of Philumene (Tertull. De Carne Christi, 6), sought to vindicate for Christ's body a caro solida, not merely, with Marcion, a body capable of suffering; and he is already on the way to assert that a body was given to Christ from the *previously created world*,[2] and to ascribe to the Demiurgus, whom he calls Fire-spirit, only the earthly as his work and kingdom. According to Apelles, Christ's sidereal body, the substance of which He brought down with Him from the higher regions to earth, condensed on it to a caro solida; and this soliditas ceased at His ascension; His body returned to the higher regions of the same gravity with them. But He had no substance from the earth, and hence could leave none behind. There is no ground for the assumption that Apelles denied the continuance of Christ's humanity after His ascension. He rather made a

[1] The passage in Tertullian, De Præs. Hær. 51, is hence evidently unjust, unless the meaning be that Apelles ascribed to Christ a parastatic body, as it is presumed angels have when they appear; comp. Tertull. De Carne Christi, 6. [The proper reading of this passage is so uncertain that nothing can be built on it.—Tr.]

[2] Tertullian, De Carne Chr. 6: De sideribus inquiunt et de substantiis superioris mundi, mutuatus est carnem.. The assertion, that it was taught that this corpus sidereum et aëreum was dispersed by Christ on His ascension into its original elements, I do not find authenticated; for such an assumption there was hardly even a motive in the case of Apelles. For it was the earthly substance alone that was viewed by him as impure, peccatrix, and hence he would not ascribe it to Christ; and, on the other hand, Tertullian reasons so against him as that we must assume that he saw in the siderea substantia nothing unworthy of Christ. Perhaps he is confounded with the author of the Anabaticon Jesaiæ (see Appendix, Note MMMM), who has something like this.

step in advance towards reconciling the new creation with the old; he conceded to the highest, the good, God, the creation of the more perfect part of the world, and sought to give to the humanity of Christ greater reality, in which he does not stand alone.[1]

The Marcionite Dualism is thus already on the regress; and if it for a moment comes to a stand, and will not advance from the true death of Christ to a true birth of Christ, or from the creation of the psychical by the good God to a creation also of the hylic, this is of no avail; for by the recognition of God as love, the principle is given up in virtue of which alone Dualism can keep its ground, namely, that the finite as such is ungodly, and cannot immediately proceed from God. This may be thus Christologically expressed, and thereby we put together what has been already said.

After Doketism, having entered on the course in which it became intertwined with Ebionism, recognised the baptism of Christ as historical, and from that, though unsatisfactorily, had caught back at the birth of Christ,—of which, however, it had no other conception than that it was a preparation of the man Jesus for the act of union [with the Christ] at the baptism; the decisive turning-point was taken by Marcion, who, especially by taking into account the propitiatory death of Christ, or the suffering and propitiating manifestation of Divine love, prepared an essential, and no longer a mere symbolical, place for the humanity of Christ. From this the Christian knowledge, becoming ever more and more conscious of the almightiness and world-creating power of love, reasoned back for the first time with effect; sought, under the guidance of the concept of God as almighty love, to think the humanity of Christ ever more and more as homogeneous with ours; to bring His deity forward in ever progressive superiority to the various stages of worldly existence which must be united with it, until the last link in the chain, which is to unite earth and heaven, was reached, and the true birth of Christ, of our substance, from the womb of Mary was found. It is natural that for this last concluding point, in which Christ is first fully assigned to our nature and becomes our brother, flesh of our flesh and bone of our bone, there should be no particular party to be named; for

[1] Appendix, Note OOOO.

with this momentum heresy was at an end, and the Church doctrine begins, to which we have now to pass over.

Before entering on this, however, as a parallel ending of this with the preceding chapter, I must show, what was above asserted, that Gnosticism, inasmuch as it would not appropriate the higher stages which Marcion reached, fell over into its apparent antithesis, Ebionism.

It has been already intimated that the later Valentinian school always more and more treated the hypostatic world of Æons as symbolical, preferred seeing one and the same power in different forms of manifestation, and regarded the plurality of the world as the composed letters of one great word, the world. It is easy to see how near this approaches to the standpoint of an Ebionitic representation of Christ; for, consequent on this, Christ could only be one form of the manifestation of God among others, without any other peculiar dignity than that which even Ebionism assigned to Him. The Pseudo-Clementine Homilies appear (Hom. xvi. 16) to recognise a similar view. But the gnosis, unless rendered somewhat sound by the religious principle (as in the case of Marcion), must sink below even Ebionism and the limits of what is Christian; the more, consequently, its principle of knowing is developed in its entire strength and one-sidedness. It has been shown above, that the Valentinian school, in which the principle of absolute knowledge was most purely held, had no answer to the question, What is the Christ who is united to Jesus? since in the ultimate reference the idea by itself is everything (the Χριστὸς ἄσαρκος), and no other reality is acknowledged than what lies in the idea as such; and, consequently, it is not viewed as a momentum of the idea, that it should be itself determined to a natural being, to outward actuality. We have seen that to the real-human side of Christ either a necessary place must be given, or that it cannot remain what the Valentinian school, influenced by its Christian or Church consciousness, would maintain it to be. If the former be refused, there remain as factors, having an actual significancy, only the invisible Christ, who is distinguishable from the Deity only in name, and the human spirit. According to this stand-point, the gnosis no more occupies itself with the historical God-man; but the whole process, from beginning to end, lies within the subjective

spirit. For a season—so long, indeed, as the voice of the Christian and the Church consciousness reverberated—it was held that the human subject, and the Divine Christ as object, were to be distinguished as the receiver and the giver of the absolute knowledge, so that thus, in the sphere of the inner world, there should be preserved to Christ His objectivity and power as Saviour. But the knowing subject, which had by its own effort attained to the dignity of absolute knowledge, would soon fall under the doubt whether the Christ, viewed as objective, was not rather a projection of the subjective consciousness, which is fully declared by this, that the subject, properly, in itself is Christ. The true Gnostic must, therefore, transfer all external reality, even Christ Himself, within the limits of the Spirit; must know Christ in Himself, and deny all significancy of any other objectivity. This comes very near to the finding of Christ in self, to the knowing of self according to the truth of the proper "I as Christ," and thereby to allow to Christ no other significancy than that of "being the truth of the individual Me." It is well known that the Mystics in all ages have spoken after this fashion; nay, several such expressions symphonize with the innermost utterance of Christianity itself. There is here a point where the line of demarcation between what is intimately Christian and the abyss of blasphemy is fine, and not recognisable by every one. The same words may, according as they are understood, belong to the one side or the other. But the cleft which separates what is blasphemous from what is Christian is always objectively existing; and it belongs to science to determine precisely the line of demarcation, and to exhibit the former as the deceptive though resembling caricature of the latter.

I shall attempt to make this distinction evident in the case of the historical figures of the second century.

Valentinians, like Heracleon and Marcus, though with them the world was only the dislocated *Word*, or the "Man" separated into his parts, and God only the *unity* of the many, yet held fast God's self-existence: nay, Marcus and others call Him the Ἄνθρωπος, and, as we have seen, concede at least partially, and under the category of *power*, His union with Jesus; but this unity threatens to turn out a merely nominal one (because it is not reflected on itself); and when this takes

place, the self-existence of God is set aside, and the Deity is transferred quite to the side of the world, the subject. We have then a view which must be designated atheistic, since it leaves only divine attributes or powers remaining, whilst it denies the absolute subject of them. This, however, is not a mere possibility; it is a necessary consequence of the Gnostic principle, inasmuch as it does not make religion, or knowledge religiously determined, its abiding presupposition. For, as ethical acting, in the strict sense, ceases to be ethical in so far as it is viewed as something merely established and commanded by God, and since it belongs rather to the concept of the ethical as distinguished from the religious that it is posited by men, so it is certain that in the concept of knowing the essential element, that which distinguishes it from all besides, is nothing else than that it is the thinking *activity* [denkende Thätigkeit] of the subjective spirit. It does not, indeed, follow as excluded by this, that the ethical activity does not presuppose to itself its relative counterpart, a suitable being which is not activity, nor posited by the activity of the subject, but a being which the religious stand-point, without thereby approaching too near to the ethical, teaches to construe into its foundation as a *being willed* and *established* by God. And similarly knowing presupposes a being that is not first established by the thinking activity,—a being, namely, at least of the thinking subject itself; which again the religious stand-point, without coming into collision with the knowing, teaches to construe as a *being thought* by God, which is to be presupposed to the thinking activity of the subject. But whilst neither of these, regarded as secondary forms, the ethical and theoretical, in itself and according to its idea, excludes religion, the latter is definitively excluded, as soon as the secondary subjective activity is viewed as first and sole, and it is overlooked that all subjective activity presupposes a being not originated by this activity, consequently one which is for the activity a something given.

Now, so long as these Gnostics, though transferring everything within the limits of the subjective spirit, yet held that within this there was a distinction between what are given to the subjective spirit, and which consequently it has received, and between this activity and what are posited by it, so long is

the bond which unites the human consciousness with religion still retained, and there is still left, within the subjective spirit itself, a place, in virtue of which man can think himself as the recipient, and God objectively as the Giver or the Disposer. But where this consciousness becomes extinct, and the concept named, of knowledge positing itself without being under law, comes into its place, under the delusion that otherwise knowledge would not be knowledge, then the decisive step towards the denial of God is taken,—then is the Divinity wholly usurped into the individual subject, and, as respects the consciousness of the subject, robbed of its objectivity,—then, though Christian-like phraseology such as that named be still used, this becomes, as respects its true meaning, the irreligious caricature of the profoundest Christian ideas, which have for their presupposition not a demoniac autonomy, but one mediated by Divine grace.

Parties who may have belonged to this are named by Epiphanius, especially Hær. xxv. xxvi.; whether it be that they are not yet or are no longer to be viewed as Christian. Epiphanius calls them Gnostics in a special sense, and passes judgment on their writings. They have (xxvi. 2) a poem which they call the Gospel of the Fulfilling (*εὐαγγέλιον τελειώσεως*), of the contents of which, however, he only says, that there is in it *θανάτου καὶ πένθους τελείωσις*. Among such the idea was secretly held, which appeared among others in a more blameless way, that Eve's fall from God brought the true gnosis; and they showed a Gospel of Eve, in which she teaches in the manner indicated the way to knowledge.[1]

I stood, they say in it, on a high mountain, where I saw a high man, and one mutilated. Thereupon I heard, as it were, a peal of thunder, and a voice which came nearer, and said, "I am thou, and thou art I; and where thou art, there am I; and in all I am diffused. And if thou willest, thou collectest me;

[1] Such views are more harmless, where God, whose law was broken, is only the Demiurgus; for there disobedience against Him may be viewed as obedience to the supreme God, as piety, especially by the Dualists; so with the Cainites and others. But Epiphanius ascribes no Demiurgus to those who held the Gospel of Eve. Compare for what follows, Fabric. Cod. Apocry. N. T. i. 349 ff. 373 ff. Epiphanius adduces many names of sects which cohere with Pantheists of this sort,—Nicolaitans, Borborians, Barbelians, Coddians, Phibionites or Stratiots, Zacchæans, etc. Hær. xxvi. 3, comp. xxv.

but if thou collectest me, thou collectest also thyself."[1] In another writing, which they called the Gospel of Philip,[2] the formula is given with which a departing soul may soar irresistibly above all powers and intermediate steps. It runs thus: "I have known myself and collected myself from all places: I have not begotten children to the Archon, but rooted up his roots: I have collected the separated members together, and know thee who thou art; for I am from above."[3] To this belongs also the opinion which Tertullian assails, that Christ has brought to us nothing but the knowledge of Himself. To this Tertullian replies: "The soul is in danger of losing salvation not from its not knowing itself, but from its not knowing Christ, the Word of God" (De Carne Christi, 12). Thus there were not wanting those who, even at that time, were indifferent towards sin and salvation; and, putting knowledge, the gnosis, in *the place of* religion, aimed at removing the objectivity of God and Christ, so as to absorb, "to collect" all, God and the world, into the I,—only, indeed, to lead to the evacuation of the I, to the removal of everything concrete, of all distinction, by which the tabula rasa of the self-consciousness is rendered indistinguishable from the nothing of the Bythos. If God and the self-consciousness (which condition each other) be degraded to being in general, they become undoubtedly indistinguishable; but also both falsely, that is, only physically, determined.

We leave these parties, which destroy themselves as well theoretically as practically; for, like Buddhism, they come with their absolute highest knowledge only to a thinking of the nothing, which in itself is an abnegation of thinking; or, if

[1] Epiphanius (Hær. xxvi. 4) relates of the Stratiots and Gnostics of Egypt, what proves that they were in part given to a nature-Pantheism, and called the quickening powers of nature Christ, or the body of Christ, which they believed was to be given back to the Father of the universe by offering. Whither the practical effect of such ideas tends, it is easy to see. Those who believed that they had measured the entire circle of nature-life, had collected and offered all power, said ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ Χριστός. There is a whole literature out of this puddle, of which Epiphanius has in part preserved the titles (xxvi. 8, 12). Recent analogous phenomena warn us against seeing in such statements mere slanders of the Fathers. Even in the time of Epiphanius there were adherents of these sects (Hær. xxvi. 14, comp. vi. 17).

[2] Epiphan. Hær. xxvi. 13.

[3] Allied are the Manichæan Gospels and that of Judas Iscariot. Fabric. l. c. 352, 353.

they seek a content for thought, they fall always away again to that which to them is but an appearance, to be immediately again removed. The only reason for naming them here is, that they were consequent formations from that Gnosticism which went straight to its end, without allowing itself to be turned aside in its error, or through the category of love and of what is ethical, in contradistinction from what is physical, to be elevated to a higher stage, on which the nature-process, and the endless play of placing and removing, is exorcised, and the restless agitation from extreme to extreme is brought into the course of a regulated progress, which at every stage has something further to gain, but gives up nothing it has gained, and so has a being in becoming, and a becoming in being. They are, to use a figure of Schleiermacher's, buoys, which in themselves are empty, but on that very account float on the surface, and are of use to indicate to the mariner where he is not to steer, if he would not run his vessel on the shallows.[1]

In conclusion, let us glance back over the path we have followed. The two Christological fundamental heresies, as we have seen, through the remnant of truth that was in them, tended, as if necessitated by their own one-sidedness, in the course of the first and second century each to be transposed, in so far as they were accordant with the Church, into its opposite; and, consequently, they must in the end have acknowledged that they had failed of their own proper aim, and must have given up, however unwillingly, their own partial view for the whole truth. But since the aim of the one was changed surreptitiously to its opposite, it attained its end on the side where the other heresy had taken its commencement. The Church truth, which it now assailed in a new way, could dread no triumph for it, because the other fundamental heresy had already sought this long before with this its new presupposition, but had had a similar unexpected course. It is not, however, to be forgotten that an Ebionism and a Doketism, penetrated by what was at first its opposite, became a more energetic form of itself than the older forms of both. When heresies thus have not themselves or their development in their own power, it is manifest that the Church truth is the star that, even without their consent, governs their course, since she, in virtue of the

[1] Appendix, Note PPPP.

truth still adhering to them, ever draws them from each aphelion back towards herself,—in paths, it is true, running opposite to each other, for the two fundamental heresies have from the beginning an opposite movement,—yet also in ever diminishing circles. Error is always weaker than truth, because truth has only one antagonist, error; but the latter has always two, namely, besides the truth, itself.

Ebionism put aside entirely the one side of the Person of Christ, and asserted that the genuine Church truth held only His *humanity;* Doketism took the converse of this. The former presupposes that the humanity of Christ was universally acknowledged by Christians; for otherwise Ebionism could not, by laying stress on this, have asserted to itself a Christian character. But Doketism and Gnosticism, on its part, exemplifies the same thing. It proposes to find the deeper meaning of Christianity by laying stress on the *higher side* in Christ; which presupposes in Gnosticism itself a consciousness that the Church did not deny this *higher* side, but only represented it imperfectly from attaching weight also to His humanity; for otherwise Gnosticism could not, by a pretended exaltation of that side, have retained for itself a Christian character. With these proofs mutually supplementing each other, they are the last, and, as opponents, the indubitably credible witnesses for primitive Christianity, attesting that, in its representation of Christ, the higher as well as the human side was set forth. They are further, in the same way, witnesses against each other; for they reciprocally accuse of omitting an essential part of Christianity. In fine, as has been said, each witnesses against itself; for each at the end of the Epoch, assumes that very thing of which at the commencement it had demanded the rejection.

As, however, in the course of heresies it was the Church truth which, in and over them, was the principle that suffered them not to rest, but ever drew them again towards the Church, in which they often as heresies surrendered themselves; so also, for the development of the visible Church from an imperfect form of consciousness to a more perfect one, the heresies were not merely serviceable as warning boundary marks, but, still more significantly, they exerted an influence on the development, by showing in themselves only an exaggeration of really Christian elements which had not been duly estimated on the part of the Church.

SECOND EPOCH.

TIME OF THE FORMATION OF THE CHRISTIAN CONCEPT OF GOD—FROM 150 TO 325.

(Ἐκκλησία θεολογοῦσα.)

SECTION I.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE LOGOS AND THE DOUBLE MONARCHIANISM.

CHAPTER FIRST.

SUBJUGATION OF EBIONISM AND DOKETISM THROUGH THE CHURCH'S FORMATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE LOGOS WHO BECAME PERFECT MAN.

From the middle of the Second Century to the Third.

The simple faith of the confessing and witnessing Christianity of primitive times was brought into the severest conflict by the Gnosis, which widely assumed the upper hand; and perhaps to the present day the Church has not been in so difficult a position as then. It may indeed be suggested, as it is by Schleiermacher, that, in the general, Gnosticism was an affair of the school, and not of the congregation. But that from the time when the heathen world flowed into the Church, and was no longer simply a characterless soft mass which received its form from the witnessing Church of the beginning,—that from the time when the peculiar tendency of the Hellenic world towards knowledge bestirred itself more freely and more powerfully,—that just from this time so many of the more educated and talented should attach themselves to Gnosticism, was evidently a phænomenon of very grave import. For, under the plausible appearance of seeking something higher than the simple faith, Gnosticism, as we have seen (Marcion excepted), regressed to

pre-Christian positions; enveloped the historical manifestation of salvation for the consciousness in a mythic cloud; and set aside or maimed it, as much as it could, though without this intent. Those whom it seized upon and bewitched, as we have seen, with a sort of magical power, were just those who, most highly endowed, were destined to be the leaders of the congregation: it was fitted to corrupt, or rather to abolish, the doctrinal status, *i.e.*, the future of the Christian Church. Had Gnosticism remained unsubdued, it would have appeared as if thinking, or science, and Christian faith contradicted each other, and that the latter could only claim the praise of illiteracy, could be only a plebeian faith. Thus there would have been introduced into Christianity the intolerable distinction of an esoteric and an exoteric truth, which would be as foreign to it as Gnosticism itself.

If we compare in the general the literature of the age of the apostolic Fathers with that of the apostolic age itself, we shall find that already the glowing coals are covered with ashes; so that, if there is no failure as yet of warmth, there is a failure of powerful light, a want of the clear lustre of Christian knowledge. Who, looking on the poor vessel of the simply believing and witnessing Christianity of this age, could have augured that it contained such a treasure of wisdom as was developed from it? It came into the light of day just as the gnosis was aiming at the re-introducing of the old darkness under the name of a new light, the highest consecration of knowledge; and the still burning coals broke out, just when they were to have been buried, into a widely shining and blazing flame, annihilating all edifices of composite human wisdom, warming the hearts and giving light to the Christian master-builders to whom [redacted] now come. A glorious period, when Christian faith and Christian science flourished, began about the middle of the second century; and so rich a harvest was reaped, for the latter especially, that at the end of the century hardly any one could wish that the Church might have escaped the Gnostic storms.

What was it, however, that calmed these storms within the Church? Was it the Episcopate, which, at least by Clement of Rome and Ignatius, was in various ways and with steady progress constructed, and in which was sought a firm centre for the unity of the Church, though as yet without a claim to in-

fallibility, without that sacrament of ordination which establishes a gulf between the state of the clergy and that of the laity? By no means. It is true that there is every reason to assume that when the two chief heresies broke out, the bond of unity was drawn tighter by the Episcopate so far as it was developed: what had previously been of service in securing to Christianity a firm and definite position over against the synagogue and heathenism, must also be productive of advantage in sustaining the Church against the irruption of errors of Jewish and heathen origin. But this form of Church polity was by no means a match for spirits of foreign origin: rather, as has been said, those who sustained this office were threatened with the gnosis if they were spiritual and living; where they were not, the danger was almost still greater. Then a one-sided dependence on outward means for the preservation of unity slid in; a benumbing mechanicalism was the more dangerous the less a rich development of doctrine had been gained, and the more, consequently, the public expression of the religious consciousness was principally directed to what may be called in the widest sense the liturgical elements of divine service. And the more the administration and conduct of these liturgical acts must have diffused a sort of hallowed lustre over the presiding minister, in the eyes of those who had been accustomed to the priesthood which prevailed all over the ancient world,—so much the more where a certain delusion unobservedly took hold of both people and leaders, under which the former forgot their spiritual priesthood, the latter humility and office,—did the minister become obviously also the reconciling centre for the clearly awakened desire for Christian knowledge. The insufficiency of the Episcopate to cope with heresy appeared however most manifestly in this, that as, on the one hand, it attacked it rather outwardly by the exclusion of persons than by the refutation of errors, so, on the other hand, in opposing them, it enlarged its own power and dignity in a way which introduced pre-Christian errors and distinctions of another sort into the Church itself.[1]

Or shall we rather assign to *Montanism*, the second oppo-

[1] About the year 150, the age could no longer think of the Evangelist John without a πέταλος, Eus. E. H. v. 24. From Clement and Ignatius to Irenæus, the more eminent teachers, by discourse or writing, in the Church are not bishops, or in general Church officers, but other Christians. In pro-

nent of the gnosis, the merit of having subdued it? This is a form full of vigour, and of widely influential significancy. In it the original Christian *feeling*, the Christian *people*, the democratic basis of the Church, predominated against the gnosis, and against the hierarchic elements. And with it there came forth three powers or factors, whom we may distinguish as Practical men, or Churchmen; Theoretical men, or men of the school and science; and Montanists, to whom pious feeling was everything. These three classes, however, stood so decidedly apart from each other, that each was by itself against both the others, and the only point of union almost between any two of them was found in their common opposition to the third. And among these three, again, Montanism was the shyest and most self-sufficient.

The Church life depended for its health on the union of these three; but none of them produced, or could produce this: this could be effected only by men who had not fallen into these one-sidednesses, and were of sound Christian piety. The simple apostolic belief, where it existed, was not inimical to the Christian knowledge, nor to the formation of the Christian congregational life; it, and it alone—the necessary gifts being presupposed—was in circumstances to meddle with, otherwise than simply to repudiate, the gnosis, and at a later period Montanism, and thoroughly to vanquish them.

In point of fact, the Church must at this trying period have had many men rich in faith, and love, and knowledge, who, penetrating into the gnosis, and being gentle and favourable towards what was true in Montanism, and along with this attaching great importance to the unity of the Church, had skill to reconcile the mutually repelling and conflicting elements, and to appropriate them to the Church, thereby overcoming contradiction, and resolving all into a higher spiritual unity. As belonging to this class, and whose works have been preserved to us, may be especially named the author of the Letter to Diognetus, Justin Martyr, Athenagoras and Theophilus of Antioch, Irenæus and Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria and Origen.[1]

portion as the bishops were *practical*, their dignity and the reverence showed to them increased with the many; but their intellectual eminence sunk at the same time.

[1] Appendix, Note QQQQ.

We have already seen how the Church development of the First Epoch was principally conducted, in a Christological respect, in accordance with the Old Testament doctrines of the Word and Wisdom of God. It is, indeed, not true that the *idea* of the Logos was first introduced into the Church about the year 150: so far from this, we have found a progressive development of this idea, growing out of the *Word* of God, the real principle, and arriving before 150 at the *Wisdom*, the ideal principle; and both referred to Christ, the historical principle, in proportion as the conviction grew, that if we are to be reconciled to God by Him, God Himself must come nigh to us in Him (see above, p. 134, Appendix, Note QQ). And even the term λόγος, alternating with ῥῆμα, in the sense of the Word of God who appeared in Christ, is not strange to this period. How could it be, since, leaving out of view the Old Testament and the apocryphal books, in the New Testament, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, the First Epistle of Peter, and the Gospel by John,[1] it is used in this sense? On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that before the gnosis the New Testament term Logos was in part a little used treasure, and in part, taken in the sense of reason, νοῦς, was not in general applied to Christ, who was in this respect spoken of as the Wisdom;[2] and as in general this momentum remained unformed, still less was there any attempt made by a reversed process to descend from the wisdom (to which, proceeding from the Word of God, one must ascend), and to acknowledge in the perfect ideality, or the eternal νοῦς, which is also love, the principle of reality, or the creative Word. So long as this was not done, knowledge could not be satisfied; but so long the Logos was not thought in His absolute freedom, but simply in connection with the world, simply as the world-principle.

At length came the gnosis. How it laboured from the ideal world, and particularly from the νοῦς, to conceive the

[1] In the word there lies primarily creative might, the coming into existence through an act of *will*. But intelligence is not thereby excluded; rather it is implicitly understood, as at least Heb. iv. 13, and John i. 4, 5, 9, prove; though it is still a work, a scientific step forward, to recognise the momentum of intelligence in its special worth.

[2] As even in the New Testament by Paul, 1 Cor. i. 24; Col. ii. 3; and in Matt. xiv. 19; Luke i. 35, xi. 49.

universe, nay, to find motives for the appearance of the Logos in Jesus, we have seen. But as, on account of the Hylè, it never came from thought, its point of issue, to *being*, so also it could not elevate thought to knowing, to discerning. The universe always was dissolved for it, in the best cases, into a passing appearance. Thought, to be wholly itself, concluded that no objectivity whatever should be suffered to continue; but it lost with that its own substance. And where this did not happen, Gnosticism continued to stand in the ruder forms of Dualism. Marcion's principle might have conducted further; but it was not from the gnosis that he had this: the category of love he derived from the Christian faith.

But what the gnosis could not attain without going back into the Church, it had still power to excite there. No man can say anything rational concerning the supreme Divine region, who has not first recognised the Divine love, where it is to be recognised, in Christ. And no man recognises it by the simple process of thinking, but only through the spiritual intuition of love. But it is not every one of those who have the fundamental knowledge of God in faith and love, who knows also how to make something of a doctrinal tenet out of that, and to appropriate the treasure which lies in the principle. Now, the gnosis rendered to faith the essential service of almost compelling it to reflect on itself, to address itself more definitely to knowledge, so as to discriminate the false from the true. This cannot issue from the natural intellect bound within the lower sphere, but only from the Christian spirit that is at home in the highest sphere, or from reason come to itself as it is in Christianity.

In this consciousness went forth the succession of men we have named. To them Christianity is the bloom of humanity, the soul in the huge body of the race. To them, who for the most part had gone through the systems of Hellenic philosophy, Christianity is the Philosophy *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, yea, the Divine wisdom itself.

Of especial moment, however, for the solution of the difficult problem which then presented itself, was the fact that the subjective Christian consciousness was now more distinctly united with the objective representation of Christian truth in the New Testament, and the latter assumed more and more its canonical rights. Not only the gnosis, but also the Montanist

piety, had an anti-historical tendency: philosophy and false spiritualistic piety appeared to combine to cover and obscure the historical aspect of Christianity; and the result of this would have been, that Christianity itself must have sunk into a sort of ghost flitting over the earth, to a momentary spiritual convulsive fit falling on mankind. What came to the rescue here was oral tradition and the Holy Scriptures of the New Testament, both closely connected, and mutually supporting each other. It was only natural that in the age of the apostolic Fathers the living testimony of those who had lived with the Apostles should give to oral tradition a preponderance over the use of the apostolic writings; though in this age there were already commenced collections of the apostolic writings,[1] and the use of them in Divine service.[2] But as the men who went back to the apostolic age gradually retired from the stage, oral tradition receded behind the apostolic written word; this came to be recognised as the canon; and to the canon, as far as it was formed, the first place was assigned; and, above all, the utmost efforts were made to contribute by historical testimonies and recollections, as well as by the internal evidence of their own belief, to the completion of the work of forming the canon. In the official system of the Church, oral tradition had found a firm centre; and the work of forming the canon, in which after Irenæus the leaders of the Church were chiefly engaged, is the pre-eminent historical act of the clergy of the second century, and is the most important contribution which even the Episcopate, watching over the unity of the Church, made to the Christological work of the Church: by this the wild shoots and extravagancies which had previously been so common were cut off right and left, and a firm course of development entered on. Without any formally conclusive decree, the apostolic writings were treated as canonical, and the greater part of the writings in the canon as we now have it as apostolic. An exegetical activity commenced, by means of which great fruit and

[1] As is shown by Marcion's canon, the passage of Ignatius Philad. 5, the numerous citations of the New Testament in the apostolic Fathers, etc.

[2] Comp. e. gr. the letter of Dionysius of Corinth, Euseb. iv. 23, Justin Apol. i. 67. The reading of the New Testament writings, on the other hand, was already customary with many much earlier, as with Clement of Rome, Ignatius, Polycarp, etc.

enrichment came to Christian knowledge and the dogmatic impulse; for it was not a slavish traditional relation to Holy Scripture which prevailed, but the relation of a free love and recognition, such as had also operated in the forming of the canon. The vitality of the *subjective* side of Christian faith at this time, is sufficiently proved by the far-spreading Montanist excitement, and still more by the men of whom we are now to speak.

In the Letter to Diognetus there appears no longer a mere simple faith, but one intimately affected by the gnosis; and the marvellous charm of the Letter lies in the exquisite combination of the depth of an inner emotional life with the freshness of a knowledge which emancipates, which enlarges the circle of vision and illustrates everything, and which yet withal remains unpretentious. Here the proper ecclesiastical position against Gnosticism is assumed. The world of Christians, the writer says (ch. 12), is a paradise; they produce fruitful trees of all kinds. For in this place are planted the tree of knowledge and the tree of life. "But the tree of knowledge does not kill; it is sin that kills." Whilst he thus speaks against an exclusive piety, he no less distinctly speaks against the gnosis of Gnosticism:[1] God planted first in Eden the tree of life, and by the tree of knowledge indicated the path to the tree of life. But as the first human beings did not use it in purity, they were stripped naked through the deception of the serpent. For neither is life sure (ἀσφαλὴς) without gnosis, nor is gnosis certain without true life. Wherefore each of the two trees was planted by the other. The Apostle censures not every kind of gnosis (1 Cor. viii. 1), but he exhibits the power of union of both, and censures that gnosis which men employ without allowing themselves to be conducted from the truth to the life. Whosoever thinks he can know anything without a true and life-attested gnosis, errs, and is deceived by the serpent, because he loves not the life. He, however, who reverently seeks and strives after the life, plants with hope. "Let the heart be to thee gnosis; but let the true Logos, received into the heart, be

[1] Which was fond of representing the Fall as the cause of knowledge (see above). I believe I am not deceiving myself when I see all through the twelfth chapter the pursuit of a middle path between Gnosticism and abstract piety.

to thee life. Then shall thy food be wholly divine, such as no serpent touches; then shall Eve be no longer deceived."

The Hellenic culture of the author is seen most strikingly in this high estimation of the Christian gnosis. And this is obvious also in his Christology. It is, indeed, not more fully formed; but the novel feature in it is, that he, after Hellenic fashion, construes the divine side of Christ not as Word or creative Power, which were also *Wisdom*, but originally as Truth or *Reason*. But just so does the author remove himself widely from the Gnostic idealism, which, confounding God and the world, establishes neither concept. "No earthly contrivance, no human mysteries, are given to Christians; but the Almighty Himself, the Creator of the universe, the invisible God, hath planted from heaven in men, and hath established in their hearts, the Truth and the Logos, since He sent not, as some insinuate, a servant, or angel, or prince, but the Artificer and Creator of the universe Himself, through whom He made the heavens and shut up the sea within its bounds, whose secret laws all the elements obey truly, to whom are subjected and whom follow the moon and the stars, etc., the heaven and what is in it, the earth and what is on it, the sea and what is in it, fire, air, the abyss, what is in the height, and what is in the depth, and what is between. Him hath He sent to them; but for what? to terrify, and appal, and subdue them by force? By no means; but in friendliness and compassion, as a king sends his son, himself a king. Him as God (ὡς Θεὸν) He sent as to men, to deliver, not to destroy*—as a persuader, not a constrainer. For violence dwells not with God" (c. 7).

As the *design* of the appearance of Christ, he assigns revelation of God (c. 8, 9). Who knows what God is, unless God Himself show it? Heathenism answers with its lies. No man hath seen God or known Him; He Himself must show Himself. He has, however, showed Himself through faith, to which alone is it granted to see God. God is a friend to man, and longsuffering towards him. That has He ever been, is now, and ever will be,—kind and good, and without wrath, and faithful: a great unutterable thought hath He thought, which He

* ["Um zu retten nicht zu rechten." To preserve the paranomasia I have substituted "destroy" for "contend with;" and this also is more in accordance with the original, ὡς σώζων ἔπεμψεν.—TR.]

hath communicated to His Son alone. So long as He kept it secret, and retained His counsel, He seemed to have no care for us. But when He uncovered that already prepared from the beginning, and revealed it to us by His beloved Son, He sent to us what no one could beforehand have expected. In the preceding times, men were convicted by their own works of being unworthy of eternal life, incapable by their own strength of entering into the kingdom of God. Thus God delayed in order that we might be made conscious of our own guilt and impotency. But as that was filled up, and it was rendered manifest that punishment and death duly awaited us, the one love (*μία ἀγάπη*) continued true. It hated not, it departed not, it remembered not evil; but was longsuffering, and bore, nay, itself took on our sins. It gave His only Son as a ransom for us; the holy for the unholy, the sinless for the wicked, the pure for the vile, the immortal for the mortal. For what else could cover our sins than the righteousness of Him? Whereby could the unholy and ungodly be justified but by the Son of God? Oh! sweet substitution! Oh, what an unsearchable device, what unexpected blessing! The unrighteousness of the many to be hid by the righteousness of the One; the righteousness of the One to justify many sinners! In Him has God showed to us a Saviour who is able to save what it was not possible to save [without Him]. In Him has God first loved us; how canst thou sufficiently love Him in return? But if thou lovest Him, thou wilt be an imitator of His goodness. And marvel not that a man may be an imitator of God; he can be so if he will. *For, to rule, to be rich, to tyrannize, is not the true eudæmony*, nor can any man in such imitate God; but *such lies outside the Divine glory. He, however, who takes his neighbour's burden on himself, becomes a god for those for whom he interposes*, he is God's imitator.—Gifted by nature with *λόγιον, νοῦς*, we are formed after God's image; but, after the previous time had showed to us the impossibility of our reaching life through our own nature, He sent His only-begotton Son (c. 9, 10), the Logos, that He might shine upon the world, and, speaking boldly and clearly (c. 11), might reveal all things,—despised by the people, preached by the Apostles, believed on by the Gentiles. He, who was from the beginning, is He who appeared anew, and is born anew continually in the hearts of the believers.

He, who was for ever, is now reverenced as the Son, by whom the Church is enriched, and grace displays itself, and increases in the saints, giving understanding, opening mysteries. Thus is the Logos established among men, since by Him light and life, Gnosis and Love, are inseparably joined. What He reveals on earth is God Himself, the Truth; and this He does not by word alone, but above all by His death. Thus also there is revealed by deed the highest concept of God, the glory of God—Love. On him who despises this, falls the weight of judgment at the second Parousia of Christ.

When the author says (c. 8), "No one has seen or known God; He has revealed Himself,"—it might seem as if he meant that the Father had Himself appeared; as also the words (c. 9), "God has taken our sins on Himself," have a patripassian sound. And since there is no reference to the Holy Ghost in the Epistle, but all that happens to any one is ascribed to the Logos; since the Logos is represented as He that fills the Church, adorns with His gifts, arouses to testify, dwells in the Church as Teacher, and rejoices in it (c. 11, 12); it might seem as if the Logos was, in the view of the author, nothing else than God Himself viewed as revealed. But he very distinctly distinguishes, even apart from revelation, the Logos from God absolutely; and particularly by applying to Him the names, Son (παῖς), Beloved, only-begotten Son (c. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11). This was from the beginning, always (ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀεὶ, c. 11); and the mystery of redemption was communicated by God to His Son from the beginning, when He formed the plan (c. 8). He knew all with the Son. The author is not satisfied by representing the Son as hypostatically existing at the creation of the universe; but, as the actual world was framed by the Son, so, when the idea of the world was conceived, the Son also was present.[1] These expressions consequently, which have so strong a patripassian sound, prove that the author saw in Christ true deity, and are explainable only on this supposition; but they do not aim at obliterating the distinction between the Son and

[1] Thus is the Gnostic Logos-doctrine refuted. The world is not God's son, but from the beginning the Son is with the Father. On the other hand, the Logos is not an idea without a history, but is the idea which, apart from the universe, subsists in the μεγαλειότης of God, Love, the principle of the Creation and of the Incarnation.

the Father. How this Christology is to be reconciled with God's unity, is not said. He does not point at the subordination of the Son. Moreover, he does not seek to prejudice the humanity of Christ, as is evident from his doctrine of Christ's death; and it is not accidental that he, after the incarnation, is fond of speaking of the Person of Christ as the Logos or the Son, by which, as we have seen, he intends the pre-existent divine nature of Christ. On the other hand, he holds that Christ is in the midst of us, inasmuch as he sees in the birth of the new man an analogue, nay, strictly taken, a continuation of the fact of the Logos assuming humanity in Jesus. It is He who "was from the beginning, and appeared anew, and always is born anew in the hearts of the saints."

Much more developed is the Christology, especially the doctrine of the Logos, of Justin Martyr. Through the latter he has become of more decisive importance; for in him, a Samaritan by birth, were united the two previous tendencies in the unfolding of the idea of the Logos, the Old Testament tendency proceeding from the Word and ending in the *παναρετος σοφία* (Euseb. iv. 22), and the Hellenic, which sees in the Logos the Divine Reason. He is the first of the Christian teachers with whom intentionally the term Logos has its double meaning, uniting and reconciling its two tendencies, of creative Word and Divine Reason (Dial. cum Tryph. 61). In this felicitous word, no longer existing with ambiguity in the mind of the Church, is found the key to the union of both tendencies, which, as above shown, had already mutually formed each other. Heathen and Jewish Christians were now conjoined by the confession of the Logos in its double sense; Ebionism and Doketism were excluded by the higher truth in which the Church had her expressed unity. The want of historical and actual validity for the idea is removed, by the recognition of the eternal *truth* as the *Creator-Word* that became man. On the other hand, the idealess character of the history of Christ in Ebionism is removed, by His being conceived as Fact, yea, as the appearing of the eternal truth and reason itself. Thus in fuller stream, and in one bed, thenceforward flowed on the more richly acknowledged Christian truth.[1]

Had Justin thought the objective essence of God after the

[1] Appendix, Note RRRR.

supersubstantial form of Philo, his doctrine of the Logos would have been unintelligible. For if God be the simply distinctionless, abstract unity, then would such a preponderance be given to the Divine monarchy, that there would remain for the Logos only a higher creature nature, or a simply economic significancy; the Logos must be viewed as necessarily outside the Divine essence, in the highest sense. But though in Justin's theology there are assonances to the Alexandrian theology, yet he asserts not God's objective want of attributes, but His unnameableness,—not God's abstract simplicity, but His unfathomableness and incomprehensibility by us. It is true that Justin's concept of God is not adjusted for the purpose of unfolding to us, *out of it*, the doctrine of the Logos or the Christology; otherwise he must have receded further from the Alexandrian doctrine than he even has done; but his doctrine of the Logos, which is wrought out by him not *a priori* but from history, from the experienced salvation which is in Christ, and apostolic tradition, receives from his doctrine of God no opposition.[1] It must not, indeed, be expected in Justin that he will show the necessity of Christianity or of the appearance of Christ; the doctrine of the Logos is rather by him set forth in the manner of a dogma, which he seeks especially to found on the Old Testament.

The Dialogue with Trypho affirms, that with the Jews the Christians hold Monotheism inviolate, and are at one with them in opposing all Polytheism. But the Person of Christ necessitates Christians to recognise in Him true deity. Christ, the first-born of the creation, has also become the beginning of another race, regenerated by Him through water and faith, and through that tree in which rests the mystery of the cross.[2] The purpose of His appearance was the transformation and elevation of the human race.[3] He particularly recognises the marvellous power, penetrating to the soul, of the discourses of Christ.[4] There rested on Him, not a charisma of the Spirit, but the seven powers in their unity;[5] and if the seed of reason

[1] Comp. Semisch l. c. ii. 247–260. One may even say, from Apol. i. 63, that the inconceivability of God in Himself by men, formed a reason with Justin for His revelation in Christ.

[2] C. Try. cap. 138.

[3] Apol. i. 23.

[4] C. Try. 121; Apol. i. 10.

[5] C. Try. 87.

is scattered over all, there rests in Him the All of reason (λογικὸν τὸ ὅλον), not a mere σπέρμα or μίμημα, but the Primal Reason itself; and Christianity is to be called divine wisdom, divine philosophy (Apol. ii. 10, 12). But it is the perfect wisdom, because it is not a powerless idea, but life-governing truth; because it fills with the fire of love, with the blessedness of reconciliation. Because Christ exhibits power to deify man, He is God. "As from one father Jacob," says he to the Jew Trypho (c. 123 ff.) "all are named, so all we are, and are called, true children, from Him who hath begotten us in the divine nature,—from Christ the God we are worthy to be called gods.[1] The whole race of man lies, since Adam's fall, under the curse, and is subject to physical and spiritual death. Hence Christ must become man. He must unite the essential life with the mortal, in order to make the latter essentially immortal (comp. the Fragments on the Resurrection). His positions concerning the manner in which Christ hath accomplished what is ascribed to Him,—viz., by the slaying of the serpent and the evil powers, in general of death, by cleansing from sin and renewal of humanity,—are but very vaguely expressed; and he is fond, however distinctly he deduces these fruits from the death of Jesus, of referring to the cross as a "mystery," as it were, in a sacred night in which the new Divine man was born. He has not taught that He was given as a ransom-price to Satan; as, indeed, none of the more eminent Fathers hold this as expressing the entire significancy of the death of Christ. It is also true, that what he places in the foreground is not the Divine righteousness and the concept of guilt and punishment, but that of evil and of sin, from which Christ delivers us. But it would be an error to seek to exclude the concept of guilt and punishment from him altogether.[2] But however vague the

[1] Comp. Apol. i. 23. [It is but fair to state, that the above passage is made up out of two different passages in Justin, of which it may be desirable to give a translation here: "As therefore from that one Jacob, who was also called Israel, your whole race is called Jacob and Israel, so [are] we from Him who hath begotten us to God from Christ; we who keep the commands of Christ are called, and are, the true children of God:" c. 23. Then having quoted Ps. lxxxii. 6, and commented on it, he says, "Be the interpretation of the Psalm what it may, it still remains certain that men are deemed worthy to become gods:" c. 124.—Tr.]

[2] Appendix, Note SSSS.

whole remains, Justin's central concept is the idea of *substitution*, which he sets forth in many ways. "God's Son, the Logos," says he, in the Fragment on the Resurrection, c. 1, "came among us, bearing a body, showing Himself and the Father, giving us in Himself the resurrection of the dead." In another fragment (from Leontius, see Grabe Spicilegium ii. 172 [Justin Opp., ed. Otto, ii. 251, No. 9]) he says, "Through disobedience mankind received corruption into their nature (*φυσικῶς εἰσεδέξατο φθοράν*). It thus became necessary that he who would rescue man should destroy that essential principle of corruption (*φθοροποιὸν οὐσίαν*)." In order to accomplish this, the essential life must be united with that which was subject to corruption, in order that that life might cast out the corruption, and elevate to immortality that which had received corruption. Hence the Logos must assume flesh. Had He simply by His death warded off death from us, He would only have helped us from without. Death would have been prevented from reaching his aim, but we should have remained in corruption; for we bear the principle of corruption in ourselves. Thus it is only in Christ's essential life, which was united with the mortal, that a universal principle is given for the subduing of corruption in the general. In Him is corruption in us also overcome. For this a basis is laid in His incarnation; but His death and resurrection, which Justin eagerly sets forth together, have also this general significancy, that they are regarded as concerning mankind, not one individual man. Only thus is it conceivable how he sees in Christ's death the death of death and of sin, and in Christ's resurrection the foundation of universal eternal life, and in both together the dying of an old and the resurrection of a new world, not only intimated, but accomplished. This is the substitution,—not a magical one, not one positing passivity, but the true and living substitution, which is also the principle of the higher life, planted by it in those men who have, by faith in Christ, their part in His perfect victory. To this belongs also the passage, c. Tryph. 116: "Through the name of Jesus, the High Priest, all become the true high-priestly race of God—all come to be as one man, allied to the Creator of the universe; through the name of His First-begotten they have put off the unclean garments, that is, their sins, and are inflamed by the word of

vocation." To this also must be referred his calling, according to a Pauline figure, all Christians together one body with many members; and his representing believers as a synagogue, a church, a soul, the daughter of God. The one soul in all the members is the Logos.[1]

High as in his esteem is the value of Christ's work, as one truly divine, and hence as witnessing for Christ's true deity, he is yet far from recognising no truth outside of Christianity. On the contrary, he counts the heathen philosophy,—that of a Plato, a Socrates, etc., as well as their virtue,—to be highly prized.[2] But he earnestly affirms the position, that in the Son who was manifested in Jesus is the whole truth, the whole Logos; and that no longer is the mere seed, or the shadow of it manifested.[3] And since in the Son who was manifested in Jesus there is the whole truth, he justly concludes, that where there is truth elsewhere, it must be a momentum or a portion of the Christian truth, placed by the same Son who revealed Himself in His fulness in Christ. Thus he was impelled, just by the recognition of a truth even before Christianity, to a higher concept of Christ—a new phase of the Church doctrine of the pre-existence of the Son.[4] In a genuinely speculative manner he lays the grounds for this doctrine deeper, as respects as well the spiritual as the natural world. The Logos pervades the latter; nay, it has in itself an immanent reference to the manifestation of Christ and to His work.[5] As respects the soul, however, it has not merely an inborn idea of God, but also a natural and essential relation to the Logos (Apol. ii. 10, 6). Besides the creation of nature and of men, however, the Logos has manifested Himself also in history. The Old Testament revelations are revelations of the Logos. He appears at one time in the form of a man, at another in that of fire, at another in an incorporeal form (Apol. i. 61, 63; c. Tryph. 61, 62); for the Father in Himself is above space and time; He comes not in any definite space;

[1] C. Try. 42, 63; Apol. ii. 8.

[2] Apol. i. 46. He even calls them Christians.

[3] Apol. ii. 8, 10. He does not, however, bring both quite together.

[4] Apol. i. 46, ii. 10, 13, ὅσα οὖν παρὰ πᾶσι καλῶς εἰρηται, ἡμῶν τῶν Χριστιανῶν ἐστιν, through the power of the Logos σπερματικός.

[5] Apol. i. 55, 60; ii. 10, 13.

He walks not, and is not surrounded by a place—not even by the whole world. But the Son, who, so far as He performs the Father's will, is also called His Angel, is He through whom all revelations are effected (c. Try. 127, comp. 56 ff.). This theologoumenon was especially agreeable to Jews of Alexandrinian culture. In order to hold God free from the limits of finitude, and yet on the other hand to allow to Divine revelation its historical validity, many Jews had understood, under the manifestations of God in the Old Testament, a power of God, to which they gave different names: Glory (Jekaru, Shekinah, δόξα), when its figure was indefinite; Man, when the form of a man was assumed; Angel, when a message was brought to men; Word, when it brought a discourse from the Father. This power they thought as not separate from the Father, as the beams of light are not separate from the sun; when the Father wills, this power is suffered to burst forth from Him; and when He wills, He draws it again back. In this Justin finds several things to blame; but it serves him as a point of junction for the higher Christology. This Power, he says, is Christ; and the Jews err, in that they think it without connection with Him. Further, no angel can have any such merely parastatic impersonal being as can be resumed into the indistinguishableness of the Divine nature. Rather must this Divine δύναμις be more than simply a name. He must be something per se, existing for Himself in distinction from the Father; and since this being, especially in Christ, has to manifest not merely Himself, but also the Father (De Resurrec. 1), He must also be, what He is called in the Old Testament, where the names Maleach and Jehovah are used interchangeably of Him, He must be God. He thus presses on the Jews, from the Old Testament, the necessity of holding, not abstract simple Divine essence, but a Monotheism which does not exclude plurality of distinctions.[1]

In the closer examination of the nature of the Logos, he again attaches himself to the Old Testament, to the doctrine of the Wisdom therein contained; but in such a way, as that what is there conceived indefinitely, and rather as a personification,

[1] This is the meaning of the passage, c. 128, that the Son is ἀριθμῷ ἕτερον τι in relation to the Father, and only this sense corresponds with the indefiniteness of the expression.

or, at the highest, as a distinction of wisdom from God in relation to the world, is now brought to the point of being regarded as a firm, nay, eternal distinction in the Divine essence itself, and is assumed even as a point of issue for the *Person* of the God-man.

In the Dialogue c. Tryph. c. 62, Justin says, "Not to angels nor to the world did God speak, when He said, Let Us make man, but to His Son. He, begotten by the Father, was before all creatures with the Father; and with Him the Father converses, as the Word by Solomon declares, that as principle (ἀρχὴ) before all creatures this birth was begotten (ἐγεγέννητο) which Solomon calls Wisdom" (comp. c. Tryph. 129). "He was (c. Tryph. 105) the only-begotten Son of the universal Father, in a peculiar manner as *Reason* (λόγος) and *Power* begotten by Him."[1]

Thus far has Justin come on his way from the historical manifestation of Christ. He knows, indeed, that the Logos is not in title merely, but in essence also, truly God, and has Divine power and honour. In one remarkable passage he even labours to construe the Logos absolutely in relation to the Father, not to the world alone;[2] but he is unable to develop the thought more clearly. "The Son of God, who alone in the proper sense is called Son, the Logos, who before all creatures was both with God and begotten by God, when God in the beginning made and ordered all through Him (ὁ λόγος πρὸ τῶν ποιημάτων καὶ συνὼν καὶ γεννώμενος ὅτε . . . . δι' αὐτοῦ πάντα ἔκτισε, κ.τ.λ.), has a name." The connection demands decisively the sense, that the Son had not received His name nor His being through the world, or on account of the world; and hence stress is laid on His being with the Father before the world, because, apart from the world, He has His name, Son, on account of His relation to the Father.[3] There is certainly some-

[1] Other names of the Logos, πρωτότοκος Θεοῦ, πρὸ πάντων τῶν κτισμάτων, ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς προβληθὲν γέννημα, ὁ μονογενής, or ὁ μόνος κυρίως λεγόμενος υἱός. Apol. i. 23, 32; ii. 6; c. Tryph. 138, etc.

[2] Apol. ii. 6. The Father, as unbegotten, has no name. For the words, Creator, Father, Lord, etc., relate rather to His works and deeds than to Himself. But His Son has a name, The Logos, before all creation, who alone in a strict sense is called Son, etc.

[3] The creation of the world and the begetting of the Logos are by no means, as Semisch thinks (l. c. ii. 280), to be regarded as simultaneous

thing strange in the addition, "when God through Him made all." But rather than the whole context should be disturbed by this, the conjecture of ὅτι for ὅτε must be accepted; because otherwise in the same breath it would be said, The Logos is begotten before the world, and with the world,—the latter of which would be quite foreign to the connection.[1] But even without this conjecture the difficulty may be surmounted, by supposing that categories which he uses in an analogous case wavered before the eyes of Justin. In c. Tryph. 128, he so places the earlier appearances of the Logos in conjunction with the incarnation, that whilst he calls them appearances δυνάμει, the actual incarnation would be the ἐνέργεια of the earlier simple potency of the incarnation. When this is applied to the passage before us, it gives the meaning, that the Logos was with God before the creation, not simply as an attribute, but δυνάμει, as potency; but that He came to ἐνέργεια when the world was made.[2] In this way, certainly, the being and the work of the Logos are still obscurely mixed; there lies prominently in the term συνεῖναι the effort to represent Him even above the world in distinction from the Father; but it would have belonged to a more fully developed concept of the absolute Spirit, had Justin been able to keep himself from always relapsing into the poor pre-Christian category, so apt to lead into error in a trinitarian respect, of the revealed and hidden God, and therewith to miss the basis which he sought for the hypostasis of the Son in the eternal Divine essence apart from the world.

Into the momentum of actuality the Logos consequently—because His content still too predominantly relates to the world*

acts, but, as the connection shows, the opposite. It is also doubtful if Semisch is right in thinking that the being with God (συνεῖναι τῷ πατρί, Apol. ii. 6; Try. 62) is to be taken as expressing the being of an "attribute" in God, whilst the individual, personal existence lies in the γεννᾶσθαι. What writer would speak so of an attribute? Nay, how can the assertion, that with Justin the Reason is but an attribute, be justified?

[1] For the conjecture it might be pleaded, that in many places the begetting of the Son *before* the time of the creation of the world is asserted, whilst nowhere is there a passage that makes these simultaneous.

[2] This explanation accords fully with the allied doctrine of Theophilus, etc., concerning the Logos, προφορικὸς and ἐνδιάθετος.

* "Weil sein Inhalt noch zu vorherrschend sich auf die Welt bezieht."

—enters only with the world, or, more exactly, with reference to the world, whose principle He must be, and which in concept He consequently precedes; whilst He, on the other hand, is actual principle only along with His work, the actual world. The distinction between the hidden and the revealed God is at first only Sabellian: Justin does not seek to abide by this; there is for him an *ἀριθμῷ ἕτερόν τι* with which he is concerned, an essential and abiding distinction in God Himself; and so he enunciates the Logos as an hypostasis even in the state of pre-existence (*συνὼν τῷ Π.*). But since he is still fettered by that insufficient distinction, and is not impelled to a construction of the full concept of God in its independence, the hypostatizing of the Logos receives in his hands again a hasty reference to revelation or the world; and thereby his doctrine of the Logos, through an unsurmounted Sabellian element, receives an Arian aspect. On the other hand, it may be proved that the just fear of thinking God emanistically in relation to the Logos, and as passive in the procession of the latter (consequently the fear of a theopassian tendency), led him even to Arian expressions. In order that God might not be thought as suffering, or as susceptible of change, through the doctrine of the begetting of the Logos, he represents Him as having proceeded by the *will of God*.[1] But had this been taken strictly, as the Arians did, it would have been opposed to the position, which beyond doubt possessed for Justin himself a much more primitive significancy, that the Logos is of the essence of God,[2] and that He potentially is eternally in God. But it is noteworthy, that we already see here two not yet refuted heresies indicated from afar. The possibility of both exists; Justin is attached to neither of them, for both can, with equal justice and equal want of it, appeal to him. Against the Arian representation there is this in Justin, besides what has been already advanced, that he does not at all represent the Son as an object of the Divine counsel and will, as he does the world—in a word, he does not place Him on the footing of a creature; but over against the word *ἐργασία* (c. Tryph 114) there stands *γέννημα*, which, as its full counterpoise, secures equality of essence, and over against the word *γεννᾶσθαι*, which has a passive sound,

[1] Appendix, Note TTTT.

[2] C. Tryph. 61: *ὁ Θεὸς γεγέννηκε δυναμίν τινα ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ λογικήν.*

there stands the term προέρχεσθαι (c. Tryph. 62, 129). If the Son proceeds from the Father (which involves His pre-existence, συνῆν τῷ πατρί), the Father might appear as passive, since in the Son divine essence proceeds from God; and that Justin held views, according to which this construction might appear possible,—consequently, did not hold strict Subordinatianism,—is shown by his resorting, in order to avoid giving the representation of a physical partition of God, to the will and the consciousness of God as causes of this procession.[1]

Justin indicates the relation of the Logos to the Father still further negatively. "The Divine essence," he says, c. Try. 129, "is not partitioned by the begetting of the Logos, nor transmuted into portions." He by this aims at excluding the separation of the Logos from the Father, and also at indicating the relation of whole and part as here an inadequate one. He feels that this is simply a physical category, and that quantitative definitions are not sufficient to indicate the relation between Father and the Son. Such are undoubtedly, in his judgment, inadequate in respect of the Father, because in this case it would result, either that the entire quantum of the Divine essence was no longer in the Father, but only in both together; or, if the Father remains the whole, that there is no getting at an hypostasis of the Son,—neither of which he is prepared to admit; and hence it follows, that he must find them also insufficient as respects the Son. For, were the Son a section and part hypostatically, it would follow that the Father also must be viewed as a part, though the greater of the two. To this it must be added, that Justin frequently asserts that the whole Reason-power appeared in Christ (Apol. ii. 10, λογικὸν τὸ ὅλον); and also in respect of power all limits to the Logos are denied,[2] when He is called, "as respects power (or potential existence, essential being), the Logos inseparable from the Father." Power rests in essence, but the essence of the Logos is true deity.[3]

[1] Semisch is not correct when he finds (ii. 88) in Justin the strictest "subordination of the Son." This is at variance with Semisch's own representation, p. 293 ff.

[2] Cohort. ad Gr.: ὅς τοῦ Θεοῦ ὑπάρχων λόγος ἀχώριστος δυνάμει, κ.τ.λ. Hence I cannot assent to the judgment of Semisch, that the Letter to Diognetus places Christ higher than Justin.

[3] The term σπέρμα, used of the Son, Apol. i. 32, is allied to γέννημα, and belongs to the category of definitions establishing the *essential equality*.

Further, Justin refuses the figure of the sun and its circle of rays, not because this figure infers that the sphere of the Son is greater quantitatively than that of the Father, but because it does not do justice to the Son's personality, seeing the sun's rays are not of its essence (c. Tryph. 138); Philo, at one with Justin in opposition to the *ἀποτέμνεσθαι*, preferred a monad expanding itself into a dyad, and used for that the term *ἐκτείνεσθαι*. According to him, the Divine monad becomes the Logos by self-expansion. This view Justin adduces (c. Tryph. 128), but rejects it, because this Divine power (the Logos) is another (than the Father) not in name merely, but in number also.[1] This is, however, the classic figure of the later Sabellianism (Epiph. Hær. lxii. 1). For this Justin himself presents another figure, "which had been delivered to him,"—the figure of fire, at which another fire or other fires may be kindled without its being itself diminished, or the others failing to be of the same kind, fire like the first. This figure also, since the kindled fire may become greater than that from which it was kindled, shows that he was not concerned about the quantitative greatness of the Father and the Logos, but that with Justin Subordinatianism adhered only to the manner in which he connects the begetting of the Son with the design of an actual world, and deduces it from the Divine will.[2]

Justin is of importance for the further course of the doctrine of the Logos, in that he referred the *begetting* to the relation of the Logos to the Father. Before we proceed with this, we must consider how he expresses himself concerning the *manifestation of the Logos in Christ.*

Semisch, however, cannot prove, as he attempts, ii. 291, that the Logos in relation to the Father is called *σπέρμα* only as Wisdom in heathenism is, according to him, a *σπέρμα* in relation to the Logos. Still less is there any proof of a representation of a qualitative partition of God in the passage, c. Tryph. 61: "God begot from Himself *δύναμίν τινα λογικήν*:" for, as Semisch acknowledges on another place, *δύναμις* connected with *γεγέννηκε* is not a power, but a hypostatic being. Why, then, might not Justin say, God begot in the Person of His Son from Himself a rational personality, without thinking of a quantitative definition?

[1] Comp. Simson, Summa Theolog. Joann. pp. 31, 40.

[2] The old assertion, that Justin identifies the Logos and the Holy Ghost, must be given up, since Semisch's thorough investigation, ii. 303 ff. It is only in respect of the *work* of both that the distinction is somewhat unsteady.

He is aware of a Christological view which indeed sees in Jesus the Christ, but to which He is only man of men, *i.e.*, the Ebionitic view (c. Tryph. 48). The gentle handling which he gives to this in opposing it, especially as compared with Gnosticism,[1] forms, at first sight, the strongest contrast to the decisiveness with which he insists on the deity, not of the Logos merely, but of Jesus also (c. Tryph. 36). For explanation of this, it may be remarked, in addition to what has been already advanced (see p. 198), that in his time Ebionism had lost its contagious power, and lingered only in fragments (τινὲς); and besides, the Ebionites to whom he refers did not renounce what was for him such a weighty historical basis, the Old Testament, as did the Gnostics and gnosticizing Ebionites. The Old Testament contains in his view the Logos-doctrine, and with that a higher Christology, so distinctly, that whosoever submits to it is easily recovered from his error, if he only receives the right explanation of the Old Testament. Whilst his Dialogue with Trypho serves for the most part for a defence of the deity of Christ, he also opposes Gnosticism as Doketism. Christ has truly become man, capable of suffering.[2] He took flesh and blood (Apol. i. 66), took on Him man, who is made in the image and likeness of God (Cohort. ad Gr. 38). So he calls Him the Logos become man (λόγος ἀνδρωθείς, c. Tryph. 102). Jesus Christ, who before was the Logos, and appeared now in the form of fire, now incorporeally, has now, according to God's will (Apol. i. 23; c. Tryph. 127), become man for the race of man, and hath taken on Him to suffer all (comp. Apol. ii. 6, 13; c. Tryph. 100).[3]

But not only are all the leading facts of Christ's life recognised by Justin—His birth, baptism, teaching, death, resurrec-

[1] He wrote (Apol. i. 26) against all heresies, according to Cedrenus, during the reign of Hadrian (Semisch i. 43). This writing was probably directed against the Gnostics especially. Comp. Apol. i. 56, 58; c. Tryph. 35, 80, 82, 98, 103; De resurr. 10.

[2] C. Tryph. 98: ἀποδεικνύων ὅτι ἀληθῶς γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος ἀντιληπτικὸς παθῶν. C. 103: "He trembles and is dismayed that we might know that the Father willed that His Son should in these sufferings be truly among us, and that we should not say that He who is the Son of God did not experience what came upon Him."

[3] Other expressions: σωματοποιεῖσθαι, σαρκοποιεῖσθαι, μορφοῦσθαι, σάρκα ἔχειν, φορεῖν, etc. The riches of expression for this department of concepts shows that Christian thought had already long dwelt on it.

tion, and ascension,—but he enters still more closely into the subject. Christ is born not as man of men, but without sin (δίχα ἁμαρτίας), of the Virgin, from the stock of Abraham (c. Tryph. 23, 54; De Resurrec. 3). The Founder of a new race, Christ (c. Tryph. 138) must show that the creation of man is possible without a conception connected with sinful lust; and that, as the virgin even conceived by the word of the serpent, and bore death, so also a virgin may by the word of an angel conceive joy and faith (c. Tryph. 100; De Resurrec. 3). The word of the Holy Ghost, who overshadowed the Virgin, Justin understands, as before observed, of the Logos (Apol. i. 33). Decidedly as he refers the incarnation to the will of the Father, he no less regards it as a voluntary act of the Logos. By Himself has the Logos become patible like us (Apol. ii. 10),—nay, the power of the Logos properly effects that, according, however, to the will of the Father (Apol. i. 32, 46, 66; c. Tryph. 54),[1] and without exclusion of the mental and corporeal participation of Mary. The potency of becoming man, which the Logos always bore in Himself, and which He manifested when He in the aforetime appeared in the *form* of a man, came thus alone to actuality (c. Tryph. 128); and this passing into a human being may figuratively be called a γέννησις of the Logos, just as the passing of the Logos that rested in God to action in the creation may be so called, as it is by Clement of Alexandria.

Justin follows out into detail the self-emptying of the Logos. Christ was a child, grew and passed through successive stages of life as we do, doing full justice to each, ate all kinds of food, and was capable of suffering (c. Tryph. 88, 98). Nevertheless He had from birth His own peculiar power; hence the Magi might properly worship Him (c. Tryph. 88). And He did not need baptism in order to receive through it, for the first time, a communication of Divine power: in the Logos Himself is the fountain of the Holy Ghost, and the unity of all His powers named by Isaiah, c. xi.; but in this man Jesus is the entire Logos. His baptism took place in order to make Him known to others; and the passage in Isaiah, as well as the accounts of the descent of the Spirit on Him, and which remained with Him, are to be understood as intimating that in Him the prophetic spirit had reached its goal, and the end of prophecy was

[1] Appendix, Note UUUU.

given in Him, who has presented the unity of the powers which separately rested on the prophets of the ancient dispensation (c. Tryph. 87). Throughout His life He remained, He was spotless and sinless, living and dying obedient to the Father (c. Tryph. 17, 35, 110, 41). After His death, He went into Hades (c. Tryph. 72, 99). His enemies thought He would remain in Hades like an ordinary man; but Christ was not wanting in the higher knowledge. Christ seems to have entered Hades because He was man, and must pay to human nature its debt; but He did not remain there, because He was the Logos who had become man. His going to Hades, besides, served to bring to the pious there the joyful tidings of their salvation (c. Tryph. 72).[1]

After His resurrection, which he regarded as the Father's boon, He lived still in the same body among us; He was glorified as He ascended to heaven.[2]

There is no doubt that Justin regarded Jesus Christ as a person in whom the Logos and humanity were vitally united. We have also in the above to observe not an unsound preponderance of the Logos, through which the reality of the human nature would be trenched upon. But it requires a more exact inquiry, whether Justin recognised also a human soul in Jesus.[3] On the negative side of this it has been urged, that whilst Justin conceives the human nature trichometrically, and accordingly ought to speak of four potences in the God-man, he in one passage (Apol. ii. 10) names only three, σῶμα, λόγος, and ψυχή. The soul (ψυχή), according to his trichotomy, is only the animal principle; and hence it is inferred that Justin viewed the Logos as supplying the place of the human soul. But this proof is by no means conclusive.[4] Justin is not so

[1] This doctrine is not so new as Semisch's representation (ii. 416) would make it appear. What is said in the Acts and in the First Epistle of Peter on this subject, was in the middle of the second century so expanded and worked up, that already the office of preaching in Hades was ascribed to the Apostles (Herm. Past. Sim. ix. 16, 17); and even Marcion made the descent to Hades an important article (Iren. i. 27, ii. 1, 24). See Neander Genet. Enter. p. 301.

[2] Comp. Semisch ii. 415, 412.

[3] See Semisch ii. 409 ff., who calls Justin a forerunner of Apollinaris.

[4] The passage runs thus: "Obviously our matter is superior to all hu-

decidedly a trichotomist, that he might not also hold the twofold division, and under ψυχὴ include both the animal principle of life and the πνεῦμα, nay, by ψυχὴ might intend the πνεῦμα.[1]

It is alleged, on the other hand, that the expressions σαρκοποιεῖσθαι, etc., as little exclude the human soul as Incarnatio; and that Justin, moreover, often uses the phrase, He *became* a man, a human being, whilst, on the contrary, he says of the earlier theophanies, He appeared *as* a man. His doctrine concerning Christ's descent into Hades also, in which he speaks of Him as still man, and so could not have regarded Him as simply the Logos, has a bearing on this question. When these things are duly pondered, there may seem reason for our deciding on the opposite side. But these proofs also are wanting in conclusiveness. For, though the later Church sought to certify the soul of Christ by the article in the Apostles' Creed concerning Christ's descent into Hades, there wants proof that these two questions were viewed together by Justin. And though the expressions, "He is truly a man," "has become a man," prove conclusively that He was not doketically affected (and consequently, if he had detected Doketism in the substituting of the Logos in place of the human soul, would have rejected it); yet it is not certain that he did detect this, especially as this question did not come into discussion in the Church for nearly a century later. We shall consequently best hit on the truth by deciding, that Justin did not indeed subject the human soul of Christ to special consideration, but that he neither taught, nor was inclined to teach, anything against the truth of Christ's humanity. If in the only passage which can be adduced bearing on this he intends by ψυχὴ, not the human soul, but the animal life-principle, and by λόγος, not the reason, but the Logos, yet that he must have been familiar with the thought of Christ's being really and in all respects a man like other men, is evident from his assertion, that what men, apart from Christ, have of reason (*i.e.*, their

man teaching, διὰ τὸ λογικὸν τὸ ὅλον, τὸν φανέντα δι' ἡμᾶς Χριστὸν, γεγονέναι καὶ σῶμα καὶ λόγον καὶ ψυχήν." "Body, Logos, soul." It seems in favour of the retaining of the word Logos in the translation, that otherwise the Logos would not be mentioned at all. But He is indicated in the words λογικὸν τὸ ὅλον, and hence λόγος may mean Reason here.

[1] As even Semisch, ii. 361, feels constrained to admit

Pneuma), is to be conceived as a spermatic indwelling of the Logos in them; so that Christ is not placed beyond the sphere of the rest of mankind, if in Him, in place of the germ and seed, the *whole* Logos, λογικὸν τὸ ὅλον, dwelt.

Even since His exaltation, Christ remains man; for as the Son of man shall He come again to the judgment (c Tryph. 31, 32; Apol. i. 52). The operations of the exalted Christ are frequently called by him the operations of the Logos, like those before His incarnation. If there may be detected here a preponderance which the Logos had in his immediate Christian consciousness over the God-man, there is to be set over against this, that he very often also calls the pre-Christian Logos Christ, even Jesus Christ, in which mode of designation he is obviously determined by his setting out from a historical point of view.[1]

The most allied to Justin's doctrine of the Logos is that of Theophilus of Antioch, and that of Tatian. Theophilus also attaches himself to the Wisdom of the Old Testament (ad Autol. L. ii.), and this in such a way, as that he seeks to show that in Christianity there is nothing new, but that it is as old as the world. With him, almost every other Christological consideration is absorbed in his interest for the momentum of the preexistence and the doctrine of the Logos; and in consequence of this onesidedness again, the incarnation is threatened with being viewed doketically. The creation, as well as the appearances of the Old Testament, and its inspiration, took place through the Logos, who was always with God, and is called ἀρχή (ii. 10) by John (i. 1), as the principle of all things. His relation to the Father is this, that the Father cannot appear within a definite space (ἀχώρητος ὁ πατὴρ), whilst the Logos can (ii. 22). Hence the Logos assumed in the world the part of the Father and Lord of all (πρόσωπον). What, however, Justin had before only hinted at, Theophilus brings definitely forward: The Logos had a being before He came forth to create; for He is the Reason and the Intelligence of God (Θεοῦ νοῦς καὶ φρόνησις). He rested in God's heart, and was His counsellor before aught was (ii. 22). As such He is called λόγος ἐνδιάθετος (ii. 10). For the creation of the world, God sent forth the Logos out of Himself.[2] The counsel which comes to God

[1] Appendix, Note VVVV.

[2] Ad Autol. ii. 10: ἔχων οὖν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ λόγον ἐνδιάθετον ἐν τοῖς

from the Logos, as yet hid in God, relates solely to the world, is the world-idea. Hence the Logos has an immanent relation to the world. But since God willed to create what He had determined (*i.e.*, to realize the thought of the Logos), He begot this Logos as manifest (*προφορικὸν*), as the First-born of all creation. But God was not thereby emptied of the Logos (the Reason); rather did He retain it in Himself, eternally conversing with it; and He begat only as yet the Logos. He means to say, the Logos remained in God, since He is God's reason; only God placed His reason as the real-principle of the world, placed Him in the momentum of actuality.

Here the knot is tied still more tightly than with Justin. On the one hand, he appears to lay hold and establish still more than Justin himself the hypostasis of the Son; as is evidenced by his using the term *ἐξερεύγεσθαι* in the creation of the world, and by his calling the Son the Logos hid in God (ii. 22). On the other hand, it is expressly said, The Logos is the Divine Reason itself, which also dwells eternally in God; whereby, indeed, the arianizing appearance of Justin disappears, but in such a way as that it is no longer seen how the essential, ever equally abiding quality in the Logos, is distinguished from the Father. The more, however, this distinction disappears, the more does that in the Logos Himself alone remain, the more does all weight fall on the distinction between the hidden and revealed Reason; and in this case, as is self-evident, there ceases to be any interest in speaking of the begetting of a hypostatic Son before the creation. Theophilus still speaks of this; but though his effort goes further, it obtains, in its connection, nothing of importance beyond the self-determination of the Divine Reason to place itself in the momentum of reality.[1]

Tatian, the Assyrian Tertullian, says (c. Græc. Orat. 5, ed.

Ἰδιόις σπλαγχνοις, ἐγέννησεν αὐτὸν μετὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ σοφίας ἐξερευξάμενος πρὸ τῶν ὅλων.

[1] Hence Theophilus does not need a caveat against infringing on Monotheism, as Justin; and he cannot say that it is by the Divine counsel that the Son came to be. Rather is He eternally as Son in God; but a *contemplated* distinction was abode by the more readily, that to Theophilus the impulse was wanting which conducted others from the Christology to the hypostatizing of the Logos. Semisch is incorrect, and he obliterates the peculiarity of Theophilus, when (l. c. ii. 282, Note 4) he reckons him among those who derive the Logos from a free act of will on the part of God.

Maur. p. 247), "God was in the beginning," *i.e.*, stood in the δύναμις of the Logos. The Father of the universe, who Himself is the essential Being or principle (ὑπόστασις) of the universe, was in a certain sense alone, inasmuch as creation as yet was not. Since, however, He had all power, and was Himself the essential Being of the visible and the invisible, He was [not alone, but there was] with Him the universe, consisting by the power of reason; Himself that is, and the Logos who was in Him (was the All, namely, the ideal).[1] But by His simple (mere) will came forth the Logos; not, however, passing into the void (like a sound or subjective thought), did the Logos become the first-born work of the Father. This Logos is the beginning of the world. He is become (this?), however, by impartation, not by excision; for that which is cut off is severed from the first, but that which is imparted has only taken a choice for the dispensation in addition [to an equality of essence, which continues in Him from the first,] without making Him defective from whom it was taken.[2]

Like Justin, Tatian thus seeks to preclude the idea of God's suffering deprivation through the procession of the Logos from Him. He maintains that there was no actual severance (ἀποκοπή, χωρίζεσθαι) through the Logos, but that a communication must be nevertheless assumed within the concept of the Divine essence. Now, how does Tatian carry out this? Not in the Divine essence apart from the οἰκονομία, the world of revelation. He knows, indeed, of a Logos before the actual world; but in relation to this, he can make no distinction save that of the Father from His own reason,—a distinction which speedily comes to nothing; for reason is in the Father, and He

[1] Comp. Tertull. adv. Prax. 5: Ante omnia Deus erat solus ipse sibi et mundus et locus et omnia.

[2] Γέγονε δὲ κατὰ μερισμὸν οὐ κατὰ ἀποκοπήν. Τὸ γὰρ ἀποτμηθὲν τοῦ πρώτου κεχώρισται, τὸ δὲ μερισθὲν οἰκονομίας τὴν αἵρεσιν προσλαβόν, οὐκ ἐνδεᾶ τὸν ὅθεν εἴληπται πεποίηκεν, after which follows the figure of one torch kindled from another. The reference to Justin, c. Tryph. 128, 61, and the polemic against him, is evident. Justin rejects there the προπηδᾶν and the partition of the Divine essence; Tatian adopts both. Daniel (Tatianus der Apol. p. 157 ff.) explains the words, from κατὰ μερισμὸν onwards, differently from what is given above, thus: "What is torn away is severed from its first; what exists by communication has a part in the essence whence it is taken."

is not God without reason.—Further, the distinction between God and the world is not clearly and thoroughly carried out, but the world is taken in by him into the inner sphere of the Divine; God is with His Logos, the universe, according to His essential eternal being (ὑπόστασις). Thus the Logos is irresistibly brought to have no higher significancy than as the yet quiescent potency of the world in God; He is simply the world according to its truth; and thus the Christian doctrine does not transcend that of the Hellenes, whom Tatian so much despises, with whom also the world is the Son of God. It is true, he does not bring forward the last conclusion; but he finds no distinction of the Logos from the Father apart from the world; and since he has already defined Him in the immanent Divine being only as the ideal world-principle, he can find the non-severing partition between the Father and Him, which he seeks, only in that the Divine essence, in so far as it accepts or puts on the momentum of revelation (οἰκονομίας αἵρεσιν προσλαβὸν), is distinguished from the Divine essence as self-existing. Here, the distinction in God Himself is still less significant than with Theophilus; and in place of a distinction between Father and Son, there is pressed in a distinction between God, who as unrevealed is with His Logos the universe and the ideal world-principle, and God, who by His free purpose presents Himself as the actual real-principle—by the simple will of the Father, and the Logos quiescent in Him, who προπηδᾷ, not γεννᾶται from the Father. From this essentially Sabellian manner of expression it cannot be seen whether and why the Logos must also have a proper hypostasis only for the creation of the world. He calls Him, indeed, the first-born work of the Father, which the Logos has become, because He could not glide into the void without result; but since in this first-born it is nevertheless only God Himself who is fixed in the momenta in which He makes Himself the actual principle of the world, the personality of the first-born has not even for the creation a significancy with him. This remains for him only a traditionally accepted representation, which is the less in keeping with his context, inasmuch as he does not seem to have been brought to it christologically.[1]

[1] Tatian does not deny the incarnation of God, but here also his expressions, corresponding with the above, have almost a patripassian sound. In

The representation of the hypostatizing of the Logos at the creation is rejected utterly by the clearer and more cautious Athenagoras, who, through his purer concept of God, opens a way to an immanent relation between the Father and Son. He very distinctly sets forth the proposition: "We call God, The Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost; at the same time proclaiming their essence in unity, and a distinction in their order (c. 10). It is the care and joy of the Christians to know God, and the Logos who comes from Him; to see what is the unity of the Son in relation to the Father, what the communion of the Father with the Son, what the Spirit; what is the union of all these, and the distinction of the united—the Spirit, the Son, the Father" (Leg. 12). Further, he fixes the concept of God, per se, much more purely than Tatian. God has not created the world from any necessity; for God is Himself all to Himself—unchanging light, the perfect world, spirit, power, reason (Leg. 16). Hence men are not formed for the sake of one another, not even for the sake of God: neither are they, however, without an end, for God is wise; but as an end to themselves, for the sake of their own proper life, which is destined for the highest (de Resurr. 12),—consequently, from the pure goodness of God. From this advance in the concept of God it follows, that Athenagoras does not regard the Logos as first begotten at the creation of the world. He calls Him a *γέννημα*, and that *πρῶτον*, but not as if He had come into being (for from the beginning, God, since He is eternal spirit, had in Himself the Logos as eternally rational);[1] but in His going

c. 22 he says, the Holy Ghost is *διάκονος τοῦ πεπονθότος Θεοῦ*; and in c. 35, *οὐ μωραίνομεν, ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες, Θεὸν ἐν ἀνθρώπου μορφῇ γεγονέναι.* For the rest, the doctrine of the Holy Ghost is the central-point of his system rather than that of Jesus or Christ, neither of which names occurs in his Apology (Cohort. ad Græc.). Comp. Daniel, p. 214 ff., 211 ff., 167 ff.

[1] Leg. 10. What must the Son (*παῖς*) be? He has the significancy *πρῶτον γέννημα εἶναι τῷ πατρί, οὐχ ὡς γενόμενον (ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ ὁ Θεός, νοῦς ἀΐδιος ὤν, εἶχεν αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸν λόγον, ἀϊδίως λόγικὸς ὤν), ἀλλ' ὡς . . . . ἰδέα καὶ ἐνέργεια προελθών.* The concluding words signify either, As He is eternal idea, so must He also be *ἐνέργεια*; or, He is called *γέννημα πρῶτον*, inasmuch as, though He Himself has not come into being, yet the conception of the world idea, as well as the creation, is represented as a proceeding from God.

forth to be as idea, so energy, for the chaotic mass. It is certain that Athenagoras here reduces the begetting of the Son, at the creation, to a figure accommodated to the concept of the creative utterance of the Son; and equally so is it, that he, apart also from the creation, places the Son eternally in God. It may be doubted, however, whether he calls the Son first in connection with the creation the world-thinking Reason, who bears therewith the idea of the world (*ἰδέα*) in Himself, as the creative principle of the same (*ἐνέργεια*), or whether he thinks the idea at least of the world as eternally given in the Logos. The latter is the more probable from another place: "God's Son, the knowledge of whom the Christians have, is the Logos of the Father in idea and in operation;"[1] *i.e.*, the Son of God has a double being: He is and remains Logos even in the actual world which has been made by Him, but He is also primarily Logos in the ideal world itself, the *κόσμος τέλειος*, the sphere of the Divine.[2] Since Athenagoras calls the sphere of the Divine, or God Himself, a *κόσμος τέλειος*, there is thereby indicated already a reference to the actual world, and consequently, according to him, the idea of the actual world doubtless as eternal. But it ought not to be overlooked, that Athenagoras does not call the Logos immanent in God the idea of the world; but he distinguishes a proper and operative Logos-being in the Son. Hence one might venture to say, that the essence of the proper eternal Logos is simply to be the idea of the world. Athenagoras will not allow the being of the Son to be expended merely in relation to the world; he ascribes to Him a previous relation to the Father. He does not obtain a distinction between the Logos and the Father first by means of the actual world, or its idea; otherwise, it would be inconceivable how he could call God an all-sufficiency in Himself, even without the world, since the world would nevertheless be again drawn immediately into God, if God is the All-self-sufficient only with the Logos, and if the Logos is only the idea of the world. This is clear still further from the words: From Him and through Him (the Logos) is everything made, since the Father and the Son are one. But since the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father

[1] Leg. 10: *ἔστιν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγος τοῦ πατρὸς ἐν ἰδέᾳ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ.*
[2] Comp. Leg. 16.

through the unity and power of the Spirit, so is the Son God's intelligence, and Logos (reason) of the Father.[1]

In Athenagoras also we miss the closer application of the doctrine of the Logos to the Christology. But he has with the clearest consciousness recognised under what has been cited the double problem, to assign its due place to the unity and the distinction. This problem Clement of Alexandria further worked out.

Clement of Alexandria is especially worthy of notice, not only because his mind was formed by means of Greek and Philonian philosophy, and he himself stands in closest relation to Neo-Platonic speculation, but because he as a learner passed through the different Oriental and Occidental tendencies within the Church, and aims at a reconciliation of these.[2] The old Ebionitic tendency had already as good as vanished; he makes no mention of it. On the other hand, he knows well the Ebionism, which was formed, after the flourishing period of Gnosticism, out of the Gnosticism especially of the Valentinian school (comp. Excerpta ex scriptis Theodoti Opp. Clem. Alex. ed. Potter, ii. 966 ff.); the emanistic form of Sabellianism (Strom. vii. 2, p. 831); the doctrine of the λόγος προφορικὸς and ἐνδιάθετος (Strom. v. 1, p. 646), and of the impersonification of the Logos at the creation (Strom. v. 3, p. 654). He also shows himself familiar with the Theologoumena of the Hebrews and Hebrew Christians, as well as with the writings of the Old and New Testaments.

The First Cause is the Father, who is not to be denoted by word or sound, but who is only to be thought, and with silent reverence to be adored (Strom. vii. 1, p. 829).

But whilst God cannot be known or shown as He is in Himself (Strom. v. 1, p. 643), it is otherwise with the Son; who is first, indeed, the object of faith, but afterwards also of knowledge (Strom. v. 1, p. 643 ff., iv. 25). Man has a high nature, the angels a higher; but the most perfect, most holy and su-

[1] Leg 10. Comp. the passage above adduced from Leg. 12, on what is the joy of the Christians.

[2] Strom i. 1, p. 322 ed. Potter. One of his teachers, for instance, was from Greece (probably Pantænus); one from Ionia, whom he met in Hellas; one from Assyria (Bardesanes or Tatian); one from Cœlesyria (probably the same whom he calls a Palestinian, ἑβραῖος ἀνέκαθεν).

preme, the most venerable, the most princely, nay, kingly nature, is that of the Son, which is in the closest manner united with the one Supreme Ruler (Strom. vii. 2, p. 831). Thus far the Son is not elevated above the sphere of the creature, and hence no foundation is laid for a knowledge of God through the knowledge of Him. But He is visibly exalted into the sphere of the Divine itself when He is called Wisdom, Knowledge, and Truth (Strom iv. 25). The Son is the revealed truth in Person ;[1] the Son is Logos of the Father, the unity of the almighty creative word and reason (Strom. vii. 2, p. 832; Pæd. iii. 13, pp. 309, 310). He is supreme and always; whole light of the Father, whole intelligence; never encompassed; wholly eye and wholly ear; all-seeing and all-knowing (Strom. vii. 2, p. 831).[2] Through Him Christianity becomes the Truth, and communicates knowledge; nay, is the Wisdom which renders all philosophy besides superfluous. The Greek philosophy has dismembered the truth of the Logos, as the Mænads did Pentheus; Christianity has in the Logos the whole truth.

Thus the position, that God cannot be known in Himself, is subjected to the limitation, that He cannot be known unless He reveal Himself. Our Pædagogue, says he (Pæd. i. 2, p. 99), is like God His Father. All the powers of the Spirit flow together united in one, the Son (Strom. iv. 25, p. 632). Whilst the Father is the First Cause, the Son in the ideal world, the oldest by His birth, is the timeless and unbegun beginning; at the same time, firstling of existence (Strom. vii. 1, p. 829). He is the Father's countenance; in Him the Father has a *σχῆμα*; He is the revealer of the Father's essence.[3] The purifying, gentle, Divine Logos, in truth the most manifest God, the Fellow of the Lord of all (*ἐξισωθεὶς*), has most easily showed to us God (Coh. 10, p. 85 ff.; Strom. v. 1, p. 646). Since He

[1] Strom. vi. 14, p. 801: *πρόσωπον τῆς δεικνυμένης ἀληθείας ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ.*

[2] Clement applies to Him the title *Θεὸς* innumerable times, a title in the use of which he is very free. Still, when creatures are called by him gods, they are so called only because of participation in the Logos. Strom. vi. 1; vii. 11, p. 870; Pæd. iii. 1, p. 251; i. 6, p. 127. He also calls the Logos God's *will*, and gives Him the title *παντοκράτωρ*, Strom. v. 1, p. 646; *θέλημα παγκρατορικόν*, Pæd. iii. 7.

[3] *Πρόσωπον τοῦ πατρός* (Pæd. i. 7, 132); *ὁ τοῦ πατρώου μηνυτὴς ἰδιώματος* (ibid.). Comp. v. 1, 647. Pæd. i. 2, 99, *Θεὸς ἐν σχήματι πατέρος.*

is the personal Logos, the truth has in Him become knowable (Strom. v. 3). "Many," says he (Strom. vi. 8, p. 775), "teach that there is much that is incomprehensible, of which even the Gnostic knows nothing except that it cannot be comprehended. But to the Son there is nothing incomprehensible, and hence through Him to the Gnostic." For him who thinks the incomprehensibility of God absolute, even Christ cannot be a revealer; he stands still in the pre-Christian concept of God, the Ὄν. And he who does not see the perfect image of the Father in the Son, to whom the Father is not wholly manifest in the Son, subordinates the Son to the Father, because in that case the Son has only partially what the Father has. And because the Father, as the Ὄν, still withholds much, which He does not communicate with the Son, it follows, that either a further revelation is possible, or this residue is simply incapable of being revealed; and thus there is probably given in Christianity the greatest possible, but it is not the absolute Religion.

It is not to be denied that Clement, as also in part Origen, is somewhat fettered by this view of God as the Ὄν; but withal, he still acknowledges that the Father is wholly in the Son, and can be known only through Christ.

We find nothing in Clement about the subordination or the creation of the Son, or about the incompleteness of the Christian religion. The Son is to him in the Father, the Father in the Son; the knowledge of the Father and the Son is to him the knowledge of the truth through the truth, as the Gnostic rule requires (Strom. v. 1, p. 643 ff.). We may ask, however, whether he holds any distinction between the Logos and the Father. This inquiry fairly arises when we read (Strom. vii. 2, p. 833), that the Logos is an activity, an energy of the Father. For this may be understood as meaning that He is the Father in the momentum of revelation; and with this, all intrinsic distinction of God from God would be either wholly set aside, or the distinction between God and the world would be swept away. It may be added, that Clement platonizing, treats the Son as ἰδέα τῶν ἰδεῶν (Strom. v. 3, p. 654),[1] as the everywhere

[1] Strom. iv. 25: The Son is infinite in His powers according to their idea. He is not, however, immediately or abstractly (ἀτιχνῶς) One like the One, nor plurality like parts, ἀλλ' ὡς πάντα ἓν, ἓν θεν καὶ πάντα. For He is a circle of all powers revolving and combining into one. Hence He is

diffused truth (Coh. 10, p. 85 f.), as the fountain of life, which brings peace, covenant, and redemption. At the same time, he will not think the Father a mere substantial basis, but the *νοῦς* belongs also to the Father. What remains to Him for a distinction from the Son?

No answer to this question, such as shall fundamentally set aside Sabellianism, is found in Clement. Still, the instances named by no means affirm that he sought to place the distinction between the Father and the Son only on the ground of revelation.[1] That he rather intends a distinction without at all approaching nearer to Sabellianism, is clear from what follows. In the above passage, where he calls Him the timeless and unbegun beginning, he yet definitely distinguishes Him from the Father (Strom vii. 1, p. 829). Elsewhere (v. 1, p. 643) he says, The Father is not without the Son; at the same time that He is the Father, He is the Father of the Son. The Logos does not come into being, according to him, at the creation of the world; He is not the *spoken* creative word; Clement rather sets forth the other side: He is the *speaking* creative word; He is the almighty Wisdom in God and with God, which, looking on the mysterious ideas, works, but always has and manifests as immanent in itself the Father's will, goodness, etc. (Strom. v. 1, p. 645; vii. 2, p. 831). The Logos who comes forth is the author of creation (Strom. v. 3, p. 654). Clement eagerly strives to remove from the Logos all passivity, change, temporality, and therewith also subordination; and hence he appears not to have approved of the expression, λόγος προφορικός. "The Logos of the Father of all is not that προφορικὸς, but is God's most manifest Wisdom and Goodness, and not less the almighty Divine Power" (Strom. v.

called also A and Ω; and with Him alone does the end become again the beginning, and ends again at the former beginning, nowhere entertaining a break. The Logos is in his view, consequently, the self-encircling all-life; and to believe in Him and through Him, is to be monadically, indissolubly united with Him.

[1] The passage where the Son is called an energy of the Father, interpreted by the connection, must mean that every act of the Son, or the Son in every act, has a reference to God the Father; so that the Father is to be thought as therein acting. Further, the Son is called the everywhere outpoured fountain of life (Coh. 10) after His incarnation, where there can be no doubt that he thinks Him personally. He is called Truth, Idea of Ideas, etc., by such also as hold firmly His distinction from the Father.

1, p. 646). There lies here a polemic against the opinion, that He is simply the spoken empty word, and not rather intelligence, real, creative power. He would, however, have held a subordinate position if He had been merely the creative word uttered by God (προφορικὸς).

The most convincing evidence, however, of Clement's regarding the Logos as relatively independent in respect of the Father, and so of his having sought to distinguish God from God in the eternal essence of God, may be said to lie in what follows. It may be assumed as settled, that Clement thinks Christ personally through the Logos, not through His humanity. Now he guards himself against the conclusion, that by means of the incarnation, or even the creation, any change passed upon the Logos, such, for instance, as the assuming of personality on the part of a potency which before was impersonal, would have been: "The Son of God," says he (Strom. vii. 2, p. 831), "never abandons His watch-tower,[1] is not divided, not severed, travels not from place to place, but is ever over all, never included, wholly intelligence, wholly light of the Father." He would, consequently, have ascribed to the Logos on His watch-tower the same distinction from the Father which he ascribes to the Logos in Christ.

Before we advance to Clement's doctrine concerning the incarnation, let us look back on the development of the doctrine of the Logos thus far. We see, towards the end of the second century, that the biblical tendency in the Church, which set out from the Creator-Word, and the Hellenic, have become thoroughly interpenetrated, and that, as a general symbol of the coalition, the word Logos becomes the standing expression to denote the higher nature manifested in Christ. But the peaceful bed of the Logos-doctrine, in which the distinct streams inosculated, became only the point of issue for new problems. For if the Logos is equally in Himself the unity of Reason, or Wisdom, and of the Word, the question arises, how He is to be thought in relation to the world and to the Father. The Logos is held to be a Divine nature, and that distinct as a personal one, since the impulse proceeding from the appearance of the personal Christ operates to produce the thought of the Logos

[1] So, wholly similar, Theodotus, Excerpta ex Script. Theod. in Clem. Opp. ii. 966 ff.

as a pre-existent hypostasis. As all the Fathers of the second century, without exception, derive the essence of the Logos from the essence of the Father, and cannot retract from this ultimate basis of the divine that was in Christ in the Divine essence, there already appears in the distance the difficult problem, how the assumption of a second and third Divine essence is to be reconciled with the unity of God.

This problem was insoluble so long as the personality of the Son was taken in exactly the same sense as the personality of Jesus Christ in relation to men. For, were this person, regarded as simply and immediately pre-existent, to be transposed into the Divine essence, there is no escape from polytheism. Rather, as the Church would not receive the latter, must the idea of personality be modified; the finite exclusive form which it has in the sphere of men must be removed from the Logos, in order that the Divine unity might not be destroyed by the Logos. It is certain also that there was an authorized sensitiveness in respect of the unity of the Divine essence, which moved so many of the Church teachers of the second century to make every effort to base the essence of the Son in the Divine essence itself, yet, in respect of the *personality* of the Logos, which thus far had been gained by a struggle, and was still too immediately interwoven with the world, to pause at the threshold of the inner Divine essence itself; and thus shall we understand the doctrine, so strange to us, which belonged to that time—the doctrine of the entrance of the Son into personality with the procession of the same to the creating of the world. Prechristian philosophemata concerning creation also may have contributed to this preliminary notion; but the strange theory of the conception of the Son before the creation, and for it, could have established itself on Christian ground for a length of time only in consequence of its seeming to afford some balance between the desire of the Christians to refer everything to the Christian principle, nay, to regard all as made thereby, and the maintenance of the unity of God. The true deity of the Christian principle was affirmed by the Catholic doctrine, that the Logos is of the *essence* of the Father,—consequently, essentially equal to God. But the distinction of the Logos from the Father was as yet not referred to the inner essence of God. The concept of God was not such as yet to endure a distinction of God in Himself from

Himself, the idea of the free absolute Spirit not yet having been formed; and, moreover, the Logos was still too immediately involved in the idea of the world, or rather the world itself, and consequently, His being was still too immediately confused in thought with His work, or the constitution of the world: He is less fixed as the thinking, the speaking, than as the thought, the spoken creative Word. If the thinking and speaking is called also the inner Logos, still the distinction of this from the Father remains a postulate.

This distribution of the momenta of the distinction and the unity must be transient. This unity is menaced by the idea of *God;* this distinction, which is transposed to the side of the world, by the idea of the *world.* If God be not distinct from God, then the distinction of the Son from the Father is not based in the inner essence of God, but falls, so far as it exists at all, to the side of the world. In this case, the Son abides in the mind as a secondary, fortuitous being, as the world is a contingent being: so that, if the distinction is not assumed in God, an Arian method of thinking must be adopted. But against this protests the Christian consciousness of these men; they desire collectively the essential equality of the Logos with the Father; they will not think Him as a creature, but as the Son. They do not deny that the distinction of the Son from the Father regresses into the Divine essence itself. But as little dare they, on account of the Divine monarchy, to accept the challenge which already lies in the essential equality of the Son, and to base in the Divine essence the whole essence of the Son, as well in respect of His distinction from the Father as in respect of His unity with Him. The consequence, however, of their having gained, if not the roots of the distinction, yet the distinction itself, by means of the creation of the universe, is, that temporality and mutability are imputed to the Logos, and this forms a contradiction to His essential equality. But thus there was ascribed to the Logos, as contradistinguished from the world, an insecure hypostasis; for, if He is called its Maker and Lord, He is, on the other hand, equally its unity—in a sense, itself; and because God was not yet construed generally in His self-distinction (whereby alone the Logos would find a basis), the Logos was too immediately confounded with the universe, and was still regarded as its nominalistic and

pantheistic unity; just as the human consciousness, before it distinguishes *self from self*, is still less capable of distinguishing from the world, but remains given over to the consciousness of the world, its only content. Since, on the other side, the unity of the Son with the Father is endangered by a form of subordination arising from this view, with which the true divinity and newness of Christianity could not consist, we are made aware of a remarkable turn. As Justin, whilst energetically endeavouring to solve the question, how (the concept of the personality of the pre-existent Son in the ordinary way being presupposed) the procession of the Logos, the second Divine essence, from the One, could be thought in compatibility with His unity, in his solution too much confounded the generation of the Son, His hypostatic being, with the world and time; the Christian interest pressed on towards a more definite distinction of the Logos from the world, and this was accomplished by the Logos being more definitely distinguished from Himself, the world-creating Logos (προφορικὸς) from the Logos *per se*. Wherever this distinction was accomplished, the main stress must of necessity come to be ever more and more laid upon the inner Logos; for this vouches most for the true deity of the Person of Christ: He is the Speaking; the other, the Spoken. Justin's hint, that God had begotten the Logos out of Himself, was so pursued by others, that they even call Him the Understanding and Reason in God. It is easy to see, that though there is here a determination of the distinction of the Logos from Himself of great importance, as bearing on the distinction between the Logos and the world, the second, the distinction of the Logos from the Father, is not yet given; rather is there a postponing provisionally of the hypostasis of the Son, and consequently more justice done to the unity of the Logos with the Father, than to the distinction between them. But there must be a regression from the world, nay, from the world-unity, into the inner Divine essence itself, and the Logos must be placed in this, before the immanent relation of the Father to the Son can be handled. With this distinction, however, of the Logos from Himself, was made the first great step towards construing the Son, who had hitherto been regarded only in His activity, in His work (to wit, the creation of the world), in His *eternal being*. The work does not thereby remain less His work, but now it is assumed as possible that He

completed His work in comprehending Himself ["Dass er sich selbst erfassend sein Werk vollziehe"], but did not immediately pass over into it; and thus, when this was followed out, as came to pass, the foundation-stone was laid for the distinction of the operatio ad extra from the immanent being of the divine *per se*,—a distinction of decisive moment to the Christian concept of God. Not more, certainly, than the foundation-stone. If no advance be made from the immanent *being*, if this does not extend to an immanent distinction of the Father from the Son, the self-distinction of the Logos is still insecure; if the divine is not distinguished from itself in itself, also apart from the work (λόγος προφορικός), the Logos has not yet perfectly comprehended Himself: the world remains the object for Him; in it alone He knows Himself; it is, in His own self-consciousness, the objective momentum, or the objective Son of God. Also, from the time of their distinguishing the Logos from Himself, the tendency of the Church Fathers, above considered, to fix upon the work was in fact so strong at first, that in respect of His coming forth to the work, a new determination, a change in His proper essence, was presumed, and His generation remains as yet bound up with the work of creation, and is only the other side of this; that also the inner Logos, still bound through relation to the world, is filled immediately with the idea of the world. But they were in earnest to distinguish the Logos from the world, and the way to this was surely marked out. First, Athenagoras took the course of denying the change in the being of the Logos,—consequently, His generation and His becoming a person at the creation, which he lowered to a figure,—and, on the other hand, distinctly let the stress fall on the inner Logos. But Clement of Alexandria consummated this tendency. He lays so much stress on the inner Logos, that he entirely retracts the προφορικὸς, and exchanges this for the distinction—only indeed laid down, not yet established—between the Father, who is never without the Son, but Father only with the Son, and the Son, who as the timeless, unbegun Logos, never quits His post, though He creates and sustains all. Thus, in accordance with the Christian consciousness, was Subordinatianism set aside. But it must be confessed, at the same time, a path was opened as well for Sabellianism as for the Nicene dogma; for with the regression into the inner Divine essence, the distinction of the Son from

the Father remains above all a mere postulate. By giving up the generation of the Son at the creation, there was also relinquished the firm position by means of which the Divine hypostasis of the God-man might be established, without incurring the risk of asserting a duality in the Divine essence. It now remained, either to pass over to Sabellianism, or to establish the distinction of the Son from the Father in another way. We shall see how the Sabellian movement, which commenced powerfully towards the end of the century, and was favoured by so many circumstances, constrained the Church, as soon as its consequences began to show themselves, just in order to preserve entire the distinction of God from the world, not to rest content with distinguishing the Logos from the world or from Himself, but to advance to a distinguishing of God from God, the Father from the Son.[1] By this means was the momentum of the Son's hypostasis, which, for the sake of preserving the unity of God, had for a season been thrown into the background, anew restored to its proper significancy; and that the more, because by the temporary retraction into the unity with the Father, the concept of the hypostasis itself was purified. By the immersion of the Logos in the inner Divine essence, the inadequate views of the nature of the Logos—which were also irreconcilable with the Divine unity, by which He was confounded with the world, and not sufficiently elevated above the exclusiveness which is proper to a finite personality—were partially stripped away; so that the attempt might be made without severing the unity of God, to give to the Son, and with Him to the Holy Ghost also, that place in the Divine essence itself which had been assigned to them from the beginning, in the traditional confession of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and accepted without doubt in the Church, though without being theologically or anthropologically grounded.

We now return to Clement. That universal significancy

[1] With what difficulty the Church made this, how it hesitated to venture on this bold step, but at the same time how definitely it recognised that Sabellianism was to be opposed at all risks, is shown, on the one hand, in Tertullian, who will rather retreat to the abandoned position of the generation of the Son at the creation than go over to Sabellianism; and on the other hand, in Origen, who will rather, with Tertullian, assume something of a subordination theory than not distinctly discriminate the Father from the Son.

of the Logos which Clement has so strongly adduced, makes, according to him, the incarnation of the Logos neither unnecessary nor impossible. He maintains, against the Gnostics, Basilides and Valentinus, that all better knowledge proceeds from the Logos originally, and that a natural knowledge of God does not suffice. Though, however, according to Clement, the Logos has a place in the inner revelation, the Reason, he ascribes to Him also capability for an outer, an objective appearance. He thus appeared formerly in the Old Testament; but because we knew not God, He was sent down in Christ, as our Teacher and Lord, as the mysterious, holy Revealer of the great Providence.[1] In Him appeared a sea of blessings; the Divine power, shining upon the earth, filled the whole with the seeds of salvation. Issuing from the Father's will swifter than the sun, He showed to us God most readily (Cohort. 10; Strom. 85 ff.). He became flesh in order to be seen (Strom. v. 3, p. 654); to be God more operative through the mouth of a man (Strom. vii. 11). Thus He arose as the universal light upon the world, which is brought nigh to each by the preaching of the Gospel. First with the revelation of Jesus is decision given from God's side; now it for the first time can and must be demanded of each (Strom. vi. 6, p. 762 ff.). He wills to give us part in the Logos, that our life shall become a system of logical acts (Pæd. i. 13); even as He appeared to show what it is possible for men to attain, in obedience to the commandments (vii. 2, p. 833), that we, deified (Pæd. iii. 1, p. 251; Str. iv. 25, p. 635, 642), should come to undivided unity and gnostic combination. He would transform us into the beauty of the Logos—our corruption, our mortality into His immortality, and save us soul and body (Strom. ii. 5, p. 440; iii. 17.; Pæd. iii. 1, p. 251).

The incarnation itself, the object of all that has been named, is by no means only the incarnation of a part of the Logos;[2] but *the* Logos is sent down (Strom. v. 1, p. 647). The entire unbroken truth has appeared in Jesus, the Logos, who is always above all, never included, not divided, nor moving from place to place, but always entire Logos (Strom. i. 13, vii. 2, p. 831). The Saviour is the revealed mystery (Pæd. iii. 1, p. 251), God in men, and man in God, and the Mediator who accomplishes the Father's will. For the Mediator is the Logos, common to

[1] Strom. v. 1, p. 647. [2] Appendix, Note WWWW.

both: God's Son, on the one side; on the other, the Saviour of men; God's servant, our leader. The flesh is servant; He receives on Himself, assumes a servant's estate. A closer description of the incarnation occurs Pæd. i. 6, p. 123, which, indeed, is somewhat fanciful. Clement cannot be charged with Doketism, if that word be strictly taken. In this passage he calls Christ a fruit of the Virgin. Referring the passage concerning the flesh and blood of Christ, John vi. 53, 54, to the incarnation, he says: His flesh was prepared by the Holy Ghost. Under the blood is to be understood the Logos; for like rich blood is the Logos formed into His life. But the Lord is the union of both, Spirit and Logos; the "meat indeed" is the whole Lord Jesus, the Logos of God, spirit become flesh (*πνεῦμα σαρκούμενον*), consecrated, heavenly flesh. Elsewhere this mingling of the Logos and the *σὰρξ* is described as the act also of the Logos, who begets Himself into the flesh in order to be seen (Strom. v. 3, p. 654: *ἔπειτα καὶ ἑαυτὸν γεννᾷ ὅταν ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ γένηται ἵνα καὶ θεαθῇ*). It must not be concluded from this, that Clement regards the Logos as having obtained by the incarnation the personality which others suppose Him to have acquired at the creation; for he does not say that the Logos was begotten at the incarnation, but that He begot Himself. In this there is implied that He previously existed; and since Clement rejects all change in the Logos, he can intend by self-begetting nothing else than that He placed Himself in a man; and since, according to Clement, the Logos before Christ was operative in men, whilst nothing is said of a self-begetting of the Logos in their case, the expression must be understood of the peculiar indwelling of the Logos, far transcending all human *φύσις* (Strom. ii. 5, p. 439), which we call the personal.[1]

That Clement intends to ascribe to Christ a truly human nature, cannot, it may be supposed, be doubted; for he calls Him not merely God in human form (Pæd. i. 2, p. 99), the Logos bearing a body, the countenance (*πρόσωπον*) of the Father

[1] From Strom. v. 14, p. 712, where the entrance of the Logos into the human nature of Jesus is presented under the figure of sinking into a deep sleep, as in Gen. ii. 21, there might be inferred the bringing about of the impersonality of the Logos through the incarnation. But the reference here is rather to the *κένωσις* of the Logos (Strom. iii. 1, p. 251), with which no change in the Logos is posited by him (Strom. vii. 2, p. 831).

in the Pentad of the senses (Strom. v. 6, vii. 11; Pæd. iii. 1), but also a man who is God (Pæd. iii. 1, p. 251). But since he calls the body a prison of the soul, and brings it into close relation to the *πάθη*, the inordinate lusts, which with him are the principle of sin, Clement seems hardly in circumstances to ascribe a true corporeity to Christ. To the same purport has been adduced the well-known passage, Coh. c. 10, p. 86, where Clement seems to describe the humanity of Christ as only a mask, His life as man as only an appearance and drama.[1] And with this is to be joined, thirdly, the remarkable assertion, that to eat and drink was not in such a sense necessary to His body as that He could not have subsisted even without food (Strom. vi. 9.)[2] To think this, appears to him ridiculous: rather was His body sustained and supported by His holy power; He ate, consequently, not so much for the sake of His body, as that His followers might not think erroneously of Him, might not imagine His manifestation to be a mere Doketic one.—But these considerations do not prove by any means that Clement held Doketic views in the proper sense. His doctrine of the body as a prison, or seat of the desires, relates only to the constitution of our body, not to the concept of body generally; he rather denies both that the soul is good and the body evil by nature (Strom. iv. 26, p. 639). The body is different from the soul, but not opposed to it according to its concept. But this difference has become in man a conflict between the flesh and the spirit; and it was to heal this enmity that Christ appeared (Strom. iii. 17, p. 559). "Holy, not unholy, as Valentinus, Marcion, Cassian insinuate, is the birth of the world and its being," he says; "and without the body, Christ could not have accomplished the work of redemption" (pp. 558, 559). As to the correctness of the above explanation of the second passage,

[1] Ὁ Λόγος . . . . . τοῦ ἀνθρώπου προσωπεῖον ἀναλαβών, καὶ σαρκὶ (σάρκα?) ἀναπλασάμενος τὸ σωτήριον δρᾶμα τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος ὑπεκρίνετο. Gieseler, Comm. qua Clem. Alex. et Orig. doctr. de corpore Christi exponitur, Gött. 1847, translates (p. 14), "Hominis personam indutus quam e carne sibi formavit, hominis partes salubriter egit." But *σαρκὶ* cannot well be translated "out of the flesh," but either *in carne ludens*, or it is better to read *σάρκα*, *carnem instaurans*.

[2] Comp. Strom. ii. 7, where approvingly, as it appears, he quotes the words of Valentinus, ἤσθιε καὶ ἔπιεν ἰδίως, οὐκ ἀποδιδοὺς τὰ βρώματα. So great was the power of the ἐγκράτεια in Him ὥστε καὶ μὴ φθαρῆναι τὴν τροφὴν ἐν αὐτῷ.

there is ground for doubt in the opposition to Doketism thus alleged (Strom. iii. 17, vi. 9). Also, if the drama in which Christ played a part is to be taken as having the sense of a mere epideictic act, or of anything of the nature of deception, it would follow that, according to the words, the passage must be referred to the *redemption* (*σωτήριον δρᾶμα*) as well as to the humanity, which no one will impute to Clement. But if Clement describes the humanity of Christ as a garment, a part (Rolle), in this passage, the context, in which he treats of the hidden dignity of the God-man, shows that he does not intend to say that His life, and passion, and acting was not truly human, or merely scenic: He is rather represented as a warrior and fellow-combatant with His creature; and the "drama," or battle-play in the passage, is a figure in which the tertium comparationis is not the simulation or appearance, but rather the publicity of a struggle that is crowned with victory, in which the theatre is the universe (Coh. 1). Further, in reference to Christ Himself, the tertium comparationis between Him and an actor on the stage, is only the contrast between Christ's outer and more humble appearance and the inner essence of the Logos. To the latter the passage itself expressly refers.[1] That the meaning is nothing else than that Christ had His course and conflict in the world (which was for Him a season of exinanition) crowned with victory, is plain from the comparison of Strom. vii. 11, p. 870, where, in praising the true Gnostic as the worthy image of heavenly strength, he says that he blamelessly plays through the drama of life which God assigns to him as an agony.[2] It must, however, be conceded that the expressions which are here used for Christ's humanity resolve it into a mere *dress*. But the Church doctrine has always called the body of Christ also an investiture, a clothing; and this justly, provided the whole humanity be not thus described, but only that aspect of it according to which it is the vehicle of the manifestation

[1] Coh. x. 11, p. 86 f. It is well known that Clement believed the outward appearance of the Lord to be mean and unlovely; e. gr. Pæd. iii. 1; Str. vi. 16, iii. 17.

[2] *Ἀμέμφως τοίνυν ὑποκρινόμενος τὸ δρᾶμα τοῦ βίου, ὅπερ ἂν ὁ Θεὸς ἀγωνίσασθαι παράσχῃ.* The Gnostic also has a veiled glory, is as it were in exile. By this he certainly does not mean to ascribe a Doketic humanity to the Gnostic, and as little is this intended of Christ in the above passage, where the very same words, *δρᾶμα ὑποκρίνεσθαι ἀγωνίσασθαι*, are used.

of the Logos. But Clement has never spoken of a laying aside again of the humanity, or viewed it as the momentary investiture of the Logos. It does not display a transient Christophany; but he knows also an incarnation of the Logos. The body itself, he says, not the soul alone, is esteemed by the Saviour; He has delivered both from the appetites (*πάθη*), from passive existence; He has removed the opposition that existed between the flesh and the spirit, and showed it to be conquerable. Were the hostility between the two essential, as the Doketæ think, how could He have communicated new strength to the one opposing member, the flesh, by assuming it and giving it immortality? But since the enmity was there through Adam's fall, how could the economy of redemption in the Church have reached its design without the body, had He, the Head of the Church, passed through life without form and beauty in the flesh, in order that He might teach us to look away to the viewless and bodiless of the Divine cause? (Strom. iii. 17, p. 559). Christ is thus in his view the representative and the principle (*κεφαλή*) of the most perfect union of the flesh and the spirit; not the destruction of the former, but, on the contrary, its exaltation in the immortal essence. And with this also the third point is discharged. Clement does not say that Christ's body, viewed in itself, was of a different kind from ours; if he did, there would certainly lie in the above passage a denial of the essential likeness of Christ to us. He rather affirms in several passages that Christ's body in and by itself was susceptible of suffering, could endure pain, did endure pain.[1] He views Christ's death not as apparitional, but as real,[2] and knows nothing of a withdrawal of the Logos from the man Jesus before His death: and in like manner, without hesi-

[1] Strom. vii. 2, p. 832; Pæd. i. 6, p. 123. The Lord hath begotten the Church *ὠδῖνι σαρκικῇ*, p. 124, *ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἐξέχεεν αἷμα*, Pæd. ii. 2, p. 177; Strom. i. 8.

[2] Coh. 10, p. 84; Strom. i. 21, pp. 407, 408, comp. Pæd. i. 6, p. 124. For the rest, the propitiatory death of Christ falls into the background with Clement, in accordance with his concept of the Divine righteousness, which is allied to that of Philo; comp. Pæd. i. 8, p. 138 ff.; yet he derives the *λύτρωσις* from Him (Pæd. i. 6, 126). From love to us hath He suffered (Strom. vi. 8, p. 775). The names Mediator and High Priest he gives to Him, however, irrespective of His death, which in his view acquires a higher significancy only in the Eucharist.

tation, avows his faith in the other leading facts of the life of Jesus. If one might also assume that the preparation of the body of Jesus by the Holy Ghost had, according to Clement, endowed Him with peculiar advantages,—among which the removal of inordinate appetites arising from the body must, according to Clement, be found,—then was the body of Christ, according to him, in and by itself a holy body from the beginning, even although He had in Himself the *πάθη ἀδιάβλητα*, blameless infirmities; as Clement says of the Gnostic, that he can satisfy the natural wants of the bodily life without blame, nay, must do so (Strom. vi. 9, p. 775). He says, indeed (vi. 9, p. 775, *ὁ Σωτὴρ ἀπαξαπλῶς ἀπαθὴς ἦν*), the Saviour was simply without passive emotion (*κίνημα παθητικὸν οὐ ἡδονὴ* or *λύπη*). But it would be rash to seek to refer this wholly to the body; the *ἀπάθεια* became part of Christ's humanity only through its union with the Logos, which, though the flesh of Christ is in itself capable of being affected (*αἰσθητὴ, ἐμπαθὴς, παθητικὴ*), constantly keeps down all affections. Through the ethic power of His will, consequently (*ἐγκράτεια*), not through the special physical constitution of Christ's body, it comes to pass that the whole person may be said to be raised above affections. Clement thinks that he can assert the absolute freedom of the Logos in Christ only by withdrawing from Him even the appearance of passivity. And in this sense he says, "Christ ate not because His body required it, for by His divine power could the Logos have sustained it for Himself; but He ate in order that His disciples might not think Him what the Doketæ afterwards thought Him" (Strom. vi. 9). One might even hesitate to ascribe this superiority to the body of Christ: this much is certain, that Christ's unity of essence with us must not, according to Clement, be endangered by what is thought of His body; rather he is of opinion that the Apostles were herein like the Lord. For his view, there is not a handling of a constitutive momentum of human nature—otherwise he must have taught differently—but rather of the removal of a want, and in particular, there remains to the body in and by itself the susceptibility of suffering, there remains on earth its needs; but by the ethical will of the Logos is the body also raised above patibility.[1]

[1] Strom. vii. 2, 852: *ὅς γε καὶ τὴν σάρκα τὴν ἐμπαθῆ φύσει γινομένην ἀναλαβὼν εἰς ἕξιν ἀτιαθείας ἐπαίδευσεν.* In Pæd. i. 5, p. 112, *μὴ παθών*

In Clement, however, we see two lines of positions which stand directly over against each other,—in the one of which it is affirmed, that Christ is in His earthly manifestation the countenance of the Father, the Logos has assumed flesh in order to be seen, He is the manifested mystery; whilst in the other it is asserted, that what He was, was not seen by men, who on account of the weakness of the flesh could not apprehend Him (Strom. vii. 2, p. 833),—to which also belongs the above cited figure of a sleep for His incarnation, and his doctrine of the external meanness of Christ's form. According to the latter aspect, He appears to have assumed humanity to conceal His deity; according to the former, to reveal it. The solution of Clement is this: Certainly there existed also *objectively* in Christ this strong contrast of two sides. In His self-representation in discourse, deed, and holy life, there was revealed the Divine itself; but on the other side this revelation was obscured by His humble appearance. Thus there depends on the apprehension of Christ the empiric, external, or the higher true. The contrast in Christ's Person, however, objectively presented, has, according to Clement, for its design to elevate the subjective apprehension, to confound the empirical, and to provoke to the negation of it (Strom. vi. 15, 17).

But if, according to Clement, Christ had not only a truly human *body*, but such an one as presented at once the reality and perfection of the human body, as these were viewed by Clement,—the question, on the other hand, concerning the human soul of Christ, as handled by Clement, occasions some difficulty. The places where Clement calls Him a man do not prove that he distinctly recognised a soul as included therein, though certainly in this, and in his passages against Doketism, there is involved that he could not deny to Him anything that was consciously regarded by him as a constituent part of human nature (Coh. 10, p. 84; Pæd. iii. 1, p. 251). As little can the conclusion be deduced from the trichotomy which he recognises—Strom. iii. 17, p. 559; Pæd. iii. 1, p. 250—that he must ascribe the *νοερὸν* or *λογητικὸν*, the *θυμικὸν* or *ἐπιθυ-*

is, as Guericke and Gieseler rightly saw, to be referred to Christ's deity, though the subject is Jesus. He calls Jesus, indeed, also *ἄϊδιον*, and the same want of precision, though in the reverse direction, is exhibited Coh. 10, p. 81, *πίστευσον . . . . τῷ παθόντι Θεῷ ζώντι.* Similarly Pæd. i. p. 124.

μητικὸν, each to Christ in order to have the reality of a human soul; for this trichotomy is not constant with him (Strom. iii. 9, p. 540, iii. 17, p. 559). It is not fitting to draw conclusions from his far-fetched doctrine concerning Christ's descent into Hades, because he admits that it is only Christ's voice or omnipotence, or indeed only an apostle of His, that is to be thought of as working in Hades (Strom. ii. 9, p. 452, vi. 6, p. 762 ff.). The passage above cited (p. 296) from Pæd. i. 6, p. 123, is, as the connection shows, to be taken as too freely rhetorical for anything to be deduced from it with dogmatic precision; and it may be as easily deduced thence, that in Christ the πνεῦμα has the place of the animal principle, as that the Logos supplies that of the πνεῦμα. "The Holy Spirit prepared the body of Jesus, so that it may be named from the Spirit; and the Lord, into whose life the Logos was richly poured, may be called a mixture of Spirit and Logos." If, however, it be attempted from this to draw the conclusion, that Clement shows a strong inclination to view the noblest part of man, and by consequence of the Gnostic especially, as something Divine, to view the reason as a partaking of the Logos, nay, as a relative being of the Logos in man, it will not follow, assuming that the Logos in Christ had taken the place of the soul in man (or trichometrically of the Spirit), that the essential similarity of Christ to man is superseded; on the contrary, it is affirmed, and that so as to represent in the most perfect manner, what belongs in general to the idea of the human essence, namely, essential union with the Logos. But as Clement would not on this account deny to the Gnostic a soul, as little would he to Christ. It is true that the most manifest evidence of the soul as distinguished from the Logos—namely, the freedom of will which can even turn to what is evil—finds no place, according to Clement, in Christ, because the holy power of the Logos rendered sin impossible in Him. But that Clement should represent Christ as almost independent of all wants and affections from without, and as participating in the ἀπάθεια of the Logos, no more necessitates his denying to Christ a soul than it has necessitated his denying to Him a body. This is proved by the passage, Pæd. i. 2, p. 99: "Our Pædagogue is, like God, His Father, whose Son He is, sinless and blameless, and impassible as respects the soul (ἀπαθὴς τὴν ψυχὴν); hence we must make our soul like Him,

He indeed is for ever free from human infirmities, and hence He alone, as sinless, can be Judge; but we must strive with all our powers to sin as little as possible." It is to be considered also, that Clement indicates as the purpose of the incarnation (Strom. vii. 2, p. 833), that Christ desired to show how far we might attain in obedience towards God: He came to heal soul and body; and since He removes in His person the enmity between flesh and spirit, He is consequently the representative of the perfect harmony of both. Considered from this general point of view, it will become probable that Clement, as he certainly viewed the assumption of a human body as necessary for the salvation of the body (Strom. iii. 17, p. 559), no less certainly desiderated for the salvation of the soul the presence in Christ's person of a human soul in its perfection.[1]

Irenæus, the greatest Church teacher of the generation before Clement, is especially worthy of notice, because he combines in himself the different tendencies in the Church, and brings them to a harmonious interpenetration. Well versed in Gnostic and Church literature, fitted by the events of his life to be a bond of union between Oriental and Occidental Christianity, he had a mild, free, and open feeling for what was true in all the often mutually exclusive parties; and the deeper he penetrated scientifically and practically into the essence of Christianity, with so much firmer a hand could he unite what was cognate and mutually attractive, and eliminate what was abnormal. No one in the second century represents as he does the purity and the fulness of the development within the Church; scarcely any one in the Church of his time is so highly esteemed as he. He respected the intensity of the subjective piety of Montanism, but at the same time he desired to have it in objective Church form; he attached much value to Church membership, and recognised no unity but one that was organic. To Gnosticism, as to heresy in general, he opposed biblical and Church doctrine, but not in such a way as that only a historical

[1] Ἀπάθεια. The soul of man is in itself παθητικὴ like the body; hence not good by nature, Strom. iv. 26, p. 639; but if in Christ it is nothing else than the faculty of the human nature to receive the λόγος ἀπαθής, it has, being inseparably joined with this, a more immediate share in the ἀπάθεια than the body.

and traditional knowledge should be adduced; what he brings forward is a practical knowledge that is at one with the inner Christian consciousness. He does not strive to oppose Gnosticism by falling back merely on authority, or on subjective feeling; and his entering into the substance of Gnosticism is rewarded by his being enabled to bring forward a treasure of Christian knowledge, and to present the most ingenious views of the connection and organism of Christian doctrine.

Irenæus views justly, as the fundamental error (fons et radix) of Gnosticism, the doctrine of the Bythos, or the concept of God which abides by mere quantitative infinitude, by physical categories. God, it is true, is here the obscure basis, the unknowable; but in the esteem of Irenæus, that is so little the innermost of God that he objects to the Gnostics, who are always restlessly steering towards this, that they seek to float into the infinite above God, but since they lift their thoughts above God, they find no resting-place for thought; let them, then, repent (ii. 4, 44; iv. 22, 35, 36). God's quantitative greatness is immeasurable; but we are referred to His love; it has been manifested, and it is the highest, the innermost in the knowledge of God. In the *Word* we have God (iii. 40; iv. 37, 40). The Son is God's love and power. Whilst then the Gnostics call the Bythos incognisable, Irenæus says that God is knowable (ii. 5). Whilst they think the Bythos void *per se*, he says, "si vacuum illum confitebuntur, in maximam incidentes blasphemiam denegabunt id *quod est spiritale ejus*" (ii. 18). Whilst they, striving to come nearer to the Bythos, and to conceive the world, must have recourse to a development, a partition of the Bythos, he says (i. 4) that there is work enough and reward enough for the gnosis, though the question be not asked, Whence God? (ii. 44); *i.e.*, we must not attempt to deduce the higher categories, through which alone God is to us truly God, wisdom and love, from the Bythos as the last and highest; but must abide by them as the last and highest. There is lacking to them, otherwise, true absoluteness, and the emanations from the Bythos are always endangered in their divinity (ii. 15). Rather, says he (ii. 14), must the successive Gnostic Æons be thought simultaneous in each other as attributes of God, which are eternally and inseparably combined in the concept of Him as momenta. Either the Bythos must be acknowledged to be

void and lifeless, or all momenta must be transferred to it, and in this case, becoming and defect must be excluded (ii. 17, 18). No successive coming into being, consequently, no passion, can be left in the world of Æons; if this is to be reducible under the true concept of God, there must be a renunciation of the idea of Æons condensed, hypostatized, produced out of God, and, instead of this, these must be regarded as belonging to the Divine essence itself, consequently must be brought down to momenta in the eternal Divine essence, as Irenæus does when he calls the Logos *multus et dives* in Himself (iv. 37),—a conclusion to which the older gnosis, especially Valentinus himself, according to Irenæus, showed a strong leaning. From this there issues at once the opposition to the Gnostic προβολαὶ, and to the distinction of the Logos as ἐνδιάθετος and as προφορικός. In God there is no partition, no composition, no passion (ii. 15, 17, 18, 27, 48). The inner Logos is to the Gnostics ἀνυπόστατος (ii. 17, 18), the προφορικὸς a sounding voice, both of which are false. Irenæus seeks to know God, as well as the world, as definitely distinguished from the Logos, and only on the ground of distinction does he arrive at unity.

If we consider more closely Irenæus's view of the Logos, we shall see that, according to its concept, it is with him *reason as well as word* (ii. 48, and ii. 15, 17, 18); and in his view neither of these must outweigh the other (comp. iii. 40, iv. 37). God is wholly reason (totus mens), Logos; and the Son is this Logos: νοῦς and λόγος are one (ii. 48). The Son is not a sounding, but a hypostatic word, uttered or spoken by the Father (prolatus).[1] In this the essential deity of the Son lies already so strongly enounced, that it is hardly necessary to speak of it further. He is no creature (iii. 8); and Christ is not to be called God in the sense in which other men are called gods. For, strictly speaking, nothing created is to be called God. But the Son manifested in Christ is actually God, because God is only to be known through God (iv. 10, 14), and because He has power to forgive sins (v. 17). The thought of Athenagoras, by which God is first recognised in His independence of the world, Irenæus works out much more clearly, and in such a way as that a higher significancy is thereby assigned to the Son. "God did not create Adam as having need of men, but that

[1] Appendix, Note, XXXX.

there might be one on whom He could accumulate His benefits" (iv. 28). Consequently it is not because the world belongs immediately to God's essence that it actually is; nor is it because the Son is the *κόσμος νοητὸς*. The hypothesis out of which the origin of the world is to be conceived is, conversely, the absolute perfection and independence of God, without which God could not be pure, unselfish love. Absolute love seeks spontaneously its proper work; its essence is to place others as an object for itself. "The Christian must learn how great God is: Gloria enim hominis Deus, operationes vero Dei et omnis sapientiæ ejus et virtutis receptaculum homo" (iii. 22). For Himself (leaving His love out of view) He needed not the creation of Adam. "For not only before Adam, but before all creation, the Word glorified His Father, abiding in Him, and the Word in turn was glorified by the Father, as He Himself says, John xvii. 5." Thus Irenæus takes his point of issue from the absolute concept of God, well knowing that wherever this is thought as becoming (werdend), the thought remains objectless, and without a resting place (ii. 4, 44).

But if he so definitely discriminates the Logos from the world,[1] what does he teach *concerning the relation of the Son to the Father?* The Gnostics, he says, as good as affirm on this point, that the generation of the Logos may be compared to that of man's word from reason. Now, every man knows this mystery, that from thought and understanding comes word; but it is mere arrogance to believe that by means of this trivial truth we can conceive the generation of the Son from God (ii. 18, 48). "They transfer the production of man's spoken word to the eternal Word of God, and assign to this a beginning of production and generation like their word. In what, then, is God's Word—nay, rather God Himself, since *He* is word—distinguished from the word of men? But in God there is nothing older or younger; He has nought foreign in Himself, but is wholly like Himself, eternally one (ii. 18). He is simple, in all parts like Himself—simplex non compositus, similimembrius (*ὁμοιομερὴς*), et totus ipse sibimet ipsi similis et æqualis" (ii. 16). He is wholly sense, wholly intellect, wholly understanding, wholly thought, wholly reason, wholly hearing, wholly eye, wholly light, wholly source of all good (comp. i. 6, § 1):

[1] Comp. further, ii. 20.

not like the sense of men and the outer light, but in relation to these things unspeakable in His greatness (ii. 16). From this it is clear that no doctrine of the Trinity could be satisfactory to him in which the so-called Persons divide among themselves the Divine attributes; as respects the attributes (virtutes), these are common to the ever self-resembling Divine essence. Even of the Logos it is said, God is wholly Νοῦς and wholly Logos; *i.e.*, God is ever whole even in the determination of Him as Logos (ii. 18). Hence it follows certainly, that in his view the Logos is wholly God, and no subordinate being. It is not, however, clear what distinction remains for him between Father and Son. When he has placed the Logos in the eternal Divine sphere, so as to exclude from Him want, change, passion, he has triumphantly confuted the Gnostics; he has showed that if their doctrine of projections was true, God would be torn asunder by Himself (ii. 16); and should the Gnostics fall back at all on the position that the projections have place within the Father Himself, it may now be asked, what projection can mean? In this case the expression would be superfluous; for if the word means anything, it means that a revelation of the projected lies outside the projecting (ii. 17). But then how does Irenæus escape the objection, that the same instance may be urged against all and every distinction of the Son from the Father? Here we must take into account that Irenæus, in those principal passages in which he assumes the Logos wholly into the Divine essence, speaks not of the Father, but of God. He does not replace the Son simply in the Father, but what he says is this: God is wholly Logos, God is Himself in the Logos; not outside Himself, like the Bythos of the Gnostics, but He is in Himself, generally (and consequently, also, under the three determinations, Father, Son, Spirit), Reason and Word. (Comp. also ii. 13, viii. 28, v. 6; and Duncker, Des Heil. Irenæus Christologie, p. 36 ff.) Whosoever speaks of the Mens Dei, and ascribes to it a proper prolation, makes God to be a compound, as if one thing were God and another the primal reason (ii. 48). As soon, then, as it is acknowledged that the distinction between the Father and the Son cannot be based on a distribution of attributes or powers, but that all Divine powers must meet in God, it must, as consequent on this, be admitted, that under each of the trinitarian determinations God is Reason, etc.,—

that is, it must be said, for instance, that the Father is Logos, in so far, namely, as under Logos is understood only Reason or Creative power. This expression, indeed, he commonly shuns; the word Logos was too definitely stamped and established by usage as a designation of the Son, for confusion not to result from its being applied otherwise. He, however, calls the Father Reason, *νοῦς*, mens; nay, in one place (ii. 48), he says, God is wholly Mens and wholly Logos,—what He speaks He thinks, and what He thinks He speaks. For his Thought is Word (*λόγος*), and his Word Thought, and the all-comprehending primal Reason is the Father Himself.[1] If one, then, is anxious to draw hasty conclusions, this passage furnishes abundant occasion for this; for, taking one's stand on it, nothing is more certain than that Irenæus is a Monarchian, and that in a Sabellian form. But whoever does this will find himself brought into difficulty by the second part of the same section, in which there is avowedly presupposed, as has been already shown, that the Son is not identical with the Father, nor with God as God. The solution is furnished by what follows. Irenæus sees more distinctly than all who preceded him, that the customary designation of the Son by the term *Logos* has something inadequate in it, whether there be understood by it reason or creative power; for, as reason and omnipotence, and, in short, all the Divine predicates, certainly belong to the Son, it is not in them that the distinction of the concept of Him from that of the Father is to be sought. If, then, it were thus possible to call God, or the Father, Logos, in the sense adduced, it is clear that by the term Logos would be designated either something different from what the word immediately expresses, namely, something distinctive of Him from God as such and the Father,—in which case it is time to say what this is,—or Sabellianism is the genuine and true sentiment of the Church.

It is obvious that the Sabellian mode of thought was chiefly supported by the perception that God is wholly reason, and also in all His distinctions like Himself in that which belongs to the Divine powers and attributes. Nevertheless Irenæus declares strongly against the Sabellian representation,

[1] The passage iv. 37, ed. Gr., p. 333*a*, Omnia per Verbum ejus discunt, qui (quia) est unus Deus Pater, is uncertain.

as also Justin depicts it, that God now rests and is silent, and anon is active (ii. 47).

Indeed, it cannot be denied that many of his highest utterances concerning Christ may be understood in a sort of patripassian sense; as when he adopts the saying of a presbyter earlier than his time: Mensura Patris Filius (iv. 8); or, Interpretator Patris Verbum (iv. 27); invisibile Filii Pater, visibile Patris Filius (iv. 14). For the word mensura recalls the Sabellian περιγραφή; and there might be found in this, as in the last statement, that the Father is the content of the Son, and that He, as circumscribed, is called "Son." But the meaning must then be, that the Son is nothing but the visibility of the Father, the Son is that manifested which the Father is hidden and invisible. Now, certainly all the three statements assert that the Father, who is in Himself infinite, has in the Son entered into a limitation necessary for us, and that the Son comprehended the Father. But since, even if the Son be a wholly independent image (selbständiges Ebenbild), the Father nevertheless is manifest in Him, it follows that all this may be said in a purely economical sense, and it is to be inquired whether Irenæus recognised no other than an economical distinction. He calls also the Spirit Figuratio Patris (iv. 17), so that in no case could he regard the Son as only the manifested God. It would be easiest to make out his antagonism to Sabellianism if we found any traces of a subordination of the Son. But what may be adduced as such, namely, that Irenæus does not ascribe to the Son omniscience (*e. gr.*, ii. 49), proves nothing, since the passages relate, or may relate, to the Son as incarnate.[1] In the connection of the system of Irenæus it must be so taken, since in other places he says expressly that the Logos, the Son and Creator of the world, knows all things (*e. gr.*, v. 18); and, in general, because, according to the above, it is peculiar to Irenæus to view God as also wholly in the Logos according to all His powers. Nevertheless there are found in him elements enough of an anti-Sabellian mode of thought.[2] Above all,

[1] So also expressions such as Filius administrans Patri, etc. (iv. 14, 17, pp. 302, 304, v. 26, p. 441*b*), Filius manus Patris (v. 1, v. 6), are decidedly referable to the œconomical relation. To him the Word is uncreated, eternal, without beginning. Comp. Duncker, p. 16 ff.

[2] Duncker, in his otherwise admirable work, seems not to be aware that

attention must be paid here to the pre-existence which he ascribes to the Son and views as eternal; and, further, to the fact that he calls the Son *invisibilis* in Himself, as he calls the Father *visibilis* for our sakes (iii. 18, p. 241, iv. 14, p. 341*b*). After he has confuted the Gnostic prolationes, and their application to the Logos, he insists that the Son (so he denominates the Logos when he would designate Him in distinction from the Father) prolatus est a Patre. Whether this be called prolation, or begetting, or nuncupatio, or adapertio, and though no man knows this generatio inerrabilis, the Father qui generavit, and the Son qui est natus, know it (ii. 48). This generatio took place not first in time, nor is the Son a creature, or passive in His prolation, but He is eternally with God (non habet initium prolationis, ii. 18). Before the world the Father glorified the Son, and the Son the Father (iii. 22). "That the Word (*i.e.*, the Son) was ever with the Father, hath He plentifully showed. Yea, before all creation has Wisdom, *i.e.*, the Spirit, been with Him" (iv. 37, 14). Still this much must be conceded, that though Irenæus *desires* definitely to recognise these distinctions as posited in the inner Divine essence, he yet does not represent the motive and ground of them as in the Divine essence itself, nor does he accommodate them to the unity; but they are certified to him through the manifestation of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. Nevertheless he holds fast the unity and simplicity of God thus determined. In these distinctions God is homogeneous (ὁμοιομερὴς); to each belongs the like *content* of the Divine predicates; He is in them One. Whence it follows that Irenæus, far from all tritheism, must, to be consequent, reject from his premisses every plurality of hypostases subordinated to each other, or excluding each other; and, on the contrary, must maintain their inter-essence in virtue of their equal Divine essence. All that he thus leaves room for is, that the one Divine essence, even apart from the world, exists per se in a threefold different form, but in each of these modes of being the whole content of the Divine predicates is contained.[1] We now proceed to the *Incarnation.*

God cannot be known without God (iv. 14). Without life

he first brings Irenæus to a mere economic form of doctrine, *i.e.*, to Sabellianism (pp. 40–44), and then afterwards retracts this (pp. 50–57).

[1] In iv. 17 it is said, Ministrat Patri ad omnia sua progenies et figuratio

we cannot live. Essential life comes from participation in God; but to have part in God is to know God, and to enjoy His goodness (iv. 37). The will of the Father, however, is to be known (iv. 14). They who would now see the light must be in the sphere of the light, and those who would see God must be in the sphere of God (ἐντὸς Θεοῦ, p. 332*b*, iv. 37), enjoying His clearness. This clearness vivifies them, so that those who see God have life. Wherefore the Unapprehended, the Incomprehended, the Unseen, hath made Himself visible, comprehensible, apprehensible for those that believe, in the Incarnation, in order to make those who apprehend and see Him blessed through faith. His greatness is unsearchable; but His goodness also is not to be told by which He gives Himself to be seen (iv. 37, p. 332). No one knows the Father save His Word, and in turn only the Father knows His Word. The Father, however, has revealed Himself, inasmuch as He has made His Word visible to all, and in turn the Son opens up the knowledge of the Father by His revelation. The Lord says not that Father and Son are simply not cognisable, otherwise His advent would have been superfluous; but only that without God, God cannot be known. But the Father revealed the Son, and in the Son Himself as the Father; and the Son revealed, through His representation, as Himself, so also the Father as Him who hath begotten the Son (iv. 14, pp. 300, 301). Thus, according to Irenæus, the revelation of the one includes that of the other; so that the revelation in Christ is to be viewed as no less the act of the Father than of the Son.

Already in the creation the Word has revealed the Father and the Son; likewise in the Law and in the Prophets the Word has preached Himself and the Father, and has ever sought to draw to the belief of these. At length the Word has made Himself visible and tangible by being born of Mary. For it is the Son who is the organ of the Father from beginning to end, and without Him can no man know the Father (iv. 14). From the beginning the Son is with His work, and reveals to all the Father, how and where He wills; and hence there is in all and through all things the one God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and one faith and one salvation (iv. 14, p. 302). Christ me-

sua, *i.e.*, Filius et Sp. Sanctus. On the Holy Ghost, see below, and Duncker l. c., p. 57 ff.

diates the whole economy in relation to mankind, serving the Father's will (v. 26, p. 441*b*). These positions he establishes somewhat more closely. It was fit that the Son who is eternally with the Father should be the universal organ of revelation. He who created the world is the same who hath given the law. Quomodo finis legis Christus, si non et initium? (iv. 26). He moreover appeared to the patriarchs and prophets; not always in the same form, but in another and another, according to time and place (iv. 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 23, 26, 27, 37, 70, iii. 18, v. 18). Cleaving to His work, He is ever in that which He has made, never retiring from it. But wherefore did this stated presence with and in His work not suffice? wherefore, at least, did not the manifold appearances before Christ? On this point he enlarges, especially in opposition to Ebionism (*e. gr.*, iii. 20, 21, 24, 29, iv. 51, 59). Where he remains by general considerations, he says, We could not have had part in immortality and incorruptibility had we not been united thereto (adunati). But how could this have been possible had not immortality and incorruptibility become what we are, so that the corruptible might be swallowed up by the incorruptible, and the mortal by the immortal? This death, which dwells in the first creation, has for him also an ethical significancy; and the Ebionites, denying the higher birth of Christ, and in Christ of humanity, abide still in the bondage (*i.e.*, the state of penalty) of the old Adamitic disobedience; they abide still in the first birth, and the curse of death which rests upon it (iii. 21, p. 249). They receive not the antidote to death, and are subject to it. The Word has said, Ye are sons of the Highest, and gods, but ye shall die like men; by this He refers to the thankless, on whose account He became flesh, who despise the gift of sonship, and rob man of his exaltation to the Lord. For the Word of God has become man, and the Son of God the Son of man united with the Word, in order that we might receive sonship; and whosoever receives the Logos becomes a son of God (*Ibid.*). The Ebionites whom he assails have, it is true, in their later forms retreated from Moses and the law back to Adam. Him they exalt above all; and in their opinion there is no need of any other, but only of appearances of him from time to time. But, says Irenæus, all who descend from Adam are under the curse; of them none is

called God or Lord (iii. 6, 31). But by accepting Christ we bear God in us, we really become partakers of the Divine nature, and sons of the Highest (iii. 21, iv. 37, 59, 68, v. 8, etc.).[1]

Still more definitely does he assign an ethical and religious significancy to Christ's incarnation, in that he sees in it the taking away of sin and guilt. The law gives us no kingdom, shows us not the king in us, but shows the manslayer (1 John iii.), who hath sin in him, and is amenable to death. He, however, who shall begin to destroy sin, and to deliver him who is amenable to death, must himself be what this one was, *i.e.*, man, in order that sin may be destroyed by man, and man may escape from death.

"If," he exclaims to the Doketæ, "Christ has not become man, ye remain under the ancient curse and under death. For we could not attain to the sonship unless the Son had entered into fellowship with us and become flesh. His humanity is not an appearance; and so His works, the slaying of sin and of death, and the vivifying of men, are realities" (iii. 20, p. 248).

This thought, that Christ must become what we are in order to redeem and perfect us, is pursued by Irenæus in detail. The Gnostic canon, *ὃν ἤμελλε σώζειν, τὰς ἀπαρχὰς αὐτῶν εἴληφε* (L. i. c. 1, § 11), he fully adopts. "Through every stage of human life Christ had to pass, in order that He might restore to all communion with God" (iii. 20, p. 248). "He sanctified each stage of life, for He came to save all by Himself; all, I say, who through Him shall be born again to God, infants and children, lads, youths, and old men" (ii. 39). To the same intent is his saying, "Had not our flesh been redeemable, the Word of God had never become flesh" (v. 14). Every man has a soul (ii. 62), and this also needs salvation. Christ gave His flesh for our flesh, His soul for our soul (v. 1, vi. 9). This thought, that Christ must assume all that belongs to us, and represent it in Himself, in order to be able to save us, is often

[1] Already, before Tertullian, as Duncker has observed, Irenæus taught that there were three stages in the development of the kingdom of God—the revelation of the Father from the creation, the advent of Christ, and the effusion of the Holy Spirit (iv. 38, 1, 3; 20, 6; v. 18, 2; 36, 2, 5; Duncker l. c. p. 71 ff.). The frequent verbal agreement of Tertullian and Irenæus renders this the more noticeable.

expressed by him by the phrase, "recapitulatio plasmatis in semetipsum."

But Irenæus does not limit himself to such general considerations; he goes still deeper into the reasons why Christ's ability to redeem us depended on His being in all things like us. Without His becoming man, without the offering of His body and His soul, redemption could have been accomplished only by the arbitrary *power* of the Divine nature, or by righteousness not demanding what was due to it according to its idea. But this demands, 1. That as it was a man who fell, it must also be a man who fulfils the law, and conquers sin and the devil; that the universal guilt and punishment of humanity should be borne by itself, and the universal disobedience of the race should be covered by an obedience from the midst of it, even Christ's whole obedience (Ib. iii. 18, v. 21, p. 432*a*). 2. That even this man should not conquer by way of power, of immediate physical force; but by the indirect way through self-offering love. Force (*βία*), Irenæus says, with the author of the Epistle to Diognetus (c. 7), dwells not with God; it becomes God to conquer only by love. This love shows itself in Christ in the bearing of the guilt and penalty, and in the fulfilling of the law. 3. The same righteousness requires that men also shall not be brought to Christ by force; but that the subjective redemption of men must take the indirect path (force being renounced) of rescuing from the kingdom of sin and the devil only those who in the free exercise of faith allow the spiritual grace, the revelation of love, to operate upon them. "It was fit that God should bring to Himself that which properly belongs to Him (man), not by application of force, but by the spiritual method of persuasion (secundum suadelam, suadentem et non vim inferentem decebat Deum accipere quæ vellet . . . quæ sunt sua, v. 1, 1).[1]

This doctrine is intimately connected with the *theology* and the *anthropology* of Irenæus. We see how high he places, in opposition to Gnosticism, the spiritual attributes, the Spiritale Dei, especially His love. Righteousness only comes with him between the physical attributes, infinitude, omnipotence, etc., and the ethical, compassion, love, etc., as occupying the place of warder. Hence God will not and cannot operate on what is spiritual in a physical way; He must gain men by a representation of what is

[1] Appendix, Note YYYY.

spiritual, by the highest manifestation of His love. But that this shall be a manifestation by suffering, is required by the same righteousness as requires that it shall conquer only spiritually, and shall renounce all force. For rectitude provides that everything shall correspond to its essence and concept, and it demands punishment when the spiritual has become carnal; further, if God as love wills that man should stand before Him not as carnalis, but as spiritualis, it follows that, since sin and guilt have entered the world, righteousness can be satisfied only by the revelation of God's love being that of suffering, sin-bearing, guilt-bearing, and at the same time substitutionary love, and that in such a way as that the suffering Divine love shall assume all the sin and guilt of man, shall comprehend in itself and absorb in its holiness all that retained the first creation, so that all men and every age of man, provided they have been in fellowship with this revelation, should stand pure and holy before God and themselves (iii. 20). But this brings us to the *Anthropology* of Irenæus. According to him, freedom belongs to the concept of man. God's love, in his view, as it were, woos man, because it is only as we will it that we can have the gift of fellowship with God. Hence man cannot be perfect τέλειος from the beginning, but only by degrees through training. Insensatum esset bonum quod esset inexercitatum. We should also set little value on the blessing of fellowship with God were we to obtain it without freedom; and with this it is not inconsistent, that in order to full choice, man desires knowledge of what is set before him, but can acquire knowledge of good and evil only by means of experience (iv. 72, p. 387; 76, pp. 380, 381). Disciplinam boni quemadmodum habere potuisset, ignorans quod est contrarium? Firmior est enim et indubitata subjacientium apprehensio, quam ea, quæ est ex suspicione conjectura. Mens per utrorumque experimentum disciplinam boni accipiens firmior efficitur.[1] God could on His part give us all as well from the beginning, but we could not on ours receive it. A physical good is in his view, consequently, of no or of little worth to men (comp. iv. 71–74). Such stress does he lay on this freedom of decision, that he, entirely dissenting from gnosticizing Ebionism, does not place Adam very high, still less regards his condition in Paradise as prototypal for us. Adam, indeed, was not made

[1] Appendix, Note ZZZZ.

sinful, but free, and greater than all of us (iv. 59); but there could be no establishment there, Christ could not have been received from the beginning; and in this lies the position, that the perfection of our nature becomes first possible through Christ. He, however, as the second Adam, presupposes a first creation. On this account the Son is in no wise dependent on mankind, nor His incarnation on the free act of man (iii. 33), but man in any case needs the incarnation. Whether man be viewed dichometrically or trichometrically (comp. ii. 52 and 62 with v. 4, and especially 6), there must ever be reckoned as belonging to the concept of man the objective Divine πνεῦμα, which he must assume (v. 6), with which he must be conjoined, that he may with this last momentum correspond wholly to his concept. Antecedent to this, indeed, he is not without reason or soul,—as man of the first creation he is δεκτικὸς of God and of carnalia, *i.e.*, he is free; but he is also not thereby perfect man. Primum homines, deinde Dei (iv. 75, 76, v. 1); the latter, in that the Divine πνεῦμα belonging to our nature is freely assumed by us men, or that we become true men. This participation of the Spirit (which he also calls commixtio cum Verbo) Adam could not have had, and so he stands far below Christ, the second Adam (iv. 59, iii. 21). On the other hand, mighty as the Son or Christ is, His appearance as a redeemer and perfecter is conditioned by a first creation; and since it is only by free apprehension that man can enjoy that which belongs to his concept, so it is on man's own account alike wise and right that God should not immediately give him the highest boon, and that, as respects redemption, a deliverance from guilt and penalty such as instead of suadela should be βίᾳ,—*i.e.*, such as, being spiritual, should be brought about in a non-spiritual, physical way,—was not possible. Hence it appears the *Divine attributes* and the *nature of man* alike demand the spiritual process by which Christ is changed into the likeness of man.

He has thus laid a basis not only for Christ's appearing in humiliation, but, by means of the idea of the Divine rectitude, also for His sufferings, namely, the necessity of a penal endurance. In conclusion, he gives hints how this may turn out for our good.

The concept of rectitude, which he was constrained by the Gnostics, especially Marcion, more closely to perpend, de-

mands as well punishment for sin as that mankind should stand before God not in an abnormal state, but according to its normal development, and through that as well-pleasing to God. Righteousness in the work of redemption is by no means with him only the Divine, orderly method of this work, or its true historical character (Duncker l. c. 176 f.). This order may belong to his idea of righteousness, but its main momentum is formed by what is above named.[1]

Humanity is since Adam's sin under the bondage of sin and death, and cannot of itself come forth to eternal and divine life. It was also impossible to change the once captivated, or to suffer the sinner to enjoy salvation (iii. 20, p. 245). Now, that truth might not fail, the Son appeared. If His coming as man was needful because only so could we come into fellowship with the immortal, the Divine one, not less needful was His becoming incarnate to suffer and die, when sin had to be taken away. Here also righteousness forbade sin and death to be immediately annihilated, or the abnormal development to be viewed immediately as normal. A man had fallen; a man must make satisfaction. Thus only through the act of our race could redemption come to be established; for righteousness must hold by our race. Now, none of the first birth were competent to accomplish this act, to complete this undertaking. Nevertheless He who is competent falls within the sphere of our race. If to the concept of each of us belongs the participation of the Spirit, there belongs also to humanity, as it is in God's idea, He in whom the Spirit dwells without measure; the fons Spiritus Sancti (comp the 4th fragment, p. 469) is for all of us, inasmuch as and because in Him the Son became man. The Son or Logos is the original type after which and to which man was at first made. Thus from the beginning there belonged to the essence of man a participation in Him, so that, so far from the appearing of the original type among us, His copies, being pronounced something contrary to the human nature or the idea of humanity, the entrance of the original type is rather to be viewed as bringing with it, for the first time, true and perfect humanity (iv. 59, v. 16, iii. 21).

Hence he often says that the man bare and apprehended

[1] Duncker (comp. p. 252 with 246) handles this concept with too little precision and firmness.

the Son of God (iii. 18, p. 240; v. 18, 20 comp. v. 8, 2; iii. 21, iv. 37, 68, 75). It was not a Gnostic *labes* or *ignorantia*, nor angels, that made the world, but God, who, bearing the world, so made it that it could bear Him (v. 18), *i.e.*, as that it should be susceptible from the beginning of an incarnation of God, since it is by this that the creation begun in Adam is for the first time completed and perfected. Hence he repeats, in view of the earlier stages of the development of revelation, that the human nature had by degrees to be accustomed to bear God; and also as respects the Word, he treats His earlier revelations as a *becoming* of His incarnation, the end which from the beginning was to be reached (iv. 13, 14, 15, 17, 26, 27, v. 8, iii. 22, 33, 37). Now, if it belongs to love in general to act for others, how much more to the Son, who is the revelation of love (iii. 40, iv. 37)? He can, however, assume the place of man over against the law because He Himself is man, yea, humanity in its entire intensity (compendium humani generis). He comprehends humanity in Himself.[1] In Him has appeared the original type with which humanity stands from the beginning in essential vital connection, from which it sprang (iv. 37, p. 330), and to have part in which, when it shall have become real, completes each individual according to his concept (v. 1, 5, 6, 16). According to this, *His history is the history of humanity in its principle.* And high as Irenæus places freedom, he yet does not forget also the common basis of life. This, indeed, as physical, has no power over us; the Son, who is the basis of our life, cannot save us βίᾳ; but when He appears as *Dilectio*, and so operates spiritually, He can, without disparagement to righteousness, without annihilation of freedom, through the power of love and His relationship to mankind, make their history His own, assume the caro inimica (iv. 14), gather the ἔχθρα to Himself (iv. 78), and that in such a way as that this same Dilectio, His personal righteousness, shall absorb and abolish the ἔχθρα, sin and death. Justa caro reconciliavit eam carnem, quæ in peccato detinebatur; and that by His assuming no other caro than ours, the inimica. Thus are we in His obedience ὑπήκοοι (v. 16), inasmuch as we believe, and in believing yield up the isolated personality (freedom of choice), choosing Him, espousing ourselves to Him.

[1] Appendix, Note AAAAA.

Mankind, in the wide distribution of itself, has taken an abnormal direction. Hence salvation is, according to Irenæus, a recapitulation of the history of mankind *per oppositum*. The abnormal is rectified and secured by means of this, that advancing regressively, per recirculationem (iii. 33), even to the beginning (recapitulendo longam expositionem generis humani, iii. 20, p. 245), the same happens in a normal way in Him, and through Him in whom is the idea of humanity itself. He must join the end to the beginning, in order to unite in Himself all peoples, tongues, and generations of men (iii. 33). Humanity, however, is set forth as the normal man through the love of Christ, which in that ideal regression to the beginning assumes on itself all the sins, guilt, and punishment of men. This sin and guilt it bears and expiates, and in this expiation there is exhibited the holy humanity, that which suffers or that which abolishes sin by its whole obedience (iii. 31, 20, iv. 37, v. 1, 16, 424*b*, Christus eam, quæ in ligno facta fuerat, inobedientiam per eam quæ in ligno fuerat, obedientiam sanans).

After His infinite love, says he (L. v. præf. 392*b*), hath the Word of God become what we are, in order that He might make us what He is. Perfect in all things, as omnipotent Word and real man He has in a spiritual way (*i.e.*, not βίᾳ, but rationabiliter) saved us, having given Himself up as a ransom for those who are thus bound (v. 1). He has, full of love, poured Himself forth to gather us into the bosom of the Father (v. 2, 395). By the Spirit He has brought God to men, and, on the other hand, has carried man to God by His incarnation (v. 1, 393). God's glory is the *living* man (iv. 37, p. 333*b*); man's life is the vision of God. Now, the Word bare always in Himself the lineaments, as it were, of all future things, and of all His revelations (p. 336*a*), and inclusively also that economy by means of which men shall come to the vision of God (332*a*), *i.e.*, the incarnation, in which Christ represented God to men and men to God (333*b*), espoused the end to the beginning, man to God (331*b*). The Invisible became visible, the Incomprehensible conceivable. He who was incapable of suffering became liable to suffering, the Word became man (iii. 18, 241*b*), uniting all in Himself and so also men, in order that, as the Word is King in the supercelestial, invisible, and spiritual sphere, so also He might take to Himself the rule in

the visible and corporeal, and, placing Himself as Head of the Church, might draw all to Himself at the right time.

By the doctrine of the incarnation all the doctrines of the heretics are abolished. They utter what is foolish who would make the appearance of Christ merely Doketic; for then had He made only a deceptive show, and the truth is not in Him (iv. 1). Vain also is the declaration that our flesh is not capable of receiving the immortal (v. 2). If He has not appeared, we must await the appearance of another; the old world (v. 14: antiqua plasmatio Adæ) is rendered abortive, and we are not saved (v. 1; 394). He was, therefore, what He seemed to be (v. 1); He became what we are (iii. 32, 260*a*). But as we are body from the earth, and soul which receives the Holy Ghost from God, the Word has also become this, presenting His creature as completed in Himself (in semetipsum recapitulans); and hence He calls Himself Son of man (iii. 32, 260), the principalis homo (v. 21, p. 432*a*; iii. 18, v. 18).

He entered into Mary in order to take for Himself of her substance: the old mass He must appropriate; otherwise He would not be similar to us (iii. 32). From the like substance He has a body as we have; else is He a stranger to us, and hath not perfected man in Himself (v. 14, 421*a*). Had He His flesh otherwise than from Mary, then is He not flesh. Caro enim vere primæ plasmationis a limo factæ successio. He must become that which had fallen. But this has flesh and blood; and consequently so also had Christ.

The soul of Christ was not especially called in question by the Gnostics. Nevertheless in the above passage (iii. 32, 260*a*) there is ascribed to Christ similarity with us in this respect. And it will hardly do to regard ψυχὴ as denoting the mere principle of animal life. For when Irenæus says (v. 1), He gave His σὰρξ for our σάρξ, His ψυχὴ for our ψυχαὶ, the ψυχὴ no less than the σὰρξ of Christ must be taken in the same sense as in us. But it is not probable that Irenæus would say that He had redeemed our animal body, and not rather our soul also; and consequently ψυχὴ here must mean *soul*, for which also the plural ψυχαὶ speaks. Nor is this an isolated statement with Irenæus. He says (v. 14), caro Christi non peccavit, neque inventus est dolus in anima ejus; in iii. 32, p. 260, he adduces, in proof of Christ's true humanity, the passage, Matt. xxvi. 38,

"My soul is troubled;" and the passage, "He is not left in Hades," is also referred to Christ (iii. 12, 225*a*). The Gnostics think, he says, v. 31, 450, 451, that as soon as they die they shall ascend above the heavens to the Demiurg. But the Lord Himself was three days in Hades, as David had prophesied, saying, "Thou hast delivered my soul from the lowermost world." "The Lord remembered His saints who were dead, and descended to them" (Eph. iv. 9). It deserves special note, also, that in states which are opposed to the nature of the Logos, as, e. gr., the temptation, he regards the Logos as resting in Christ. For, since he views these states as not merely animal, but as conscious (iii. 32, 260), there is presupposed for such momenta as those in which the Logos is in repose, a human consciousness, a soul. The fundamental thought, which is here decisive, that Christ in order to redeem us must become what we are, that the conquest of sin and of death might be the deed of a man, is most clearly brought out; and with this it would be strange if there did not appear in him a progress in this to something more definite. We have thus in Irenæus the fitting transition to Tertullian's doctrine, which was still more precisely formed through the opposition to it of the patripassian views then coming into vogue. It is undeniable that in this matter his peculiar anthropology was of service to Irenæus (see above). A man is one who has a soul in a body, which soul is free and receptive (δεκτική) of the carnal, the spiritual, the divine. Through this his free soul man becomes a rational being, even when through sinking himself in the carnal, he becomes brutish. To his full concept, however, to his truth, it belongs that his freedom shall accept the Divine Pneuma. Now, what this Pneuma is in man, that was the Logos in Christ; for a rational, free human soul there is consequently room in Christ along with the Logos, just as there is in men generally along with the Pneuma. Hence the significancy which he finds in the temptation of Christ (v. 21, 22, iii. 21). Whether the origin of the soul by which man becomes a rational being is regarded by Irenæus as by traduction or by creation, is, so far as our inquiry is concerned, of no moment. For the identity of Christ's humanity with ours remains established in either case.[1]

[1] Hence it is a matter of indifference to us how Irenæus views the ψυχή in relation to the αἷμα or αἷμα λογικόν. The former is with him, besides,

The more strenuously he labours to show the thorough identity of the humanity of Christ with ours (iii. 32), so much the more does he seek to bring out His distinction from us.

"The Ebionites also," says he, v. 1, "talk foolishly, who do not receive into their soul through faith the union of God and man, but persist in the old leaven of a birth through which we are heirs of death. They reject the mingling with heavenly wine, and will to remain only earthly water, not receiving God to mix with them. They thus adhere to him who has been subdued and driven out of Paradise, Adam, not considering that, as the Divine breath of life conjoined with Adam's frame presented a living rational being (animal rationale), so at the end the Word of the Father and the Spirit conjoined, with the old substance of the Adamic frame, produces a living and perfect man, who apprehends the perfect Father; so that we, who in the living Adam have all died, might be all made alive in the spiritual. For never did Adam escape the hands of God [the Word and the Spirit], to which the Father said, Let us make man after our image and likeness! And in the end, not from the will of the flesh, nor from the will of man, but according to the Father's good pleasure, have His hands perfected the living man in order that Adam might become according to God's image and likeness." And v. 16, p. 424, he says: "It is said, it is true, in past times, that man is in the image and likeness of God, but this was not exhibited. For the Word was as yet invisible, after the image (εἰκών) of which man was made. Hence he easily lost his resemblance (ὁμοίωμα). But when the Word of God became flesh, then it certified both (ἐπεκύρωσε). For, on the one hand, He truly showed the image (the original type), since He became what his image was; and, on the other, established the similarity, the exact conformity of men, since He

the λογικὴ ζωή, the principle of the corporeal life. Comp. v. 4, 6-9. In the former edition I brought into question whether the "soul of Christ" was recognised by Irenæus. Further research, however, and closer consideration of the above passages has convinced me that Irenæus distinctly ascribes a soul to Christ, and this I years ago put down in the text. Since then Duncker's work has appeared, and he, p. 206 ff., has, as it seems to me, made this so evident, that henceforth it can hardly admit of a doubt. He sets this forth in reply to me, but Irenæus himself had before convinced me of it. So much the more have I cause to rejoice over the independent agreement of our results.

made man like the invisible Father. He made Himself a man, and men like Himself, that man by his resemblance to the Son might become precious to the Father."

Christ is thus, according to Irenæus, a being not foreign to mankind, but rather the representation of perfect humanity, the idea on which Adam was at first created, but which was not wrought out in Adam. As little, however, is He of the Adamic race. He is truly conceived only as a descent of the Logos, the primal type, into the world of those formed on His model, in order to be in the world the real Head and Type (iii. 18, p. 241*b*). He was born of the Virgin without sin.

But since the Logos is elevated above becoming and suffering, and, on the contrary, the concept of freedom and growth in man occupies so important a place with Irenæus, there arises the difficult question: How does Irenæus view the two as in connection in the one person of Christ? The medium of union, according to him, is the Holy Ghost. It is not an adventitious circumstance that *both* the Word and the Spirit are viewed by him as operating in the incarnation; this is for him altogether a necessary determination.

The Holy Ghost,[1] who, according to Irenæus, inspires (in different gradations) matter in general, does this especially for men. Humanity would be like arid, parched land, falling to pieces without unity, incapable of producing fruit, were it without a moistening dew from heaven to keep together the mass (*i.e.*, without the inner bond). It would be like a dry tree, of which the accuser could only demand the burning. The rain

[1] When Baur (Trin. i. 179) finds a subordinational and montanistic doctrine of the Trinity in the words of the Presbyter in Irenæus, v. 36: hanc esse adornationem et dispositionem eorum qui salvantur—et per hujusmodi gradus proficere, et per Spiritum quidem ad filium, per filium autem ascendere ad Patrem (he might also have adduced the passage still more immediately appertaining to Irenæus, iv. 37, p. 332*b*),—he seems to have overlooked that the passage speaks of a dispositio eorum qui salvantur, not divinæ naturæ. It is not the Divine nature that makes progress (gradus), but Christians. The same thought occurs iv. 37, and it is indeed clear that a gradation in revelation belongs to a progress from step to step in faith; but this progress does not involve a gradation in the Divine essence itself, still less the doctrine of an immanent Trinity besides the economic, as a glance at iv. 37 shows. But how there is here anything of Montanism, according to which the Paraclete is the last and highest revelation of God, I cannot see.

from heaven, the living water, the Holy Ghost, makes the dry tree fruitful, produces the well-watered soil. He, aptans hominem Deo (iii. 19, p. 244*a*), fits the human nature (σάρκα) to receive the Son. And as He has already in the Prophets accustomed men to the union of God with man, so hath He also accustomed Himself with Christ to dwell in the race of man. In the incarnation the Word and the Spirit so co-operated (v. 1, p. 394*b*) that the Holy Ghost prepared the hominem spiritalem (iii. 33), the second Adam, in which the Logos found a man assimilated to Himself (*ib.*), who was His perfect organ. This man, normal in every moment, gathered strength and grew even in respect of the actual participation of the Spirit; and the baptism of Christ, which had reference only to His humanity, is the perfect anointing of Him with the Holy Ghost (iii. 10, 19). And now He is, even in His humanity, the fountain of the Holy Ghost for all who believe in Him. Even before Christ, whatever the Spirit wrought in men was also the work of the Logos; and Irenæus seems to view the relation of the two in general, and also in the incarnation, in such a way as that he ascribes the Divine, in so far as it has become the subjective actual Divine life of man, to the Holy Ghost, as the principle of the μόρφωσις, as He Himself is called Figuratio Dei and Sapientia; whilst to the Logos he ascribes the creative power itself which brings into being. Thus, in his view, the agency of the Spirit presupposes the willing and working of the Son; and the second Adam, the spiritual Man, is not somehow perfected by the Holy Ghost, before the Logos enters into Him as into a place prepared for Him, but they act together, so as that the formation of a living, nay, spiritual man, is only the realization of the Son's will in love and power to become in him a man. This may be also thus expressed: What in a later age was called communicatio idiomatum, was in the earliest age ascribed to the co-working of the Holy Ghost with the Son. So in the Pastor of Hermas and by Clement of Alexandria.

It specially deserves notice that Irenæus seems, by this agency of the Spirit in reference to humanity, to gain space for a relative independence of the humanity of Christ, such as is demanded by the concept of temptation, suffering, human growth. Without detriment to the indissoluble unio of the Logos with man, there is obtained from his positions the possi-

bility of thinking the incarnation as by the fundamental act not completed but begun. The idea of incarnation with him is, that Christ is the presentation and reality of the original type, or the Logos actually in a man; that the principalis homo, the second Adam, is nothing but the primitive in the momentum of actuality. Now, since the primitive type has no becoming (werden), still less liability to temptation, whilst in his view the becoming of Christ is so important, it follows immediately from his premisses that the incarnation of the primitive type cannot be thought by him as one finished. In every moment, indeed, of His earthly life, Christ is the invisible become visible (iii. 21); and, as the light of the Father entered into the humanity of the Lord, so it comes beaming forth from Him on us (iv. 37, p. 331*a*); but that the humanity of Christ was from the first adequate to the Logos, and thereby to its proper idea, is denied expressly by his laying so much stress on the baptism and temptation of Christ (see above). If, on the other hand, there be taken in addition to this, the decision with which he vindicates the concept of growth and freedom to the race of man, there is desiderated therewith a relative independence of the humanity of Christ; and the perfected incarnation, the full reality of that idea, according to which the man has assimilated to himself the Word (Verbum homo assimilatus est), comes to pass only in the exalted state of Christ; not merely in appearance, but objectively. In fact, his doctrine concerning the ἡσυχάζειν of the Logos, e. gr., in the temptation, leads to this. He represses as yet His activity in its full compass, in order that the free human development of Christ, His susceptibility of temptation, may find scope; consequently he leaves the humanity during the earthly life of Christ still in a relative independence; and the process of the incarnation is an advancing one, until with the perfecting of men both factors absolutely coincide. During the period of the process it is the Pneuma, which unfolds itself out of the Logos, in measure suited to each stage, in the humanity of Christ, forms the humanity and brings it to an actual existence, and also secures and mediates the union of the humanity with the Logos Himself for the time during which the former needs still a relative independence in order to have a true human development. The idea of humanity, however, as well as that of the incarnation of the Logos, is realized to

Irenæus in Christ's exaltation, although before that, at each step of the development, Christ was a perfect man, *i.e.*, one who presented the norm and idea of each age in the life of man. And He now preserves for ever humanity equalized with the Logos, but not absorbed thereby; He will return to judgment as the Son of man; He went to heaven ἔνσαρκος, and so will He again appear (iii. 18, pp. 242–245).[1]

[1] Appendix, Note BBBBB.

APPENDIX.

NOTES.

Note A, page 20.

In what follows, Philo's system will be considered principally in the light of the Messianic idea,—a course, the justice of which appears at once, when a correct view is taken of his very variously estimated doctrine of the Logos.—Compare Dähne's "Geschichtliche Darstellung der jüdisch-alexandrinischen Religionsphilosophie," 1834 (reviewed by Baur in the "Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik," 1835, November Number, pp. 95 f.); Gfrörer's "Philo und die alexandrinische Theosophie," Stuttg. 1831; Grossmann's "Quæstiones Philoneæ," Leipzig 1829; L. A. Simson's "Summa Theolog. Joann. Diss." 1839, pp. 28–64; Georgii's Essay, "über die neuesten Gegensätze in Auffassung der alexandrinischen Religionsphilosophie, ins besondere des jüdischen Alexandrinismus," in Illgen's "Zeitschrift für historische Theologie," 1839, Parts 3 and 4; Dr Ed. v. Muralt's "Untersuchungen über Philo in Beziehung auf die der (petersb.) Akademie gehörige Handschrift von 27 Tractaten desselben, vorgelesen d. 5 Juni 1840;" Semisch's "Justin der Märtyrer," vol. ii. 1842, pp. 267–274; Baur's "Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und Menschwerdung Gottes," 1841, vol. i., pp. 59–76; Baur's "Christliche Gnosis," 1835, pp. 42 ff.; Lücke's "Commentar zum Evangelium Johannis," 3d ed., vol. i. 253, 272 ff. (where also the older literature of this subject is given); A. Franck's "Die Kabbala, oder die Religionsphilosophie der Hebräer" (translated from the French by Ad. Gelinek, Leipzig 1844, specially pp. 215–249); Ritter's

"Geschichte der Philosophie" iv. 418, 446 ff.; Neander's "Church History," vol. i.; not to mention expositions, at second-hand, like that of Strauss in his "Kritik der christlichen Glaubenslehre" i. 414 f.—The different views taken of Philo's system appear to be gradually converging towards the one, namely, that it is compounded of heterogeneous elements, and that it carries out the old distinction between the revealed and the hidden God, in a peculiar manner:—in the view of Lücke (page 253), the theologumena of Wisdom and of the Word meet and unite in the Logos, whom Philo distinguishes from God; in the view of others, the Logos of Philo was, in the last instance, a purely *ideal* potence. (G. A. Meier, for example, in his "Geschichte d. Lehre v. der Trinität," vol. i., pp. 20 ff., maintains that the Logos of Philo is a mere abstraction, the idea of the world; he concedes to it merely theoretical significance.) The controversy relates principally to the following questions:—

I. Whether the Logos of Philo was a mere personification or a real hypostasis? Many of the more recent writers have decided in favour of the latter alternative: for example, besides Grossmann, Dähne, Gfrörer, Ritter, Lücke (page 279), Semisch (page 274), also some of the older authors, as Keil and Ballenstedt. Still Lücke has not failed to see that the counter-arguments advanced by the Reviewer of the works of Grossmann and Gfrörer in the Leipziger Litteratur-Zeitung (see No. 126, pp. 1001 f., 1831; No. 255, pp. 2029 ff.) have great weight. Simson, von Muralt, partially also Franck and others, are opposed to the writers just mentioned. Both Lücke and Semisch allow that Philo is not always self-consistent; see the remarks of the latter on the passage cited page 274: "Philo, it is true, does not throughout strictly recognise the personality of the Logos; sometimes, he apparently reduces it from the rank of a person to that of a mere attribute," and so forth.—Lücke brings together as completely as possible the arguments for the personality of Philo's Logos:—1. Philo terms the Logos ἀρχάγγελος. But he designates him also ἀρχιερεὺς, παράκλητος; and Lücke allows that these words prove as little as σφραγὶς or δεσμός. Further, even supposing ἀρχάγγελος should be taken in the same sense as the Old Testament angels alluded to by Philo, still these latter are so identified with the ἰδέαι, λόγοι, δυνάμεις.

that their personality is often questionable. Nay more, as the Logos, again, is represented as the unity of these δυνάμεις or ἄγγελοι, instead of arguing,—because the angels are personal, therefore the Logos also is personal; the reverse course of argument might with equal justice be adopted, namely, either the Logos is personal, and then the angels relatively to Him are not personal, but the impersonal powers, of which He is the unity; or the angels are personal, and then the Logos, who is their unity, is not personal. 2. Philo designates the Logos δεύτερος Θεός (see Euseb. Præp. Evang. vii. 13). But he immediately adds, that he merely says that catachrestically; for a δεύτερος Θεὸς would be, in his view, strictly speaking, a contradictio in adjecto. The passage unquestionably relates to a less perfect divine element, which is capable of coming into contact with the world, whereas the highest divine element cannot do so. But whether this less perfect divine element is personal, or merely one aspect of God, to which in thought a kind of independent existence is attributed,—the aspect, namely, of revelation which, without being actually personal, may be personified, —is not thereby decided. For, do not even more modern writers speak of something in God which is not God,—of God in altereity, and so forth? 3. The Logos is the image of God; but God is personal, therefore also the Logos. But the body of man also is the reflex of his spirit; and a mirror reflects back the form. The Logos is undoubtedly living; but so also are impersonal forces. Besides, by the same line of argument, we should be fully justified in asserting all nature to be personal, on the ground that the Logos, whose reflex it is, is personal. 4. To these considerations some add (for example, Semisch) the argumentation from the idea of the Logos as the being who mediates between God and the world. Lücke himself, however, rightly felt that the idea of mediator (ἀρχιερεὺς) proves nothing. Even God Himself, in one aspect of His nature, could effect the mediation at which Philo aimed. Such a mediation is not ethical, but simply physical or metaphysical. Baur acknowledges the existence of a totally unreconciled contradiction in Philo's system: in his view, indeed, it contains two systems—a God who has no power at all to reveal Himself; and again a world, which, through the Logos, is a revelation of God (p. 63). This Logos, Baur concludes to be, on the one hand, hyposta-

tical; in that he distinguishes between Him and *σοφία*, representing the latter as an attribute of the Most High God, along with the two others, subordinated to it, namely, power and goodness. Out of these three, specially out of wisdom, the Logos was an hypostatic outflow. The *σοφία* in God holds the same relation to the Logos, as the *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* in man to the *λόγος προφορικός*. But how anything more than the veritable reality of the Logos can be deduced from this relation—how His existence as a subject can be deduced therefrom, is not shown. Nay more, Baur has failed to prove even that a settled distinction was made between the Logos and *σοφία*: in order to do this, he must point out passages where the latter is represented as speaking, creating; and the former, as a creature,—ideas which lay far beyond Philo's horizon. On the other hand, Baur considers Philo's Logos again to be a completely empty, formal conception; he holds Him to be the idea of the world or the world conceived as an unity,—on which supposition everything would assume a nominalistic character (p. 74). In the judgment of Franck also, the one system of Philo really embraces two. He, however, postulates, in addition to the Hellenic factor, a cabbalistic one, derived from Persia: in my view, on the contrary, all the main peculiarities of Philo's system may be explained by the conflict between the Hellenic Absolute, which appeared to Philo infinitely exalted and imposing, and the Old Testament conception of God. Unlike Plotinus, he did not take his stand firmly and alone on the Absolute, the *ὄν*; but, however strong a hold that Hellenic idea had on him, the Old Testament conception of God still retained an influence. His endeavours to adapt the latter to the former, deemed by him to be the higher, involved his whole system in a chaotic circling and vacillation. He sinks under the undertaking to prove the religion of the Old Testament to be identical with that of the Hellenic Absolute, whose glory consists in the fact, that everything besides it is a mere shadow of its own glory, which it shuts up within itself. He thus sacrifices the ethical absoluteness or exaltedness of God to a physical absoluteness, in the fancy that he is thereby serving the interests of *θεοπρέπεια*. But though he makes this sacrifice, he never arrives at the goal of his wishes, because the other factor, his empirical starting-point, was religion; and the justification of his religion as the absolutely true

one, ever remained his main object. It is true, he puts a new construction on it, he universalizes and dissipates it, in order to honour it; notwithstanding this, he was *unwilling* to arrive at the conclusion, that God alone really exists, or that there is nothing but the absolute idea and the knowledge of it. On the contrary, his constant aim was the union of philosophy and religion, understanding by religion that of the Old Testament, rightly understood and viewed in its inmost substance. However different these views may appear, all will without difficulty allow that the Logos, if actually hypostatized by Philo, must have been regarded solely as a being standing outside of the Divine sphere, separated from and subordinated to God. If Philo had the idea of creation, then, in case he hypostatized the Logos, he must have held Him to be a creature, as did the Arians at a later period. He does not, however, represent Him as a mere creature, but as an emanation; and thus apparently approaches nearer to the Christian idea, which found expression at a subsequent period in the term ὁμοουσία. In reality, however, an emanatistic conception of God stands nearer to heathenism than to Christianity; and in the very nature of the case, an emanatistic personality is always characterized by a measure of vagueness and shiftingness. And, inasmuch as a difference is scarcely discoverable between an emanatistic conception of archetype, and the revealed, in distinction from the hidden, God, it matters very little whether, with Lücke, we hold the Logos of Philo to be hypostatized, that is, after an emanatistic manner; or, deny the presence of a Divine hypostasis in Philo's system, at the same time conceding the distinction between the revealed and hidden God. The question respecting the personality of the Logos of Philo is of a much narrower interest than is often supposed, and may, to a certain extent, be described as a quæstio vexata; for it lay entirely beyond his range of vision; and as the physical categories to which he confines himself shut out every conception of personality, it was quite impossible for him to answer it.

II. The second question is,—*Whether Philo's Logos* (whatever may be its relation to hypostasis) *can be conceived as truly Divine?* This question has been partially answered in the course of the preceding remarks. We have, above all things, to ask, whether Philo's conception of God Himself is truly Divine, or

whether it is not rather physical? If the latter, its incompatibility with Christianity is manifest at the very outset. In the sphere which is subject to categories derived from nature, it is impossible that full justice should be done, either to the distinctions or to the unity (compare, for example, the categories of ground and existence, thing and its qualities, essence and phænomenon, whole and parts, force and expression, substance and accident, in the second volume of Hegel's "Logik"). Accordingly, if Philo has not the true conception of God, his Logos must of necessity be destitute of true divinity. But even the Divine, according to Philo's idea of it, in which all things are one, cannot really pertain to his Logos. For that which he esteems the best and inmost part of God is incommunicable; or, regarded from another point of view, the Absolute acknowledged by Philo, does not admit of distinctions in the inmost Divine sphere, but merely has a circle of rays, a world of light round itself, in which it is reflected: that is the Divine in its aspect as a revelation, comprehended and summed up in the Logos. Compare the "De Cherub." § 28, ed. Richter; Mangey i. 156.

NOTE B, page 21.

Compare "Quod Deus sit immutabilis," § 11, p. 281, Richter ii. 77,—*Τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν ψυχῆς, οἱ δὲ σώματος γεγόνασι φίλοι.. Οἱ μὲν οὖν ψυχῆς ἑταῖροι νοηταῖς καὶ ἀσωμάτοις φύσεσιν ἐνομιλεῖν δυνάμενοι, οὐδεμιᾷ τῶν γεγονότων ἰδέᾳ παραβάλλουσι τὸ ὄν· ἀλλ' ἐμβιβάσαντες αὐτὸ πάσης ποιότητος — τὴν κατὰ τὸ εἶναι μόνον φαντασίαν ἐνεδέξαντο, μὴ μορφώσαντες αὐτό.* That is blessedness and the acme of joy, to think the *ψιλὴν ἄνευ χαρακτῆρος Θεοῦ ὕπαρξιν.* Lovers of the body, on the contrary, are unable to conceive God's pure simple nature; they conceive Him therefore as themselves ("de præm. et pœn." 6, T. ii. 414, Richter v. 226).

NOTE C, page 22.

Compare "de Somn." i. 25 (T. i. 644). Jacob saw the Lord in a dream, the *ἀρχώγγελος ὑπεράνω γὰρ ὡς ἅρματος ἡνίοχον, ἢ ὡς νεὼς κυβερνήτην, ὑπολεπτέον ἵστασθαι τὸ Ὄν, ἐπὶ σωμάτων, ἐπὶ ψυχῶν, ἐπὶ θρεμμάτων, ἐπὶ λόγων, ἐπὶ ἀγ-*

γέλων, ἐπὶ γῆς, etc. ἐπ' αἰσθητικῶν δυνάμεων, ἐπ' ἀοράτων φύσεων ὅσαπερ θεατὰ καὶ ἀθέατα. Τὸν γὰρ κόσμον ἅπαντα ἐξάψας ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἀναρτήσας τὴν τοσαύτην ἡνιοχεῖ φύσιν.

NOTE D, page 22.

"De confus. ling." § 27; Mangey, T. i. 425. On Genesis xi. 5, "The Lord descended, to look at the city." It was thus spoken on account of our ὠφέλεια. Ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ Θεοῦ πεπλήρωται τὰ πάντα, περιέχοντος οὐ περιεχομένου, ᾧ πανταχοῦ τε καὶ οὐδαμοῦ συμβέβηκεν εἶναι μόνῳ. He is nowhere, in so far as it is impossible for Him to be in any space, who has produced both space and that which is corporeal: He is everywhere, ὅτι τὰς δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ διὰ γῆς καὶ ὕδατος, ἀέρος τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ τείνας μέρος οὐδὲν ἔρημον ἀπολέλοιπε τοῦ κόσμου, πάντα δὲ συναγαγὼν διὰ πάντων ἀοράτοις ἔσφιγξε δεσμοῖς. "De Cherub." § 24, Mangey, T. i. 153:—Ἴδιον Θεοῦ τὸ ποιεῖν ὃ οὐ θέμις ἐπιγράψασθαι γεννητῷ (not therefore to the Logos, so far as He was γεννητὸς) ἴδιον δὲ γεννητοῦ τὸ πάσχειν.

NOTE E, page 22.

Compare "De Cher." § 24, not. 17; but especially the "de opificio mundi," T. i. 2, § 2. Μωϋσῆς ἔγνω, ὅτι ἀναγκαιότατόν ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι, τὸ μὲν εἶναι δραστήριον αἴτιον, τὸ δὲ παθητικόν. Καὶ ὅτι τὸ μὲν δραστήριον ὁ τῶν ὅλων νοῦς ἐστιν εἰλικρινέστατος καὶ ἀκραιφνέστατος, κρειττων τε ἢ ἀρετὴ, καὶ κρειττων ἢ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ κρειττων ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν· τὸ δὲ παθητικὸν, ἄψυχον καὶ ἀκίνητον ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, κινηθὲν δὲ καὶ σχηματισθὲν καὶ ψυχωθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ, μετέβαλεν εἰς τὸ τελειότατον ἔργον, τόνδε τὸν κόσμον. On the other hand, in the "de opificio mundi," § 5, he remarks, εἰ γάρ τις ἐθελήσειε τὴν αἰτίαν, ἧς ἕνεκα τόδε τὸ πᾶν ἐδημιουργεῖτο, διερευνᾶσθαι, δοκεῖ μοι μὴ διαμαρτεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ φάμενος, ὅπερ καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων εἶπέ τις· ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸν πατέρα καὶ ποιητὴν οὗ χάριν τῆς ἀρίστης αὐτοῦ φύσεως οὐκ ἐφθόνησεν οὐσίᾳ, μηδ' ἐξ ἑαυτῆς ἐχούσῃ καλὸν, δυναμένῃ δὲ γενέσθαι πάντα. Matter is ἄποιος, ἄψυχος in itself; nay further, ἄτακτος, ἀσυμφωνίας, etc., μεστή, but susceptible of being animated by a soul and reduced to harmony.

NOTE F, page 23.

The soul is an *ἀπόσπασμα τῆς θείας καὶ εὐδαίμονος ψυχῆς οὐ διαιρετόν. Τέμνεται γὰρ οὐδὲν τοῦ θείου κατ' ἀπάρτησιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐκτείνεται.* Quod deterior potiori insidietur, § 24, T. i. 209. One might now imagine, that Philo did after all conceive the soul to be personal, although he describes it as a mere extension of God; and that the Logos, therefore, was personal. That would be correct, if Philo had not been necessitated to regard the personality of man as a limit imposed by the body—a limit from which the Logos is free. Compare the "De Leg. Alleg." ii. 21, Mangey, T. i. 82: *ἡ ἀκρότομος πέτρα ἡ σοφία τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστιν, ἣν ἄκραν καὶ πρωτίστην ἔτεμεν ἀπὸ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεων*, etc.; where the word *ἔτεμεν* must be explained in agreement with the above passage.

NOTE G, page 23.

An attentive reading of "De Somn." L. i. § 37–41, T. i. 655 ff., leads to the conclusion, that in Philo's estimation, the idea of a Divine duality or plurality owes its rise to the inferiority of the point of view of him who entertains it: it originates with the *φαντασία*, as he elsewhere designates it ("de Abrah." § 24, 25); and this holds true, he expressly says, of a Logos alongside of God. This *φαντασία*, he undoubtedly does not regard as purely arbitrary, as something merely subjective; for the one God manifests Himself in different ways, for the benefit of individuals, in order that at all stages they may be able to apprehend something of Him. For this reason, this appearance does not absolutely vanish, even on the highest stage of contemplation, that is, of true contemplation. But it continues no longer to be regarded as the highest; still less does the mind believe in the existence of two Divine persons: on the contrary, the Most High God appeared and was, in the form of the Logos, as the principle properly constitutive of the personality; the Logos, therefore, can only be regarded as the personal God, so long as the Most High God is not known. When once He is known, the Logos cannot be conceived to be anything more than the revelation of God, without any independent Divine hypostasis of His own.

NOTE H, page 23.

" De Agricult." § 12, Mangey, T. i. 309, ὁ πρωτόγονος υἱός; " de confus. ling." § 28, ὁ πρωτόγονος λόγος; § 14, πρεσβύτατος υἱός; " de conf. ling." §§ 20, 28, and " quis rerum divin. hæres," § 48, εἰκών; " de somn." i. 39, T. i. 656, Θεός; but, in distinction from ὁ Θεός, we can only speak catachrestically (καταχρηστικός = misapplied) of more than one. In the same sense also is the expression δεύτερος Θεὸς, in Eusebius' " Præp. Evang." vii. 13, to be taken. He is a mediator, when He is termed (as in " Quis rerum div. hær." § 42, T. i. 502) μέσος τῶν ἄκρων, ἀμφοτεροις ὁμηρεύων, because He is neither ungenerated like God, nor generated like men. Compare " de somn." ii. 28, T. i. 683, 684, εἰ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν δεῖ, μεθόριός τις Θεοῦ φύσις τοῦ μὲν ἐλάττων, ἀνθρώπου δὲ κρείττων. " Who is He then, if He is not man? God? That I should not like to say, for Moses received that name when he was designated in Egypt Pharaoh's god (that is, because it would be ethnic); but also not man. He is the one who touches both extremes, the basis and the apex" (that is, He is not a particular Divine person, but God, as the one who diffuses Himself, as the living). He is termed ἀρχιερεύς, ibid. § 27; " de profug." § 21. Through Him God constitutes Himself the means or the mediation of creation; He did not need another besides Himself (" de mundi opif." § 6, T. i. 5);—to suppose that a creature can create, would be a sin (" de Cherub." T. i. 153, § 24). Philo does not at all regard Him as a creature; but, on the contrary, as the guardian of the boundary between the creature and the Creator. " Quis rerum div. hær." § 42. In the same treatise He is also designated ἱκέτης, πρεσβευτής; as in the " de vita Moysis" iii. 14, T. ii. 155, παράκλητος. Like God, He is further termed ἀρχάγγελος, ἡνίοχος, ἡγεμών. But also in relation to God the δόξα (" de somn." i. 40, etc.), σκιὰ of God (" Leg. Alleg." iii. 31, T. i. 106), σκιὰ Θεοῦ ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ ἐστιν, ᾧ καθάπερ ὀργάνῳ προσχρησάμενος ἐκοσμοποίει. Αὕτη δὲ ἡ σκιὰ καὶ τὸ ὡσανεὶ ἀπεικόνισμα ἑτέρων ἐστιν ἀρχέτυπον. In His relation to the world, also, impersonal designations are frequently applied to Him; besides ὄργανον, we find also σφραγίς, δεσμὸς κόσμου, νόμος, the στήλη on which the All rests, the τόπος or the μητρόπολις of the universe, the ἰδέα τῶν ἰδεῶν, equivalent to γενικώτατος λόγος

in the "de mundi opificio," § 6, T. i. 5; "de migrat. Abr." § 18, T. i. 452,—*ἐκείνη μὲν ἡ σφραγὶς ἰδέα ἐστιν ἰδεῶν, καθ' ἣν ὁ Θεὸς ἐτύπωσε τὸν κόσμον, ἀσώματος δήπου καὶ νοητή.*

NOTE I, page 24.

Philo uses λόγος as identical also with *νοῦς*, both in man and in God. So in the "de opificio mundi" (see above), *τὸ μὲν δραστήριον ὁ τῶν ὅλων νοῦς ἐστιν*, etc., where he attributes to the *νοῦς* what he elsewhere attributes to the λόγος. In God Himself (see the "de migr. Abr." § 1, T. 1, 437), the Logos is designated the house, the dwelling-place, or the hearth (*ἑστία*) of the Divine *νοῦς*; it denotes, therefore, the fixed ideal centre of God. The *νοῦς* consequently signifies the active principle, that which elsewhere is termed λόγος. The λόγος is the resting-place of the world, also of the ideal world; He is its *τόπος*, or its possibility ("de mundi opific." § 5), *οὐδὲ ὁ ἐκ τῶν ἰδεῶν κόσμος ἄλλον ἂν ἔχοι τόπον, ἢ τὸν θεῖον λόγον.* All the *δυνάμεις* also dwell in Him; so also the *δύναμις κοσμοποιητικὴ*, which must be the source of the truly good, has its seat (that is, its fountain) in Him (ibid.). The λόγος, in this respect, is identical with the *σοφία*.—In the "De Ebriet." § 8, T. i. 361, the *ἐπιστήμη* of the Creator is represented as the Mother of created things, even as God is the Father. Copulating with it, though not after the manner of a man, God effected the generation and birth of the world (*ἔσπειρε γένεσιν*); "receiving into itself the seed of God, it gave birth to the only, beloved Son of God, this visible world." "Quod Deus sit immutabilis," § 6, T. i. 277,—*Ὁ δὲ πατὴρ καὶ τεχνίτης καὶ ἐπίτροπος τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ τε καὶ κόσμῳ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἐστι* (scil. *Θεός*). The ideal world is the elder, the visible world is the younger, son of God; time is the son of the world, and the grandson of God.

NOTE J, page 24.

"De vita Moys." L. iii. § 13, T. ii. 154:—*Διπλοῦν δὲ τὸ λογεῖον οὐκ ἄπο σκοποῦ. Διττὸς γὰρ ὁ λόγος ἐν τε τῷ παντὶ καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπου φύσει. Κατὰ μὲν τὸ πᾶν ὅ,τε περὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων καὶ παραδειγματικῶν ἰδεῶν, ἐξ ὧν ὁ νοητὸς ἐπάγη κόσμος, καὶ ὁ περὶ τῶν ὁρατῶν, ἃ δὴ μιμήματα καὶ ἀπεικονίσματα τῶν ἰδεῶν ἐκείνων ἐστίν.* In this passage, the Logos is first described in His relation to the ideal world;—be it that He is represented

as, as it were, the ideal material of which it was formed, or as its formative principle. If the former, "de confus. ling." T. i. 414, may be compared, where we read,—"The eldest Son imitated the ways of His Father, and, looking upon His archetypal images, created the forms (of the actual world);"—which passage proves that the ideal world is in the νοῦς of the Father, that the Father is its producer, and that consequently the Logos, when the same thing is attributed to Him, must be simply and solely the Father's νοῦς. In that case, all that remains for the elder Son is to be the principle of the visible world. At this point, for the first time, the question might be asked—Is not the Son, whom the Father γεννῇ, ἀνατέλλει for the γένεσις of the world, an hypostasis? On the second supposition, namely, that the Logos denoted the primal formative principle, we must bear in mind that God also is described as the producer of the ideal world, and that the Logos, therefore, must be identical with the understanding of God, which conceives the idea of the world. The second portion of the passage really does represent the Logos as the actual principle of the real world. But then, again, Philo quite as frequently considers God alone to be the Father of the All (see below).

NOTE K, page 25.

According to the fragment in A. Mai vii. 98 *b.*, he sees everywhere in the actual world discord and strife. He speaks differently, it is true, in the work "de incorrupt. mundi,"—for example, T. ii. pp. 495, 496. The only way of explaining the inconsistency is to distinguish between a lower and a higher view of the world,—a distinction which is repeatedly hinted at; —for example, "de Abrah." § 24, T. ii. pp. 18, 19; "de mutand. nomin." § 3, T. i. 581; "de præmiis" ii. 415; "quod Deus sit immutabilis," T. i. 281–283. Compare Note B, page 21.

NOTE L, page 27.

He speaks, it is true, frequently of the ἀγαθότης of God, which takes pity on matter, and is the motive of the creation or the formation of the world (for example, "de mundi opificio," § 5, T. i. 5); but it is inaccurate and premature to identify this ἀγαθότης with love. Ἀγαθότης has more the character of physical goodness. Further, if there had been no ὕλη (the ex-

istence of which Philo represents as contingent, relatively to, because independent of, God), there would have been no cause for compassion. Accordingly, he never advances beyond the view of the creation of the world as something contingent. He takes, it is true, a feeble step to a better view—feeble, because it is not ethical, but rather pagan in character—when he remarks, that inactivity and solitude would be as good as death to God.

Note M, page 29.

"De profugis," § 20, T. i. 562. Baur's gradation (l. c. 68 ff.):—1. *Wisdom* (God), with the fundamental forces of goodness and power; 2. *Logos*,—in the second stage corresponding to σοφία,—with Θεὸς and κύριος—corresponding to goodness and power in the first stage:—I do not find to be strictly observed by Philo, on the one hand; and, on the other hand, it no more proves that he considered the Logos to have a special personality, than that a particular thought (λόγος πρεσβύτερος) is something personal relatively to the act of thinking, or that a word (λόγος προφορικός) is personal relatively to a thought. That the determinations, power and goodness, along with wisdom, play a very important part in Philo's system, we shall see further on; they are important, however, not merely relatively to the inner essence of God,—indeed, strictly speaking, they are not at all important in that relation,—but he regards them as potences, δυνάμεις (T. ii. 261; "de sacrificant," § 13; "de profug." § 18 ff., T. i. 560 ff.), having a significance, also, relatively to the Divine activity. But of that essence of God, on the one hand, no attribute is predicable; whilst, on the other hand, it must be presupposed as the source of all attributes, though it itself posits no distinctions within itself.

Note N, page 30.

To this connection belongs the question, whether Philo applies to the Divine Logos itself the distinction between the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and the λόγος προφορικὸς. He makes use of the following words in the "de vita Moysis," T. ii. L. iii. p. 154:—"Two Logoses are to be distinguished, both in relation to the All, and in relation to man. In relation to the All, namely, we must distinguish between that Logos which stands related to the

incorporeal, archetypal ideas, of which the ideal world was compounded, and that Logos which stands related to visible things, to the imitations and copies of those ideas. In man, however, we must distinguish between the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and the λόγος προφορικὸς,—discourse which is still immanent (thought), and uttered discourse." In Philo's view, undoubtedly, both pairs must answer to each other; and he never wearies of carrying out this relation of resemblance between the Logos and man. By the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος in man, however, he cannot mean reason in a state of rest, but reason in its immanent activity—the world of human thoughts, which corresponds to the κόσμος νοητὸς of the Logos. Thus apprehended, the distinction between the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and the λόγος προφορικὸς, entirely in Philo's sense, may unhesitatingly, nay more, must, in any case, be substantially, transferred to the Divine Logos; and it is to be regarded as quite accidental that Philo did not, like some subsequent writers, apply the distinction himself. The spirit of the application he undoubtedly has, in that he teaches that, alongside of God, in Himself, there is the Logos in the above-mentioned twofold relation. But these two relations of the Logos are related to each other precisely as the Logos is related to God as He is in Himself, who is so often termed His Father. It pertains to the nature of likeness to God, that this relation, to wit, the self-distinction which is immanent in all life, should recur at every fresh stage.

NOTE O, page 37.

"De opificio mundi," p. 18. Evils, as the consequence of sin, he cannot of course deny; but so far as he refers them to God, he teaches that their sole end and aim is the benefit of man (T. i. 306; "de agricult." § 9; "de opif. mundi," T. i. 19); and he represents the task of repentance to be the reminding men of their own συμφέρον. Hence also he defines the righteousness of God to be the σωτήριον, not of the Divine law, of the unconditionally good, but of man and the world in its parts (see the fragment, T. ii. 664). In accordance with this, must the κολαστικὴ δύναμις also, which he attributes to the Ὄν, be explained. Of the same character is his physical, and neither ethical nor religious, demonstration of the providence and care of God for us (T. i.; de "opificio mundi," pp. 41-42):—That a

father should care for his child is *φύσεως νόμοις καὶ θεσμοῖς ἀναγκαῖον.*

NOTE P, page 38.

For this reason also, he terms the Scriptures *λόγος θεῖος* ("de migr. Abr." § 31, T. i. 463). We ought to be content with even the *ἄγραφα ἔθη* of his nation, as they are, and to make no alterations in them. ("De justit." l.c.) We must remember that these *ἄγραφα ἔθη* are the traditions, in particular, of the Jewish people, in order to estimate how far his feeling for, and interest in, development and history had died out, in consequence of his reduction of Hebrew ethics to Hellenic physics.

NOTE Q, page 41.

In proof that the fundamental philosophic or theosophic idea of Valentin and Basilides belongs to the same family as Philo, compare the *Ὄν* of Philo with the *βυθός*; the Gnostic *πλήρωμα* with the *κόσμος νοητὸς*; his conversion of the angels into *ἰδέαι, δυνάμεις*, nay, even into categories, with the Gnostic doctrine of the Æons; the sympathy of God for the *ὕλη*, with the compassion of the *σωτὴρ* for the sufferings of the Achamoth. Add further to these things, the negative asceticism, and the laudation of knowledge. But special reference should be made to his doctrine of the creation of man. Here, where he touches on the point which had so much engaged the attention of the Gnostics,—the question, namely, of the origin of evil,—his system shows, of very necessity, a leaning to the answer given by Gnosticism; for the fault of imperfection and sin is thrown, in an emanatistic manner, on lower creative powers,—which powers are represented by Gnosticism as gathered into a focus in the Demiurge. The difference between the two arises, partly from the Christian element held by the Gnostics, and partly from their taking a more lively interest in the question of the origin of evil. That those who succeeded Philo did not rest contented with the vacillating personifications of the *ἰδέαι* contained in his system, but went on to represent those *ἰδέαι* as individual beings, may perhaps have been due to the circumstance that the historical fact of Christianity compelled them to view the *Χριστὸς*, to whom was assigned so distinguished a position among the *ἰδέαι*, as an actual personal phænomenon. But to

represent the Pleroma as filled with personalities—with the, as it were, condensed potences of Philo—was to posit that mythological process, through the teaching of which Gnostics appear to stand nearer to heathenism, and to which there are many analogous elements even in Philo (compare Frank l. c. pp. 222, 227). We find repeated here the very same thing that must be remarked in the history of religion in general. Apostasy from a monotheism of a character still thoroughly indefinite to personal gods, is, on the other hand, to be regarded also as a step in advance. For the union of substance and subject is the proper goal of the idea of God. A monotheism of mere substance is no better than a polytheism, in which there is a superfluity of divine personalities. The Christian conception of God first presented us with the union of the two momenta. It is worthy of note, that according to an old report given by Irenæus, the earlier Gnostics were still more closely allied to Philo, and that the disciples of Valentin first taught the concrescence of the προβολὰς into determinate persons, outside of the Pleroma.

Note R, page 43.

Gfrörer, in the above-mentioned work, notwithstanding all the pains he has taken, and all the historical license he has permitted himself, has not prevailed upon me to alter the proposition with which I have concluded the above argument. Nor has he been able to bring to light one passage, in which an incarnation of the veritably divine was taught prior to the coming of Christ, even if we should regard his proofs of the age of the religious ideas of the Jews as more valid than the German public holds them to be. Indeed, in the way of all attempts whatever to derive the fundamental idea of Christianity from Judaism, the undeniable fact, that during the first centuries an unbroken series of attacks on the deity of Christ proceeded from Jews and Judaizing Christians, appears to me to present a very great difficulty—a difficulty, too, not set aside by Gfrörer. Heathen Christians, on the contrary, and those who shared Hellenic culture, took less offence at the doctrine. The testimony of Justin Martyr (c. Tryph. c. 48), which Origen, in particular, confirmed by his approval, may therefore be regarded as invincible—the testimony, namely, that the Jews say,—*καὶ γὰρ πάντες ἡμεῖς τὸν χριστὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐξ ἀνθρώπων προσδοκῶμεν*

γενήσεσθαι, καὶ τὸν Ἠλίαν χρῖσαι αὐτὸν ἐλθόντα. Without resorting for help to Hellenic, and in general to heathenish, elements, which had been appropriated by Jewish writers, he could never hope to discover the idea of an incarnation of God within the domain of Judaism. But the advantage which he might gain in this way (an advantage, be it observed, which he does not altogether despise), is more than counterbalanced, in that a deadly blow is given to the professed tenacity and coherence of Jewish tradition, which forms the chief groundwork of his proof of the great age of the religious ideas of the Jews, by the undeniable—undeniable for any one with a true feeling for the historical—penetration of foreign elements into Jewish modes of thought. It is further clear from what has been advanced, that an appeal to heathenism is by no means sufficient to overthrow the claim to originality put forth by Christianity, relatively to the true idea of the God-man. In this case, as indeed in general, philosophy had neither the ability nor the duty to anticipate reality, though it is able, and it is its duty, to understand the reality when given. The Hellenic religion had not, in its gods, that true divinity which we behold in Christ; and, though the philosophy of heathendom awakened the consciousness of the Absolute, the incarnation of God appeared to it incompatible with that Absolute, even as the fact appeared incredible to the Jews. The mixture of Hellenic and Hebraic elements in Alexandrian and Hellenic Judaism, the influence of which was undoubtedly felt in Palestine also, must, it is true, have served to help forward the development of the Old Testament idea of the Chochma, and thus to weaken the *metaphysical* antagonism between God and the world; and we may be allowed to assume, that this was one of the things ordained to prepare the way for the incarnation of God in Christ. But even on that supposition, Judaism did not advance beyond the dilemma, that the revealing principle must either be conceived to be personal,—and then it is no longer truly divine, but a creature, as, for example, an archangel, Adam, Messias, and so forth; or, if it be held to be truly divine, it is of so universal and indistinct a character, that its incarnation in an individual is inconceivable, and that, so far as it is veritably divine, it threatens ever to fall back into the αὐτόθεος, who cannot become incarnate, nay more, who cannot even directly

reveal Himself. From all this, Philo constitutes no exception.

NOTE S, page 47.

Baumgarten Crusius's "Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte" ii. 1030. Two things must be recognised as historical facts:—firstly, that faith in the deity of Christ owed its origin far less to existing opinions and testimonies, than to a deep and elevated feeling produced by the spectacle of that which Christ had been, which He had done, and which he was constantly doing in the Church, and in the souls of His disciples: secondly, that for this reason, this faith was in no sense dependent on the apotheoses of heathendom, or indeed, in general, on anything which appertained to polytheism. In the note at the same place he remarks, —"As far as existing opinions were concerned, we must at all events maintain that there were no *Jewish* ones, which could have given rise to, or helped forward, this doctrine." Immediately thereupon is cited the above-mentioned passage (p. 36) from Justin Martyr (c. Tryph. c. 48). In accordance therewith, however, and with what was advanced above, we must reduce it to its limited truth in relation to Christology, when he says (p. 1129), "Not even Jewish, much less heathenish, usage presented any difficulty whatever, in the way of representing the Divine and human as united in one being and life." For, such a divinity, as satisfied the Christian mind, neither heathenish nor Jewish modes of thought were able to attribute to a man.

NOTE T, page 49.

By assigning to that which is canonical, in distinction from that which forms part of the history of dogmas, the position above indicated, we secure the advantage, that the historical development of dogmas starts with that which is most general and indeterminate, and constantly advances to that which is more determinate. (The higher forms even of the canonical, did not rest satisfied with that indeterminateness.) The time that followed immediately on the Apostles, was far from equalling that of the Apostles. On the contrary, beginning with that which is most indeterminate, that is, dogmatically regarded, at the lowest stage possible in the domain of Christianity, when Christian truth had, as it were, abased itself, by going back to

the form of a germ, that period initiated the entire process of the thought of the Church in the most thorough manner possible. We may learn from this fact, that the Christian principle was meant to become a natural thing in, not to be substituted in the place of, the then existing world. The development was not to take a sudden leap; Christianity was not to be planted in the world as a young tree, but as a seed which enclosed the entire future within itself.

NOTE U, page 49.

The remark just made seems to me to contain the reply to the difficult question of the relation between heresy and orthodoxy; a question which is of special importance at the present time, and which the Reviewer in the "Hallische Jahrbücher" has made it specially incumbent on me to consider. The said Reviewer, to whom I owe many thanks, is quite right in maintaining that most of the so-called heresies ought to be regarded as momenta of the dogmatic process of the Church itself. But their claim to this position rests not on that which is erroneous in them, even though the error should consist merely in the isolation of a true element, but solely on the Christian truth embodied in and asserted by them. To the idea of an heresy, therefore, is necessary the acknowledgment by it, of the truth of the fundamental idea of Christianity. For otherwise it falls under the category of the heathenish or Jewish, on which the light of Christianity has merely fallen: as such, it is perhaps right that it should be cursorily mentioned in histories of the Church and of Christian dogmas; but it can never be termed an integrant moment in the work of the formation of Christian dogmas, unless we deny that in Christianity there is anything new and whole, and derive it entirely from that which went before it. On this supposition, which certainly cannot be that of the Reviewer, the idea of heresy would be widened to such an extent, that everything which belongs at all to the sphere of religion, whether in Judaism or heathenism, would have to be treated as a Christian heresy; a view, to which indeed the historian of heresies, Epiphanius, and others, have approximated as nearly as possible, but which can scarcely secure the approbation of more cultivated and scientific minds. Applying this to the well-known heretical compass of Schleiermacher, we

shall say,—Strict pantheism and deism (materialism) occupy too low a stage, to merit the name of heresies: and the appellation can only be employed when, alongside of religion in general, the fundamental presupposition of Christianity is also recognised. This presupposition may be viewed either objectively, that is, Christologically, or subjectively, that is, anthropologically. Each of these two forms contains the other within itself, in such a manner, that the element which is still lacking or misunderstood, will, with irresistible necessity, be supplemented from that which is actually recognised; and if such a supplementing does not take place, the element once recognised will perish, in consequence of the reaction of the error with which it is associated. The result would be, not an heresy, but a complete lack of the Christian. That which is healthy may effect the healing of the unhealthy, because that which is healthy, wherever it exists at all, is the vehicle and bearer of the virtue of the whole; but where the healthy is overpowered by the unhealthy element, Christian truth has either entirely ceased to exist, or has never attained an actual existence. In which case it is absurd to speak of heresy. The old Pelagianism was an heresy, because it preserved the fundamental presupposition of Christianity in its objective, Christological form; the same is quite as frequently true also of the later Manichæism. Ebionism also was a heresy, so long as it retained, at all events, an idea of the work of Christ for, and in humanity, from which might flow the regeneration of its Christology. In a similar position, too, was Docetism. But when the recognition of our deliverance by Christ is absent either from the creed or the doctrinal system, and, at the same time, the one or the other of the constitutive momenta of His person, as the Redeemer, is entirely denied, there, of a certainty, Christianity no longer exists. For there is no third form, under which Christianity might still exist or be preserved; the history of dogmas, at all events, knows of no such third form. And were it conceivable that a man could preserve Christianity in his heart, in the immediate and primary domain of religion, whilst in the domain of the understanding he denied the fundamental presupposition of Christianity, both in its objective and subjective form, he would occupy, as to his thought, a position outside of Christianity, and would, therefore, be no subject for the history of

Christian dogmas, until, at all events in one aspect, the life of his heart and the life of his intellect had been brought into accord. Until then, however, he could not lay claim even to the title of heretic. The succeeding discussion will be guided by these principles. From them the following conclusions may be drawn.

I. There can be no word of heresy, save where a Christian element is recognised, to which it forms the antagonism. That which is, in itself, one and the same error, both within and without the domain of Christianity, cannot be termed an heresy unless it has come into more than a merely external contact with Christianity, until the two have entered into a relation of reciprocity to each other.

II. All heresies originate in the extra-Christian world; and even the apparent exaggerations of Christianity are, not merely in another aspect, but essentially, a lagging behind true Christianity. For this reason, Christianity cannot have sprung from heresies and their mutual interpenetration; but Christianity is the truth whose existence is to be presupposed, and behind which heresies lag, one in one manner, and another in another manner; nay more, Christianity is the power which must in some sense dwell in heresies, with, at all events, partial integrity, in order that they may continue to be properly heresies.

III. This Christian truth may possibly have attained to clearness in the minds of some of the members of the Church, whilst to others it still remains dim: should this be the case, the latter must be referred to the former for cure, and from them must receive what they need, but can give nothing in return. Of such a nature the great heresies of old were not, in so far as the Church itself undeniably arrived at a more distinct consciousness of Christian truth through its struggle with them. These old heresies represented with peculiar clearness of consciousness one momentum of Christian truth; but their tendency was to give this one momentum the importance of the whole: they were not overcome until the Church itself had learnt from them the lesson they were meant to teach, till the element of truth, through which the error allied with it first became dangerous, had been incorporated with, or, more correctly speaking, had been developed out of, the general Christian consciousness. For Christian truth is never arrived at by a way of

combination, but solely by the unfolding of the plastic principle, of the germ, in which the whole lies infolded, and which either actually exists, or does not exist, and cannot be compounded. With the first-mentioned kind of heretics the healing art of the Church has to do; in the second alone does the history of dogmas take an interest.

Now, as we cannot hesitate to consider heresies, in the sense just given, to be momenta in the development of the Church's truth; nay more, to say that heretics, so far as they actually recognise the fundamental presupposition of Christianity, not merely with the intellect, but also with the heart, are not to be excluded from the Church according to the Protestant idea thereof, although they are to be deemed sick members; as, further, heresies in general cannot be completely and justly estimated by the standard of the particular temporary form of the Church with which they are severally confronted, but can only be judged by the standard of Christian truth itself, or by the Church, at a stage when it has set forth, definitely and without ambiguity, the element of truth which those heresies represented: even so is it inadmissible to imagine the Church ever to have been constituted solely of opposed heresies, and the truth which united the extremes nowhere to have had an actual existence on earth, but to have been merely, as it were, the idea hovering over, and guiding, the process. In the manner of determinate knowledge, to which a course of conciliatory thought is necessary, this truth did not, it is true, exist prior to the work of the reflective intellect; but it cannot, therefore, be said to have been totally destitute of reality. Such a view, rigidly carried out through the entire sphere of Christian history, would lead to an aimless progressus in infinitum, of which the mere formal movement is in itself the end, and would imply that Christian truth is first generated and posited by the reflective and conciliative intellect. How was it possible, save abstractly considered, that Christian truth, in entrusting itself to humanity, should meet solely with persons who would apprehend it heretically, that is, who would put one momentum in the place of the whole; and that it should secure a higher form of existence, solely through the medium of an exchange brought about by the conflict of two extremes? This, however, is by no means required by the idea of humanity or of historical development. An historical

development, on the contrary, will more surely and happily attain to its goal, and an end will be put to that continual flux of one heresy into another, which is unavoidable so long as they are left to themselves, when between the two extremes there stands a middle power, which, from the very beginning, in its own manner, aims at the same object as the heresies, and evinces the tendency—a tendency, undoubtedly, fully developed through the medium of the extremes—to seek that which shall furnish a point of union for the two extremes. That such a middle tendency at all times existed in the Church, may be historically demonstrated: it is traceable primarily in the sphere of simple faith, which, though predominantly concerned with the practical, stands in an inner connection with Christian knowledge. In these regions, it is as certain that the unadulterated fundamental presupposition of Christianity, to wit, that in Christ the Divine and human were united, or that the eternal redemption had been historically effected, was always recognised, as that there always existed redeemed men and a true Church of Christ on earth. The very idea of heresy in the aforementioned sense requires that it have errors in doctrine; as heresy, it is a disease of Christian knowledge. Diseases of the life of faith, by themselves, are not heresies; and it is possible that the life of faith may be in an, at all events, relatively healthy state, even whilst the intellect is yielding to heresy,—not, however, for a long period. This relative independence of the two spheres must not be denied to faith, whilst at the same time it is allowed to be pleaded in favour of heresies. But we must confess, what is also the fact, namely, that the tendency to the development of the intellectual aspect does not stir with equal force in all believers; many, on the contrary, content themselves, without its therefore being right to designate their faith false, with that elementary knowledge which is identical with faith itself, and of which heretics cannot be destitute if they expect to be considered, in the true sense, members of the Church. The position occupied by such believers relatively to knowledge, may, it is true, be marked by imperfection; nay more, such a relation to knowledge, may keep their faith in a lower condition, and easily become a disease; and lastly, it may be possible for such simple believers to fall into error the moment they follow the example of heretics, and devote greater attention to the aspect of knowledge: still, their

fault lies in a direction quite different from that of heretics, properly so called; and their strength consists in their faithfully preserving that basis of πίστις, without which heresy can never be freed from itself. Whenever heresies have arrived at a more developed stage, they take up in pairs, as two extremes, a position of antagonism to that Christian truth which, in its immediate spiritual reality, is the possession of all simple practical believers; and just this simple faith is fitted to ward off or to lay bare, as decidedly as possible, both those intellectual errors; even though its first aim, in discharging this office, should simply be to bring their advocates back to itself. Now this faith, which is the common starting-point of all Christian heretics who deserve the name, even when they bear opposite characters, will rise up and testify against them. But something more is necessary than the mere negation of the error; nor will it be enough merely to repeat the truth, which had previously been received as authoritative, but a combination must be effected, in the form of distinct knowledge, of those momenta which, in the heresies, had come into antagonism to each other, and into antagonism to the truth. For this is precisely the significance of important heresies, that they cannot suffer the faith to remain indifferent to them; on the contrary, inasmuch as even opposed heresies always agree on one point, to wit, in maintaining that the two momenta of the truth, of which each of the extremes represents and embodies one, are incompatible with each other, whereas faith, without ceasing to be the vehicle and bearer of the truth, cannot concede the alleged incompatibility, faith finds itself compelled to undertake the reflective conciliation of the momenta. As the result of such efforts, it not merely secures itself in the position it held before, but grows in inner determinateness. But whenever faith withdraws from the task thus imposed upon it, it becomes crippled itself, and its earlier lack of knowledge degenerates into error and becomes chargeable as a fault; for the principle of Christianity never suffers its representatives to stagnate until it has itself undergone a change. Those portions of the Christian body which fail in the duty referred to, cease, in consequence, to participate in the general movement of the Church, and are left behind in the form of sects. Three factors, consequently, and not merely two—that is, two opposed heresies—take part in the process through which

the history of dogmas passes. No one of these factors can plead quite guiltless when heresies arise. Relatively to its opposite extreme, each of the respective heresies is completely justifiable: and even simple faith cannot altogether excuse itself; for it left over to heresy a field which it ought to have cultivated itself. But quite as clear is it that heresies will never convert each other; for they can scarcely possess the power to effect a conversion to anything besides themselves; and if it should happen that one heresy effected a conversion in the domain of the other, the persons alone would have altered their position, the heresies would remain. Faith alone possesses the unmutilated power and virtue of the whole: it is not under the sway of the principle of isolation and exclusiveness, as are heresies; in virtue of the love whose roots it bears within itself, it is, above all, capable of appreciating even antagonistic elements, of thus confessing the collective guilt, and also of atoning it and gaining the victory, through fetching up that which had been neglected. Now, so far as faith is the constitutive element of the Church in the true sense of the word; and so far as faith and not heresy effects the subjugation of error, and leads the dogma to a higher stage (which would still be the case even if a heretic should attain deliverance from error through the reaction of the healthy element in his own system); we may say with justice, and in a thoroughly Protestant spirit, that the representatives of faith, which is the original and practical element of Christianity, even though they should be, in the first instance, devoid of science and dogmatic culture, constitute the *Church;* and that the tendency embodied in them, always conquering, as it does in the aforementioned way, and never dying out in any generation, is the true churchly tendency. Heretics, on the contrary, so far as they are heretics, and have not preserved the faith, are excluded from the Church, according to its true idea, even though they should be externally included within it. Heresy, therefore, is freed from error by means of faith; and faith is freed from its lack of conciliative or reflective knowledge through the solicitations of heresy.

NOTE V, page 64.

As in other respects, so also in this, James, rightly understood, is most decidedly opposed to Catholicism, although it

would fain constitute him its representative. With this his lofty idea of the dignity and essential equality of all Christians in divine freedom, is connected all that he says against the self-exaltation of individuals, whether on the ground of higher wisdom, of rank, or of riches; and the traces of Ebionitism, which some profess to find in his estimate of riches and so forth, are due solely to misunderstanding, and to the practice of drawing conclusions from isolated passages, without the consideration of the entire connection. Such a depreciation of wealth as is contained in James's Epistle, is not the sign of a mind lacking Christian force and substance; but, conscious that the treasure of Christianity is superior to all riches (ii. 5), he cannot but express his displeasure against those who aimed at restoring distinctions which belonged to an ante-Christian period, and which threaten the royal liberty of all.—Compare i. 9, ii. 1, 5, 7, 15 ff., iv. 1, 3, v. 1–6, iii. 17, i. 27.

NOTE W, page 70.

I believe myself under the necessity of deciding in favour of the latter; though I by no means intend to attribute to Peter the doctrine of the Logos as a pre-existent hypostatic being. My reasons are the following:—

I. But a few verses further on (ii. 4) he designates Christ λίθος ζῶν; compare verse 7, and therewith i. 23, λόγος Θεοῦ ζῶν καὶ μένων.

II. Verse 23 thus becomes at once more pregnant and clearer. The sense will then be—the ῥῆμα, λόγος Θεοῦ, to which such lofty predicates belong, that is, Christ, is to be understood by the ῥῆμα εὐαγγελισθέν, or the former is the content which gives the latter its power and influence. According to the other explanation, the sense would merely be—the word of God abides eternally: consequently, also, the joyful message brought to you; for it also is the word of God. (Compare Heb. iv. 12, 13, v. 11.)

III. The sense thus obtained does not in any way transcend Peter's point of view. It is, on the contrary, a mere following out of the Hebrew theologomenon of דְּבַר יְהוָה: the Logos of Peter is not that of Philo or the Hellenists, to wit, reason; but, in a genuinely Hebrew spirit, the revelation of God, the powerfully operative word of the Creator: Heb. xi. 3, i. 3. The designation itself is partly suggested by Gen. i., and partly by

the standing title given to the law; for the name almost always given to the law was, "Word of God." In this historical connection, nothing was more natural than to designate Christ also a Word of God; nay more, as the consummation of revelation, He was "*the* Word of God," that is, the perfect revelation made in an human, personal (ζῶν), *abiding* (μένων) form. According to this designation, it is true, Christ would be the word spoken, rather than the speaker; and He is, for the first time, more distinctly described as the latter in the Epistle to the Hebrews (i. 4), and in the Gospel of John (i. 18). But even this latter designation would be nothing more than natural from the pens of men who had drawn their culture and ideas from the Old Testament. I cannot forbear here remarking in general, that far too little effort has been made to follow out the traces of a gradual formation of the doctrine of the Logos within the New Testament Canon, although this ought to have been of the first tasks. Many look upon John's doctrine of the Logos as something foreign and strange, as a problem which can only be solved by tracing it to extra-biblical sources, to such as Philo and so forth. This procedure is only justifiable on the supposition that there is no family resemblance whatever between the Logos and other phænomena within the limits of Christianity. That such a family resemblance exists, I maintain, because I am unable to discover the Hellenic idea of "reason" even in John's doctrine of the Logos. From James (i. 18, 21) and the Synoptics onwards to Peter; and further, from Peter to the Epistle to the Hebrews (iv. 12 ff.), the Apocalypse, and the Gospel of John, the doctrine of the Logos may be shown to have pursued a gradual, progressive, and connected course.

Note X, page 73.

The author appears to me to have been a Jewish Christian, who was acquainted with, and recognised, Paul; without, however, making Paul's doctrine of faith and works the centre of his own system. His antagonists were probably Gentile Christians, a degeneration of the tendency of Paul, and, in their antinomianism, forerunners of Cerdon and Marcion. Their affinity with Gnostic elements is particularly evident from their polemic against eschatological doctrines (c. 3); in agreement therewith also, are the features of the second chapter.

The views of the author himself were influenced, both negatively and positively, by the antagonists with whom he had to deal. They were influenced *negatively*, so far as this letter was the fruit of the reaction of his Christian spirit against the laxity, which led to the mixing up of the Church with the world—a laxity which seized hold of the minds of many, as soon as they found that the realization of their eschatological expectations was postponed. Montanism may perhaps be regarded as a continuation of this reaction; but, both in an ethical and an eschatological respect, it exaggerated expectation, until it assumed an heretical form (compare also 2 Peter i. 19–21). That they were probably influenced *positively*, we may judge from the stress which the writer, in common with his antagonists, lays on Christian knowledge; though he differs from them in refusing to let go his hold on, and even giving great prominence to, historical tradition (i. 14–18, ii. 21, iii. 2, 15). In fact, he even goes so far as to distinguish two classes of men, or two stadia in the history of the same men. The first stadium is the *προτρέχειν* on the *παράδοσις* of the Apostles. It is the duty of every man to abide in this stadium until the second stadium shall be initiated by the aid of Divine *δύναμις* (i. 19). This is historical faith. The second stadium is the rise of the morning star in the heart, the break of the day or of the higher consciousness (i. 19; compare Jude 19). That is the true gnosis (i. 5), the fruit of faith; whereas false teachers possess merely a show of wisdom (ii. 17, 18), and have fallen away from the *παράδοσις* of the Apostles (ii. 21, 22). Finally, as with wisdom, so also is it with freedom (ii. 19) and with the nobility of human nature. That of which heretics make a boast, and of which they in reality possess the contrary (*ζόφος τοῦ σκότους*, ii. 17, i. 9, blindness, shortsightedness, forgetfulness, *δουλεία*, ii. 19, and degradation to the level of a spiritless animal nature), is really possessed by Christians (i. 3–8). In the knowledge of Christ they have wisdom, all the fulness of spiritual blessings; nay more, they are partakers of Divine nature (i. 4). The last point is particularly noteworthy. The author, in teaching such a participation, shows that he has passed beyond the Jewish separation between God and the world; that a mighty revolution of Jewish conceptions has been brought about (compare Acts xvii. 28), by the knowledge that the union of the Divine and human had

been actually accomplished in Christ. At the same time, when we take into consideration i. 19, and the slight notice taken of the doctrine of the atonement of Christ (which occupies so important a place in the First Epistle of Peter), we see clearly that the writer attached higher importance to the Christ in us than to the Christ for us. By consequence, he was able to recognise as a Christian good the element of truth, which the heretical gnosis, though lacking, at the same time sought (i. 3, 4).

Note Y, page 83.

At first sight, it might be supposed impossible to discuss Christology monographically, and without having previously given a history of the conceptions entertained of God and man, to which one could appeal. For the idea of the God-man presupposes both a conception of God and a conception of man. In its beginnings, Christian thought was undoubtedly determined, as to both points, by the representations handed down to it; and for this reason an account has been given of those representations in the introduction, so far as seemed needful, in the persons of their chief expounders. But, so far from the Christian conception of God and Christian anthropology having been the groundwork of Christology, history shows that the appearance of Christ, and the gradually increasing determinateness of the view taken of His person, were the most powerful agent in the transformation of the idea of God and the idea of man entertained by the ancient world. Moreover, from the second century onwards, an extensive series of works, devoted to investigations into the nature of God and man, owed its existence to Christianity, or, more precisely expressed, to the interest felt in the doctrine of the Person of Christ. That the doctrine of the Trinity was indebted for its development to Christology, is universally acknowledged; but the same thing is true also of the Christian doctrine of the Divine attributes (and of this less notice has been taken). For, that it was necessary and possible really to regard God as Love, could only be felt by a faith which had beheld the Father in the Son of His love. The world prior to Christ had not known God as love, but had regarded Him either as mere goodness, or as mere justice and holiness. In this respect also, therefore, the appearance of

Christ came into conflict with the heathenish and Jewish conception of God. Christianity tolerated neither the ascription of an unethical goodness to God (and so far pronounced Judaism to be in the right), nor of a righteousness and holiness which are not perfected in love (and herein condemned the ergism (ἔργον) and one-sided juridical character of Judaism). To the conflicts with Gnosticism may so far, therefore, be traced the genesis of the Christian idea of God, if only at first in its most general and fundamental characteristic features. Next to Irenæus, Tertullian rendered the most important services relatively to this matter, by his work against Marcion. Not until goodness and power on the one hand, and justice and holiness on the other, had been seen to be combined in love,—in that the conviction had been arrived at, that a love which excludes, instead of being the realization of, holy righteousness in all its strictness and truth, would cease to be Divine, and that a holiness and justice which fail to give the Divine love its due cannot subsist, and must be either indifferent to, or powerless against, evil; not until thus, in the idea of love, which is the glorification, at once, of goodness and power, of holiness and righteousness, the Christian conception of God had been arrived at, was a starting-point secured for the development of the Christian *doctrine* of the Trinity. The rigidness of the prior conceptions of God was melted by love; God was no longer a mere righteous Judge, or the Exalted One, or the ὄν: on the other hand, after righteousness and holiness had been recognised as essential to Divine love, the Church ceased to be exposed to the danger of confounding God through His love, after a pantheistic or pagan manner, with the world.

Note Z, page 94.

If this be the right view to take of the first Christian period, it can occasion no surprise to find the lack of dogmatical productiveness counterbalanced by the greater measure of moral activity. Amongst the fruits of the moral activity of the first Christians, we may count the giving to the Church a constitution and laws. And, although the Catholic idea of the priest and bishop cannot lay claim to origination in the earliest stadia of Christianity, it is both involved in the nature of the case and attested by historical evidence, that the time which inter-

vened prior to the awakenment of interest in strictly dogmatical questions, was mainly taken up with the organization of the Churches, and the development of the constitution under the greatest variety of forms. It is an incontestable fact, that the development of ecclesiastical arrangements was far in advance of the development of dogmas; that by the former an earthly seat was, as it were, prepared for the latter. Those who show the keenest eye for everything in which the age of the Apostolic Fathers fell short of the true Christian idea, ought also, in order to be consistent, to follow up as keenly, and as far as possible, the errors which, clothed in a *practical* garb, were introduced into the Church by heathenish and Jewish society and principles. Instead of that, they are chargeable with thorough inconsistency; for, although they willingly allow, that when the Church condemned heretical elements it was condemning its own past early condition, they are unwilling to grant that the same defectiveness (and the charge of heresy may be reduced to a charge of defectiveness) must necessarily have manifested itself also in the ethical creations which peculiarly belong to this period. For example, the rise of Episcopal power and the Episcopal constitution of the Church they assign to a later age; and, on this ground, also attribute documents to a later age, which, if assigned to their proper age, would throw of themselves a decided light on the history of the Church and its doctrinal development, and utterly annihilate the entire hypothesis of an Ebionitic origin of the Church—an hypothesis really borrowed from the Socinians.

NOTE AA, page 101.

Ἐν λόγῳ τῆς μεγαλωσύνης αὐτοῦ συνεστήσατο τὰ πάντα, καὶ ἐν λόγῳ δύναται αὐτὰ καταστρέψαι. The addition of the term *μεγαλωσύνη*, which Clement frequently applies to the higher nature of Christ, is favourable to the reference of *λόγος* to the pre-existent essence of Christ. It would then appear as though the creative Divine Word were personified, exactly after the manner of the theologomena of that period. Another and particularly forcible reason, is the relation of our author to the Epistles of Paul and the Epistle to the Hebrews, in both of which the pre-existence of the Son is not only taught, but is further brought into connection with the creation. Compare,

besides the above passages from Paul's Epistles, Hebrews i. 3, iv. 12, xi. 3. Our author was so intimately acquainted with the Epistle to the Hebrews, and followed so closely in its footsteps, that the idea of the pre-existence of the Son cannot possibly have been strange to him (compare also Zeller l. c. pp. 61 ff.). But he shows himself to be a faithful disciple of Paul, not merely in his Christological principles, but also specially in his doctrine of grace (c. 32). He says: It is not wisdom and insight, it is not piety or the works of the sanctified heart which we have done, that justify us; indeed, we are not at all justified by ourselves; but we are called of God's gracious will in Christ, through faith. *Now this same Clement was the representative of the Church in Rome about the year* 100: so much the more certainly, therefore, must we judge his faith to have been in agreement with that of the Church in Rome, if he wrote thus, not as bishop—that is, not officially—but as the one who had been chosen in confidence to be spokesman.

NOTE BB, page 102.

Docetical and Ebionitical elements must, therefore, have already manifested themselves in the Church. Compare Schneckenburger's "Das Evangelium der Ægyptier," 1834. But when this scholar alleges that a patripassian Unitarianism is taught in the epistle before us, he must have overlooked the passage just quoted from c. 9. Baptism is highly lauded, and connected rather with a stringent doctrine of penitence than with faith (c. 8). "Beyond the grave there is no more opportunity for repentance; even as a vessel may be improved so long as it is in the hand of the potter, but not after it has once been baked." The present world and the future, these two *αἰῶνες*, are hostile to each other (c. 6, compare Barn. c. 18). All these features are not in the manner of the first epistle. Where the latter thought occurs, together with the view of the world involved therein, some have supposed that they had scented the traces of Ebionism. The circumstance, that even this epistle, with *its* Christology, contains Ebionitical elements, ought to have obtained greater attention, and to have prevented the adoption of an arbitrary definition of the idea of Ebionism. (Compare Schwegler's "Montanism," pp. 112 ff.) He who holds such lofty Christological views may

perhaps be called a Jewish Christian; nay more, he may Judaize in many ways; but an Ebionite, in the sense in which that name is applied scientifically, he cannot be called. From c. 8 (λέγει κύριος ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ), the author would appear to have already become accustomed to the use of Gospels; but there was not yet any canon. The epistle also contains an apocalyptic passage (c. 11), found in the Gospel of the Egyptians. To judge from the mode in which Docetism and Ebionism are handled, and from the other marks taken together, the work was probably not written later than the first half of the second century. The first epistle, on the contrary, was probably written about the middle of the first ninety years after Christ.

Note CC, page 103.

He was well aware of his capabilities, and of the nature of the task given him to perform: he styles himself ἄνθρωπον πρὸς ἕνωσιν κατηρτισμένον (Philad. 8); he is assured that the impulse he feels to work for the settlement of the organization of the Church, is an impulse of the Spirit; and experience forced irresistibly upon him the conviction, that such efforts were called for by the circumstances of the time (Philad. 7). At the time when the epistles were written, the organization of the Church under bishops, presbyters, and deacons, had not yet, by any means, been everywhere carried out, nor the principle thereof recognised as necessary. Indeed, the aim of the epistles was to lay down the idea, and, on the basis thereof, to initiate a thorough realization of the whole. The highest purpose of the Episcopate, according to his idea of it (the particular form assumed by which was entirely the result of the struggle with Docetism and Judaism), was the realization in the Church of the divine-human life, whose unity in Christ, and therefore also in the Church, the just-mentioned heresies threatened to dissolve. Gnosticism proper is not controverted in these epistles. On the other hand, as the letters themselves acknowledge, the way had already been prepared for his idea,—dogmatically, in particular, by Paul; historically by the development of the constitution of the Church down to his time, although it had undoubtedly taken a different course in different places, and had not been consciously led by one principle (Polyc. 6; Magnes. 4; Philad. 8).

NOTE DD, page 104.

He nowhere gives expression to the Levitical idea of priesthood. The bishop does not offer up Christ in sacrifice; but is the mouth and representative of the Church, which presents its sacrifices of praise and thanksgiving to God (compare Höfling's "Die Lehre der apostolischen Väter u. s. w. vom Opfer im christlichen Cultus," 1841, pp. 32–44). He seldomer speaks of him as the medium through which we obtain Divine gifts, although a teacher, in virtue of his office, might without hesitation be so characterized. No allusion whatever is made to ordination, to a Levitical order, in contrast to the laity. On the contrary, the universal priesthood of Christians continues to be recognised; and even of bishops it is said, that they do not become bishops apart from the people (compare Ep. ad Philad. 10; ad Smyrn. 11 f.; Polyc. 7). He never terms the bishops ἱερεῖς—although he might have employed the word without fear of objection;—Christ alone is, in his view, the ἀρχιερεύς. The point on which he lays chief stress is, that the bishop shall represent the unity of the Church, acting as teacher and administrator, and performing the representative (liturgical) acts of the Cultus. He regards the bishop as the λειτουργός; above all (in the states which were still heathenish), as the administrator of Church Regiment. Now, as Ignatius undoubtedly did not consider it a matter of choice whether believers should openly constitute themselves into a church or not, but held that the setting forth of their unity in a visible form belongs to the very idea of faith (see below); consequently, he whose office it is to set forth that unity, as the mouthpiece or representative of the Church, as the leader of individuals in the spirit of the entire community, cannot be an accidental, dispensable person. On the contrary, he held the office of bishop, in connection with the presbytery and diaconate, to be necessary, and of Divine authority. Notwithstanding all this, he has by no means laid down the Roman Catholic conception of a bishop; for even Protestants acknowledge the Divine institution of the "ministerium." His fault does not lie in a wish to curtail the rights of the community; for he everywhere conceives the bishop, on the one hand, to be the expression of the inmost and truest will of the individual; and the individual, on the other

hand, to be related to the bishop, not as a bondsman, but as a freeman, united with him by love and confidence. The members of the Church, says he, ought to stand related to the bishop as the God-man was related to the Father; and to establish order, is by no means to put restraints on liberty. The weakness of his theory, consists in his supposing his ideal of a bishop to be more nearly realizable than it actually was; in his esteeming the idea of unity, expressed by the office of bishop, to be in itself so elevating and purifying (Polyc. 1), and in general so full of blessing and of power, that he forgets the possibility of bishops being unworthy of their office, and overlooks the new dangers to which the very unity of the Church would be exposed, were the great power to be misemployed, which he desired to see committed to the bishop and the presbytery. Unity is to him the thing of prime importance:—not merely on account of the heresies and schisms, which he would fain cut away, but because he esteems its realization and preservation to be the highest good, the great end and aim of the Church. On this foundation rests, in his view, the Divine right of the Episcopate: and, although he did not appeal so distinctly as did Clement (1 Cor. 42, 44) to the authority of the Apostles who instituted it, he must have held it to be quite as certain as the Divine institution of Christianity itself; for he did not see any possibility of setting forth that unity, wherein consists the truth of the Church, otherwise than through the medium of the Episcopate, the presbytery, and the diaconate. Solely as the expression of the Church's unity, and on no other ground, did Ignatius esteem the bishop higher than the presbyter. This Church order is the will of God and Christ (*γνώμη, νόμος*, Magn. 2, 3); in such a sense, however, that through it the Church fulfils one of the ends of its existence,—the end, namely, of manifesting itself as the image of Christ (Magn. 6). Not to a particular Divine act, by which this Church order was instituted, does he appeal; he views it rather as a Divine necessity involved in the very existence of the Church; whereas a falsifier would certainly have felt himself compelled to refer the institution, at all events, to the Apostles, as did the Romish Church in the Pseudo-Clementines. Compare, on the other hand, Philad. 8. Bishops he regards, after the manner of Christian monarchs, as bishops by the grace of God; nay more, as themselves a grace of God (Magn. 2, *Θεοῦ*

χάρις): we owe them obedience for the sake of God and Christ; for all authorities can claim obedience by Divine right (Magn. 3); but that bishops, in conjunction with the presbyters, are the rulers of the Church, he considers to be involved in the idea of the Church (Trall. 3), the realization of which is both a duty and a Divine right (compare Magnes. 6, 2; Eph. 1; Smyrn. 8, 9; Philad. 4). Ignatius speaks merely of the divinity of the Episcopate, or, more correctly, of the divinity of Church authorities, whose necessary apex, in every individual church, is the bishop: to the mode in which personal fitness for the office is secured, he makes no allusion whatever; in no place does he speak of the communication of grace qualificatory for office, through the medium of the sacrament of ordination. From the characteristics thus furnished us, of the stadium at which the development of the constitution of the Church had arrived, we should judge this epistle to be of high antiquity. In the first place, for example, such confidence as the author cherishes in the cohesive energy of the Episcopate, and in its power to ensure the purity of the Church, is inexplicable, save on the supposition that he had as good as not found by experience, that even the bishop and presbytery themselves were not safe from heresy, and could not preserve the Church from it. The author, therefore, as he himself confesses, must have lived at a time when merely sufficient preparations had been made for the actual realization of his idea of the Episcopate. In the second place, inasmuch as, although by no means indifferent to the personal character of bishops (Polyc. 1, 2, 8; Magn. 2, 3; Epp. 1), it never seems to occur to him that his unity, "than which there exists nothing better" (Polyc. 1), might degenerate into a mere formality, and he suggests no provision either for securing confidence in the personal worth of the bishops, or for establishing it dogmatically (as do the Clementine Homilies, and, with them, the Romish Church, by the dogma of the communication of the Holy Spirit at ordination), we must judge these epistles to have originated at a period when such provisions had not yet been felt to be necessary,—that is, at a period when the Churches, but particularly their presidents and those who would next be elected to the office, took care to exact and to furnish pledges of personal worth (compare Clement, 1 Cor. c. 42, 44); a period, especially, when the pure apostolic tradition (the

σὰρξ Χριστοῦ) was represented in such a manner by a considerable number of disciples of the Apostles, to whom was entrusted the leading of the Church, that it was possible for the written tradition to be thrown into the shade—a thing which would have been impossible at a later time. Ignatius, for example, thus proceeds. In this respect, even Justin Martyr occupies an essentially different position (from the year 139 onwards); and still more Irenæus. The latter (although bishops never cease, in his view, to be also presbyters; for presbyters they continue to be in any case, even according to Ignatius, and constitute merely the summing up of the presbytery, Eph. 4) already, laying stress on the uninterrupted apostolical succession, and on the pure tradition conveyed through its medium, insists that oral and written tradition mutually confirm each other, and solely in conjunction with each other, constitute a certain source of the truth. He holds much the same relation to the formation of the canon as the Ignatian Epistles held to the development of the Episcopacy,—that is, he took part in the matter, just when the preliminary labours were being brought to a temporary close by the *idea* of the canon; and he endeavours scientifically to demonstrate both the necessity and the nature of the canon (c. Hær. 3, 1, 11). Justin Martyr also attaches greater importance than Ignatius to the apostolic writings. The formation of the canon was preceded, and, as we learn from very clear traces, was aided, by the organization of the Church, both in its historical and dogmatical aspect; for the bishops and presbyters are to be regarded, in particular, as the vehicles both of the historical and dogmatical tradition (regula fidei, symbolum Apostolicum), on which the matter depended. This organization, at all events in its bearing on the point which, in the view of Ignatius, was the flower of the Cultus, and the highest sign and manifestation of the unity of the Church,—to wit, the Eucharist,—was universally established in agreement with the idea of Ignatius at the time of Justin (compare Ign. ad Smyrn. 8 with Justin Martyr's Apologia 1, 67). Justin's idea of the unity of the Church is also similar to that of Ignatius, although his entire tendency was less practical (compare the Dial. cum Tryphone 63, 116). Lastly, I cannot but consider Neander's remark appropriate, that Montanism is to be regarded, partly as a reaction against the constitution of the Church of that

day, and partly as an element which was, at a subsequent period, reduced to a fixed form by the Romish Church. As a principle of reaction, it bore principally on the idea of the Episcopate, which, when the office was not held by men worthy of the dignity (Ignatius confidently takes for granted, that the office will be held by those who are fit for it), endangered the independence of the Church and the Divine right of such as were moved by the Holy Ghost, who, after all, must be the sole final source of all ecclesiastical authority and dignity. In this aspect, Montanism was a reaction of the substantial, real principle against the merely formal unity of the Episcopate, which entrusted to the unworthy, and those who were destitute of the Spirit, power over those who were filled by the Spirit. Viewed in this light, Montanism may be styled a democratic reaction on the part of the members of the Church, asserting their universal prophetic and priestly rank against the concentration of ecclesiastical dignities and rights in the Episcopate. From which it evidently follows, that a considerable time must have intervened between the rise of Montanism and the state of things set forth in the Epistles of Ignatius; the former being a reaction against the very thing which the latter treat as an object to be realized, and which enkindled the fresh, unquestioning, and confident enthusiasm of their author. Such enthusiasm is intelligible and right when a great idea has just been conceived, and the soul is filled with the conviction that it is destined shortly to become a living reality. In opposition to Ignatius, the Roman Catholic Church justified Montanism in maintaining, that not the office of bishop in itself, not the formal unity which it is able to effect, is enough, but that personal equipment with the Holy Spirit is necessary to the reality and truth of the Episcopacy; but it condemned Montanism for aiming at substituting in the place of the Episcopacy its sporadic prophetic spirit,—an inspiration, fanaticism, or extasy, which both breaks the historical link connecting the Church with preceding ages, and carries within itself no pledge of purity. In this respect it followed again the example of Ignatius, modifying his views, however, by teaching that the Episcopate, as such, is made partaker of the Holy Ghost by means of the rite of ordination. An attempt was thus made to meet and do justice to the true element in Montanism, and, at the same time, to incorporate it

with the fixed order of the Church. But even so, there is still a distinction to be noted. Bishops, in the view of Ignatius, are the representatives, the images of Christ; the presbytery represents the Apostles. This idea, as Gieseler truly remarks, was transformed by the Church into the idea that Episcopacy was the continuation of the apostolic office; until, finally, Catholicism put the Pope in Christ's place—the place assigned by Ignatius to the body of bishops. The foregoing remarks will be seen, I trust, to justify the view I have taken, even though I should believe myself compelled, by the consideration last adduced, to date the Epistles of Ignatius a full generation prior to Montanism, and to decide, after the investigations recently instituted by Meier, Baur, Lange, Rothe, Arndt, Huther (compare "Studien und Kritiken," 1835, pp. 881 ff.; 1836, pp. 540 ff.; 1839, pp. 136 ff.; also Gieseler's "Church History" i. 142, Observ. 4), in favour of the genuineness of the shorter edition, and that mainly on account of the form which Episcopacy still bears in it. The opposed view, defended by Baur, and the parallel drawn by him between the romance of the Clementine Homilies and the Ignatian Epistles, had a somewhat dazzling effect upon me in the first instance, but did not stand the test of a more thorough examination. Düsterdieck's supposition, that Lucian, in his Life of Peregrinus, written about the middle of the second century, had in his eye Ignatius the Christian hero, as he is set before us in the epistles, is far more to be commended. The main point in deciding on the genuineness of the epistles, is the question of the Episcopate, and that has already been discussed. A further objection is, that the history which forms the groundwork is improbable. How weak these reasons are, Huther has ably shown, in relation to the well calculated procedure adopted by Trajan (see Illgen's "Zeitschrift für hist. Theologie," 1841, Hefele l.c. pp. xxxix. ff.); compare Gieseler's remarks ("Church History," 2d ed. vol. i. p. 138) against Baur ("Episkopat." p. 149). I here add the arguments advanced by Huther. Although, in Justin's day, general persecutions of the Christians were still less common than in the time of Ignatius, the former speaks, as of a thing that was not rare, of Christians enthusiastically offering themselves for execution (Apol. 2, 12). Why, then, shall we characterize the yearnings for death, to which Ignatius gives expression in his Epistles to the Romans, as im-

probable, especially as he did not inform against himself, but may have owed his imprisonment to the information of false brethren, or the hostility of those who were differently minded from himself? (The latter is rendered probable by the passage from the Epist. ad Polyc. 6, where he designates himself *ἀντίψυχον τῶν ὑποτασσομένων τῷ ἐπισκόπῳ, τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις, τοῖς διακόνοις*, that is, a sacrifice for the idea of his life. Compare, in addition, the passage concerning ζῆλος in Clement, 1 Cor. v. How, if even in Antioch, and perhaps ere he himself became a bishop, he had advocated the idea, which he develops in such an original manner, with all his enthusiasm and ability, and had endeavoured to reduce it to reality?—if, by the idea of the obedience due to the Episcopate, he had aimed at subjugating the heads of the parties, which, according to the Epistle of Clement, at this time existed in Corinth, and which, to judge from Philad. 10, Smyrn. 11, compared with ad Rom. 9, Trall. 13, in Antioch also, would seem to have raised opposition on account of the bishopric; and had further, when elected bishop, employed his episcopal authority against them? If such were the case, we may easily suppose that informers might represent him as the cause of the disturbances that arose, that he might thus become a martyr, and in dying establish more firmly that for which, living, he had laboured.) Moreover, the defects of his character—its apparent contradictions, the alternation between a strong feeling of his own dignity and almost insulting expressions of humility (especially in the Epistle ad Trall.)—are quite explicable in a man of his fiery temperament, personally possessed by such an idea. The author himself, too, betrays a sense of the fact, that an element of impurity had mixed itself up with his ζῆλος (Trall. 4); whereas a writer, whose object it was to recommend Episcopacy through the mouth of the dying Christian hero, would not have allowed him to hint at anything of that sort: such expressions, therefore, are a sign of inner, psychological truth. Further, his delineation of the heretics who stood opposed to him, and who negatively aided in the determination of his mode of thought, is quite different from what it would have been had he written only twenty years later (that is, about 137, instead of about 117), when Gnosticism had gained its more important representatives. Their influence on himself would also have been different. Gnosticism proper he never

seeks to controvert (in the longer edition of his Epistles, Gnosticism is attacked); he does, however, argue against Docetism. —The passage in Magnes. 8 will be discussed below. Let it suffice here, in the first instance, to remark, that Baur, in his criticism of the New Testament, seems to be much more anxious to remove books from their position in the canon, than to show afterwards what position they ought to occupy; otherwise, it would be incomprehensible how he could pronounce the Ignatian Epistles to be the product of a later period, amongst other reasons, because this passage is directed against Gnosticism; when the Epistles to the Philippians and Colossians, even if Paul were not their author, must have been written, at the latest, about the time of Ignatius, in order that there might have been interval long enough to render them suitable, in the eyes of Marcion, for adoption into his canon—as writings, that is, which were held by the Church to be Pauline. Lastly, the remarks just made, bear the following relation to Baur's hypotheses regarding the Pseudo-Clementine writings. If it be right at all to attribute to these writings an influence on the peculiar form assumed by the Episcopate in the Romish Church (although that form can be sufficiently explained from the Judaizing principle, and from the national political character of the Romans; and, in any case, it is not necessary, with Baur, to trace the hierarchical influence exerted by the Pseudo-Clementine literature in the Eastern Churches, to Rome; compare Bickell's "Geschichte des Kirchenrechts," 1843, Beil. iv. pp. 148 ff. Nr. 63 ff.), it can only be on the ground of a point common to them and the Church, to wit, the very weighty one of ordination; that is, on the ground of the very point which, according to the account given above of the stadia in the development of the Episcopate, was, at all events in the Church, unquestionably a later one. The Clementines, therefore, set up a wider distinction between the clergy and the laity than did Ignatius: they give the bishop, in particular, a far higher position than did Ignatius, and speak of a superior bishop (as it were Pope), whereas Ignatius treats all bishops as equal. Ignatius, therefore, represents, so to speak, the ideal aspect of the idea of the Episcopate: the other aspect, which unquestionably, at all events in point of principle, marks a relapse into Judaism, is the realistic one. In the view of Ignatius, the bishop is the teacher, especially, however, the liturg and regent of the Church: ac-

cording to the Clementine writings, his sole business, it is true, is to distribute doctrine and the forgiveness of sin; but ordination and the Spirit communicated by that rite, constitute the Episcopate the continuation of the prophets of truth, apart from whom it is impossible to attain to blessedness. In reality, therefore, they constitute the bishop a mediator, a Levitical priest, whose word binds and looses, and who can either communicate or withhold the Spirit. The Catholic Church holds neither the Ignatian nor the Pseudo-Clementine idea of the Episcopate by itself, but endeavours, as we have shown, to combine the two. Baur is right, therefore, when he maintains that the Catholic conception of the Episcopate did not exist at the commencement of the second century; and if the Epistles of Ignatius contained such a conception, their authenticity could not be defended. He is wrong, however,—and in this respect his combinations do not stand the test,—when he fails, as do most writers, properly to distinguish between the Ignatian idea of the Episcopate, and the idea which subsequently prevailed in the Church. He also fails to distinguish between the Pseudo-Clementine and the Ignatian idea. But for this, he would have seen that the idea entertained by the Catholic Church, and to which Montanism had given rise, had not become what it was all at once, but consisted of several momenta, and had needed a long course of preparation: he must also have reckoned the Ignatian idea of the Episcopate amongst the things which had prepared its way; and thus the strongest argument against the genuineness of these epistles would have been converted into the strongest argument for their high antiquity, that is, into a strong argument for their genuineness.—Indeed, in general, Baur's efforts to trace the origin of the Episcopate to Rome, by means of the Clementines, seem to me so far not to have been successful; for those writings bear on their forehead the sign of the uneasy conscience of an isolated, heretical party; and it is much simpler and easier to say, with Gieseler ("Church History" i. 140 ff.), that, on the death of the Apostles and their disciples, the churches having lost their leaders, and feeling the need of unity, sought for a substitute; such a substitute offered itself in the Episcopate, a pattern of which might be found in the position occupied by James and his successors in the mother Church of Jerusalem. The example set in Jerusalem was imitated first by the neighbouring

churches: in the more distant churches, the chief presbyters, as presidents, assumed a similar position; but, as far as any power of exercising independent authority was concerned, were little raised above the other presbyters. So Clemen. ad Cor. i. 44; Polyc. ad Philad. 5, 6.—This was the historically safe method; and it is a matter of more surprise that Baur should have preferred the Clementine hypothesis, as he considers James in Jerusalem to have been an Ebionite, and as that primitive Christianity should have been Ebionitical, and that the Episcopate should have had an Ebionitic origin, would seem to consist very well with that circumstance. It is true, the main, nay, in the last instance, the only, argument against, would then be converted into an argument for, the genuineness of the Ignatian Epistles; and, even as an hypothesis, the Ebionitic character of primitive Christianity would no longer be tenable.

With regard to the age of the Pseudo-Clementine writings, specially of the Homilies, nothing is herewith decided. Nothing else preventing, they might be supposed to have contributed their part towards preparing the way for the realistic aspect of the Catholic Episcopacy: they were not, however, so favourably situated for exerting an influence as the Ignatian Epistles, which were not only not an heretical production, but were most intimately connected with John, and especially with Paul (Ephes., Col., 1 Cor.); whilst the former are by no means even Petrine in character. For they neither merely repeat nor exaggerate the distinctive features of Peter's Christianity, but are Ebionitical, and therefore, after what we have seen above, must be, at all events Christologically and soteriologically, utterly irreconcilable with Peter. The only thing which they have appropriated from, or in which they may perhaps be said to have outdone, Peter, is his shortcoming in practice—a shortcoming which contravened his own principles. But their attempt to conceal their dogmatic nakedness by such a theoretical accordance with Peter, was in vain. These remarks are, strictly speaking, so self-evident, that there ought to be no need of making them. But we are threatened at the present time with such a confusion of ideas, such an arbitrary commingling of terms like Petrinism, Judaism, Ebionitism, that it is both necessary and appropriate to raise a protest. Even the division into genuine and spurious portions, proposed

by Neander, solely on account of the Episcopacy, appears to me completely inadmissible. The epistles are so entirely of one mould, and, in particular, their advocacy of an ecclesiastical organization, as the means of securing ecclesiastical unity, is so inseparably interwoven with everything else, that I should prefer concluding the whole to be spurious, to supposing that essential and important parts are interpolations. Neander's hatred of the priesthood, especially in its Catholic form, seems to have affected his judgment of the epistles, and to have prejudiced him against them. Reference has already been made above to the historical objections which he might raise against them.

NOTE EE, page 112.

Magn. 8. *οἱ γὰρ θειότατοι προφῆται κατὰ Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν ἔζησαν· διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐδιώχθησαν, ἐμπνεόμενοι ὑπὸ τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ,—ὅτι εἷς Θεός ἐστιν ὁ φανερώσας ἑαυτὸν διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, ὅς ἐστιν αὐτοῦ λόγος ἀΐδιος, οὐκ ἀπὸ σιγῆς προελθών, ὃς κατὰ πάντα εὐηρέστησεν τῷ πέμψαντι αὐτόν.* The word Logos can occasion no surprise, especially as, both here and elsewhere, we can show it to be connected, not with λόγος in the sense of *νοῦς*, but with the expression *ῥῆμα Θεοῦ*. For the same term is employed even by John; and whether we prefer referring to Apocalypse xix. 14, or to John i. 1, 1 John i. 1 ff., the term *ἀΐδιος* must substantially be predicated also of the Johannean Logos. Even Philo designates his Logos *αἰώνιος*. Similarly, the presbyters, the disciples of the Apostles, speak in Irenæus v. 36 (probably according to Papias) of Christ as the Verbum—a feature which points to the time of Ignatius. So also, when the Logos is spoken of by Cerinthus, or, at a somewhat later period, in the *Κήρυγμα Πέτρου* (see Gieseler i. 153; Schliemann's "Die Clementinen," p. 252); or when the fifth book of the Sibyllines (see below) designates the Messiah *Θεὸς ἀΐδιος*. This is the only passage of the shorter edition in which a reference seems to be made to Gnostic elements; and even in this passage the reference is quite a passing one. For this reason we may assume that the letters were written at a time when the chief representatives of Gnosticism had not yet made their appearance. On the other hand, we may judge from Philo, and the affinity of the various branches

of the different members of the Gnostic family with each other and with him, that, during the first century, there could have been no lack of elements out of which Gnosticism might gradually be formed. The *μυθεύματα*, to which allusion is made even in canonical writings which existed prior to Ignatius, and of which Ignatius himself speaks (Magn. 8), prepared the way for Gnosticism, in particular, by giving a still more pagan character to Philo's conception of God. This paganization was effected in various ways: the angels played a great rôle, and their genealogies were probably but a coarser form of the doctrine of the Æons. Not only, however, was this akin to the *ἄγγελοι*, the *λόγοι* of Philo, but the distinction drawn by Philo between the *Ὄν* and the *λόγος*, involved essentially that drawn by the Gnostics between *σιγὴ* and the *λόγος*. Given a Logology, and it was the simplest possible process to develop therefrom the word *σιγή*. For, prior to the utterance of the word, there was silence. The designation *σιγὴ* presupposes the doctrine of the Logos; but where the idea of God had been ethnicized, and no hesitation was felt (as in the case of Philo) in positing a change in God Himself,—that is, in supposing the Logos to have sprung forth out of a preceding silence,—there the idea of *σιγὴ* is very naturally suggested by that of the Logos. Now, if it be a fact, that fully developed Gnostic systems existed some ten or twenty years after A.D. 117, instead of regarding with suspicion the isolated traces of so important and widespread a phænomenon, discoverable at an earlier period, we ought to see in them forerunners of those systems, historically natural and to be expected. Accordingly, this passage, so far from warranting conclusions against the genuineness of the epistles, is a strong testimony in favour of their high antiquity, especially as the opponents referred to are Judaizers of the oldest Cerinthian kind. Other writers suppose an interpolation. But there is nothing to justify this supposition, especially when we compare the longer edition, which altered the text in agreement with the dogmatical views of a later period. The original of the other two passages, translated in the text, from Magn. 6, and Poly. c. 3, runs as follows:—*Χριστοῦ, ὃς πρὸ αἰώνων παρὰ πατρὶ ἦν καὶ ἐν τέλει ἐφάνη*; and, *τὸν ὑπὲρ καιρὸν προσδόκα, τὸν ἄχρονον, τὸν ἀόρατον τὸν δι' ἡμᾶς ὁρατὸν, τὸν ἀψηλάφητον, τὸν ἀπαθῆ, τὸν δι' ἡμᾶς παθητόν.*

NOTE FF, page 116.

Irenæus adv. hæres. 3, 3, 4; Euseb. H. E. 4, 14; Schliemann's "Die Clementinen." The main source is his Epistle to the Philippians, and then the fragment of the letter from Irenæus (compare Euseb. 5, 20) to Florinus (compare Iren. Opp. ed. Grabe, pp. 463, 464). Irenæus was acquainted with several other letters addressed by Polycarp to neighbouring churches and to individuals, which have not been preserved; but, in lib. 3, 3, he gives especial prominence to the Epistle to the Philippians, from which the χαρακτὴρ τῆς πίστεως αὐτοῦ and the true Christian doctrine might be learned. In his letter to Florinus—a letter which modern criticism would seem to have almost totally forgotten—Irenæus says,—"I saw thee in Asia Minor with Polycarp, when thou livedst in splendour at the Imperial Court, and endeavouredst to gain importance in the eyes of Polycarp. For, of that which then happened I retain a better remembrance than of that which has recently taken place; for that which is learnt in youth grows together with the soul, and becomes one substance with it." Then, after detailing what he remembered of Polycarp—of his walk, of his appearance, of his manner of life, of his discourses to the people, of the accounts he gave of his intimate intercourse with John and others who had seen the Lord, of their discourses, and of that which he had heard from them regarding the Lord, His miracles and His teachings,—he adds, that that which Polycarp had received from those who had themselves seen the Word of Life, even as he narrated it, was entirely in agreement with the Scriptures (that is, of the New Testament, which Irenæus, at all events at a later period, compared therewith). "Such things I eagerly listened to, even at that time, by the grace of God which was given to me, and wrote them down for remembrance, not on paper, but in mine heart; and by God's grace I read them there ever afresh and unadulterated." That the Epistle to the Philippians referred to by Irenæus is the same with which Eusebius was acquainted (Church History 4, 14; 3, 36), is scarcely to be questioned; and that the epistle now extant is the same as that of Eusebius, is evident from the remark made by Eusebius,—"The Epistle of Polycarp shows an acquaintance with the First Epistle of Peter." This epistle is, in

fact, most frequently mentioned; for example, in c. 1 we find 1 Peter i. 8; in c. 2, 1 Peter i. 13, 21, iii. 9; in c. 5, 1 Peter ii. 11; in c. 7, 1 Peter iv. 7; in c. 8, 1 Peter ii. 22, 24; in the conclusion, which, with the exception of c. 10, exists solely in an old translation, 1 Peter ii. 12. But it shows also an acquaintance with the First Epistle of John, quoting 1 John iv. 3. The author is, however, specially familiar with the epistles of the Apostle Paul, and, like Ignatius, makes frequent mention of him; he also alludes to Ignatius himself and his epistles (Eus. 3, 36). The epistle contains congratulations to the Church of Antioch on account of the actual re-establishment of the peace, wishes for which had been expressed in the Epistles of Ignatius (Ign. Ep. ad Polyc. 8). Hence Polycarp must have written his epistle about the time of the death of Ignatius. That the epistle holds a different relation to the *idea* of the Episcopate from that of Ignatius, may be conceded. Unlike Ignatius, it does not go on to characterize more definitely the first of the presbyters, the (without doubt life-long) president, as the one whose mission it is to represent the unity of the life of the Church; but nothing in the epistle justifies the opinion, that it presupposes different circumstances from those of the Ignatian Epistles. It is true, no distinction is made in the epistle between bishop and presbyter; but such a distinction as the one above described, which was in agreement with the spirit of the age, and beyond which Ignatius aimed at advancing, is presupposed. Polycarp himself is represented as the spokesman, as the first in Smyrna: he holds intercourse with other churches, he subscribes the letter, he speaks in his own name therein—is, in point of fact, the bishop; whereas the opening words, "Polycarp and the presbyters with him wish, etc.," would have led us to expect something different, if the presbyters around him had merely held the same rank with himself. He acts rather as did Paul, for example, in 1 Cor. i. 1; Gal. i. 2. Furthermore, even supposing Polycarp to have been much more strongly inspired by the idea of the Episcopacy than the simple character of his piety allowed, a reason can be assigned why he should have hesitated to lay stress on it in this epistle. In the Church at Philippi, circumstances had occurred which the Ignatian idea of the Episcopate scarcely anticipated, and for which it was unprepared. According to c. 11, Valens, who, as it

would appear, had occupied a high position in their midst, had become a scandal in consequence of his improper conduct;—he had misused his office in a shameful manner. To have insisted on the official rights of this president, would, therefore, have been a very unseasonable thing; and, consequently, Polycarp contents himself with the general exhortation,—which, though so general, is somewhat Ignatian in tone,—"Be obedient to the presbyters and deacons, as to God and Christ" (c. 5). For, amongst the presbyters he includes also the president, whose duty it was to act in their name, and whom Ignatius considered to be the representative of the unity of the Church, not apart from the presbytery, but as the logical carrying out of that which appeared to him to be involved in the office of president. I agree, therefore, with Neander and Gieseler, who see no sufficient reason whatever for denying the authorship of Polycarp; at the same time, I would remark, that he shows himself, as far as knowledge is concerned, to have possessed rather a receptive than a productive nature. He is well acquainted with the Scriptures of the Old, and with many books of the New Testament, but is, in the main, content with that which is directly practical.

Note GG, page 118.

Irenæus 3, 3. The Epistle of the Church of Smyrna to the Churches in Pontus (whence Marcion sprung), may perhaps be taken as an evidence that Polycarp was well known, and had laboured in that country (compare Euseb. 4, 15). The epistle contains embellishments; other parts, however, are simple and thoroughly credible—specially the words attributed to Polycarp. So far as these bear upon Christology, they perfectly agree with the Epistle of Polycarp. His martyrdom he terms a participation in the cup of Christ; he designates God the Father of Jesus Christ; Jesus Christ Himself he styles *παῖς Θεοῦ ἀγαπητὸς καὶ εὐλογητός*, and *αἰώνιος ἀρχιερεύς* (compare ad Philipp. 12). Through the Son, honour accrues to the Father, together with the Son, in the Holy Spirit, to all eternity.—If his death took place in the year 167, he must have lived long after Irenæus, and have died *πάνυ γηραλέος*; and if, as Irenæus repeatedly alleges, he enjoyed intimate intercourse with the Apostle John, the words of Eusebius (H. E. 4, 15),

ὀγδοήκοντα καὶ ἓξ ἔτη δουλεύω αὐτῷ, καὶ οὐδέν με ἠδίκησε, must be understood of the time during which he was a Christian, and not of his age:—indeed, the words in themselves require to be taken in this sense. The reading in Eusebius, which is the older, does not run ὀγδοήκοντα καὶ ἓξ ἔτη ἔχω δουλεύων. Moreover, the sense just given is more suitable to the context, which speaks of the long continuance of the kindness of Christ, than the mention of his natural age, especially as his age had just been referred to by the Proconsul, and it was now his duty to reply thereto. Polycarp had therefore reached an age not quite so great as that of Simeon, or of some of the men who were healed by Christ, and whom Quadratus speaks of as still living, in his Apology; but merely, perhaps, the age of Pothinus, Bishop of Lyons, who is said to have been sent thither by Polycarp. The conclusion of the Epistle of the Church of Smyrna, with its pure views on the subject of martyrdom and the veneration due to martyrs, is peculiarly worthy of note: this passage, by itself, is an undoubted indication of high antiquity. Now in the same passage we read,—"The Jews carefully observed us when we fetched the remains of Polycarp out of the fire (they supposed, namely, that the Christians would make it an object of worship). They knew not that we could neither desert Christ, who died for the salvation of the entire world of the redeemed, nor worship another. For we worship Christ, who was the Son of God; but the martyrs we love and honour as disciples and imitators of Christ."

NOTE HH, page 120.

Compare Routh's "Reliquiæ Sacræ" i. 74. The Martyrology attributed to Bede praises in him a feature of an anti-Judaistic character:—"Firmavit, ut nulla esca a Christianis repudiaretur, quæ rationalis et humana est." To a similar intent speaks the author of the Epistle to Diognetus (c. 4). If we are careful to note in the latter epistle, that the Jews are represented as still sacrificing and as unswervingly adhering to the religion of their fathers (c. 3, 4), and that the author styles himself a disciple of the Apostles, we shall be inclined to adopt the supposition of its high antiquity. Reasons might be advanced in favour of the authorship of Quadratus, who elsewhere also is called a disciple of the Apostles. The philosophic and

rhetorical culture evinced in the epistle, its free and universal point of view (c. 5, 6), and its ethical doctrine, especially of *εὐδαιμονία*, quite agree with that which we know of the man from other sources. Both the tone and the spirit of the letter, and the entire circle of thought, show that the author was a man in whom Christianity had been engrafted on a noble philosophic culture. If this be true, the Epistle is an early and certain illustration and proof of the fact, that even at the commencement of the second century the doctrine of the Logos was pretty commonly held. And, actually, Justin's doctrine of the Logos, as expounded in his Apologia (of the year 139), is already more developed than that of the epistle in question. To assign the epistle to a still earlier period, with some of the older writers (for example, Gallandius) and with Möhler, appears to me unwarranted, because prior to Quadratus and Aristides we have no traces of the union of Christianity with Hellenic *φιλοσοφία*. But the question may undoubtedly be asked,—Whether the work was not written at all events somewhat later than about A.D. 130? In favour of a later date, may be urged, in particular, that the author represents Mary as the second Eve (c. 12), in the manner constantly adopted by Irenæus; and his employment of the expression *ξύλον ζωῆς καὶ γνώσεως*. His conciliation of the claims of *ζωὴ* and of *γνῶσις* (c. 12), which betrays a higher, freer point of view, would also suit a later portion of the second century. Lastly too, the conclusion, in which the candles for Easter (c. 12) are spoken of, points in the same direction. (It is useless, with the "Congregatio St Mauri" (the Benedictines), to conjecture for *κηροὶ χοροὶ*, or, with Sylburg, *καιροὶ*.) In such a case, the author must have designated himself a disciple of the Apostles merely in the wider sense (c. 11); and his judgment of Judaism would relate to its principle, which was not renounced even after the universal exile, not to the actual condition of its Cultus. Even the question regarding the novelty of Christianity, which the author answers so beautifully in the manner of Paul and John, was constantly brought under discussion at a much later period. It is true, these arguments for the later composition of the work may all be set aside by adopting a particular division of the work. Semisch, Böhl, and Otto take this course; Hefele also inclines thereto (see his "Patres Apostolici," ed. 2, 1842, lxi.). To me, however, the

division does not appear to have a sufficient warrant; on the contrary, cc. 11, 12, seem to me to exhibit the same compass of thought and Christian colouring as the rest, and first to bring the epistle to an appropriate conclusion. The twelfth chapter, it is true, is addressed to several others besides Diognetus; but what was there to hinder the author, who had styled himself a teacher of the Gentiles (c. 11), from expecting or desiring that Diognetus would not keep the epistle entirely to himself? Between his doctrine of γνῶσις (c. 12) and that of πίστις (c. 8) there is no contradiction; as we shall see, if we only consider that in c. 12 he expresses his desire for ζωὴ as well as γνῶσις, and that by the latter he means not discursive knowledge, but the knowledge of the ὀφθαλμοὶ καρδίας (ἤτω σοι καρδία γνῶσις: καρδία is the subject of the sentence). I grant that the arguments just mentioned, which would show the epistle to have been written after 150, are not decisive; and in favour of an earlier date, one might further, in particular, urge,—that the citations from Paul are free in character, after the manner of Justin; that the question of gnosis is handled so guilelessly, and no notice taken of Gnosticism; and that, further, the author shows, in his conception of God, that he occupied a point of view from which love appeared as the distinctively Christian characteristic of God, in opposition to mere power and justice. At the time of Irenæus and Tertullian, on the contrary, nay, even at the time of the earlier opponents of Marcion and others, the Christian intellect considered the task devolving upon it to be the reverse one of asserting for justice also a place alongside of love, as an attribute of the Most High God, and, so to speak, to reproduce the former as stored up and included in the latter: whereas the author of this epistle, like Ignatius, feels blessed in, and devotes himself almost solely to, the contemplation of the love of God. Finally, in favour of the earlier date may especially be adduced c. 11,—Ἀποστόλων γενόμενος μαθητὴς γίνομαι διδάσκαλος ἐθνῶν; for such a division, at first sight, reminds one in some measure of the earliest times. But even at a later time such a division might have been employed with perfect justice, and its use in the present instance is clearly traceable to the individuality of the writer. It is undoubtedly possible that, at a later time also, a peculiarly thoughtful man, thoroughly and harmoniously cultivated, without taking part in

the conflicts of the age, or, at all events, without wishing to introduce his heathen disciple to the controversies then raging in the Christian world, might have written this work. It breathes an air of eternity; it is marked by inner harmony and clearness: and precisely because it was so direct an expression of the eternal element in Christianity, does it bear so few traces of any particular period; indeed, it might have found a home in any age of the Church's history. But if the division of the epistle above referred to be adopted, it must have been written probably not long after the year 120. Otto's acute and painstaking investigations have furnished strong reasons for agreeing with some of the old manuscripts, which attribute the epistle to Justin Martyr; for my own part, however, I must confess that the point of view seems to me higher, and the style nobler, than that of Justin. But be its age what it may, caution would suggest the advisability of employing the epistle at a later period, in connection with a question so important as that of the age of the Hellenic-Christian doctrine of the Logos. For the various views on the subject, see Otto in Illgen's "Zeitschrift," 1841, Heft 2, p. 80; and 1842, Heft 2, p. 54 f.; further, his "de Epist. ad Diognetum S. Justini Philos. et Martyris nomen præ se ferente," Jena 1845.

Note II, page 121.

This follows from Hieron. Quæst. hebr. in Genesin:—Plerique existimant, sicut in altercatione quoque Jasonis et Papisci scriptum est,—in Hebræo haberi,—In Filio fecit Deus cœlum et terram. (Even as Origen explains the ἀρχὴ in John i. 1 and Gen. i. 1, ed. de la Rue ii. 52; iv. 17 ff., of the Divine Wisdom.) Compare Routh l.c. i. 91, 94. Of a doctrine of the Logos taught by Aristo we know nothing: at the same time, he belonged to the number of those who, in harmony with the Old Testament, though without using the title Logos, developed, during the first half of the second century, momenta of the doctrine, such as the pre-existence and the world-creating power of the Son. Compare also Irenæus adv. hær. 2, 3. Similarly Clem. Alex. Strom. 6, 16, p. 815 ed. Potter.—The account of apologies being presented to the Emperor Hadrian, in the eighteenth year of his reign, by Apelles and Aristo, contained in the Chron. Alex. (ed. Rader. 600), is probably based on a

misunderstanding of Eusebius. Fabricius supposes that Aristo of Pella is the writer referred to.

NOTE JJ, page 121.

Compare Routh l.c. i. 94. Theodotion and Aquila translated Deut. xxi. 23 by λοιδορία Θεοῦ; similarly also, the Ebionites, according to Jerome, rendered it ὕβρις. Both translations efface the idea of punishment, of curse. Aristo did not understand Hebrew. But that he was acquainted with the Septuagint, which gives a rendering of Deut. xxi. 23 more favourable to his purposes (compare Gal. iii. 13), may be judged from his explanation of Gen. i. 1:—See the LXX. in loco.

NOTE KK, page 123.

As Irenæus, in his five books, felt conscious that he was setting forth the same Christian doctrine, about the year 180, that he had heard in his youth, from Polycarp, during the first twenty years of the first century (Ep. ad Florin. l.c.; compare Flemmer's "de itineribus et rebus gestis Hadriani Imperat. secundum nummorum et inscriptionum testim." Haun. 1836, c. 3, 9), and on which the various churches of the world were agreed (L. 3, 1–4); so also Eusebius, who had before him many old documents now no longer extant, makes frequent allusions to the essential agreement in matters of faith between his own and former times; and such an agreement could, at that period, relate to one subject alone, to wit, that of a Christology (H. E. 4, 5, 7, 14, 23). There exists, however, another testimony with regard to the faith of the then Christendom, dating from the time of Aristo, Quadratus, and Aristides, if not from an earlier period,—the testimony, namely, of that unknown old man, by whose means Justin Martyr was brought to Christianity (Dial. c. Tryph. 3–7). That what Justin relates of this old man is true, I regard as fully made out by Semisch (see l.c. i. 15 ff.); the same writer has also shown that Ephesus was most probably the scene of the conversation (p. 21). Now, as Justin presented an apology for the Christians as early as the year 139, and was still a young man when converted, the conversation most probably took place during the first twenty years of the second century, if not earlier. But the old man, who is described as a παλαιὸς πρεσβύτης (c. 3), unquestionably produces

the impression not merely of a highly cultivated mind, but also of a ripened Christian; so that what he says concerning Christ must be regarded as the faith of Christians about the end of the first, or the commencement of the second century. It is true the old man enters so cordially and sympathetically into the philosophical ideas of the young man, and his intention from the outset was so decided, merely to awaken doubts of his philosophemes, and to excite him to make a trial of the "friends of Christ," that he says very little regarding the substance of Christian doctrine. What he does say, however, is significant. At the close of the third, and at the commencement of the fourth chapter, the old man tries to show that, inasmuch as the true εὐδαιμονία consists solely in the knowledge of God, and as the spirit can know God alone through God, not through itself, a twofold revelation is necessary. Firstly, an objective revelation; because, as the only way in which we know anything at all, so also the only way in which we can know God, is by means of an external appearance—by something which shall affect the sense of sight or of hearing. Secondly, a subjective revelation in the Holy Spirit, because the pure alone is susceptible to the Divine. All this is, as it were, a direct outcome of the doctrinal type of John (compare John i. 18; 1 John i. 1 ff.; John v. 37, 38). Both (c. 7, ed. Col. 109), in the conviction of the old man, are given in Christianity,—that is, in Christ the Son of God, who was announced by the prophets, and sent by the Father; and in the Holy Spirit, through whom God and His Christ vouchsafe knowledge to us, and open the gates of light to him who prays. Foolish and unintelligible do they seem (that is, Divine things and their revelation in Christ) to all, whom God and His Christ do not make capable of understanding them. Compare the close of the Epistola ad Diognetum 8, 4.—Who the old man was, cannot be shown. Fabricius suggests Polycarp; but this is not very probable. He was evidently a man of large mind and philosophical culture; but still he seems to have been inferior to the author of the Epistle to Diognetus, notwithstanding the many resemblances between the situation of things and their fundamental ideas. The old man also, as did Justin at a later period, stood in a relation to prophecy, in which the other cannot be shown to have stood.

Note LL, page 123.

The following may be adduced as marks indicative of the time when this work was written :—1. One repentance (Vis. ii. 2, iii. 7; Mand. iv. 3; "Pœnitentia una est, Pœnitentiæ justorum habent fines"). All the weight falls on this one repentance: over it is appointed an angel, as Præpositus pœnitentiæ. Hereupon the question of adultery also is discussed. The idea of marriage also indicates a later period (Vis. ii. 2; Mand. iv. 4). 2. With this is connected, in the second place, what is taught regarding holy baptism. Even the pious in the nether world, who stand in no need of improvement, cannot attain to blessedness, until they have received through the Apostles the seal of baptism (Simil. ix. 16). 3. The highest position is assigned to martyrdom in Vis. iii. 1. 4. Christian piety has already created a system of ascetical practices ("stationem habeo," Simil. v. 15). 5. The pastor everywhere raises his voice against the rigid forms of the Church, which threatened to absorb the religious activity of the rest of Christians in the functions of the presidents;—in one word, he sets his face against ecclesiastical formalism. This is especially clear from his relation to the presidents of the Church, and from the view he takes of the tendency to give the presidents so prominent a position in the cultus and constitution. To the liturgical and episcopal representation of the Church he opposes the ethical, and objects to a particular principatus in the Church (Simil. viii. 8; Mand. xii. 2). The false spirits wish to hold the first cathedra. In Vis. iii. 9 we read,—"And to you who preside over the Church (that is, to the bishops, according to Sim. ix. 27), and who love the first seats, I say, Be not like poison-mixers."—It is true, pillars are set up in the vineyard of God, that is, presidents, who bind the people together (Simil. v. 5); and the bishops, whose duty it was to be a shadow to the people, had assumed, even in his day, the first places (Simil. ix. 27; Vis. iii. 9, 5). Not, however, as bishops are they incorporated with the ideal Church, which he beholds in vision (Simil. ix. 27, 15); but some of the bishops alone are the shadowing trees; even as, on the other hand, such as are not bishops occupy the same position. But the scornful attack he makes on the cathedra is worthy of special remark. In the third Vis. c. 11, we read,—"In the first instance, the Church

appeared to Hermas as an old woman sitting on a cathedra :— 'because your spirit is old and already fading. Like old women, who cannot renew themselves, and expect nothing but sleep; so have you surrendered yourselves to sloth, have not cast your cares upon the Lord, etc.'" But on the cathedra sat the woman, "quoniam omnis infirmus super cathedram sedet, propter infirmitatem suam, ut contineatur infirmitas ejus." (Compare Mand. xv. 2.) The cathedra, therefore, is for such as are sleepy; and tends to rock persons to sleep. Weakness seeks in it a support; but that is unbelief: moreover, what is itself weak cannot strengthen others. "Spiritus vester antiquior etiam marcidus est, et non habens vim a vestris infirmitatibus et dubitatione cordis." In the second Visio (Vis. iii. 12), the woman (the Church) appears to him with a youthful countenance and joyous aspect; and yet still old as to flesh and hair. The explanation thereof is,—"Her spirit is renewed, she has laid aside the infirmitates, she is rejuvenated by repentance." But she never attains a firm position, until she repents with all her heart. Then he beholds her sitting, not on the cathedra, but "*super subsellium sedentem*," that is the "fortis positio." He aims, therefore, at asserting the equality of all; relatively both to the rich and to the dignitaries of the Church. Those who fight about rank and dignities must submit themselves to repentance (Sim. viii. 7). Such opposition of course presupposes experiences which were impossible during the age of the Apostolic Fathers: that which awakened the enthusiasm of Ignatius,—to wit, the idea of the unity of the Church as an edifice, in which Apostles, Bishops, Teachers, and Deacons fit into each other like stones which fit into their proper places (Vis. iii. 5),—is not unknown to him; but he complains that this organization of the constitution threatens, where there is a lack of fit persons, to overthrow the equality of Christians, and introduces "a false spirit," a worldly element, into the Church (Mand. xii. 2). But in consequence of the predominance of the cathedra, and of all activity being concentred in the bishop, the religious meetings have a soporiferous character. Particular light is thrown on his controversy against the representation of the Church through the Episcopacy and the liturgy, by his ideal of the Divine service of the Church (Mand. xi. 12). "The main point is to have the Spirit; not the false spirit, but the Spirit from

above. The spirit of man is earthly and trifling, speaks much and yet has no power. The spirit from the earth speaks when it wills; but the true Spirit speaks when God wills, and not when man wills. Accordingly, when a man who has the Spirit comes into the assembly of the righteous, who believe in God, and prayer is offered to God, the holy messenger of the Deity fills that man with the Holy Spirit, and he speaks in the midst of the multitude as God wills." The author, therefore, seems to wish to bring back the free mode of worship which obtained in Corinth; he desires no fixed order, neither as affecting speakers nor the subject of discourse. The sudden operations of the Spirit, that which is abrupt, alone inspires him with confidence. Forms that have grown up historically are human, earthly; God alone ought to speak in the Church. Both in this matter, in his remarks on repentance adduced above, and in his idea of the Church (Sim. ix. 18) and of marriage (Mand. iv. 4), but especially in his notion that all progress in knowledge must be effected by means of visions, in an abrupt Montanistic form, he was a forerunner of Montanus. That he represents his instructor as accustomed to appear to him in the form of a shepherd (whence the book derives its title), is probably due not to accident, but to the afore-mentioned antagonism to the Episcopate. Another point of affinity between him and Montanism is, that the new elements communicated to him in his revelations are principally of an ethical nature. Even the tendency of Simil. iv. is ethical,—a point which must not be overlooked in interpreting it. In his ethics, it is true, he takes up a predominantly negative, consequently legal, position relatively to the world. The Shepherd attaches little importance to the religious ascetical practices prescribed by the Church, and so far represents a freer point of view (Sim. v. 3); but to an ethical asceticism he continues to adhere, and that forms the substance of his new revelations.—From the features just described, it is evident, on the one hand, that the Shepherd of Hermas must be dated prior to Montanism, of which, however, it was a forerunner (compare similar features in other writers of this period, Euseb. H. E. iv. 23); and, on the other hand, that it must have been written after the organization of the Church had acquired, through the Episcopacy and other institutions, a more compact form than it possessed at the time of Ignatius.

Many things which were still matters of dispute in the days of Ignatius, and needed some such energetical recommendation as is contained in his epistles, seem to have already become actual facts at the time of the Shepherd. Experiences of the lack of personal worth, and of dangers to the equality of Christians, to the free movement of the spirit, and to true and vital piety arising from the Episcopate, with which Ignatius could surely not have been acquainted, seeing that with perfect artlessness he takes no notice whatever of them, have now become frequent. In general, indeed, the unity realized through the development of ecclesiastical institutions, appeared to many (for the Shepherd cannot be regarded as an isolated phænomenon) to be of too formal a character, and led them to protest against it in the name of the spirit of Christianity. Baur has treated Hermas very imperfectly in his work on the Episcopate (pp. 75 ff.). Of the above passages concerning the cathedra and the first seat, he takes no notice; he advances no further than the passage from Vis. ii. 4, which he explains to mean that Clement is placed in the class of the Seniores. This passage, however, forms part of the dress of the epistle, which required that circumstances should be represented as they had been some fifty years previously, especially as Clement's name was intended to secure for the epistle admission into the Church. Besides, the shepherd himself would fain have seen the earlier and simpler state of things restored. Further, the passage does not at all describe Clement merely as one of the Seniores. He is specially mentioned along side of the Seniores, and was, therefore, at the very least, as even Baur must allow, regarded as primus inter pares. In no passage referring to the circumstances of his own time does Hermas speak of Presbyteri or Seniores, as Baur appears to think, but of Episcopi, Doctores, Ministri. We must, therefore, agree with Routh when he asserts ("Reliquiæ Sacræ" iv. 33), that he sees no reason for contradicting the canon of Muratori (ib. p. 5), which testifies,—"Pastorem vero nuperrime temporibus nostris in urbe Roma Herma conscripsit, sedente (in) cathedra urbis Romæ ecclesiæ Pio Episcopo fratre ejus" (compare also pseudo-Tertullian in the Carm. adv. Marc.). That a tendency akin to Montanism made its appearance in Rome at a somewhat later time, namely, about the third quarter of the second cen-

tury, is attested in other ways also. A decided reaction against that tendency did not begin till the last quarter of the same century. This is sadly inconsistent with the hypothesis, which I am more and more compelled to regard as historically untenable, that Ebionism predominated in Rome till towards the middle of the second century; for about the year 100, Clement, who was there, was no Ebionite; and Montanism likewise was not Ebionitical in the matter of Christology, nor is its distinctive character, in general, expressed by the term Ebionism. Montanism, on the contrary, maintained that Christianity was a new thing in its every momentum; and it did not acquire a legal, that is, in point of principle, a Judaistic character, until it began to exaggerate and stereotype this particular aspect. Whereas national Judaism,—to wit, the insisting on the Mosaic law, on circumcision, on the eschatological hopes of Israel and the like,—which, regarded apart from Christology, constituted Ebionism proper, were never characteristics of Montanism as such. Hermas himself, however, to judge from the manner in which he speaks, was probably a Jewish Christian. Judaizing elements may also be pointed out in his work: amongst these may be specially reckoned the value attached to good works, and, in general, to the law; besides such separate matters as, that Michael is the protecting angel of the Christians (Simil. viii. 3); the great rôle played altogether by the doctrine of angels; the existence of a particular penitential angel; the exclusiveness which he enjoins in relation to the "exteræ gentes" (Simil. viii. 9). At the same time, the Judaizing tendency evinced in the matters above mentioned, is such as might arise within the Church itself in any age whatever: in other words, the Judaistic elements in Hermas are not a proper continuation of the national Judaism of the Jews. On the contrary, the author intended to raise the strongest possible opposition thereto: for example, Michael was the first protecting angel of the Jews; now he is represented as the protecting angel of the Christians; nor is the aim of the Visions to enforce the laws of the Old Testament, but rather to oppose to them a Christian legislation. Still an antagonism of such a character inevitably becomes partially assimilated and fixed to that to which it stands opposed; and however decidedly the breach may have been between these men and national Judaism,

they continued, as to principle, within the same sphere, namely, that of legality which, in the wider sense, may be described as Judaizing. It would be exceedingly instructive to trace out the course taken by the Church at this stadium of its opposition to Judaism, playing as it did, against its own will, into the hands of the principle to which it stood in antagonism. It manifested itself, not merely in the ethical sphere, strictly so termed, but also in the command to fast on the Sabbath, in the order of festivals appointed for the Church, in the development of eschatology, and especially of Chiliasm, in baptism as related to circumcision, and in the holy Eucharist, which was described as a Christian service of sacrifice, and as such was contrasted with the ante-Christian service. A careful investigation of all the aspects of this stadium, through which it was historically necessary for the Church to pass, would serve the cause of science better than the confusion of distinctions—the classing of Judaistic elements of this nature under Ebionism—with the design, if possible, of deducing from, or rather importing into, the history, the conclusion, that, during the earliest period of its existence, the Christian Church was Ebionitical.

Note MM, page 127.

In view of the passages above adduced, it can only excite astonishment to find Baur denying (see his "Trinitätslehre," vol. i. 136, note) that Hermas designates the Divine in Christ by any other terms than πνεῦμα and πνεῦμα ἅγιον. Not to the manifested Christ alone does Hermas give the name Son of God, but he believes also in a pre-mundane Son of God, hypostatically distinguished from the Father. And even supposing he did designate this pre-mundane Son by the name Holy Ghost (that he does not do so, is evident from what has been advanced above; for although he regards the Son also as a spirit, he never calls the Son by the name Holy Spirit, but His standing title is Son), the idea of this hypostatical Holy Spirit would be identical with the Son of God recognised by the Church. If the Holy Spirit constituted the personal element in Christ—which Baur does not deny,—then his Christology cannot have been Ebionitical:—he cannot have been an Ebionite of the vulgar sort, nor even of the Clementine order; for, unlike

the Ebionites, he regarded Christ as more than a mere prophet; and, unlike the Clementine writings, Hermas represents his Christ-Spirit as taking part in the creation, and is thus able to bring Him into close proximity to God.

NOTE NN, page 127.

For this reason the most judicious inquirers have, with one accord, pronounced it to be a failure. Compare Gieseler's "Church History" i. 151, 152. That writer remarks,—"Tendencies of the most different nature were allowed to have their way, so long as they left untouched the Divine and the human in Christ, whose union was the condition of the redemptive and exemplary character of the life of Jesus. Hence the Shepherd of Hermas, notwithstanding the peculiarities of his Christology, gave no offence." Schliemann (l.c. 421–426), who allows that Hermas has an Ebionitical colouring in the matter of ethics, pronounces him entirely free from such elements, in relation to Christology. Meier also is of the same opinion (see his "Die Lehre von der Trinität" i. 47–49), though he considers that the entire work of Hermas stands on the boundary-line separating Judaism and Christianity. He is of opinion, indeed, that Simil. 5 by itself, if we disregard the circumstance that the Spirit is termed Son of God merely parabolically, and rather take the words as used doctrinally, discriminates hypostatically between God and Spirit,—which would be compatible with an Ebionitical Christology; for Christ might then be the ἄνθρωπος ψιλὸς in whom, as in other men, the Holy Spirit dwells, and who was exalted in reward for His virtue. An incarnation would thus be excluded. Still, this is not necessarily involved in the hypostatical distinction drawn between God and Spirit, instead of between Son and Spirit;—a distinction whose existence may be called in question. For, even if the Holy Spirit stood in the same relation to the humanity of Christ as to other men, "He might at the same time have stood in a personal relation to another hypostasis; and Hermas undoubtedly hints at such a relation, as, for example, when he says, 'The Son of God is older than all other creatures,' etc. Sim. 9, 12, etc." Page 49,—"He teaches also the existence of a veritable incarnation, when he says, 'The old rock on which the tower of the Church is built and the new gate—both alike are the Son of

God, because He who is older than the world will appear in the completion of the days.'" A still more decided opinion against, not merely the Ebionism of the author, but also against the assertion that he identifies the Son and the Holy Spirit, is expressed by L. Wolff: see his "Ueber den Begriff geschichtlicher Entwickelung des Dogma's, in Rudelbach's und Guericke's Zeitschrift, 1842, i. pp. 57 ff.;" compare also Rossel's review of Baur's "Trinitätslehre," in the "Berliner Jahrbücher," 1844, Numbers 41–45, specially pp. 337 ff.

Note OO, page 127.

Sim. 9, 12: "Nemo intrabit in regnum Dei, nisi qui acceperit nomen Filii Dei, qui est ei carissimus (who becomes a Christian, not Christ, through baptism in His name).—Porta Filius Dei est, qui solus est accessus ad Deum.—Petra et Porta Filius est." The Rock is old, the Door is new; for "Filius quidem Dei omni creatura antiquior est, ita ut in consilio Patri suo adfuerit ad condendam creaturam, Porta autem propterea nova est, quia in consummatione, etc.;" see note on page 127.—Vis. 2, 2: "Juravit Dominus per Filium suum: qui denegaverit Filium et se, et ipsi denegaturi sunt illum in advenientibus diebus."—Sim. 9, 14: "Nomen Filii Dei magnum et immensum est et totus ab eo sustentatur orbis. Si ergo, inquam, omnis Dei creatura per Filium ejus sustentatur, cur non et eos sustinet, qui invitati sunt ab eo, et *nomen ejus ferunt*, et in præceptis ejus ambulant? Nonne etiam vides, inquit, quod sustinet eos, qui ex totis præcordiis portant nomen ejus? Ipse igitur fundamentum est eorum, et libenter portat eos, qui non negant nomen ejus, sed libenter sustinent illum."

Note PP, page 128.

Moreover, the fifth similitude shows how much pains Hermas took to assign to the humanity of Christ an abiding significance. How can a "body" be rewarded by being exalted to the rank of Son of God, and put on a level with the Holy Spirit? One might with much greater reason say, that Hermas approximates to the view of the Adoptianists, who held that the humanity of Christ participated in Sonship, not so much on the ground of its connection with the Son of God, as because of its own holy walk.

Note QQ, page 134.

Baur, in his comprehensive work on the History of the Doctrine of the Trinity and of the Incarnation, treats the age of the Apostolic Fathers altogether scantily, and dwells but little longer on Hermas, who, according to his notion, "may be regarded as the most faithful representative of this Judaizing tendency (of the entire period of the Apostolic Fathers)." In his review of Schliemann's "Die Clementinen," in Zeller's "Jahrbücher" (1844), however, he has considerably modified, nay, even partially withdrawn from, this position. Hermas, he maintains, teaches that the Holy Spirit alone was the higher element, which constituted Christ the Son of God. For this reason, he deems himself warranted in drawing the further conclusion, that "others also, such as Barnabas and Clement, who attributed, indeed, pre-existence and the creation of the world to the Son, but without at all hinting at the idea of the Logos, must be supposed to have shared the same view." Such a method of proof seems to me to accomplish little. To constitute Hermas the representative of all the Apostolic Fathers, and to judge the rest by him, is not an historical mode of procedure, and distorts the many-featured image of this period. Further, to maintain that, where the word Logos is absent, there is no longer any trace of the idea, is to estimate the idea of the Logos rather by forms of expression, than by substance. But when the Son of God is identified with the Wisdom of Proverbs (Sim. ix. 12); when, further, He is designated "Intellectus," "Gloria Dei" (compare Clemens ad Cor. i. 37), "*nomen* Dei magnificum, nuncius *κατ' ἐξοχήν*;" nay more, when a creative "Verbum" (as in Heb. i. 3) is attributed to Him (Vis. iii. 1 ff.),—surely we may affirm the existence of more than mere hints of the idea of the Logos in Hermas. (Compare Note AA.) Indeed, it is altogether an abnormity to maintain that the discrimination of the Holy Spirit, as a pre-existent subject, from God, took place at an earlier stage than that of the higher nature of Christ. In fact, the entire course taken by the development of the doctrine of the Trinity must be misapprehended, ere we can deny that it continually derived its impulse from the doctrine of the Son of God in Christ, until at last the *ὁμοουσία* of the Son having been established, that of the Spirit also was decided. The con-

fusion produced by the hypothesis of Baur avenges itself also on his own view; for he is entirely unable to explain how it was, that the Holy Spirit, whose nature least urgently called for hypostatization, was discriminated from God as a distinct subject, or was even, as he supposes, designated Son of God, prior to the Son, whose nature most urgently called for hypostatization; and any explanation he attempts, substantially throws down what he had previously built up. He says, notwithstanding, again (pp. 135 ff.),—In order to understand why the Holy Spirit was conceived to be a pre-existent subject, and Son of God, we must go back to the human appearance of the Son of God, from which this name was transferred to the Holy Spirit (the question was not one of a mere name, but of the determination of the Holy Spirit, as a personality distinct from God). The Spirit is called the Son of God, "because He was from the very beginning destined to appear as Son of God in a human body." If this be the case, Hermas must unquestionably teach that a *Divine subject*, pre-existent and distinct from God, had become man, and that, on the ground of the complete correspondence which existed between the incarnate form of this Divine subject and its own essential idea, it bore from the commencement the name Son of God: but what becomes then of the Ebionitic element in the conception formed of the matter, with the proof of the existence of which, Baur's entire theory of primitive Christianity stands or falls? The doctrine of the Trinity must have been affected thereby; yet even it would not have been affected, unless the term "Holy Spirit" had denoted the person taught by the Church, and were not merely the more indefinite name for the Divine principle in general, which was thus advanced from the category of mere power to that of personality. But no one could venture to call the Christology therein involved, Judaistic or Ebionitical.—Even supposing, however, there existed a greater or lesser party which first defined the Holy Spirit to be a pre-existent hypostasis, distinct from the Father (for the pre-existence must be taken into the bargain), and then went on to distinguish between the Logos and the Holy Spirit—it would not favour the hypothesis of the Church having been originally Ebionitical. For the belief in an incarnation of the Holy Spirit could no more be termed Ebionitical, than that in an incarnation of the Logos.

The danger thus accruing would affect, not the doctrine of the Divine in Christ, but merely, in the worst case, that of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the Church; inasmuch as the Holy Spirit would be represented as possessed in His totality by Christ. Nor, indeed, would this be a necessary consequence; for even the God-man is considered by the Church to stand in a twofold relation to men—an objective relation, in that He is outside of, and independent of men; and a subjective relation, in that He dwells in their hearts. But however various may have been the starting-points in the development of Christology, there is no trace whatever of the existence of a party which taught the doctrine of an hypostatical Holy Spirit, subsequently embodied in the creeds of the Church, prior to that of an hypostatical Son of God, that is, of the Logos. In the apocryphal books of the old Testament (especially in the works of Sirach), Word and Spirit are still very imperfectly distinguished; but in the πνεῦμα of those books, no one will think of finding the "Holy Spirit" of the baptismal formula. When Matthew and Luke speak, in connection with the incarnation, not of the Logos, but of the πνεῦμα ἅγιον, and derive the divinity of Christ from this πνεῦμα alone, πνεῦμα must unquestionably be taken in the indefinite, comprehensive signification of the modern expression, "the Divine in Christ:"—no one, therefore, ought to find in it the Holy Ghost which now forms part of the doctrine of the Trinity. This mode of speech is exactly parallel to that of Paul (Rom. i. 3, ix. 5); and the more indefinite designation could be, and alway was, employed along with the more definite one;—it might therefore have been usual, at a time when the solemn expression Logos, or Son of God, was the established designation of the Divine in Christ. Compare above, the numerous passages from the writings of Ignatius, who held Christ to be the ἕνωσις σαρκὸς καὶ πνεύματος, and along therewith teaches the pre-existence of the Logos. In like manner, Barnabas terms Christ's body σκεῦος πνεύματος (c. 7), notwithstanding his doctrine of the pre-existent Son of God (c. 5, 12; compare 1 Peter iii. 18); the Epistle to the Hebrews also (ix. 14) says of Christ,—ὃς διὰ πνεύματος αἰωνίου ἑαυτὸν προσήνεγκεν ἄμωμον τῷ Θεῷ, notwithstanding the logological opening (c. i. 1-3), to which not even the expression λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ, which is parallel to that of the pre-existent υἱὸς, is

strange (compare c. iv. 12 ff.). Clement. Ep. ii. 9,—*Χριστὸς ὁ κύριος, ὢν μὲν τὸ πρῶτον πνεῦμα, ἐγένετο σάρξ.* Later Fathers also were in the habit of using the word in the same broad sense;—for example, Tertullian adv. Marc. iii. 16,—"Spiritus Creatoris, qui est Christus;" iii. 6; adv. Hermog. 18; Apol. 21; de carne Christi 18,—"Sic denique homo cum Deo dum caro hominis cum spiritu Dei:" further, Cyprian, de idol. vanit. ed Basil. 1558, p. 122, where the more correct reading is, "hic in Virgine labitur, carne Spiritus sanctus induitur;" which the hand of a stranger, whose mind recurred to the Holy Ghost of the Creeds, when he read the expression, "spiritus sanctus," converted into—"hic in Virginem illabitur, carnem Spiritu sancto cooperante induitur." We must rather take the more indefinite reading; for in the "adv. Prax." 27 of Tertullian, the Father also is designated "Spiritus."

It was of course necessary that the more indefinite expression *πνεῦμα*, employed by Matthew and Luke, should, in the course of time, be left behind, and a more definite one adopted. To this the Christian mind was mainly impelled by its conviction, that in Christ the Divine had dwelt hypostatically, abidingly. The effect thereof was, that instead of employing merely the comprehensive term "Divine Spirit," which, although it marked the true divinity of the essence of Christ, did not distinguish the Son from the Father, who is also *πνεῦμα*, the Christian mind proceeded to characterize and discriminate more carefully the Divine in Christ from the Divine in the Father. To do so was the more necessary, as the Divine in Christ, having been once recognised as hypostatical, must needs also be decided to have been pre-existent. Not until the Divine in Christ had been more carefully defined and characterized, could the second work be undertaken, to wit, the discrimination of the Divine in the Church, or the Holy Spirit.

This discrimination of the *πνεῦμα* in Christ from the *πνεῦμα* of the Father (that is, from the Divine in general, not from the Holy Ghost of the doctrine of the Trinity), which was required also by the baptismal formula, found many points of connection in such theologumena of the age as the יְקָרָה or *δόξα*, the Shechinah, the Memra, the doctrine of the Metatron and Adam Kadmon, of the *ῥῆμα* and *λόγος Θεοῦ* with the *Σοφία* or Chochmah, on the one hand; and, on the other hand, in the Hellenic doctrine

of the νοῦς or λόγος (Reason): it was plainly initiated also by apostolic expressions orally handed down, and by others contained in the canonical writings. For the purpose of distinguishing more carefully the Divine in Christ, which he terms πνεῦμα, from the Father, Paul makes use of the expression Son of God, which he refers not merely to the God-man, but also to the Divine nature of the Son by itself (see above, page 73). At the same time, he also applies to Him some of the above-mentioned theologumena:—for example, he calls Him the Second Adam, the First-born of the creation, the εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ, the Power and Wisdom of God (1 Cor. i. 24). As to the latter, he resembles Luke, who, in the chief passage of his Gospel touching the incarnation (Luke i. 35), speaks not merely of πνεῦμα in general, but also of the δύναμις ὑψίστου (on which expression Acts viii. 10 throws an instructive light); and he represents Christ also as styling Himself σοφία (Luke xi. 49). This designation of the pre-existent Divine essence of Christ by the name "Son of God," may be taken as the typical one of primitive Christianity; for we find it also in the Epistle to the Hebrews (c. i.); and both the term μονογενής employed by John, which at an early period came into general use (as is clear from Gnostic writings, and from the Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs), and Paul's πρωτότοκος, belong to the same family. Those, on the contrary, who adhered more positively to the Old Testament, would more readily go back to the Shechinah, or the דִּבּר יְהוָה, for a designation of the higher nature of Christ in its distinction from the Father. The latter we find in 1 Peter i. 24, compare ii. 4 (whether we make ῥῆμα or λόγος Θεοῦ out of it); in Apoc. xix. 15, compare John i. 1 ff.; in 1 John i. 1 ff.:—the former in John i. 14, ὁ λόγος—ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν.

The early Church felt also that it was but more carefully defining the indeterminate, when it understood the words of Luke or Matthew—"The Holy Ghost will come upon thee;" "that which is born of thee, is of the Holy Ghost"—to refer to a determinate Divine power (δύναμις ὑψίστου, Luke i. 35)—to the pre-existent, and from the Father hypostatically distinct, Son of God, or to the Word—not, however, to the Holy Ghost of the doctrine of the Trinity. Justin Martyr, in his Apologia (i. 33), says,—τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ (Luke i. 35; Matt. i. 20) οὐδὲν ἄλλο νοῆσαι θέμις, ἢ τὸν λόγον,

ὃς καὶ πρωτότοκος τῷ Θεῷ ἐστιν. In an exactly similar way, Tertullian (adv. Prax. 26, ed. Semler, 1828, ii. 197 ff.) remarks, —"The Evangelist does not say, as Praxeas would lead us to expect, 'Deus superveniet, et Altissimus obumbravit te,' but, 'spiritus Dei, virtus Altissimi.' Portionem totius intelligi voluit, quæ cessura erat in filii nomen." And he concludes,—"hic spiritus Dei idem erit Sermo. Sic enim, Johanne dicente,—'Sermo caro factus est,' spiritum quoque intelligimus in mentione sermonis; ita et hic Sermonem quoque agnoscimus in nomine Spiritus. Nam et spiritus substantia est Sermonis, et sermo operatio spiritus, et duo unum sunt." That Tertullian did not hold the "spiritus" whose "operatio" is the "Sermo," to be the Trinitarian Holy Spirit, is undeniable. We see, accordingly, that the adopted mode of conciliating the πνεῦμα ἅγιον of Matt. i. 20 and Luke i. 35 with the Trinitarian πνεῦμα ἅγιον of Matt. xxviii. 19, was the just one of taking πνεῦμα ἅγιον, in its first usage, as a more indefinite designation of the Divine nature of Christ, which continued to be employed even after the more definite name had been set apart for the purpose: an example thereof is John iii. 34. In addition to the above examples of the freer use of πνεῦμα, we may further adduce Theophilus of Antioch and Athenagoras, out of the second century; both of whom prove that at that time the πνεῦμα spoken of in connection with the incarnation, was not considered to be identical with the πνεῦμα of the doctrine of the Trinity. Theophilus says,—The Word was the Father's helper at the creation of the world; He is the ἀρχή, πνεῦμα Θεοῦ, σοφία, δύναμις ὑψίστου, and entered into the prophets (ad Autolyc. L. ii. p. 88, ed. Col. 1686). But Athenagoras says,—Father and Son interpenetrate each other, in virtue of the unity and power of their spirit:—by Spirit must, in this case again, be understood the common Divine essence. In like manner, Irenæus designates the Divine in Christ, "spiritum Patris," L. v. 1—"effundente Spiritum Patris in adunitionem et communionem Dei et hominis, ad homines quidem deponente Deum per Spiritum, ad Deum autem rursus imponente hominem per suam incarnationem." § 2, Christ's appearance was not docetical, εἰ μὴ ὢν ἄνθρωπος ἐφαίνετο ἄνθρωπος, οὔτε, ὃ ἦν ἐπ' ἀληθείας, ἔμεινε, πνεῦμα Θεοῦ, ἐπεὶ ἀόρατον τὸ πνεῦμα, οὔτε ἀλήθειά τις ἦν ἐν αὐτῷ, οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἐκεῖνα, ἅπερ ἐφαίνετο. In § 3 express reference is made to Luke i. 35, and

the "Spiritus Sanctus" is regarded as the "Virtus Altissimi," the "Filius Dei," the "Verbum." Athanasius ad Serap. i. 980, c. Apoll. i. 8; Greg. Naz. or. 42, 19. Hilary employs the term "Spiritus," with special frequency, for "Verbum;" for which he assigns the reason ("de Trinit." 8, 25), that all the three, both Father and Son also, are spirit. For other passages pertinent to this matter, see Geo. Bull's "Defensio Fidei Nic." 1, 2, 5, ed. Grabe, p. 19; and the introduction to the Opp. Hilarii, ed. Maur. pp. xviii. ff. § 57 ff.

But even though it should be true that πνεῦμα, as used in connection with the birth of Christ (Matt. i. 20; Luke i. 35), was a mere predicate of the Logos, it does not therefore follow that early traces of the proper Trinitarian use of πνεῦμα are not also to be found. Even in the baptismal formula of Matt. xxviii. 19, 20, the expression πνεῦμα ἅγιον is used quite differently, in a specific and narrower sense; for it is distinguished from, and co-ordinated with, the Father and the Son. Nor has there ever been a time, when the Church did not feel, both that it was a partaker of the Divine Spirit, and that the participation of believers in the Spirit was different from that of Christ. Hence, at an early period, both in the Canon and in the Church, the Holy Spirit, in the narrower sense, was regarded as the principle of the subjective appropriation of Christianity. Now, so soon as the πνεῦμα ἅγιον, in the Trinitarian sense, was somewhat more clearly defined, it was necessarily conceived to be most intimately related to Christ,—firstly, in so far as it proceeded from Christ; secondly, in so far as it exerted an influence on the Person of Christ, as upon all human subjects. He it is who sends the πνεῦμα, the power from on high (Luke xxiv. 49; Acts i. 8; John xiv. xv. xvi.); and in this aspect, Christ is the original seat and source of the πνεῦμα ἅγιον, the centre of unity of the Seven Spirits, and so forth; as He is designated, not only by Hermas, but also by Irenæus (πηγὴ τοῦ πνεύματος, Iren. Fragm. p. 346, ed. Massuet.). Similar terms are made use of by Tertullian. This mode of regarding the πνεῦμα ἅγιον, which is based on John iii. 34, vii. 39, xx. 22—"The Spirit was not yet given, for Christ was not yet glorified,"—whilst it very clearly establishes the divinity of the πνεῦμα which is communicated to believers, necessarily leaves the question of its hypostasis comparatively out of sight; indeed, in general, it touches solely on

the œconomic aspect of the matter. But this view, according to which the πνεῦμα is simply the power sent by the exalted Lord, streaming forth from Him, in whom its absolute fulness had found a centre and resting-place (compare the Gospel of the Nazarenes), was immediately supplemented by the opposite view, according to which, this same πνεῦμα was not merely an emanation of the Son of God, but was one of the constitutive principles of His human personality, and exercised an influence upon it. Such a supplementing was above all suggested by the account of the baptism of Jesus, which represents a connection as established between the πνεῦμα ἅγιον and the already existent personality of Jesus. John (i. 29 ff.) and the Synoptics agree entirely on this point. The notion thereof originally entertained, seems to have been the following:—Although Christ was the Son of God by birth out of the holy nature of God Himself, yet, for His official activity,—that is, for His mission to baptize with fire and the Spirit,—the union between Himself and that Spirit, which, at the proper time, He would have to communicate to believers, was first accomplished when He was Himself baptized. A place having thus been left for the Holy Ghost alongside of the indwelling Son of God, nay more, the complete preparation of the humanity of Christ for its office being attributed to Him, the idea that the Holy Spirit took part along with the pre-existent Son in the work of incarnation could easily suggest itself;—and this we have found to be certainly the case with Irenæus and others; probably also with Hermas, if the explanation attempted above be correct. Thence arose the temptation to refer the word πνεῦμα used by Matthew and Luke to this activity of the Trinitarian Holy Spirit,—a temptation to which later writers frequently yielded. Against such a reference, however, Justin Martyr, Clemens Alexandrinus, and Tertullian, justly protested, when the body of Christ was represented as the work of the Holy Spirit or of the Father; whereas the Logos must Himself have formed His own body out of Mary. Compare Augustin. c. Maximin. L. 2, 17. § 2.

The initiatory, indefinite designation of the Divine nature of the Logos (πνεῦμα, πνεῦμα Θεοῦ) having thus been exchanged for one more definite, the πνεῦμα of the doctrine of the Trinity ceased to be applied to the Son. This was, on the whole, the course taken in the matter by the Church, as we learn from the

works of the Apostolic Fathers and of the Apologists. Such a course was natural, and is attested by the passages above adduced; whereas, to suppose that the πνεῦμα ἅγιον was first conceived to be pre-existent and hypostatical, and that afterwards followed the discrimination of the Logos, is an incomprehensible ὕστερον πρότερον, utterly unsustained by historical evidence. We by no means intend to assert, however, that all actually advanced in the way indicated, from the indeterminate πνεῦμα of Matt. i. 20 (compare also Rom. i. 3) to the more determinate designation of the Divine in Christ, by means of the doctrine of the pre-existent Son or Logos. Some, on the contrary, contented themselves with the more indefinite designation of the Divine in Christ:—the consequence thereof was, that they had no place for that idea of the Trinity, the general outline of which had been furnished to the Church even by the formula of baptism, and that a gulf arose between them and the rest of the Church in the matter of doctrine, Montanists not even excepted. These were the proper Ebionites, of whom the Nazarenes alone seem in part to have arrived at the idea of an hypostatical existence of the Divine Spirit in Christ (thus transcending Ebionism); although, as they did not recognise the pre-existence of this hypostasis, it necessarily bore a vague, indeterminate character. The other Ebionites, on the contrary, sank gradually beneath the point of view of Matt. i. 20 (compare Luke i. 35); for they came to look upon the higher element in Christ as a mere divine influence, similar to that which worked in the prophets, or as a higher created spirit, which either united itself with Christ at an earlier or a later period, or manifested itself docetically in Him. On this view, also, it was possible to say, quite naturally, that a "spiritus sanctus" had appeared in Christ. The Elkesaites, for example, were able to speak thus; at all events there was no great difference of opinion when they taught the existence of a δύναμις κεκρυμμένη, חֵיל כְּסִי, which appeared in Christ. Even Lactantius describes the incarnation as follows (Instit. iv. 12): "descendens itaque de cœlo sanctus ille Spiritus, sanctam virginem, cujus utero se insinuaret, elegit." (For further details, see below.)

This is the proper place to add a word, by way of conclusion, on the subject of Montanism. In the first place, it is necessary to draw a much more precise distinction between the earlier and

the later form of Montanism than is drawn by Schwegler. Montanism was preceded by a widely diffused sickly condition: when it accidentally broke out in Phrygia, it proved, indeed, to be of an infectious nature, but at the same time assumed many different forms, as is found to be the case also with physical diseases. The disease which made its appearance under the form of Montanism was primarily of a practical kind. There was no desire to make any change in the faith of the Church; there was no inclination to speculation (compare Gieseler i. 197); nay more, Montanists were most violent opponents of Gnosticism, both as a form and as a system of knowledge. Nor did they evince any disposition to attain to theosophic knowledge by means of ecstasies. At first they were animated merely by very intense religious feelings, hostile to the present world and its arrangements; and these feelings were heightened by chiliastic expectations. They felt themselves endowed with the power to inaugurate a practical reformation, and endeavoured, in the name of God, to reduce their negative ideal of the world to reality. They believed, it is true, that the new Jerusalem would suddenly descend from heaven, and that it cannot be built up by men; but at the same time deemed it necessary that the world should, even now, be judged and weighed by the πνευματικοι, in accordance with that abrupt ideal,—that is, that it should be treated negatively. The spark thus thrown out, falling into the chiliastic expectations of the Church, and the legal spirit now afresh growing up, kindled a fire which speedily spread in all directions. The older Montanists laid their hands on the dogmas of the Church for the first time in Asia Minor, when the prophetic utterances of Montanus began to be grossly overvalued either by himself or by his companions,—probably, therefore, after they had met with opposition, especially from the bishops: in the next place, in Africa, where Tertullian professed to have derived revelations on dogmatical subjects, specially on the Trinity, from Montanistic prophetesses. In the first case, with a view to exalting as much as possible the new Montanistic period, they represented it as the inauguration of the masculine age of the Holy Spirit. Whether it be a mere fiction of their opponents or not, that the Montanists denied the presence of the Holy Spirit even in the Apostles, much more in the world, prior to their time, this much

is certain, that they considered the Paraclete never to have been truly revealed prior to Montanus: according to Tertullian, the Church was not ripe for this revelation till it had entered on its masculine age. If now Montanism implicitly reproached the Church with hitherto possessing too little of the Holy Ghost, it is evident that, dogmatically viewed, the charge implies, that however much the Church might have spoken concerning the Son, or the Logos, and the Father, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit had been hitherto kept in the background. In this aspect, therefore, Montanus is a striking proof of the baselessness of the theory, that the Church knew of the Holy Spirit alone prior to Montanus. For then he would not have needed to raise complaints, but merely to quicken the desire for the Holy Spirit, in whom, according to the teaching of the Church, on the supposition that it was Ebionitical, every man may participate, even as Christ Himself participated. On the contrary, his complaints, and what he says of the Paraclete, so far as they have a dogmatical bearing, have not their full meaning, except on the supposition that the Church of his day, although it acknowledged, indeed, that the Divine was concentrated in Christ as the incarnate Logos and Son of God, had discriminated more clearly the Son from the Father, than the Holy Spirit from Father and Son, and had not fully apprehended the novelty of its principle. Montanism thus becomes an indirect witness to the earlier prevalence of the doctrine of the deity of the Son. As regards the form assumed by Montanism in Africa, little can be said for the originality claimed by it in relation to questions of dogma. It has been already remarked by others (Gieseler's "Church History" i. 197), that the description of these prophetesses presents many points of similarity with our magnetic clairvoyantes. Now, as it is a constant characteristic of these latter to be, on the one hand, quite destitute of originality in spiritual and divine things, and yet, on the other hand, to be most keenly susceptible of the ideas of those with whom they are en rapport; so, reasoning by analogy, we may conclude that the utterance of the speculative doctrine of the Trinity by Tertullian's prophetesses, instead of being a proof of its novelty, was rather a proof that similar ideas were already floating in the mind of the Church, on which such phænomena had been ingrafted. Be this, however, as it may, it is certain

that Tertullian taught substantially the same doctrine of the Trinity, in works written prior to his becoming a follower of Montanus. Nay more, he himself felt conscious thereof, and therefore treated the Montanist prophecies rather as a confirmation of the doctrine of the Church (adv. Prax. 2, 8, 13; de resurr. carn. 63).—The circumstance (Epiph. hær. 49, 1) that Christ appeared to the prophetess Priscilla or Quintilla in the form of a woman, cannot fairly be taken as an evidence that Christ was conceived as the Ruach Jehovah, and that the doctrine of the Word, or of the Divine Wisdom, was not known. We might rather suppose, as in the case of the Shepherd of Hermas, that Christ appeared in the form of the Church, which, because the Holy Spirit had not yet found its full and proper revelation, was still conceived to be included in Him. The words of Epiphanius, however, more readily suggest an entirely different explanation. Christ appeared to the prophetess as Wisdom (*σοφία*, feminine); for, to communicate wisdom was the end and aim of revelation. She says, *ἐν ἰδέᾳ γυναικὸς ἐσχηματισμένος ἐν στολῇ λαμπρᾷ ἦλθε πρός με Χριστὸς, καὶ ἐνέβαλεν ἐν ἐμοὶ τὴν σοφίαν*, etc. Nothing whatever is said, in this connection, regarding the *πνεῦμα*. So that this proof, also, of the professed Ebionitical character of primitive Christianity becomes a proof to the contrary.

NOTE RR, page 137.

Inasmuch as he explained Paradise to be the Church, he must have regarded the Church as the perfection of humanity, as the realization of its archetype. Still, as in another passage, probably also belonging to his book (in Irenæus 5, 36), he gives to the "many mansions of the Father's house" (John xiv. 2) the meaning,—either into heaven, or into Paradise, or into the city of God, will every one come, according as he has borne an hundred-fold, or sixty-fold, or thirty-fold fruit; and well will it be to live in Paradise,—he designated by this title, not the Church of the present, but of the future, or the last age; intending thus, also, to indicate the original innocence of humanity (compare the fragment of Papias amongst the Scholia of Maximus on Dionysius Areopagita in Routh l.c. 8), and especially the re-establishment of concord between it and nature, now that it has become the Church.

Note SS, page 137.

Iren. 5, 36, 2. After what has been advanced above, it would be perfectly unwarrantable to count Papias, in a Christological respect, amongst Ebionites. Whether he was an Ebionite in the matter of eschatology, shall be discussed further on. For the present, I must content myself with calling attention to the fact, that his style is not Judaized, but rather evinces skill and culture in the use of Hellenic expressions. His view of the guilt of the angels on account of the evils of the world, the government of which was entrusted to them (Routh l.c. 14, from Andreas of Cæsarea), is shared also by Church Fathers of a more Hellenizing tendency. That he was acquainted with the doctrine of the Logos, is certain; that he had himself appropriated that doctrine, appears to me probable, because the passage in Irenæus 5, 36, quotes an utterance of Christ, as having been handed down by the presbyters, the disciples of the Apostles, who were very likely the presbyters mentioned by Papias, with the words, "quemadmodum Verbum ejus (sc. Dei) ait." But, even supposing this passage were not from Papias, it would be valuable as a testimony on the part of Irenæus, who undoubtedly derived his information from old sources, that the disciples of the Apostles had a doctrine of the Logos and of the Trinity. The presbyters mentioned by Irenæus in iv. 8, v. 17 (Edit. Grabe), however, I think, were of a later period, on the ground of their more developed Christological views. See below.

Note TT, page 139.

This is the passage on which is based the opinion that Hegesippus was an Ebionite as to his doctrine of the law. No other is now extant. Eusebius, however, who was acquainted with his work—it was known even to Stephanus Gobarus—reckons him amongst the champions of the truth (*ὑπερμάχους τῆς ἀληθείας*, Euseb. 4, 7; compare 8), amongst the *teachers of the Church* (4, 21), along with Dionysius of Corinth, Pinytus, Apollinaris, Melito, Irenæus; and remarks concerning all these, Hegesippus included, that the *ὀρθοδοξία* of the apostolic *κήρυγμα*, and of sound faith (4, 8, 21), had been laid down by them in writings. To any one who knows how Eusebius speaks

of Ebionites, it must after this appear impossible that Hegesippus should have been an Ebionite. Similar evidence might also be adduced from Jerome.

The entire endeavour to represent the Church, in the earliest years of its existence, as Ebionitical, is not new, for the Socinians had already done the same thing; and most of the arguments adduced by recent writers are a mere repetition of those employed by the Socinians. Compare the controversy between Dan. Zwicker and George Bull, and the latter's "Primitiva et Apostolica Traditio dogm. de J. Ch. divinitate," Lond. 1705, C. 3, pp. 12–18.

NOTE UU, page 140.

Eus. 4, 22. *Ἔτι δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς* (*after* having spoken of sects *within* the Church) *καὶ τὰς πάλαι γεγενημένας παρὰ Ἰουδαίοις αἱρέσεις ἱστορεῖ λέγων· ἦσαν δὲ γνῶμαι διάφοροι ἐν τῇ περιτομῇ ἐν υἱοῖς Ἰσραὴλ τῶν κατὰ τῆς φυλῆς Ἰούδα καὶ τοῦ Χριστοῦ αὗται· Ἐσσαῖοι, Γαλιλαῖοι, Ἡμεροβαπτισταί, Μασβωθαῖοι, Σαμαρεῖται, Σαδδουκαῖοι, Φαρισαῖοι.* It has also been regarded as a sign of his Ebionism, that he does not mention the Ebionites amongst heretics. That he does not mention Ebion, will not be made a ground of suspicion against him; but Cerinthus was in Asia Minor (see Note VV). Karpocrates, however, he has mentioned (Euseb. 4, 22). Furthermore, if, as Baur and others maintain, Ebionism was most intimately connected with, and grew out of, Essæism; if, further, Hegesippus mentions the Essenes (4, 22) first of all, in his enumeration of antichristian Jewish sects, and constantly directs attention to the fact, that the poison of false doctrine was introduced into the Church from the Jewish sects; how is it possible at the same time to assert that he approved of Ebionism?

NOTE VV, page 140.

This is the place to notice what Hegesippus says regarding the virginity of the Church. Eusebius mentions it in two passages (Euseb. 4, 22, and 3, 32). "After the death of James (post Christum 69), Tebuthis, who sprang from Jewish sects, began secretly, under Simeon, to corrupt the Church, which had hitherto been a virgin." In the other passage (3, 32) we read—"After the death of the Apostles (that is, about A.D. 100), the sects, which had heretofore remained secret and in the back-

ground, broke openly out;" here, also, he says again, that the Church, up to that time, had been an unspotted virgin. From which Baur draws the conclusion, that, prior to the end of the first century, there were no traces of Gnosis;—in support of his conclusion, quoting a passage from Clemens Alexandrinus, who (with the purpose of showing heretics to be latecomers, Strom. 7) puts them into the time of Hadrian. This latter passage needs no refutation. It appears to me to be an arbitrary mode of procedure to appeal, as Baur does, to 3, 32 alone: others also have condemned it. Compare Vatke's review of Baur's work, "Der Ursprung des Episkopates," in the "Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik," 1839, pp. 9 ff. But as far as regards Hegesippus, the two passages referred to contradict each other, if he represents the Apostles as having died subsequently to James the Just; and that he does so is undeniable, for he had just before been speaking of the time of Trajan and the death of Simeon, and had referred to that time the unmasked and public appearance of the sects. Now, how could Hegesippus call the Church an unspotted virgin, in one passage, till about the year 100, and in the other, merely till the year 69? Hegesippus himself furnishes an explanation, and solves the contradiction. He does not deny in 3, 32 what he had said in 4, 22,—namely, that a secret corruption of doctrine had begun far earlier (ἄρχεται Τέβουθις—ὑποφθείρειν),—but repeats it much more strongly in 3, 32. He does, however, change his point of view: in the one case, looking rather at the inner condition, he terms the poison of false doctrine, which had already secretly crept in, a spotting of the virgin Church; in the other case, looking rather at the open appearance, he considers the time during which the sects were still forced to remain secret, as a time of virginity, in comparison with a later period, dating from the end of the century, when the unity of the Church was, even outwardly, endangered. Besides, as Vatke also has justly remarked (l. c. p. 12), it must not be forgotten, that, for the earlier time, the horizon of Hegesippus was principally bounded by the Jewish Christians of Palestine; and that, therefore, we have no right to deny the existence of false teachers in other parts of the Church,—for example, in Asia Minor or in the European Churches,—prior to the year 69. The context indicates that the expression, διὰ τοῦτο ἐκάλουν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν παρ-

θένον (Euseb. 4, 22), refers to Jerusalem; and it is only the other passage, which marks a stadium when heresies, long actually existent, were on the point of becoming schisms, that can be referred to the Church in general; for it speaks of the departure of the entire body of the Apostles.

NOTE WW, page 141.

The book is, it is true, here termed *πανάρετος Σοφία*; but simply because it is a revelation, a self-representation of the Wisdom which pre-existed with God—which same Wisdom then appeared in Christ, as personal wisdom (compare Clem. ad Cor. i. 57, cll. 36). But very noteworthy is, further, the hint given by Eusebius in the above-mentioned passage. We find, namely, that about this time, Christian teachers undoubtedly went back frequently to "Wisdom" for a designation of the higher element in Christ. Compare, for example, the present passage, and, besides it, Hermas (Simil. 9, 12, compare Prov. viii.; and perhaps Simil. 5, 6). So also the Montanists (Epiphan. 49, 1). By conceiving the Wisdom of the Old Testament, as having personally appeared in Christ, not only was a bridge secured to the Hellenic doctrine of the Logos, in which the idea of Reason dominates over that of "Word," but essentially the same idea was arrived at. Indeed, Fathers who held the doctrine of the Logos put the doctrine of the Divine Wisdom on exactly the same footing with it; and concerning the milder Ebionites, for example, who did not deny the birth of Christ from a virgin, through the Holy Ghost, Eusebius (3, 27) says, that they nevertheless fell into the godlessness of the strict Ebionites, because they did not believe in the pre-existence of Christ as λόγος and *σοφία*. According to the judgment of Eusebius, therefore, Hegesippus must be declared not to have belonged even to the milder class of Ebionites. He, with Hermas and others who were still known to Eusebius, is rather a proof that even men whose culture had been mainly of the Old Testament kind, connected the theologumenon of *σοφία* with the creative Word, *ῥῆμα*, which primarily represented the realistic aspect of *δύναμις*. In this way the essential momenta of the as yet indeterminate expression, Son of God, were so analyzed and evolved, as that faith recognised again that higher element in Christ which it had aimed at characterizing by the name. These momenta were

three; and an inner necessity governed and ordered the progress from the one to the other. In the first place, under the influence especially of the eschatological belief, that absoluteness would pertain to the Son at the end of the days, the Church went back to the commencement, or the *pre-existence;* an understanding of this doctrine of the New Testament was thus arrived at, and it became the common property of the Church. In the second place, therewith was directly connected the idea of His participation in the creation of the world, as the "Word of Power," ῥῆμα, λόγος (compare also Memra; Clem. Ep. i. 36, 16; Barn. v. 12; Herm. Sim. ix. 12; the presbyters in Irenæus v. 36). Thus was the principle of the second creation combined with that of the first (Barnab. 6), for example, by Clement, Barnabas, and Hermas. Thirdly, and till about the year 150, was added the "Wisdom of God." The momenta of the idea of the Son of God were now for the first time more fully unfolded. The starting-point of the Hellenic thinkers was not *Being*, the real (the Creative Word), as was that of those who still kept up their connection with the Old Testament revelation, but *Thought*, νοῦς ἔννοια; and such was at first the significance of the Hellenic doctrine of the Logos (see below, Gnosis). But the task of the predominantly Hellenic tendency was to effect the passage from Thought to Being: this passage Hellenic thinkers gradually effected by learning ever more closely to associate νοῦς and reality, and to identify the Divine Reason with the pre-existent creative Word. Thus, that with which the realistic, Hebrew development started, formed the second stadium in the Hellenic development: both, however, evolved essentially the same momenta, and consequently met and united in the word ῥῆμα, which is at the same time חָכְמָה, or in Reason, which is at the same time Creative Word;—in other words, they united in the later doctrine of the Logos, the difference between which and that of the New Testament, especially of John i. 4, is of the same nature as the difference between an image arrived at by reflection on, and the union of, its individual momenta, and that image which is the source of the impulse, and which, being immediate, has the advantage of presenting the intuition of the totality of its object, in undivided fulness, simplicity, and purity. Until the individual momenta which were combined in the later doctrine of the Logos had been arrived at by these two main

lines, frequent use might be made, both by heretics and Church teachers, of such expressions as λόγος Θεοῦ; but the different parties would employ them in very different senses.

NOTE XX, page 142.

Herewith is given the right point of view for understanding the words, handed down to us by Photius after Stephanus Gobarus (see Phot. Bibl. 232, 13, Rothomagi 1653, p. 894), and which Baur asserts to have been directed against Paul. "To say, 'Eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, etc., the treasures laid up in store for the righteous,' is foolish; and those who use such language lie against the Divine Scriptures, and against the Lord, who says, 'Blessed are your eyes, for they see, and your ears, for they hear, etc.'" Stephanus, who had the work of Hegesippus before him, and quotes a passage from the fifth book, expresses himself at a loss to explain why he displayed so much passion (*οὐκ οἶδ' ὅ,τι καὶ παθὼν—ταῦτα λέγει*); for us, naturally, quoted as they are abruptly and out of all connection, they are still more difficult of explanation. Some recent writers suppose themselves to have the key in the assumption that Hegesippus was Anti-Pauline, and that he thus gave expression to his antipathy to Paul's more spiritual tendency. But this opinion is utterly devoid of support, and an absolutely worthless combination. We find the words, it is true, in Paul (1 Cor. ii. 9); but, according to the testimony of Origen (hom. ult. in Matt. xxvii. 9), they were also found in the Apocalyps. Eliæ (compare Schliemann, p. 450). The following consideration, however, is still more important:—the largest and most essential part of the words are quoted by Paul himself from Isa. lxiv. 3. From this we may with certainty conclude, that Hegesippus cannot have meant to describe the words in themselves, as a *μάτην εἰρημένον*, or as even a lie against the Divine Scriptures; for they are contained both in the Old and New Testaments. He must, therefore, have had in view a particular application of them. Now this application cannot have been that of Paul in his Epistle to the Corinthians; for it clashes neither with the words of the Lord referred to by Hegesippus—being, on the contrary, most intimately connected therewith—nor with Hegesippus' own doctrine of the novelty and magnitude of the revelation with which believers are favoured, and of the spirituality of the kingdom of

Christ (see above). Consequently Hegesippus, in the passage under consideration, must be condemning an application of Paul's words which involved a perversion of the meaning of Scripture;—an application made either by the Docetists, who despised the empirical appearance of Christ; or, if the passage refers to eschatology (as it probably does, to judge from the connection in Stephanus Gobarus), by those who either denied eschatology altogether, or treated it after a Gnostic fashion. We arrive at a much more definite result by comparing the passage with Irenæus, 5, 36 (at the close). In the entire context of the last chapters, Irenæus appeals to Papias, whom he recognises to be an apostolic man; at the close he adduces the very passage contained in Papias (1 Cor. ii. 9), and teaches, without doubt in opposition to the same antagonists as those whom Papias had in view, what is the false, and what is the right, application of the words. The right application, says he, is that according to which the entrance of the things which no eye hath seen will take place after the resurrection of the righteous, that is, after the so-called thousand years' kingdom: the false application, therefore, would be that according to which the earthly kingdom of Christ begins after the resurrection of the righteous. Such, therefore, was probably the opinion both of Papias and of Hegesippus.

Note YY, page 147.

The possibility, for example, of drawing an image of Christ like that of John, depended on the attainment of a more determinate and settled eschatology, which should admit of Christ's being conceived in the element of eternity. We thus see also afresh, why the next step taken in advance of eschatology (through the medium of which the mind first became aware of the absoluteness of the principle embodied in the Person of Christ) necessarily was the doctrine of the pre-existence of the said principle. The doctrine of the Pre-existence and Eschatology are two poles, which mutually require and posit each other; and each of which is imperfect without the other. Not the intermediate steps, which prepared the way for the final result and consummation, most readily occurred to the reflecting mind; but, to a mind looking at the matter realistically, teleologically, the absoluteness of the consummation called for a cor-

respondent absoluteness of the beginning: for, indeed, the absoluteness of the end is but a momentum of that of the beginning; inasmuch as an eschatological absoluteness would be unrealizable, if the principle dominating the beginning (the first creation) were different from that which is manifested at the end. We find also, on a comparison of the earlier and later Epistles of Paul, that his mind followed a similar course. But if the two termini are embraced by the Christian principle; or, if, as the Apocalypse describes it, it is the Alpha and the Omega, then a broad and sure foundation for its further development is laid, and the knowledge is substantially attained, that Christianity, which brought in an absolute reconciliation, is also the absolute religion, the absolute world of the spirit.

Note ZZ, page 150.

Lücke's "Versuch einer vollständigen Einleitung in die Offenbarung Johannis" is the best work on the subject of New Testament Prophecy and *Apocalyptics* (Apokalyptik), written in recent times. He distinguishes between the προφητεία, which remains strictly within the limits of its fundamental idea, and ἀποκάλυψις, which goes into concrete details, portrays, calculates, symbolizes, and allegorizes. The latter is related to the former, as the developed epos is related to epical popular traditions. Equally apt is the distinction drawn by him between Jewish and Christian apocalyptics. It is true, the fundamental form and main substance are the same in both; but that which for Daniel, the representative of Old Testament apocalyptics, was still a dark goal, and existent merely in idea, has become commencement, starting-point, clear historical fact for John, the representative of New Testament apocalyptics. The presupposition and basis of New Testament apocalyptics is the full history of the Son of God on earth,—that earth which already begins to be glorified by the Spirit. "The commencement, already actually made, is no longer merely pattern, but the thing itself—the full, real kernel, which includes within itself all the forces, laws, and arrangements for the future; so that the accomplishment of the entire development is absolutely secured." Lastly, he distinguishes between apocryphal and canonical apocalyptics. "Outside of the sphere of the canonical, there exist productions both of a genuinely Christian and of a genu-

inely Jewish character. Apocryphal productions, however, were mere imitations and unorganic repetitions of canonical productions. Sound non-canonical productions, on the contrary, were really the organic continuation and development of canonical productions."

NOTE AAA, page 150.

Lücke aptly remarks,—that ancient Christendom sketched for itself, in its eschatology, a kind of philosophy of history. Indeed, we may say in general, that prophecy and apocalyptics introduced among men the idea of universal history. Apocalyptics, which Lücke recognises to be a necessary step in advance of *προφητεία*—though, because touching the sphere of the arbitrary and contingent, much more exposed to degeneracy—cannot claim more than two proper representatives among all the Fathers whose names have been mentioned, to wit, Barnabas and Papias. And, rightly understood, neither Justin Martyr, Dial. c. Tryph. c. 80 (compare Semisch's "Justin der Märtyrer," 1842, ii. p. 467 ff.), nor Eusebius (in 3, 39) are opposed to this statement. The latter merely says, "*most* of the teachers of the Church," not all; and further, "most *after* Papias" (amongst whom Eusebius mentions Irenæus), shared his views. Even Chiliasm must be assigned to the sphere of apocalyptics, not to that of Christian prophecy. This is not properly the place to speak of Chiliasm: for it contributed nothing new to Christology, that was not already contributed by Christian eschatology in general. But as there still exist men who tread in the footsteps of Corrodi,—whose unpoetical nature, and mental incapacity sympathetically to enter into these matters, led him to prefer calculating how many butts of wine the chiliastic vine of Papias and Irenæus should produce,—and as, further, since the time of Corrodi, Chiliasm in particular has been adduced in proof of the Ebionism of the early Christians; it may be excusable to give the subject a brief consideration.

I. Christian Chiliasm, so far from being derivable from, may in part be more justly regarded as a polemic against, Judaism, on the part of Christianity. This is, in particular, its character, where it has apparently borrowed most features from Judaism. It is non-Jewish, so far as it represents the thousand years' kingdom as brought in by the exalted Jesus of Nazareth,

and as including both Jews and Gentiles; whereas unbelieving Judaism, in particular, will then undergo judgment. A point undoubtedly common to Jewish and Christian apocalyptics, is the period of blessedness on earth: a further point in common is, the city of God, Jerusalem, which plays a great rôle both with the Montanists and Irenæus; and the differences in the duration of the Messianic kingdom on earth are rather accidental. (The Sibylline Books have eleven ages of the world; the Book of Enoch has ten, and so forth. The Jews taught that Messianic blessedness would last 500 years; Christians sometimes left it undecided, as, for example, Irenæus; at other times they adopted the Jewish calculation of 500 years, as did the "Evangel. Nicodemi," c. 19: most frequently, however, they taught that it would endure 1000 years. So Papias, the Montanists, Tertullian and Barnabas also.) But the city of God comes down from heaven to destroy the fleshly, *Jewish* Jerusalem, and to take its place. Israel according to the flesh,—that is, Israel which continues unbelieving,—gives way to Israel according to the Spirit. Further, ante-Christian, Jewish apocalyptics invariably teach that Messiah will found the kingdom of earthly blessedness immediately on His first appearance. It makes no reference to a twofold *παρουσία*: what it appears to know thereof, even supposing it to be ante-Christian, is seen, on closer examination, to be a mere deceptive semblance. For the Messiah who is in secret (Justin. Dial. c. Tryph. c. 8, 110), in the depths of the sea, or wherever else He is supposed to tarry, is by no means a first manifestation, but merely a symbol of His certain and speedy appearance, originating in impatience. Messiah Ben Joseph or Ephraim, and Ben David, owed His rise to the desire to show, that to the Ten Tribes also belonged the honour of claiming Messiah as their Son. As two persons are there referred to, the unity plainly consists solely in the impersonal idea of the Messiah; and this presupposes a Christology, to which it is a matter of indifference how many persons claim to be realizations of the idea. Finally, the Messiah out of Ephraim dies, it is true, in war, and then rises again; but, in the first place, he then, notwithstanding, recedes quite to the background behind the second Messiah; and through this exchange of persons the main point is evaded,—to wit, that the exalted one should be identical with the sufferer: in the second place, the establish-

ment of the earthly kingdom of blessedness by the second Messiah follows immediately on the sufferings of the first. Moreover, with the exception of the Book of Enoch, all attribute judgment, not to the Messiah, but to God; *and, in the view of the Jews, the Messianic kingdom of earthly blessedness was not merely a prelude to heavenly blessedness, but was itself substantially the goal and final consummation.* The dualistic character of Judaism manifested itself particularly in the notion, that heaven was too holy and majestical to be a suitable dwelling-place for man (Corrodi's "Kritische Geschichte des Chiliasmus" i. 389 ff.). Paradise and the earth were held to be the abode of the pious, with which they are eternally content: Jews were not even able to distinguish between the thousand years' kingdom, and that renewal of the world which holds good for all eternity; for both relate, in their view, solely to what is sensuous, and need nothing more than a perfect earth. Christians, on the contrary, distinguished from the very commencement a double *παρουσία* of the one Christ; and, although they soon took up with the notion of a period intervening between the first and second presence,—that is, of a kingdom of Christ upon earth,—they by no means looked upon this kingdom as final and abiding; heaven was their eternal goal:—the kingdom, on the contrary, formed part of the course of this world, and constituted simply its appropriate termination. For this reason, Christians represented the judgment as taking place at the end of the golden period of the earth, and as forming a grand crisis; whereas Jewish apocalyptical writers could only assign to it an uncertain, unimportant position, owing to their idea that the highest good lay in the realization of earthly blessedness. Further, Christians invariably maintained it to be essential, that Messiah should be the Judge. (Compare Corrodi i. 313 ff. 322, 381.) In relation, therefore, to this matter also, Christianity pursued an independent course—a course governed by its own essential principles; though it unquestionably applied to the purposes of the edifice it was raising, elements derived from a previous period. It would therefore be a more correct and profitable procedure, to ascertain the distinctive character of the principle of Christianity, to which everything else owed its position and rank, than to resort to Judaism for an explanation; especially in face of the fact, that on the very point under con-

sideration, Christianity took up a position of antagonism to Judaism. The same remark holds good, even though we should allow, as we must, that the form assumed by Christianity in connection with this matter was partly due to its antagonism to Judaism. Justin Martyr, Irenæus, and others,—nay more, not a few down to the most recent times, cherished the hope of a thousand years' kingdom; and for this reason alone they cannot be rightly understood, unless regarded from a point of view entirely different from the Judaizing one. The Ebionitic Chiliasm, of which Jerome makes mention in his "Comment. in Jesaiam," c. 66, 20, did bear a Judaistic character; but why Christians also cherished the idea of a thousand years' kingdom; and why, instead of assuming that the absolute completion of the kingdom of God in heaven would be the first result of Christ's second coming, as we should have expected, they delayed that perfection, by intercalating a thousand years' kingdom,—this is the question now to be considered.

II. The answer to this question is facilitated by Irenæus, who gives conscious expression to the motive which operated on the Christian mind (5, 31; 2, 35; 1, 2, 36, 1). When the kingdom of heaven was set into such a glaring contrast to the present world, that the only possible relation between the two was a negative one, one of hostility; and when the coming kingdom of heaven was represented as being simply substituted for the existing order of things, the transition was too abrupt, the first creation was practically excluded and annihilated by the second. In such a case, the reconciliation of spirit and nature, which was held to have been absolutely realized in Christ, and to be *principially* (principiell) continued in believers, would have taken place, at all events partially, in vain. Otherwise viewed, the victory gained by Christianity over the world was incomplete, if it exerted merely an annihilating, and not at the same time also an ennobling, power on the first nature or creation. Complete victor it can never be, until nature has been reduced to the position of a momentum of itself, of an organ in its service. Now, Chiliasm was the first concession made by the longing for the speedy coming of the Lord, to the in some respects opposed tendency of Christianity to become a vital power in the history of the world. It was not meant that nature should exist in vain. On the contrary, as it

was first the instrument of sin, and thus failed to answer its true idea, so now the time had come when it should fulfil its destiny, in being a willing instrument of the perfect man, that is, of the righteous who are raised from the dead. This work Christ could not leave unperformed: to say that Christ appeared merely to judge and destroy the world, would have been to represent Christianity as incapable of converting the antagonism between nature and spirit into a true harmony. The period of the so-called thousand years' kingdom having been thus secured for the general history of the world, it became more and more the custom to take the week of creation in Genesis as the archetype of the history of the world. The history of the world is the week of creation, distributed through time: each day of the world, or each age of the world, comprises a thousand years: corresponding to the sabbath of creation, which commenced after man had been formed, there must be a sabbath of the world, which shall commence as soon as humanity, having been restored to its original innocence, stands on earth as did Adam in Paradise. The entire period from the fall, which robbed us of Paradise, is thus lowered, as it were, to the rank of an episode; and the further development of humanity to perfection is connected with that paradisiacal condition, as though the fall had never intervened; the sole difference being, that now, in consequence of the conflict with and vanquishment of sin, the holiness is firmly established.—With this, however, it would seem to be inconsistent that Chiliasts should universally have laid the greatest stress on the restoration of the vital powers of nature, on their beauty and their serviceableness to man, who is the ruler of nature, and is set to enjoy it in the richest measure. Christianity, which even in its abasement begins so ideally, here appears to end eudæmonistically. The spiritual, which was at first recognised as the highest good, for the sake of which everything else was to be sacrificed, appears now to give way to nature, and nature, as the final, to be constituted also the highest, end. But it is false to say that any one of the Church writers conceived the thousand years' kingdom to be the last; on the contrary, they represent it as a stage of transition to eternal life. For this reason, also, it is unjustifiable to say that Chiliasm degrades faith and sanctity in this life to the rank of mere means, whose end lies outside of themselves: they continue to be ends in

themselves, though, at the same time, regarded as preparing the way for a new and more perfect stadium. The present world is a period of suffering, especially for the members of the thousand years' kingdom. The spirit manifests its greatness, it is true, in suffering—it displays there the depth of its love; but still its condition is an incongruous one; for, as the truth of the world, the perfect man ought to rule over, instead of suffering from, the world. To advance no further than the idea of resignation, of patience, would be merely in appearance a higher view of Christianity. Hence the early Church, impelled by a desire to reinstate the spirit of man, with its powers regenerated by love, in its rights, developed the system of Chiliasm. At the same time, in order to satisfy the peculiar claims both of love and power, and lest, by the premature promise of power, love, which can only reveal itself in the act of renouncing power, and by renunciation recover power in a higher way, should be poisoned, it drew a sharp distinction between the two, and assigned the realization of the one to one period, of the other to another period. Chiliasm, therefore, was the form in which Christianity first gave conscious expression to the conviction of its destiny to rule the world: Chiliasm was the assertion of the fact that Christianity is related positively as well as negatively to the world: Chiliasm declared that, by renouncing, Christianity was called to glorify, the world. With whatever disfavour the early Christians looked upon art, Chiliasm is the spot in which the beautiful, the harmonious in spirit and nature, still find recognition—in which a poetical, or, if one will, a romantic view of the world, is tolerated. So certain as that the eye of Chiliasts was not fixed on something merely spiritual, and that its proper and distinctive aim was the removal of the ban which lay on the life of nature, and the restoration of nature to its ideal existence; even so mistaken is it to subject the imagination, whose office it is to people this domain, as one in which poetry in its truest sense is meant to dwell, to the laws of number and geometry. It is easy enough to find contradictions everywhere; but the self-conceited mockery of a Corrodi, with whom one has learned to treat mildly even the mythology of heathenism, instead of being a mark of wisdom, is rather ludicrous and foolish.—It was not necessary to Chiliasm to represent the thousand years' kingdom as established in an abrupt and absolutely supernatural manner;

for Irenæus, on the contrary, attached great importance to Chiliasm, precisely because the thousand years' kingdom seemed to him to constitute a gradual transition between the present and the higher world: indeed, he expressly treats it as a link of connection between the present and the future. Only as the Christian mind is alienated from the present order of things, and as it groans under the pressure and restrictions of the world, will it imagine the change to be an abrupt one. The more the immanent world-transforming power of Christianity is restrained, the less Christendom is awakened to a consciousness of the infinite energy of the principle of which it is the vehicle, by works of far-reaching effect, the more decidedly will it feel disposed to defer all to the second coming of Christ, whose presence will bring with it the certainty of the full action of Christian influences. Nevertheless, as we have seen, Chiliasm was also the fruit and sign of the advance of Christendom to the conviction, that nature is destined by its inmost essence and idea to stand in a positive relation to spirit. As such, it materially aided in leading the Christian mind away from abstract and general notions of the future, to those tasks of the present whose performance would, in an immanent way, lay the foundations of the future. In this light, also, Irenæus regarded it. Accordingly, Chiliasm conceived the Christian portion of the world's existence to comprise three momenta, represented as three periods. During the first period, that is, the period until the thousand years' kingdom, spirit was held to be a sufferer, to be in a state of humiliation, to be called upon to display patience and love; during the second period, it was conceived as ruling. They failed, however, as yet to combine the two: on the contrary, the first period is too predominantly one of suffering, of the vanquishment of the world; the second period, again, was one-sidedly held to be one of rule and enjoyment. At the same time, the two essentially inseparable momenta receive recognition, in that they are represented as following upon, and inwardly connected with, each other; and in that the third period,—namely, eternity,—witnesses their mutual interpenetration, and their attainment of equilibrium. The ethical element, or the idea of holiness, which manifested itself in so strong, though in a negative, form in Montanism, was the chief motive which impelled the Church to seek and find the union of the connected

momenta of renunciation and the glorification of the world, in that animating Divine love, whose influence alone was capable of quieting down the ecstasies of Montanism, and diverting its energies into the channel of calm and orderly Church activity. The realization of chiliastic expectations was thus gradually handed over to the Church, as the task to be performed by it in the history of the world. The truth which it asserted justly claimed a realization by Christendom, at every stage of its existence, in ever higher forms and increasing measure. Chiliasm, therefore, had its time; during its time it represented a noble and precious principle; and we may fairly demand for it a juster treatment in the future. Its main opponent was Gnosticism; for Gnosticism threatened the existence of history, threatened the teleological element, the realization of the ideal, and thus also Christianity itself. On the other hand, Gnosticism, which, in its way, clung to the idea of the presence of the highest good even in this world—an idea totally misunderstood by Montanism—was fitted to direct attention to that element, which must be presupposed by every truly ethical view of things, in order that, as happened from the second half of the second century onwards, Montanism and Gnosticism might alike be transcended.

Note BBB, page 151.

Similar words, written about the same time, may be found in Irenæus ("ad Trall." xi.), who represents the cross as a fruit-bearing tree. The predicate ἀΐδιος Θεὸς (καὶ ἄμβροτος), which is given to the Messiah (page 556), also reminds one of the expression Θεοῦ λόγος ἀΐδιος, employed by Ignatius in "Ad Magn." viii. For evidence that the fifth book, or, at all events, the passages adduced from it, fall into the time of Hadrian, and even into the commencement of his reign, see Bleek l. c. p. 173 ff., and Lücke, who shares the same opinion.—The sixth book is almost entirely taken up with Christology; but, on account of the fire which is represented as appearing at the baptism of Christ, must probably also be referred to the second century (compare Grabe's "Spicilegium" i. 28, 69). In the seventh book much is already said respecting the Logos, not of a strictly Gnostic character, but with a tendency in that direction. This also, as well as Book the Eighth, was probably written in the second half of the second century.—That the

Orphic Sayings are connected with Alexandrian Judaism, is a recognised fact. The *Αὐδή*, which, according to them, creates the world, does not really transcend the Alexandrian doctrine of the Logos, notwithstanding Justin's identification (Cohort. ad Gr.) of it with his own view of the Logos.—When we compare Virgil's fourth Eclogue, and its words regarding the "virgo," the "nova progenies" from heaven, the "puer" with whom a golden age begins, in which sin will be destroyed, the serpent killed, and a son endued with his father's virtues will rule the "orbis terrarum," with the well-known prophecies in Tacitus (Hist. v. 13) and Suetonius (Vespas. 4)—passages which all point to Eastern sources (compare Assyrium amomum, Virg. Ecl. 4, 4), opened up to the Romans partly by the Jewish Diaspora, and partly through the restoration of the Sibylline Books, effected by the collection of thousands of ancient and recent oracles, undertaken in consonance with a decree of the Senate, after the destruction of the Capitol by fire under Sylla (see Suet. Aug. 31; Tacit. Annal. 6, 12),—we must hesitate to place everything of this kind, bearing at the first glance an astonishing resemblance to Christianity, to the account of Christian interpolation. The portions touched upon in the text, however, belong, at all events in their existing form, to the earliest Christian times. The ante-Christian elements in the Sibylline Books, so far as they have any bearing on Christianity, were both a positive and negative preparation for the introduction of Christianity into the heathen world:—*negatively*, in that they undermined the foundations on which the self-confidence of the ancient world was built. In the days of its greatest power, Rome was unable to get rid of inner tremblings at some fate near at hand, threatening ruin. *Positively*, in so far as, probably through the influence of Hebrew prophecy, the presentiment of a higher, pure, and guiltless existence, dawned on the subjugators of the world.

Note CCC, page 152.

Lawrence, Gfrörer, Gieseler, and with ever increasing decidedness Hoffmann also, unlike Lücke, agree in considering it to be not a Jewish-Christian work, or a work interpolated by Christians, but a Jewish work; whatever difference of opinion there may be between them as regards the date of its compo-

sition. The very latest date at which it may be assumed to have existed in its present form, is the end of the first century; partly because it is appealed to by the Epistle of Jude, and partly because of the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs. The earliest date we can assume for the composition of the whole, is that of the prophecies of Daniel; one section, at all events, must have been composed after the commencement of the acquaintance with the Parthians (compare c. 54, 9). But whether the whole should be referred to the post-Herodian period,—say, prior to the destruction of Jerusalem,—or to the time of Herod, as Lawrence thinks, or even to an earlier time, as is Hoffmann's judgment, cannot be determined, partly because there is little reason for supposing it to be the work of one author, and partly because the chief passage bearing on the chronology (c. 89), does not clearly say whether the twelve shepherds are Jewish or not. If they are not Jewish, as Hoffmann has concluded, very wide room is left for hypotheses. Furthermore, precisely this section (c. 84–89) awakens the strongest suspicion in Hoffmann's mind (see his "Das Buch Henoch," 2d Abtheilung, ix.), that the speaker here is a different person from the speaker in the other parts of the work; and accordingly he acknowledges that the foundation for the critical determination of the date of composition is thus cut away. The work in its present form would undoubtedly appear to have been before the author of the Twelve Testaments, in the second century. But this circumstance does not prove that the book had one author, and is written in one spirit. Still less, from the fact that the Book of Sohar appears to treat it as a Hebrew work originating with Enoch; for the passages made use of by the Book of Sohar are not contained in the section in which the Christological elements are found (c. 37–70), but in c. 16–36. In favour of a plurality of authors, who added or inserted one piece after the other (compare c. 71, 1; 81, 1, 2; 91, 1), may be adduced in particular also, the great difference between the sections c. 16–36 and c. 37–70, c. 64–67, 1; if not the whole of the 105th chapter, yet from ver. 21 onwards; the manifold disorder in the book (compare Hoffmann l. c. i. 5, 6; also c. 53, 54); the imitations of the earlier in the later portions; and also the custom, frequent in ancient times, of adding new portions to an older well-founded edifice (compare the

Fourth Book of Esra, the Sibylline Books, the Anabaticon Jesaiæ, which is added to the Martyrion, and others). Whilst maintaining, however, the plurality of authors, I do not intend to assert that all who co-operated could not have been Jews; I only cannot venture absolutely to deny that some portions were written after the Christian era, either by a Hebrew, who, though somewhat influenced by Christianity, was in essence thoroughly Jewish, or by an interpolating Christian writer. We should, indeed, more easily understand how the Church, in its first stadia, so quickly advanced to the idea of the pre-existence of Christ, if Jews had already been led on to the same point, prior to the appearance of Christ, by the Old Testament idea of the Messiah. It is as clear as day that the way for the New Testament doctrine of the Logos must have been thus in an important degree prepared, without, as we shall see, its distinctive character being in the slightest degree impaired. But the very importance of such a datum, renders double care necessary.

Note DDD, page 154.

The Fourth Book of Esra (Fabr. Cod. Pseudepigr. V. T. ii. 173–307) contains elements which belong to this connection (c. 1, 2, 7). The mention of Jesus by the Latin text, in the latter passage, unmistakeably betrays the hand of a Christian, especially as it is not found in the Arabic text (7, 28). Moreover, the first two chapters, in which (2, 43–47) the Son of God is depicted as a youth of lofty stature, standing high above all others on Mount Zion, and distributing crowns to those who confess Him, or as a shepherd who bestows eternal rest, are not contained in the Arabic text. Such a description does not in itself transcend Hebrew ideas; for even the Messiah of the Old Testament is described as a judge and as a Son of God. But still that Christian elements have been intermixed, is plain from a comparison of i. 50 with Matt. xxiii. 37; of i. 35 with Rom. x. 20; of i. 37 with John xx. 29. But even supposing it to have been written by a Christian prior to A.D. 150, it contains elements of a less peculiar character than the passage quoted by Justin from Esra—*τοῦτο τὸ πάσχα ὁ Σωτὴρ ἡμῶν καὶ καταφυγὴ ἡμῶν* (in Fabricius l. c. i. 1152). When Justin complains that the Jews had erased this passage from Esra, on account of the Christians, we must conclude that it had been interpolated by a

Christian prior to the time of Justin, and had already found its way into the manuscripts. From this, however, it follows again, that at all events as early as the commencement of the second century, there were men who, after the manner of Paul (1 Cor. v. 7), regarded Christ as the true Paschal Lamb, the same thing which we find also in John xix. 36. The Anabaticon of Isaiah appears to be of a much later origin, though even it is ante-Nicene. Its Christology is somewhat Docetical in character.

NOTE EEE, page 154.

Compare Nitzsch, "de Testament. xii. Patriarch." Wittenb. 1810; Lücke l. c.; Grabe's "Spicilegium" i. 129–252; Fabric. Cod. Pseudepigr. V. T. i. 496–759. Origen, and probably also Tertullian, was acquainted with the work (compare Fabricius l. c. 499 f.). It must therefore have been written before the end of the second century. We cannot, with Dodwell, conclude from the Hellenisms of its style, that it belongs even to the first century. The limits of the time within which the work was composed, may be drawn more closely, than between the Book of Enoch and the end of the second century; if we note, on the one hand, that Jerusalem is spoken of as already destroyed (Levi xv. 16); that heathens already constitute the majority in Christendom (for example, Levi viii.; Benj. ix. 11) —a representation which suits at all events the close of the first century; that an entire series of formulæ to express the idea of the incarnation of God, and which the author has at his fingers' ends, had already been formed—a circumstance which points to, at all events, the commencement of the second century; and, on the other hand, that the collective tendency of the work is to teach that the priesthood is higher than royalty, but that both are by their very idea inseparable. Christ, therefore, must not be conceived merely as a King, but He is also the High Priest. Royalty and high-priesthood must not be separated. Were any reference to the constitution of the Church discoverable in the book, one might easily suppose that its main purpose was either to establish or overthrow the priesthood in the Church. Such, however, is not the case: on the contrary, the author is dealing with Judaism; and he unweariedly reminds the Jews that the Messiah is above all to be conceived as a priest, to whom the old priesthood is called upon to resign its rights. Now, this un-

doubtedly does not suit the time subsequent to the destruction of Jerusalem by Hadrian: it would, however, suit the time prior to that event. For, with the destruction of Jerusalem, all the unity and infecting power of the Jewish ceremonial system ceased. Furthermore, down to the time of Hadrian, the Christian Church in Palestine was seriously exposed to the danger of a relapse into Judaism. For, to use the words of Sulpicius Severus, "Christum Deum credebant," but "sub legis observatione" (Hist. Sacr. L. ii. 31, ed. Lips. 1709, 245); or, more precisely, Christ was conceived by them predominantly as the one who is exalted, and who will come again as King, that is, their conception of Him was an eschatological one; but these Christians at the same time clung to the law, and asserted its continuous obligatoriness, at all events on Jewish converts. Now this work attacks the separation of royalty and priesthood, —attacks, therefore, the opinion of the Jews, that Messiah was to be expected as a King, and not above all as a Priest. For the same reason also, it attacks those Christians, who, whilst believing in Jesus the exalted King, because they do not believe in Jesus the Priest, regard the ceremonial law as still existing and binding, and are therefore in danger of believing that what is best has not yet been brought to light,—consequently, of taking an Ebionitic view of the work of Christ. With an emphasis reminding one of the Epistle to the Hebrews, the authors show that Christ's death put an end to the Old Testament law, and to its central feature, to wit, the Levitical priesthood (Benj. 9, 11; specially Levi c. 4–8, 10; Reub. 9). The kind of prominence thus given to the high-priestly, in comparison with the kingly, office of Christ (Judah 21, 24), appears to me to suit only the first half of the second century. At that time it was still possible unhesitatingly to say (Levi 18),—Christ will continue King and Priest for ever, and throughout all generations will have no successor; for this was not opposed to the idea which Ignatius wished to see realized: it would, however, have clashed with the spirit of the second half of the second century, when, in consequence of the new significance ascribed to ordination, a new priesthood was practically established. In the days of the author, the Church had already begun to make a collection of New Testament writings which were counted sacred (Benj. 11). The question, whether the author were a Jew or a Christian,

can be most certainly answered, from a consideration of the fundamental idea of the entire book. In no one of the Twelve Testaments is this fundamental idea forgotten. Were this the work of an interpolator, we should have to assume the original foundation to have been an Hebraizing moral treatise, for the composition of which we can discover no sufficient motive. Besides, the moral discussions themselves are partially enlisted in the service of this idea (Zab. 8). The fundamental thought of the entire Testament of Joseph (xi. 18, xii. 3) is the following: Joseph is a type of the suffering Christ;—apart from this thought, its entire composition is a mystery. Now the Testament of Joseph is for the most part the goal of the rest. The idea seems to have been, so to group the sons of Jacob around Joseph, that he should be the object of the hatred of them all in their manifold sins, and yet, whilst apparently perishing at their hands, be their deliverer. His history thus becomes a type of the history of Christ, who suffers in consequence of the sins of His people, in order, as the atoning Lamb, which is at the same time King, to bring spiritual redemption. The dying Jacob interprets the type, and sets it forth for coming times, so that no one, when Christ comes, may fail to see in Him the Reconciler. But though it is evident that the author was a Christian, it cannot be denied that the entire style of the work, its morality, and its doctrine of sin (for example, Zebulon i.; Reuben ii.), bear traces of a Judaizing tendency. Amongst such traces, we may mention also the seven heavens (Levi i. ff.), the *Ἐγρήγοροι* (Reub. v.), and so forth. We cannot, however, with Grabe (compare Fabricius l. c. 501 ff.), go so far as to assume a Jew as the original author, and besides him a Christian interpolator. Such a separation of the Christian element is impossible, for the fundamental idea and the entire conception of the work is Christian. More recent writers, specially Nitzsch and Lücke, are of the same opinion. The author was a Jewish Christian;—assuming this, the Judaizing elements are explained. Here also we have another illustration of the untenableness of the opinion, that Jewish Christians as such were Ebionitical, or, at all events, anti-Pauline. The passage in Benj. xi. (compare Tertull. c. Marcion. 1; Scorpiac. adv. Gnostic. 13) unquestionably refers to Paul. It runs as follows, —In the latter days there will spring forth from the seed of

Benjamin, the beloved of the Lord, who heareth His voice, and doeth His will, who enlighteneth all the heathen with new knowledge, and brings up the light of knowledge over Israel, and, like a wolf (Gen. xlix. 27), tears it away from Israel that he may give it to the synagogue of the heathen. It will abide in the synagogue of the heathen till the end of the world, and will be as a melody on the lips of their princes. And in sacred books will be written his work and his words." The author has, further, many Johannean features;—for example, "the Lamb of God" (Test. xi. xii.); the slaughter which it undergoes (xi. 19); μονογενὴς is used of Christ (Benj. 9). Neander ("Church History" ii. 602, 609) therefore appears to me to be wrong, in judging this work to be an offspring of Ebionism.

NOTE FFF, page 160.

To this connection belongs the "Evangelium Nicodemi." That the second part is of a far later origin (Cod. Apocr. N. T. ed. Thilo, P. i. 666 ff.) is certain: on the other hand, with the first part is connected the "Acta Pilati," with which even Justin Martyr (Apol. i. 35, 48) was acquainted (compare "Thilo l. c. cxviii. 796 ff., and his Easter Programme 1837; Insunt Acta SS. App. Petri et Pauli," Partic. i. 26, 27). This work has, on the whole, the synoptic conception of Christ; it evinces also an acquaintance with the miracles narrated in the Gospel of John; but it adds many features of a fabulous and incredible character. Much simpler, on the contrary, is the tone of the Epistles of Pilate to Claudius and Tiberius (Thilo l. c. 796–802). The ἀναφορὰ of Pilate is completely legendary (l. c. 803–813). Other apocryphal writings—such as the "Evangelium Infantiæ," "Nativitas Mariæ," "Protevangelium Jacobi"—contain rather a Docetical than an Ebionitical representation of Christ. The former, for example, represents Christ as saying, in His cradle, to His mother, "Ego quem peperisti, sum Jesus, Filius Dei, ὁ λόγος, misitque me pater meus ad salutem mundi" (c. 1). Similarly also the Protevangelium Jacobi, whose author classes himself amongst the πνευματικοὶ, and who, although he does not call the true humanity of Christ in question, is at great pains to show that Mary still continued to be a virgin, even after giving birth to Jesus, and must therefore have taken a Docetical view of the birth of Christ. The

"Acta Pauli et Theslæ," in their present form, cannot have been written before the fifth century. What the older form was, in which the Acta were known even in the time of Tertullian, it is impossible now to ascertain. The work in its present form is, indeed, gloomily ascetical, especially in relation to marriage; but these ethical errors have not affected its dogmatical, particularly its Christological, orthodoxy. Not merely was Christ designated in ancient times, *ὁ ἀγαπητὸς καὶ ἅγιος παῖς Θεοῦ, υἱὸς τοῦ ὑψίστου* (c. 8, 10), but He was even worshipped by Paul: to His sufferings also is attributed the virtue of saving us from judgment. Accordingly Schliemann (l. c. 431 ff.) must be allowed to be right, when, in opposition to Schwegler (l. c. 262 ff.), he maintains that here there are no signs of Ebionism.

NOTE GGG, page 165.

In his reply Origen demonstrated the ignorance of Celsus, for in the deeper sense Christians do hold the law; and even the external law was not at once cast aside by Peter and the Christians of Jerusalem. Nay more, even still later, there existed those who, like the two kinds of Ebionites, clinging to the letter, wished both to recognise Jesus as the foretold one, and also to retain the law of their fathers. But as Origen was not in the slightest degree aware that these constituted the great body of Christians, the ignorance of Celsus can only be explained on the supposition that the Ebionitic Christians had escaped his notice through having become an insignificant sect. In favour of this view, the passage v. 61 may also be adduced, even supposing Celsus himself should have referred to the Ebionites, and not Origen have quoted them as examples.

NOTE HHH, page 173.

L. c. *ἀρχὴν ἡμέρας ὀγδόης ποιήσω, ὅ ἐστιν ἄλλου κόσμου ἀρχήν. Διὸ καὶ ἄγομεν τὴν ἡμέραν τὴν ὀγδόην εἰς εὐφροσύνην, ἐν ᾗ καὶ ὁ Ἰησοῦς ἀνέστη ἐκ νεκρῶν*, etc. Similarly Ignatius ad Magn. 9,—Christians who live in a new hope, are no longer *σαββατίζοντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ κυριακὴν ζωὴν ζῶντες, ἐν ᾗ καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἡμῶν ἀνέτειλεν δι' αὐτοῦ*. Plin. Ep. L. x. 97,—"Quod essent soliti *stato die* ante lucem convenire." Euseb. 4, 23, 24, 26; Const. Apost. 10, 23,—*τὸ σάββατον μέντοι καὶ τὴν κυριακὴν*

ἑορτάζετε, ὅτι τὸ μὲν δημιουργίας ἐστὶν ὑπόμνημα, ἡ δὲ ἀναστάσεως. 2, 59; 5, 20; 8, 33. Opposition to Gnosticism appears to have been the motive for the longer retention of the observation of the Jewish Sabbath along with Sunday. Indeed, at the outset the observance of both was almost historically unavoidable. From the time of Tertullian, the double observance was due to the return of a legal, if even an anti-Jewish, spirit. To give up the religious celebration of the festival of creation, so long as the Creator was conceived by some not to be the highest God, was almost an inward impossibility. This opposition to Gnosticism, however, might take two forms: either both days might continue to be observed as festivals of joy; or the festivals of the first and second creation might be celebrated on one and the same day, to wit, Sunday. The latter course might easily be taken, inasmuch as the Son of God, who rose from the dead, was from an early period held to be the Creator of the world. The latter form was the freer; it was also independent of Judaism; and at the same time almost more strongly opposed to Gnosticism than the first mentioned. In the Apologia of Justin Martyr (i. 67), we find a trace of the adoption of the latter course by the Oriental Church during the first half of the second century. According to the passage referred to, Sunday is the festival day of Christians; there is no word whatever of a Sabbath; whereas Sunday was also set apart for the commemoration of the first creation. And we find, in fact, that the Sabbath was not universally observed in the East; but, to judge from Justin Martyr, Ignatius, Barnabas, the "Epistola ad Diognetum" 4, only where the influence of a Judaizing Christianity was more strongly felt. In the very district which deviated least widely from the Jews in the matter of the time of celebrating the feast of Passover, to wit, in Asia Minor, the custom of commemorating once a week the resurrection of the Lord, seems first to have grown spontaneously out of the principle of Christianity. We find accordingly that the polemic against the Jewish Sabbath (compare Ep. ad Diognet. 4; Conc. Laod. can. 29; compare Col. ii. 16; Apocal. i. 10) was quite as vigorous in a great part of the Oriental Churches, at all events in the second century, as it was in Rome, where an endeavour was subsequently made, by the appointment of fasting on the Sabbath, to change its character, in agreement with

the Christian idea. The commemoration of the creation was, naturally, then allowed to fall into the background (compare also Bingh. L. xx. c. 3, vol. ix. p. 54 ff.). For the prohibition of fasting on the Sabbath, which has a Judaistic appearance (Can. Apost. 54), even Bingham assigned a much more probable reason (L. xx. c. 3, § 5, vol. ix. p. 59 ff.) than the one alleged by Baur (Episk. p. 135 ff.),—to wit, antagonism to Marcion and others, who, according to Epiph. Hær. 42, 3, by way of degrading the Demiurge, ordained a fast on the Sabbath.

Note III, page 174.

That Christ died on a Friday, the Orientals knew well enough (Justin's Apol. i. 67); but they believed themselves to have done enough for the commemoration of that day by the organization of the Christian week, by celebrating Sunday as the day of resurrection, and by adopting the division of the days which naturally resulted therefrom. On the contrary, in the appointment of yearly festivals (the tendency to which showed itself altogether at an earlier period in the East than in the West), they endeavoured, especially in Asia Minor, to fix upon the true date, the exact day. One motive for this accuracy, was the desire to set forth, in opposition to the Jews, the Christian festival of Passover as the fulfilment of the Jewish festival (compare John xix. 36; Justini Martyris Dial. c. Tryph. 40, 111; Iren. Fragm. ed. Mass. p. 342). On the other hand, the opponents of this procedure of the Church of Asia Minor, who formed the decided majority (Euseb. 5, 23, 2), regulated the yearly festivals in agreement with the weekly; but their boasting of this as a proof of their anti-Judaistic spirit, rested on a misconception of the custom of the Church in Asia Minor. Indeed, it is hard to say whether the latter custom was not more decidedly anti-Judaistic than the so-called Roman, especially as the Romans continued dependent on Jewish calculations. In reality, however, neither party based its custom on the principle of cleaving to Judaism. That those of Asia Minor, in particular, did not at all mean to allow the Divine obligatoriness of the Old Testament law of Passover, is clear from the friendly character of the intercourse between Polycarp and Anicetus, notwithstanding their difference of opinion (Euseb. 5, 24). Victor's behaviour, on the contrary, is rather to be termed Ju-

daistic,—not indeed in the historical sense of the word, but in the dogmatical.—Neander (Church History i. 1, p. 513 ff.) appears to me to be right in understanding the Epistle of Polycrates (Euseb. 5, 24) to mean, that the Church of Asia Minor regarded as the main matter, not the paschal meal, but primarily the commemoration of the suffering and death of Christ.

NOTE JJJ, page 175.

It is difficult to understand how there could be any need felt of a baptismal festival, after it had become customary to commemorate the birth of Christ. But the custom once introduced of commemorating His baptism, we can easily understand how the commemoration of His birth—that is, of the commencement of the existence of Christ for us, of His official existence—might for a time be conjoined therewith:—and, indeed, the Church at a later period spoke of His baptism as a "secunda nativitas." As early as the first thirty years of the second century (Clem. Alex. Strom. 1, 21, ed. Pott. i. 407), the Basilidians celebrated the festival of the baptism of Christ. With this fact are in agreement the passages adduced above (p. 247 f.) from the Sibylline Books, which belong to the time of Hadrian, and in which the baptism of Christ is in particular a constant theme. The Ebionites, also, probably observed this festival at an early period; for they in general attached the greatest significance to the rite of baptism. Now it is quite certain that the Church, which observed this festival at all events at a later period, did not adopt it from the Basilidians; consequently, concludes Neander (Church History i. 1, p. 519 ff.), with undoubted justice, the baptism of Christ was commemorated by the Church prior to the rise of the Gnostic sects. Possibly, indeed, as Neander thinks, the passage contains a hint of the commemoration by the Church, of the birth of Jesus;—not, however, as though it had any intention of thereby pretending to determine the exact day of the birth of Christ; for that was held to be a secondary matter. Clement's meaning would then be,—"In the view of the Basilidians, the *day* on which the festival of baptism is observed is of importance; the Church, on the contrary, is indifferent about the exact day, even in commemorating the birth of Christ." The passage would accordingly tend to show that the birth of Christ was held in greater esteem by the

Church than His baptism; a thing which was not impossible about the year 200, although the festival of the birth continued to be incidentally, irregularly observed.

NOTE KKK, page 187.

That, theoretically, he required men to experience everything for themselves, that they might thus become conscious and certain of their freedom, is, on the contrary, perfectly attested. It is the principle, which elsewhere also is brought forward, that nothing must remain unnegatived, if freedom is to be perfect, and conscious of its perfection. This, however, is merely the negative aspect of the new Christian principle, without the higher filling up of the absolute void of formal freedom. For this reason also, the required negation of everything opposed to freedom, far from being identical with the denial of self and the world, demanded by Christianity, is but the caprice of a subject whose existence is vanity, and the heathenish counterpart of Pharisaism; for the apparent spirituality of Pharisaism had also, as its reverse aspect, a finer and more poisonous form of sensuality.

NOTE LLL, page 188.

In Matt. T. xi. 12: *οἱ ὀλίγῳ διαφέροντες αὐτῶν* (that is, from the *σωματικοῖς Ἰουδαίοις*) *Ἐβιωναῖοι.* Similarly also Justin Martyr in the Dial. c. Tryphone l. c. After saying that, in his opinion, those also can be saved who, whilst believing in Christ, continue to observe the law for themselves, provided they do not insist on the heathen undergoing circumcision, and hold intercourse with free Gentile Christians. *Ἐὰν δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους τοῦ ὑμετέρου πιστεύειν λέγοντες ἐπὶ τοῦτον τὸν Χριστὸν,—ἐκ παντὸς κατὰ τὸν διὰ Μωσέως διαταχθέντα νόμον ἀναγκάζωσι ζῆν τοὺς ἐξ ἐθνῶν πιστεύοντας,—ἢ μὴ κοινωνεῖν αὐτοῖς—αἱρῶνται, ὁμοίως καὶ τούτους οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι.* Schliemann (l. c. 553 f.) justly condemns the translation of the last words—"I do not agree with these." Evidently there should follow a stronger judgment on them than on the first-mentioned class. Schliemann proposes to translate—"I will not recognise them, even as they do not recognise us." But as *κἀγὼ* fails, we might translate—"I cannot treat them after the same manner with those first, more moderate ones." More moderate than the men who

wished to lay upon the heathen the yoke of the Old Testament, and esteemed the freer heathen Christians unclean, are those heathen Christians who allow this burden to be laid on themselves, but continue to confess the Anointed of God. On the contrary, *τοὺς ὁμολογήσαντας καὶ ἐπιγνόντας, τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν Χριστὸν καὶ ἥτινι οὖν αἰτίᾳ μεταβάντας ἐπὶ τὴν ἔννομον πολιτείαν, ἀρνησαμένους, ὅτι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ Χριστὸς καὶ πρὶν τελευτῆς μὴ μεταγνόντας οὐδ' ὅλως σωθήσεσθαι ἀποφαίνομαι.* How easy such a relapse was for both parties, is plain from the observations immediately following in the text.

NOTE MMM, page 193.

What Irenæus says (i. 26) of the Ebionites in this respect, must refer to the above-mentioned class. The Gospel of the Hebrews, which many Ebionites possessed, and which Jerome saw in the fifth century, seems to me to have been based on the Gospel of Matthew. But as the introduction thereto, preserved by Epiphanius, appears to intend to represent the Gospel as the work of the twelve Apostles, and as amongst the extant fragments of it there are unquestionably portions of Luke's Gospel (for example, Epiph. Hær. 30, 22; cll. Luke xxii. 15), the most probable supposition is the following:—The Gospel of Matthew formed the groundwork, but underwent in process of time many alterations, partly because it was meant to be the Gospel of the twelve Apostles, and might therefore adopt portions, according to pleasure, from other Gospel traditions, and partly from doctrinal reasons, or from an inclination to certain apocryphal embellishments. Thus arose necessarily a variety of recensions, some of them containing the most arbitrary interpolations. (Compare Epiph. Hær. 30, 3, 13; Grabe, Spicileg. i. 25.) Each of the three classes above mentioned—the Nazarenes, and the two kinds of Ebionites—had its own particular recension.

NOTE NNN, page 193.

The fact that Epiphanius does not accuse them of regarding Christ as an ordinary man, but acknowledges that he knows nothing about the matter, is in itself evidence thereof, and certainly a good sign. Irenæus says (i. 26, 2)—"ea autem, quæ sunt erga Dominum, non similiter ut Cerinthus et Carpocrates opinantur." We need neither erase "non," with Cotelerius,

nor, with Grabe, read "consimiliter" instead of "non similiter," if we only refer the words to the Nazarenes.—Origen also was acquainted with them (Orig. c. Celsum 5, 61, 65). *Οἱ διττοὶ Ἐβιωναῖοι ἤτοι ἐκ παρθένου ὁμολογοῦντες ὁμοίως ἡμῖν τὸν Ἰησοῦν, ἢ οὐχ οὕτω γεγεννῆσθαι.* Perhaps also the words of Origen, in his Comm. in Joh. T. ii. 6 (de la Rue's ed. iv. 64), belong to this connection:—*Ἄρτι ἔλαβέ με ἡ μήτηρ μου τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα ἐν μιᾷ τῶν τριχῶν μου, καὶ ἀπήνεγκέ με εἰς τὸ ὄρος τὸ μέγα Θαβώρ.* For, though they may have styled the Holy Spirit the *μήτηρ Ἰησοῦ* from the day of His birth, they can scarcely have so termed Him from His baptism. Grabe is of a different opinion (l. c. 327, 328). Origen's explanation is a marvellous one. The view above given, I find also held by Neander (2d ed. 1, 2, 605, 606), who makes it probable that the words *ἐν μιᾷ τῶν τριχῶν μου* are intended to express in a poetical form the fact, that it was the impulse of the Holy Spirit which animated and led Him in all things. For the rest, these words, and the passage referred to in Note 3, page 193, show that at an early period apocryphal elements had found their way into their Gospel. That they taught the birth from the Virgin, is clear from the quotation from Jerome, given in the note to page 191.

Note OOO, page 194.

Hieron. Comm. in Jesaiam, c. 31, 6, 7; Schliemann l. c. p. 455 f. They neither required heathen Christians to observe the law, nor regarded such observance as necessary to salvation; they trusted in the mercy of God, not in their own power. Following Jerome, Schliemann (p. 457) gives an affecting description of their sentiments. Bitterly persecuted by the Pharisees, and hostile to them as to men whom they deemed seducers of the people, they mourned deeply over their unbelieving brethren, and looked with longing for the time when their conversion should be effected. To sadden the spirit of their brother, they considered to be one of the greatest sins; and in their Gospel one might read,—"Nunquam læti sitis nisi quum fratrem vestrum videritis in caritate." Optat. Milev. de Schism. Donat. 4, 5, represents them as saying,—"Patrem passum esse, non filium."

Note PPP, page 195.

What they meant by the birth of Christ from the Holy Spirit, which they undoubtedly believed, is difficult to say. Most probably it was a mere dead dogma; otherwise they would have been led into the development above indicated. But whilst they stood still, Christian heresies grew up, one after the other, and left the traces of their existence in the recensions of their Gospel. Perhaps, therefore, the account given of the baptism of Christ by the Nazarenes, was intended as an answer to the notions embodied in these heresies—an answer serving also the purpose of defending their own point of view against similar charges. From the stress which, after their fashion, it unquestionably lays on the baptism of Christ, their version may be regarded as a kind of concession to the class to which we are just about to call attention. They were not conscious, however, of putting the birth of Christ into the background as compared with His baptism, nor that their teachings respecting the latter did not altogether accord with the full import of their doctrine of the birth from the Holy Spirit. At this point, therefore, the heresy begins. It is more difficult to assign with certainty the probable motive of the stress laid on baptism in their account of the rite. According to Theodoret, they honoured Christ as ἄνθρωπον δίκαιον (Hær. Fab. 2, 2). This we must take in the strict sense, and not as Schliemann, without proof, takes it (pp. 260, 455), who classes them with other Ebionites, on the plea that they attributed to Christ, not absolute sinlessness, but merely a higher degree of virtue. For if Jesus, as their Gospel narrates, when called upon by His mother and brothers to allow Himself to be baptized by John, answered (Hieronym. c. Pelag. 3, 2),—"Quid peccavi, ut vadam et baptizer ab eo, nisi forte hoc ipsum, quod dixi, ignorantia, est,"—the Nazarene Gospel, if these words actually occurred in it, must have intended to teach that, though Jesus prior to His baptism was chargeable with ignorance,—that is, was not fully enlightened by, and endued with, the Holy Spirit,—He had not the consciousness of sin. I am compelled therefore to regard this interpolation, even if it really did form part of their Gospel, as an answer to, or an apologetic declaration against, those Ebionites, etc., who drew from the baptism of Christ the conclusion, that He also needed to repent. Their

answer would be—Baptism had a different significance relatively to Christ:—what significance, they indicate when they represent Christ as having an imperfect consciousness, or as being "in ignorantia," prior to baptism. Perhaps also the circumstance that, immediately before His baptism, Christ claims to have kept Himself free from sin, is a hint that, in the opinion of the Nazarenes, the distinction about to be conferred on Him was a reward for His virtue. Or we might also say (especially if "ignorantia" be taken reflectively, as a want of clear consciousness of His moral condition), that the Nazarenes conceived Jesus to have been, prior to baptism, in a completely unconscious, childlike state; and that at His baptism He first attained to the manly form of perfect virtue, that is, attained to a fully conscious virtue; whereas His will had been ever equally pure, and, as His birth from the Holy Ghost would lead us to expect, had never transgressed. In both cases, Christ would be affirmed to be sinless; and we should then be obliged to suppose, what in itself is quite possible, that for His baptism, on which they laid such great stress, they assigned a motive not altogether consistent with their belief in the supernaturalness of His birth. I think it, however, more than questionable, whether the passage was contained in their Gospel. If, as Credner thinks, "ignorantia" should be understood to denote "sins of ignorance" (compare Testam. Patr. vi. 1, ἄγνοια), we ought not to seek for this passage in the Nazarene Gospel, but in another recension of the Gospel of the Hebrews,—that, namely, which was employed by the *Κήρυγμα Πέτρου*. This latter also, according to Hieron. de bapt. Hæret., adduces the passage. Now Jerome characterizes the *Κήρυγμα Πέτρου* as a book "in quo contra omnas scripturas et de peccato proprio confitentem invenies Christum." If this statement be correct (and there is no reason for doubting its correctness, if the book were written in Alexandria some time before Basilides), the *Κήρυγμα* must have referred the passage under notice to the unconscious sinfulness of Christ prior to baptism; but to attribute such a supposition to the Nazarenes, would be thoroughly irreconcileable with their belief in a birth from the Holy Spirit, or in the appearance of God among men in Christ. Nazarenes who renounced the tenets which constituted their characteristic difference from the Ebionites, ought rather to be termed Ebionites. Compare Note

TTT. The indefinite, amphibolical nature of the Christology of the Nazarenes, is in agreement with their entire character.

NOTE QQQ, page 196.

As, among other things, follows from the fact, that at a later period Symmachus, translator of the Old Testament, was a leader of the second class, which after him were termed Symmachians. Their chief seat was on the east of the Jordan, and for this reason Clemens Alexandrinus terms them *Περατικοὶ*. They were also to be found in Cypria, Asia Minor, and Rome; perhaps also in Alexandria. Compare Ep. Barnab. c. 7, 12, 14; Ignat. ad Magn. and ad Philad.; Epiph. hær. 30, 18. See especially the words of the latter respecting the Cerinthians:— *οὗτοι ἀπὸ Κηρίνθου Ἰουδαῖοί τινες τὴν περιτομὴν αὐχοῦνται, τὸν δὲ κόσμον ὑπ' ἀγγέλων γεγενῆσθαι λέγοντες, Ἰησοῦν δὲ κατὰ προκοπὴν Χριστὸν κεκλῆσθαι.* Euseb. H. E. 3, 27: *Ἐβιωναίους τούτους οἰκείως ἐπεφήμισον, πτωχῶς καὶ ταπεινῶς τὰ περὶ τοῦ Χριστοῦ δοξάζοντες. Λιτὸν μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν καὶ κοινὸν ἡγοῦντο, κατὰ προκοπὴν ἤθους αὐτὸν μόνον ἄνθρωπον δεδικαιωμένον, ἐξ ἀνδρός τε κοινωνίας καὶ τῆς Μαρίας γεγενημένον.* The word *δεδικαιωμένον* perhaps contains an allusion to some act, by which Jesus was proclaimed by God as Christ, on account of His righteousness.

NOTE RRR, page 197.

Even the Epistle to the Hebrews would lead us to expect this. Further, not only Hegesippus, but also the Chronic. Pasch., and other information we have respecting Cerinthus, point thereto. Schliemann decides for the time of Hadrian, instead of that of Trajan; but, all things considered, this is at least thirty years too late: the decision is based on an over-estimate of the influence of external events, such as the expulsion of the Jews from the Aelia Capitolina. Even the name *Περατικοὶ* is probably an indication that, of the Jewish Christians who continued in the neighbourhood of Pella after the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus, some took an Ebionitic turn; and therefore pursued a course similar to that of the fraction which seceded from the mother Church of Jerusalem under Tebuthis.

NOTE SSS, page 199.

Dial. c. Tryph. 48, ed. Col. 267 E. *Καὶ γὰρ εἰσί τινες, ὦφίλοι, ἔλεγον, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡμετέρου γένους, ὁμολογοῦντες αὐτὸν Χριστὸν εἶναι, ἄνθρωπον δὲ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀποφαινόμενοι· οἷς οὐ συντίθεμαι, οὐδ' ἂν πλεῖστοι ταῦτά μοι δοξάσαντες εἴποιεν, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνοις διδάγμασι κεκελεύσμεθα ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ Χριστοῦ πείθεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς διὰ τῶν μακαρίων προφητῶν κηρυχθεῖσι καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ διδαχθεῖσι.* Compare G. Bull, Judicium Ecclesiæ, etc., c. 7, p. 69, with the Appendix of Grabe, p. 79 ff. The proposal of the former, to read *ὑμετέρου γένους* instead of *ἡμετέρου γένους*, does not accomplish its purpose; for the word *πλεῖστοι*, which occurs afterwards, implies that there were some who held this view, whom Justin could not avoid reckoning amongst Christians, even though chargeable with heresy. In order to ascertain Justin's entire judgment of these Ebionites, we must take into consideration c. 35, 81, and indeed his entire Christology. How greatly the Ebionites were in the minority, is evident from the circumstance, that although the conversation had just before related to the legality of their spirit, the Jew Tryphon (c. 10) attributes to Christians universally the characteristic of the non-observance of the law. In a very similar manner, Celsus (see Origen. c. Cels. 2, 1) brings the same reproach against Christians.

NOTE TTT, page 200.

Epiph. hær. 30, 13: *Τοῦ λαοῦ βαπτισθέντος ἦλθε καὶ Ἰησοῦς, καὶ ἐβαπτίσθη ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἰωάννου. Καὶ ὡς ἀνῆλθεν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος, ἠνοίγησαν οἱ οὐρανοὶ, καὶ εἶδε τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸ ἅγιον ἐν εἴδει περιστερᾶς κατελθούσης καὶ εἰσελθούσης εἰς αὐτόν. Καὶ φωνὴ ἐγένετο ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, λέγουσα· Σύ μου εἶ ὁ υἱὸς ὁ ἀγαπητὸς, ἐν σοὶ ηὐδόκησα. Καὶ πάλιν· ἐγὼ σήμερον γεγέννηκα σε. Καὶ εὐθὺς περιέλαμψε τὸν τόπον φῶς μέγα. Ὁ ἰδὼν ὁ Ἰωάννης λέγει αὐτῷ· σὺ τίς εἶ κύριε; Καὶ πάλιν φωνὴ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ πρὸς αὐτόν· Οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ υἱός μου ὁ ἀγαπητὸς, ἐφ' ὃν ηὐδόκησα. Καὶ τότε ὁ Ἰωάννης προσπεσὼν αὐτῷ ἔλεγε· δέομαί σου, κύριε, σύ με βάπτισον. Ὁ δὲ ἐκώλυεν, αὐτῷ λέγων· ἄφες, ὅτι οὕτως ἐστὶ πρέπον πληρωθῆναι πάντα.*—The passage adduced from Jerome in Note PPP must also be attributed to these Ebionites, if "ignorantia" referred to sins of ignorance. In

favour of which, might further be alleged, that the class now under consideration, which rejected the account of the childhood of Christ, and began its Gospel with His baptism, may have represented the mother of Jesus as calling upon her Son to allow Himself to be baptized by John, for the purpose of thus hinting, that she, at all events, knew nothing of His supernatural birth from the Holy Spirit. The words run as follows (Hier. c. Pelag. 3, 2):—"Ecce mater Domini et fratres ejus dicebant ei: Joannes baptista baptizat in *remissionem peccatorum*, eamus et baptizemur ab eo, etc." It is further deserving of remark, that the Ebionitical Gospel intentionally transposes the words of Matthew iii. 14, 15, to after the baptism. Prior to the baptism, neither John nor any one else, not even Jesus Himself, is supposed by them to have recognised Him as Christ

NOTE UUU, page 201.

This consideration is the more important, as they are by no means sparing of expressions which imply that the Holy Spirit of God dwelt in Him; thus giving up the deistic point of view, from which they had at first regarded the birth of Christ: see Note TTT. (*Τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸ ἅγιον ἐν εἴδει περιστερᾶς καταλθούσης καὶ εἰσελθούσης εἰς αὐτόν.*) In itself it is possible that they held the *πνεῦμα* of God—that is, God as He reveals Himself in the world of spirit—to have been personally present in Jesus from the day of His baptism, as did the Nazarenes. In that case, however, they could no longer be charged with denying the deity of Christ,—a charge, notwithstanding, constantly brought against them. For this reason, I am compelled to agree with Schliemann (p. 485), who takes *πνεῦμα* impersonally, as a power,—a view which is suggested also by Isa. xi. 1, and by Justin's *χρίεσθαι*. But unquestionably, if they held that *all* the powers of the Holy Spirit entered into Him, in order to His complete equipment, the Holy Spirit cannot have been any longer outside of Him, but must have been in Him, and must therefore proceed alone from Him. And if the entire Divine Spirit was in Him, the only difference between this and an incarnation of the God-Spirit would be, that we must take the *πνεῦμα*, not in the Trinitarian sense, but either patripassianally, or else as the principle of revelation; and accordingly, if not in name, yet in conception, as equivalent to the Logos, with the

single modification, that, prior to the baptism of Christ, it was not possessed of an hypostatic existence, distinct from that of the Father. This consideration shows us, indeed, the path by which it was possible for these Ebionites to have advanced forward to the point of view occupied by the Nazarenes; but we have no evidence of their having done so. For in Hær. 30, 3, Epiphanius speaks of Ebionites No. 1, not of Ebionites No. 2 (see above). Concerning one portion of the Ebionites, whom he did not consider at one with the third class mentioned above, he remarks, *πάλιν δὲ, ὅτε βούλονται, λέγουσιν· οὐχὶ, ἀλλὰ εἰς αὐτὸν ἦλθε τὸ πνεῦμα, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ Χριστὸς, καὶ ἐνεδύσατο αὐτὸν τὸν Ἰησοῦν καλούμενον.* The expression, *εἰς αὐτὸν ἦλθε τὸ πνεῦμα*, reminds one of the passage cited from the account of the baptism given by the Gospel of the Ebionites now under notice. This *ἐνδύσασθαι τὸν Ἰησοῦν*, taught by the Ebionites whom Epiphanius here has in view, certainly took place at the baptism of Jesus (compare c. 29). If the *πνεῦμα* be the *πνεῦμα ἅγιον*, their meaning must have been, that from the time of His baptism, the humanity of Christ was no longer the main matter; that, on the contrary, it was then reduced, as it were, to the rank of a garment of the indwelling Holy Spirit,—an idea in remarkable analogy with expressions used by the teachers of the Church. But the addition, *ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ Χριστὸς*, hints that it was a personal pre-existent being which descended on Christ:—and this would suit Cerinthus, and others related to him. We have here, therefore, a new illustration of the looseness with which the word *πνεῦμα* was used, and how much caution is requisite to ascertain in each case its true sense. In the present instance, it denotes a higher, but still a created spirit. Now, as these Ebionites held the Old Testament to be a Divine revelation, and were most closely related to the followers of Cerinthus, they probably regarded this highest, pre-existent spirit as the principle of all Old Testament revelations. In this way, without resorting for help to the theologumenon of the Word and Wisdom, and independently of the Hellenic idea of the Logos, they approximated, though employing other expressions, to the Church doctrine of the pre-existent Son, whom they designate *Χριστός*. And, indeed, the doctrine of the Church itself did not all at once get rid of the subordination of the pre-existent hypostasis of the Son. It is, perhaps, further worthy of note,

that so soon as, with Cerinthus and those last mentioned, the higher nature which united itself with Christ was conceived to be hypostatical, the soil of Ebionism (which, starting with the human personality of Jesus, represented Him as a mere man, exalted by virtue and the possession of the powers of the Holy Ghost) was quitted, and an alliance was effected with Docetism. Nay more, this higher Æon Christ, who descends into Jesus as one person descending into another, dominates, so long as the union lasts. The union, however, could not become a permanent one, but continued dissoluble, inasmuch as there was already a vigorous human personality, which had long enjoyed an independent existence. The other fraction of these Ebionites, who maintained that Christ was merely endowed with the highest measure of the powers of the Holy Spirit, might have held the union with the man Jesus to be a permanent one; and, indeed, we have no account to the contrary. But, as Epiphanius (Hær. 30, 14) rightly remarks, the former could only recognise a *συνάφεια* of the *Χριστὸς* with Jesus—such a *συνάφεια*, namely, as that the personality of the latter was either as it were absorbed, or made latent, by the *Χριστὸς*, during the continuance of the union. In opposition to the incarnation of the Christos, they quoted the words—"Who are my sisters and brothers?"—that is, I (the personal centre of the Messiah, whilst discharging His office of Teacher) know no one amongst you of like nature with Myself. (*Ἀρνοῦνται εἶναι αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον δῆθεν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου, οὗ εἴρηκεν ὁ Σωτήρ· τίς μού ἐστι μήτηρ;*)

Note VVV, page 202.

According to Epiphanius (Hær. 30, 3), some of the Ebionites, with the undoubted design of favouring monarchian ideas, gave the doctrine of the hypostatical being which united itself with Christ the following development:—"Christ (= *ἅγιον πνεῦμα*) is from above; was created before all things as a spirit; is above the angels; is a Lord over all, and the heir of the world to come. From this higher world He descends, whenever He wills: thus He came in Adam, and appeared to the patriarchs, clothed in a body, as in a dress. In the latter days, however, He appeared in Adam's veritable body, allowed Himself to be seen, was crucified, rose from the dead, and went back whence He came." Others say,—"Adam, the pro-

toplast, into whose nostrils God Himself breathed breath, was Christ." We shall see immediately that these tendencies, notwithstanding their apparent differences, prepared the way for later phænomena, and were summed up in the system of the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies, which taught a monarchian Docetism up to the level of the Subordinatianism which, at their time, still partially clung to the doctrine of the Church.

NOTE WWW, page 207.

The author does not believe in an eternal matter outside of God, for that would be incompatible with his monotheism; but he teaches a προβάλλεσθαι of the four elements out of God, or through God. From this we may probably conclude, that he assumed the presence of a nature in God; and this conclusion accords with his doctrine of the body or form of God. But the nature in God is one thing; that which has proceeded forth from God, and is endowed with independence, another thing. The former is most intimately united with the σοφία or the πνεῦμα in God, and is, therefore, merely a constituent element of the Unity (Monas) itself. Outside of God, however, it has a predominant tendency to independence, as it were, to gravitate towards itself: having passed out of that unity in which it constituted, not an empty susceptibility, but one replete with the richest treasures, it has now the germ of evil in itself. That oneness with itself and the πνεῦμα, which it enjoyed in God, ceased, and it was discerpted into the four elements out of which all things arose. These elements are, indeed, gathered again into a unity, in the spirit of the earth, ἡ καθόλου καὶ ψυχὴ γεώδης, but it is a false unity, brought about by the mixture of the elements, and its name is Satan, who is free (according to the Clementine idea of freedom), although he was created evil. That this unity is completely different from the unity just pointed out in the Monas, is self-evident; but it is equally clear that the two are, notwithstanding, connected with each other. Opposed to this mighty spirit, which holds possession of the present world, is the Christ-Spirit, *created* from the beginning as the right is created in correlation to the left. Its claims on the human souls which are related to Him are, it is true, in the present world, constantly resisted, through the too great power of the spirit of the earth; but He is Lord of the

world to come. Thus, out of an original Divine unity, there arose in the world a glaring dualism, which took the further form of negative asceticism. Nature, which in God is so united with the *πνεῦμα* as to constitute pure susceptibility (*ὕλη*),—susceptibility, moreover, which, being a momentum of God, is good,—becomes, in the world, an independent, and, as it were, stubborn and seductive material. For this very reason, therefore, it cannot be represented as absolutely and simply evil; it corresponds to something, which, in God—in unity with the *πνεῦμα*—is good; moreover, the *σοφία* of God is its Creator. This feature of their doctrine shows itself partly in their avoidance of extremes, even in asceticism, and partly in the observation (Hom. 19, conclusion), that nature also loves God,—that is, in one aspect it is good, and possesses a susceptibility to God, after whom it yearns. The same may be said concerning Satan, who constitutes its unity. The good principle is so certain of its victory, that the evil principle serves it without either knowing or willing to do so; for, though Satan himself is not righteous, as God is, his work is righteous. When he does mischief, he is executing a Divine punishment, which God, as the Good, cannot Himself directly execute. Accordingly, he is compelled, without being aware of it, to help on the victory of the true, righteous God. At this point, the Satan of the Clementines may be said to approximate as nearly as possible to the Demiurge of the Gnostics. Compare 3, 5; 9, 9; 11, 10; 7, 3; 15, 7; 8, 20; 19, 6, 12. The Clementine doctrine of Satan and matter deserves to be compared with that of Bardesanes. Compare Hahn's "Bardesanes Gnosticus, Syrorum primus Hymnologus," 1819, p. 58 ff. The commingling of freedom and necessity in the two also presents many points of similarity.

NOTE XXX, page 210.

Ἐὰν τῷ ὑπὸ χειρῶν Θεοῦ κυοφορηθέντι ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ἅγιον Χριστοῦ μὴ δῷ τις ἔχειν πνεῦμα, πῶς ἑτέρῳ τινὶ ἐκ μυσαρᾶς σταγόνος γεγεννημένῳ διδοὺς ἔχειν, οὐ τὰ μέγιστα ἀσεβεῖ; Τὰ δὲ μέγιστα εὐσεβῇ, ἐὰν ἑτέρῳ μὲν μὴ δῷῃ ἔχειν, ἐκεῖνον δὲ μόνον ἔχειν λέγοι, ὃς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αἰῶνος ἅμα τοῖς ὀνόμασι μορφὰς ἀλλάσσων τὸν αἰῶνα τρέχει, μέχρις ὅτε ἰδίων χρόνων τυχὼν, διὰ τοὺς καμάτους Θεοῦ ἐλέει χρισθεὶς εἰς ἀεὶ ἕξει τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν· κ.τ.λ. Hom. 3, 20.

Note YYY, page 212.

It is to be highly rated, that the Clementines laid such great stress on the idea of justice: they raised opposition to the doctrine of the immediate goodness of God, laid down by those Gnostics who rejected the justice of God. Not till the righteous fire of anger has been brought into activity against the desires, do they recognise the presence of virtue in man (11, 3; 3, 31). In the history of the world, we find first goodness, then justice (18, 3). Men did not continue in possession of the original, direct happiness, which was conferred on them; but began to misuse their gifts, to be unthankful and forgetful of God,—supposing, because they had not received the good in reward of their previous righteous exertions, that all must necessarily be as it was. Then followed just punishment; and henceforth it was ordained, that men should earn their blessings by work, instead of receiving them directly. But, although the idea of righteousness is the dawn of the distinction between spirit and nature, the dawn of the ethical, the distinction between the two can only be superficially determined, until love is recognised as the positive element,—love, which effectually dethrones, by making the sensuous its servant, until the distinction is at one and the same time intensified to the utmost, and thus reconciled. Applied to Christology, this signifies,—because Christ was only —that is, regarded as the Righteous One, and not also as the Reconciler—that is, as mediating love, therefore the conception of righteousness itself is an imperfect one. A step was taken towards mediation, and towards conceiving Christ as a mediator; but it was a fruitless one. However much the Clementines discourse of righteousness, when they come to the deciding point—when they ought to show how Divine justice and Divine grace are reconciled—they turn round. Instead of a reconciliation, they teach a remission of justice; they fall back again upon the unethical goodness of God, which, and not the activity of Christ, they are compelled to regard as the cause of the forgiveness of sin: whereas they were already half way towards finding for Christ, by means of the idea of the Divine righteousness revealing itself in Him, an essential and independent position as mediator; and thus further to substitute a triadic for the diadic process which they had hitherto taught.

NOTE ZZZ, page 212.

Thus also is excluded the opinion of the Ebionites, that a time of "ignorantia" preceded the baptism of Christ. The opinion of Cerinthus, that the human was completely in bondage, and required therefore to be as it were ravished out of itself into Christ, must also have worn the appearance of ecstasy to our author. Inasmuch as the doctrine is laid down, that the Prophet of truth *cannot* sin, cannot err, the earlier Ebionitic principle, that it would have been unrighteous to elect Jesus to the office of Χριστὸς, had He not previously merited it by His virtue, is plainly given up. The Clementines, therefore, had no longer any reason for supposing that, prior to being endued with the necessary powers for His work, Christ lived for a time a merely human life, such as is led by ordinary men (ψιλός, λιτός); and in point of fact, they ceased to lay any stress whatever on the fact of baptism. But we must go still further. A man found already in existence by the Christos, and who had been living a considerable period apart from the Christos, would not at all fit into the system. For such a man would, at all events, have been exposed to vacillations of his free will; whereas the Prophet of truth must be exalted above such vacillations. Nay more, according to the general tenor of the system, a man without the Christos might be partially in the truth, and partially in lies. Such a condition of vacillation, or even of former sinfulness, must leave traces of itself even after the human had been united with the Christ. The human would then no longer answer to the predicates of the Prophet of truth; and only in the way of ecstasy—that is, by its being suddenly suppressed, and the continuity of its consciousness being broken—could such imperfection be removed. We see, therefore, that the author of the Clementines, so far from having any reason for teaching that the equipment for the office of the Messiah first took place during the course of a human life (of which opinion no trace is discoverable in them); such a view must, on the contrary, have occasioned useless and insurmountable difficulties. They probably, therefore, held the man Jesus to have been united with the "Son," or Christos, from the first moment of his existence; an idea which, of course, presupposes his origin to have been different from that of other men—to have been supernatural.

This, however, does not imply that he was born of a virgin; nor do the Clementines contain any allusion to such a birth. On the contrary, they appear to deny that Jesus was David's son. In general, they seem not to have regarded David with favour; because he reminded them of the external theocratic kingdom, which, as a kingdom of this world, the Clementines assigned to Satan. It is possible, indeed, that, according to the Clementine theory, Jesus must have participated in the lie and sin of the "Left," had he been born of Mary. In point of fact, the Clementines by no means felt the need of the deliverer's passing through a true human development; all that they required, was the outward appearance of a ready-made and fully endowed prophet of truth, who, if he were in possession of his knowledge at one time, must also have been in possession of it at another. But, it may be asked, if they passed by the baptism of Christ and His birth from the Virgin, what was their positive view? Without doubt, that Christ began at some time or other —they give no precise point—to exist as Jesus, through *conversion* into a complete man; but that this conversion affected merely the form, not the essence of the Christ. To the same conclusion we are also led by the analogy of the angels, one of whom, even though the highest, is really and truly the Christos. The angels have received from God the capability of transforming themselves into bodies, and of living amongst men, exactly like men; and this same capability was possessed in still higher measure by the Christos, who indeed was already, in Himself, the archetypal man. The archetypal man assumed the form of the individual Jesus, attained in him to an individual appearance, which differed from His previous appearances in that it was final and sufficient. Now, if the premundane Christos finds in the form of Jesus that actuality which affords Him rest after His labours, this appearance of His must surely have been regarded by the Clementines as the most perfect of all, although they do very little to show that such was the case.—When Adam is designated a man κνοφορηθεὶς by the hand of God, inasmuch as this hand cannot have been the left, we might understand the reference to be to the σοφία, which conferred on Christ that perfect body, by means of which He first became Adam, and in the end, Jesus. And this is of importance; for, had the Christos metamorphosed Himself into a body taken from the nature which is

independent of God, He must have been stained with sin and sensuality, as happened to the angels, who took their bodies from the elements of this world.—The womb which contained the Christos, therefore (this will lie in the *κυοφορηθεὶς ἐν χειρὶ*, etc., which so often occurs), was not a virgin, not a woman of the earth, nor the kingdom of nature in general, but the immediate hand of God.

NOTE AAAA, page 212.

That his system was not that of the Church, nor authoritative even in a single land, the author knows well enough. Hence the solicitude expressed in the letter of Peter to Clement, the pretence of secrecy, and the appeal to secret doctrines. Compare 2, 39; 16, 21. But the most striking proof of its sectarian origin is the system itself, the peculiarities of which,—as, for example, its doctrine of the Adam-Christus, of the Spirit of the Earth, of the union of the male and female in God and in the world,—bear in no case the stamp of the Church; but refer us, if we allow Epiphanius to speak (and even Baur does that), to the districts of Syria and Arabia, which, during the first and even during the second century, swarmed with sects. In those districts, namely, were conjoined higher, also Hellenic, culture; intercourse with the world (compare Ullmann's "Comment. de Beryll. Bostr.); many Hebrew and Jewish Christian elements; and finally, such a form of Ethnicism as that of which we find rich traces in the Clementines. But, however many sectarian and extravagant elements have found their way into them,—for example, in their doctrine of the Old Testament, of Satan, and of matter,—they are notwithstanding in advance of the earlier Ebionism, in the direction of universalism; and their author, partly on account of his rigid monotheism, and partly on account of his faithful adherence to James the Just, under whom even Peter appears to be subordinated, must be regarded as a genuine, though a degenerate and isolated, offspring of the dispersed Christians of Jerusalem. The occasion of the work and its fiction, I consider to have been the efforts made to exalt the Romish Episcopacy, during the second half of the second century. In that Episcopacy, the Christianity of the heathen world had then already begun to consolidate itself as in a centre. In support of the opposition raised to this Episcopate, Peter and Paul, who

were already regarded as the two distinguished founders of the Romish Church, are made the subject of manipulation. With this design, Clement of Rome, that disciple of Paul whose historical significance relatively to Rome was higher than that of any other, is taken from Paul, and is represented as converted by Peter. Peter is therefore first constituted the heir of all Paul's deeds; but solely in order to the glorification of the cathedra of James, on whom in the last instance he is dependent. Hence, finally, Paul, having been robbed of his school and of his deeds, is pushed aside. An heretical work or tendency like this, with its entire web of lies, should scarcely be deemed worthy of the honour of having its trembling assertion, that the Church was originally Ebionitical—an assertion plainly advanced with an evil conscience—believed, whilst the non-heretical witnesses to the contrary are partially ignored, partially charged with falsification, and partially set aside, by means of a critical or hermeneutical procedure, the principal basis of which is the fiction whose cause it is meant to serve. Taking their stand on these homilies, so far as it answers their purpose, the writers referred to have tried to construct the entire history of the Christian Church during the first centuries. We find, however, the law verified, that myths become history to him who treats history as a myth. The merits of Dr Baur relatively to the History of Dogmas, I shall never call in question; he has the art of making his combinations and hypotheses not merely plausible, even when thoroughly untenable, but also suggestive and fruitful. I willingly recognise, further, the high degree of acuteness and art which Dr Baur has displayed, in his endeavours to justify his view of the Ebionitic character of primitive Christianity; but at the same time, I fear that it is not a very favourable omen, when such an expenditure of effort and such means are requisite in order to give a cause some appearance of truth. Ῥάδιον τ' ἀληθές; error looks forced. It is true, the traditional view of primitive Christianity needs rectifying in some points; but, on the whole, it is the only tenable one. But as little as its age can constitute it true, even so little can the novelty of an hypothesis be a pledge that it will not soon become antiquated. All depends therefore on proof. Now, that there is no imaginable a priori necessity for supposing Christianity to have first taken its rise about 150 years after Christ, has been ably shown by

Dietlein in his "Das Urchristenthum" (Primitive Christianity), 1845 (see the Introduction). And if we look for historical proof, let us for a moment suppose, in order to comprehend the position of the question at a glance, that what is really impossible is actually the fact, to wit, that the hypothesis of Baur had been as long and as universally held to be true, as has been the view of the Church. Imagine, then, documents hitherto overlooked or concealed (as in the case of the Clementine Homilies), being suddenly brought to light—such documents, I mean, as the Church writings which we have designated the Witnessing; let me ask, would not the system of Baur or of the Socinians experience a shock of quite a different kind from that which has been experienced by the Church's view, in consequence of the very recent discovery (as it were) of the Pseudo-Clementines? though, of course, these writings need to have an organic place assigned to them in the history of the Church. In other words, were not one standard employed by the hypothesis in question for the Ebionites, and a different one for the Church, and were but a portion of the skill, acuteness, and critical acumen brought to bear on the claims of the Ebionites that have been brought to bear on the claims of the Church, the Ebionitic myth would not have been accepted as genuine coin and historical truth, nor the, as I regard it, hypercritical procedure against the Church, have ended in an uncritical procedure towards the Ebionites.

NOTE BBBB, page 217.

Written before Origen's day, and after the Homilies, and therefore at the beginning of the third century. In them the Gnostic and Judaic-monarchian elements above referred to are separated. The former elements are entirely excluded; the possibility of change in God is denied; nay, even the self-production or aseity of God (*αὐτοπάτωρ, αὐτογενὴς*)—an idea left half developed by the Clementine Homilies—is rejected, in order that God may be absolutely simple, immoveable, fixed. No process, such as is involved in His being both Father and Son, not even an eternal one, is admitted. The author regarded it as absurd; for he said that it would logically end in a Trinity. All we can say of God is, that He *is* absolutely; and thus we are landed at the *Ὄν*. The Recognitions draw a sharp distinction between two things, which the Homilies leave

pretty undistinguished, to wit, between the process in the being of God, through ἔκστασις and συστολή, and the act of will. By the will of God alone do they conceive the world and the Son of God to have been originated; not by change, conversion, self-division; not by emanation, nor by extension (which the Homilies leave an open question, notwithstanding the distinctness with which they affirm Christ to have been a creature), Recogn. 3, 8. Not something like Himself did God produce when He began to be active; for that would have been a denial of His impassibility, inasmuch as He would have produced an effect in Himself. Then, too, there would be a danger of involving Him in the distinction of the sexes (l. c. 9). This view involves an important loss to Christology, on the one hand, because the truly divine can no longer be said to be in Christ, but is above Him, and He therefore is not the Mediator: on the other hand, however, it is a gain. The form of the Christos, which in the Gnostic or Sabellian system was left vague and indefinite, now assumes more distinctly the consolidated shape of an hypostasis. After saving the monarchy in the above-mentioned way, the Recognitions no longer shrink from giving Christ the highest possible predicates. They are under the influence, not of an Ebionitical fondness for the Old Testament, and of a consequent desire to detract from the merits of Christianity, but of a just concern to preserve the unity of God. For this reason they stand considerably nearer to the Church. The Son, they say, was born in an unutterable manner (1, 69); He is designated the Only-born, because He derived His substance from the Unborn One; and Son, because He was born of the Unbegotten One. The Son, the First-born, who created the world, and is the Father's perfect image, sets forth God's entire power as a Creator (3, 9; 10, 20; compare 9, 3; 8, 62). He is unalterable; and the Holy Spirit was created by Him as the fullest manifestation of His power (3, 11). He has a kind of omnipresence, as He pleases (2, 22; 8, 62); He lives through all ages as a true prophet (2, 22), but not in metamorphoses (3, 11). He Himself is not, indeed, the Unborn One; but inasmuch as He is such as He is, and is so great in divinity, He sets forth the entire power of the Unbegotten One. Many, therefore, who are destitute of the fear and knowledge of God regard Him as the Unbegotten One.—We

see that here Ebionism inclines completely towards Arianism. With this is connected also the circumstance, that the Recognitions devote little attention to the idea of the incarnation. This question Arianism willingly passed over in silence: beyond Docetism it was never able to advance; for otherwise it would have had to solve the difficult problem of conceiving two finite beings in each other. It is remarkable that the Christology which is set forth by Simon in the Homilies, as a possible one, and which is attributed to a disciple of Peter (Hom. 18, 5, 6), is adopted and carried out in the Recognitions (1, 45; 2, 42). As Peter is not represented in the Homilies as absolutely rejecting it, we may judge that the germs of an ethnicizing Arianism already lay in Ebionism; and a new proof is given us of the affinity of principle between a Judaism which does not enter thoroughly into Christianity, and heathenism. A further and quite as significant a characteristic of this entire tendency, which was content with the semblance of the divine in Jesus, and regarded the Most High God as exalted above the Son, is, that it as good as left the idea of the atonement out of sight, and never advanced beyond the sphere of law and justice: indeed the Recognitions treat the appearance of Jesus merely as that of the true Prophet, who is now our lawgiver, and will one day be our judge. The rite of baptism, which is supposed, like that of ordination, to exert a magical influence, not merely takes the place of sacrifices in the Recognitions; but the Divine forgiveness of sin, bestowed in connection with it, takes the place of the high-priestly office of Christ. It is further deserving of remark, that whereas the Homilies, in agreement with the universal Ebionitical type (which, as we have shown, the Church had already left behind in its doctrine of the Word of God, and of Wisdom), represent the higher principle in Jesus as Pneuma, although hypostatically (Filius Dei Christus); the Recognitions clearly distinguish between the Holy Spirit and the Son, and forbid designating the Spirit, Son of God (3, 11). They rather assign Him a position similar to the one He holds in the "Anabaticon Jesaiæ" (compare Gieseler's "Anabaticon Jesaiæ"). In the last heaven, in the highest sphere, is the "Filius dilectus" with the Father (in the Æthiopic Recension "Dilectus"). The Holy Spirit is termed "Angelus Spiriti sancti;" but is not of like nature with the

other angels. The beloved Son, Isaiah sees descending at the Father's behest through all the seven heavens. In the last five, in order not to be recognised by the angels (who after the manner of the Demiurge know nothing of higher things), constantly changes His figure, and assumes that of the angels of each sphere. Thus Christ assumed humanity also, walked in the flesh, and was unknown by the devil, whom He came to conquer. The devil killed Him, not knowing who He was. But on that account Christ penetrated into the deepest depths of His kingdom, bursting all bars, and triumphing gloriously over him.

NOTE CCCC, page 220.

This scarcely needs proof. Markos says,—Redemption consists in *τελεία γνῶσις*. This is the second birth of the Gnostics (Epiph. Hær. 34, 19). The highest Æons are almost invariably such as refer to knowledge; as, for example, *Ἔννοια, νοῦς, ἀλήθεια, λόγος, φρόνησις*, and the like. The Logos, where mention of Him occurs, is to be taken not as creative power, but either as reason or as thought. So Basilides. Ptolemæus says (Epiph. Hær. 33, 1),—Thought, reason, is the first in God; the will is the second (*ἐπιγινόμενον*). From thought and will, *νοῦς* (monogenes) and *ἀλήθεια* are then derived. Quite similar are the words of Valentinus and others (Epiph. Hær. 35, 1; 31, 2). The world-creating or world-forming Wisdom receives, like *Δύναμις*, when it is mentioned, a much lower place. All this displays to us the completest antagonism to Hebraism, which held, not thought, but the creative Word and the Spirit of God, to be the fundamental categories, on the basis of which we must ascend to the ideal categories of thought, reason, etc.

NOTE DDDD, page 224.

Dualism first broke ground for the distinction between spirit and nature; but the freedom which is characteristic of mind could not be rightly apprehended, until nature was recognised as that which is posited by and dependent on mind. On the contrary, however antagonistic the relation of mind to nature, mind necessarily continues to be physically determined by nature, and not even free from the natural element which pertains to itself, as long as it is passively related to nature. Accordingly, the dualistic religions have not yet outgrown either natural re-

ligion (Naturreligion), or Pantheism, for even the evil principle is represented by them as divine, absolute. On the other hand, all Pantheism leads to Dualism, and contains the seeds of Dualism within itself; for example, the Indian religion ended in Parsism. For if the underlying, substantial life alone is divine, all the concrete life of creation must be undivine, mere appearance, which is to be *practically* annulled by ascetical practices, by the burning of the world, etc.; theoretically, by thought. Hence all Gnostic systems are in one aspect interwoven with Dualism, however unintentionally; for example, the school of Valentinian. The Christian idea alone furnishes at once the reconciliation between God and humanity, and that between spirit and matter.

NOTE EEEE, page 225.

1. Adherents of the Dualism whose character was predominantly physical, were the Ophites, Saturnilus, Secundus, and subsequently the Manichæans; 2. of pantheistic Monism, Valentine and his wide-spread school, especially Heraclion, his contemporary,—Ptolemæus, Markos; 3. of the Judaizing Monism, Cerinthus, so far as he held Gnostic views, and the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies and Recognitions. The connecting link between number 2 and 3 is Basilides, in whose system ethnic and Jewish elements hold equal balance. For in many respects he resembles Valentine; and any other Dualism than that involved in the said resemblance, and in his doctrine of justice and of the ἐκλογή, I am unable to discover in his system, although several recent writers attribute to him another. Bardesanes, on the contrary, appears to have occupied a middle position between the first and the two others. For his system, besides comprising Ophitic and Valentinian elements, lays great stress also on freedom.

NOTE FFFF, page 226.

If this system, on the one hand, jars with the pure conception of God, in that, through putting the will and the ethical into the background, it is unable to keep cosmogony and theogony sufficiently apart, and subjects the divine life, in a mythical manner, to fate, to suffering, and to change; it makes amends for this, on the other hand, by introducing life and motion into the conception of God, and thus preparing the way

for the Trinitarian self-diremption, in opposition both to a rigid Jewish monotheism, and to the idea of an abstract substance. Ground was broken for the doctrine of the Trinity as far as consciousness was concerned, by the distinction drawn, and relation established, between Propator and the νοῦς, or Monogenes. But whatever advance is made in the knowledge of the Divine self-consciousness, is an advance also towards a right understanding of cosmogony. First of all, however, it was necessary that attention should be directed to the neglected ethical aspect of the conception of God; and this was done even by Gnostics.

NOTE GGGG, page 228.

It is probable that, at all events through Cerdo, his teacher, a connection existed between Marcion and those Syrian Dualists whose system Valentine sought to conciliate, by bringing to light its pantheistic aspects. Valentine, however, in his system, either diluted, or left unheeded, many dualistic elements. Hence we find existing, alongside of Valentine and his school, a dualistic system which from the very commencement was hostile to the Old Testament, and welcomed in Christianity the overthrow of the God of the Jews. This same Dualism, however, being but superficial, that is, having neither an ethical nor a religious character, is not free from ethnic elements. Now Cerdo, whatever affinity there may be between him and Saturnilos (compare Epiph. Hær. 23, 2, and 41, 1), did, as it would seem, put into the background the ethnic elements of the earlier Dualism, designated the unknown Most High God good, and thus gave Dualism a more ethical character. Marcion, however, was the first to define the character of this goodness as love, and thus to secure for his gnosis a religious point of departure.

NOTE HHHH, page 229.

The exclusiveness chargeable on this form of Dualism, notwithstanding its very high, or even Christian character, was a sufficient justification of the existence and opposition of the two other systems. As opposed to its "diabolization of the world" (Weltverteufelung), the ethnic system of Valentine was in the right; as opposed to its rejection of the just God, the "Deus sævus," Judaism and the Judaistic gnosis were in the right. And, in fact, we find that Ptolemæus, for example, in his

Epistle to Flora, and the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies, both maintain their position in opposition even to Marcion. But Marcion made the deepest impression also on the Church. Even the Clementines were unable quite to withstand the superior force of his principle; but the result of their contact was, after all, merely a mutual enfeeblement of the ideas of righteousness and love, and the establishment of a kind of alliance between them, which naturally left the supremacy still in the hands of righteousness.

NOTE IIII, page 229.

Compare Irenæus and Tertullian adv. Marc. The latter in particular saw clearly that, in cutting away righteousness, the very groundwork of "love" would be cut away, apart from which it must necessarily relapse into mere unethical, physical goodness; for righteousness alone ensures the negation of the natural, the spirituality and sanctity of love. In this direction, Tertullian has given utterance to deep, speculative thoughts. But he was less happy in his efforts to solve the other aspect of the problem, that is, in showing how love is the true realization of righteousness. We see that, at this point, everything depended on the atoning work of Christ; and this Tertullian felt quite as strongly as Marcion. Marcion desired no unethical goodness, as is evident not only from the stress he laid on the atonement of Christ, but also from the preference he gave, in general, to Judaism over heathenism. One may say, therefore, that whereas the Valentinian school retained a merely physical reflection of the idea of righteousness, in the Horos, who guards the distinction between the "finite" and the "infinite;" Dualism, in distinguishing between spirit and matter, especially where the distinction took an ethical character, endeavoured to assign its just place to "righteousness." Similarly, Marcion also, in his much deeper Dualism, unconsciously tried to find a place for righteousness. For an essential momentum of righteousness is to uphold distinctions. Marcionitism also constantly reappeared in the form of Antinomianism, etc., until righteousness had been shown to be involved in love itself—until it had been shown that, in the Divine manifestations of love, righteousness is not cast aside, without being first perfected and realized in and through love:—that is, until righteousness had been recognised as an essential and permanent momentum of love.

NOTE JJJJ, page 229.

The Ophites say a good deal, it is true, of the sufferings of the *σοφία* in apostasy, and which the Æon Christos was intended to obviate; for which reason it was arranged that the tyrant Jaldabaoth should cause Jesus to be born of a virgin, distinguished above all others for purity, wisdom, righteousness. On him descended Christos, in union with the higher *σοφία*, worked miracles, and proclaimed the unknown Father, who is above Jaldabaoth (the Demiurge of the Ophites). For doing this, Jaldabaoth killed him. But these sufferings related solely to Jesus; the Christos escaped to heaven. Here, therefore, there is no atonement; the suffering *σοφία* must be classed rather under the category of the suffering gods of heathenism. Moreover, the Perfect One is supposed incapable of having anything to do with suffering; for the true nature of love was not understood. On the other hand, by His flight, the perfect Christos confessed His weakness. In this case, further, there is no incarnation; for Jesus and Christ are two distinct subjects, the former represented Ebionitically, the latter Docetically; the union of the two first began with the office they fulfilled, and was dissoluble in its nature, having for its sole aim the teaching of doctrine and the working of miracles. Redemption, therefore, is conceived as instruction, and not as atonement—a view which is further carried out in the system of Valentine. A hint of the higher significance of the atoning work of Christ is contained in the notion, that Jaldabaoth having unjustly killed Jesus, Christ, as it were by way of punishment, takes His seat at the right hand of the tyrant, and without his knowledge attracts to Himself all the germs of light diffused through his kingdom, till he becomes powerless. All this is so completely ethnic, that it is difficult to say whether the Ophites should be called Christian heretics or not; for their mode of expression leaves it doubtful whether their sytem was a symbolical representation of Christian ideas or not.

NOTE KKKK, page 230.

This hypostatization may indeed be looked upon as mythical; but to suppose that they intentionally clothed their ideas in the form in which we find them, when they might have adopted

another strictly logical form, is completely to misapprehend the nature of Gnosticism. Besides, their terminology relatively to this question is in reality very constant. The passage from Tertullian adv. Valent. 4, had otherwise frequently suggested to me the idea, that possibly the early gnosis had had more to do with Divine powers, now inclining towards, and now away from, hypostatization, as in the system of Philo, and that the giving a more fixed hypostatis to these Divine powers was an effect of the doctrine of the pre-existence of Christ. But that there were no hypostases in the system of Valentine, as Tertullian there affirms, seems to me very improbable, in face of the fragments of his works which have been preserved by Clemens Alexand. (see Grabe 2, 50 ff.). On the contrary, later Gnostics like Markos were reproached with denying the Son of God to be an hypostasis (Orig. Comm. Joh. T. iv. 22). Herakleon, also, probably inclined thereto (compare the passages culled from the writings of Origen in Grabe's Spicilegium 2, 87–89). It was perhaps also the natural course, that the symbolical garment of the world of Æons should gradually fall away, and that what then remained to the Valentinian school, with its pantheistic fundamental views, were the manifold Divine powers, which were afterwards conceived as the single sounds of the one great Word of the world (Epiph. Hær. 34, 8–10; Grabe's Spicileg. 2, 89). They then arrived again at the ante-Christian idea, that the world, or man in himself, is the Son of God,—an idea which, logically carried out, left Christ merely an Ebionitic position. What Ebionites may be regarded as the continuation of this form of gnosis, will shortly become clear.—The matter took an entirely different shape with Marcion. He taught that the inmost essence of God, love, appeared in Christ. In such case, Christ could no longer be spoken of as an hypostasis subordinate to the Most High God: those who adopted his view, ought rather to have advanced onwards to Patripassianism, or even to the doctrine of the Church; which, whilst claiming for Christ true divinity, escapes Patripassianism, by recognising those self-distinctions in God, the way for which had been prepared by Gnosticism.

NOTE LLLL, page 235.

Compare respecting Basilides, Epiph. Hær. 24, 3,—*εἶναι αὐτόν φησι φαντασίαν ἐν τῷ φαίνεσθαι, μὴ εἶναι δὲ ἄνθρωπον,*

μηδὲ σάρκα εἰληφέναι. Baur is, therefore, not quite accurate, when he says that Basilides ought not to be termed a Docetist (Gnosis, p. 225). It would be correct, if Basilides had laid stress on the αὐτεξούσιον, that is, on the human aspect; but such is not the case. On the contrary, as we shall immediately see, he stands in direct antagonism to Cerinthus, however he may at first sight seem to resemble him. Theodoret (Ep. 145; compare Hahn l. c. 65) says, indeed, Valentine, Basilides, Bardesanes, and Harmonios accept the birth from the Virgin, but merely πάροδον δι' αὐτῆς ὥσπερ διὰ σωλῆνος.

NOTE MMMM, page 238.

Several parties assume also a passing away of the body of Christ, a dissolution of it into its elements. This comes naturally to such as do not distinguish a man Jesus from the Christ, but regard it as the design of His appearance to clothe Himself with a body, such as shall be suited to our planet, and be composed of its elements. To render this process of assimilation and decomposition of the body easy and natural to the imagination, they represent Christ as descending through all the heavens, and as assuming to Himself from each, as He passed through it, a bodily integument from its elements, which, the farther He descended, became the more gross, until Christ came down to the most material of all, the earth. In His ascent to heaven, the elements thus previously assumed, are, according to His will, gradually deposited in their respective spheres (comp. Anabaticon Jesaiæ). The Melchisedechians and Theodotians also have something akin to this; and we must add Apelles, if credit is to be given to the passage, De Præscript. Hær. 51.

NOTE NNNN, page 241.

Tertullian l. c. 2, 27; 3, 21; "de carne Christi," c. 5. But this is especially clear from the long treatise by Epiphanius, on Marcion's Codex, according to which he did not permit himself to alter any passage, merely because it alluded to the death of Christ and His atoning sufferings; for example, he left the passage, "Christ became a curse for us," standing (Epiph. Hær. 42, 8), and drew from it the conclusion that we had been the property of a stranger, because the creatures of the Demiurge,

and that for this reason alone was it necessary to purchase us into His life. Epiphanius remarks,—"He says ἠγόρασε, but Paul says ἐξηγόρασε: he represents Christ as a curse (as a substitutionary ransom) in connection with this purchase; but Christ was no curse, He was the abolition of the curse." As though Marcion would have denied the latter, and not rather have endeavoured to show how the latter was brought about by the former. Compare further, Epiph. ed. Petav. i. 313, no. 16. 317; no. 73, 76. Luke ix. 22, xxiii. 46; Rom. v. 6, so far from appearing objectionable to him, were taken as the basis of arguments. Compare in connection herewith, Baur's "Gnosis," p. 242, who has employed the view of the system of Marcion given by the Armenian Esnig in the fifth century (see Neumann in Illgen's "Zeitschrift für historische Theologie"), for the purpose of supplementing Marcion's doctrine of the atonement; as Marcion conceived the Demiurge, through whose heaven Christ descended, to have been even then powerless against, although hostile to, Him, as also at His death (compare Neander's Church History i. 531), which he must have regarded as the result of the free love of Christ, and not of the preponderance of the jealous Demiurge. To the death, with which the Demiurge threatened Him, His love surrendered itself, merely because the Demiurge had a certain right to the men whom he had created; and to whose laws also Marcion concedes a relative truth. For this reason Christ bought us, the property of a stranger, by His death. The teachers of the Church, too, like Irenæus, were not disposed to assert the absolute significance of righteousness in such a manner as to exclude love. As regards Marcion, however, this is a fresh proof that he aimed at vanquishing justice, not by the physical category of power, but by the higher one of love. Compare, for a contrary view of the matter, Niemeyer's "De Docetis," 1823, p. 44 ff.

Note OOOO, page 245.

Tertull. de Carne Chr. 6. "Quidam discentes Pontici illius (pupils of Marcion), supra magistrum sapere compulsi, concedunt Christo carnis veritatem, sine præjudicio tamen renuendæ nativitatis. Habuerit, inquiunt, carnem dum omnino non nativitatem." How easy it was for the Church to combat heretics, who conceded as much as did Marcion and his school,

from their own premises, is shown by the passage from Tertullian's "De Carne Christi" 6. In proof that Christ's body was sidereal, Apelles had appealed to the appearances of angels. Tertullian replied, refuting him by his own doctrine,—"It depends on the cause of the appearances; the cause determines also their nature. Nullus unquam angelus ideo descendit, ut crucifigeretur, ut mortem experiretur, ut a morte suscitaretur. —Non venerant mori, ideo nec nasci. At vero Christus mori missus, nasci quoque necessario habuit, ut mori posset. Non enim mori solet, nisi quod nascitur. Mutuum debitum est inter se nativitati cum mortalitate." He makes the same reply in another form (Ib. c. 8),—"If the earthly substance, as such, be peccatrix, so also is thine heavenly substance; for only if the world, the finite in general, delictum est, can the earthly substance be termed delictum and unworthy of Christ." Now, in order that the ὕλη also might be subsumed under the spiritual nature of God, it was necessary, before all things, to abolish the absolute limit between it and spirit, to regard the hylic as another (for example) restricted stage of the psychical or pneumatical. Efforts were made even by Gnostics to compass this end. In this connection may be mentioned the remarkable view spoken of by Tertullian in his "De Carne Christi," c. 10 ff., which derived the body of Christ, not from sidereal elements consolidated in the region of the earth, but from His own soul. Without doubt this was a view of the later Valentinians. Christ's soul was conceived by them as a light-substance, which became opaque and solid, either in consequence of its mere passage through the earthly region, or for the sake of its passage through Mary. His body was, therefore, as to its substance, "anima, animalis, tenebras accipiens;" and so we can say, "His flesh became soulical, or even the soul became flesh, body in Christ; so that we saw it born, we saw it die, and, what is still more, we saw it rise again." Tertullian, indeed, then remarks, and justly, that such a body is either a mere mask and untruth,—that the soul had therefore merely put on a surface foreign to it, that it was not converted into body, and that, in short, there was no actual body at all; or, if this conversion really did take place, the soul must have ceased to be soul after the conversion. In the first case, the body of Christ would be an unreality; in the second case, the work of redemption must

have been imperfect, inasmuch as Christ had no soul. And yet this view was on the very verge of breaking through the distinction between the psychical and the hylical; primarily, it is true, merely as applied to the Person of Christ; but the Person of Christ had a more general significance. And some actually at once raised the objection, that our nature in its truth, is to be conceived like that of Christ, and that the psychical is the truth and substance of the body. They had thus arrived at a point of view directly opposed to that with which gnosis began; for at first, though the form of matter was held to be derived from the divine, the substance was regarded as extra-divine, as an ἔκτρωμα. But Tertullian asks, with justice, how the dark body (tenebræ) can show the light-nature as its truth? which is but another form of the question asked above,—How can concealment—for they really do represent the psychical and the psychical σὰρξ as a veil—be again required by them for the revelation of the pneumatical aspect of Christ's being? A contradiction which can only be removed by regarding the external human appearance of Christ, notwithstanding that in one respect it was characterized by transitoriness, and was left behind even by the faith of the Church, as, in another aspect,—to wit, in the very aspect which was most essential,—as a necessary and constituent element of the idea of the Christ: in other words, until it is viewed, not as a veiling self-emptying, but as an utterance, as a revelation in the form of act, as love which has become nature. Literalistic extravagances in the estimate formed of the eternal significance of all the parts of the body of Christ are chargeable also upon the Church, and might, by another path, have led to Docetism. Christian literature, even prior to Origen's time, had exhausted the subject of the bodily life and functions of Christ (Origen. ad Galat. de la Rue's ed. iv. 690 f.);—discussions, the details of which, indeed, are of little interest to us, but which show that that period of the Church's history, on which devolved the task of settling the question of the true corporeality of Christ, cannot be reproached with a lack of thoroughness and earnestness. Compare the painstaking collection by Niemeyer in his work, "De Docetis," pp. 2–9, 32 ff.; and in reference to the combating of the Docetists by the Apostolical Fathers, especially Polycarp (Ep. 7), Ignatius (Ep. ad Smyrn. 2; ad Trall. 5, 10), p. 6, in the New Testament writings, p. 29. What Ignatius

says,—"Those who hold Christ's sufferings for a phantom, are themselves a phantom,"—are considered by Neander to belong to the oldest epistle which he counts genuine.

NOTE PPPP, page 251.

Of all the Gnostics, no one was further removed from the above described Pantheism, which leads to Atheism, than Marcion. No one, less than he, treated Christ as though His only office were to lead us to Gnostic self-knowledge, or set forth in Christ that only which our Ego also is, in its essential nature. On the contrary, Marcion was just the man who taught that with Christianity an absolutely new thing had been introduced into the world; who exaggerated the consciousness of sin and the religious point of view, to such an extent as scarcely to leave even a susceptibility for Christ in the ante-Christian world. It is the more surprising, therefore, that Baur (see his "Gnosis," p. 292 ff.) should have deemed it right, whether to his praise or to his blame, to class him amongst those who regarded Christ as the mere symbolical expression (reflex) of the idea of God, arising in the subjective consciousness. He did undoubtedly maintain that God as love was something new for the consciousness of man ("agnitione novus," Tertull. adv. Marc. i. 9); but cannot the Church also concede that? Are we therefore to deny that, according to Marcion, the new knowledge of the, it is true, eternal God of love, was conferred on men by the new work of love, in the appearance and atoning death of Christ? Nor do I further understand how Baur can hint (p. 294) that there was so great a difference between Marcion's view of the significance of the external revelation of Christ, and that entertained by Praxeas and Noetus.

NOTE QQQQ, page 256.

Many works written about this time have been lost (Euseb. H. E. 4, 7); even their very titles are no longer known, although Eusebius was acquainted with most of them (H. E. 4, 21). Several authors are described by him as "orthodox men;"—so, for example, Philippus in Gortyna, who wrote against Marcion (4, 25); Dionysius of Corinth, a man of freer tendencies (4, 23); Modestus; Musanus, the friendly antagonist of the Encratites (4, 21, 28): further, Agrippa Castor's ἱκανώτατος ἔλεγχος

against Basilides, which Eusebius knew (4, 7),—not to mention the opponents of the Montanists, Apollonius (5, 18), Cl. Apollinaris of Hierapolis, Serapion (5, 16; 6, 12). Compare also Eusebius 5, 23–25. Of the above-mentioned Apollinaris under Marcus Aurelius, and Melito in Sardes, his contemporary, further of the author of the "Little Labyrinth," and the unnamed presbyters in Irenæus, valuable Christological fragments of the second century are still extant. Notice is merited by the passage from Eusebius' H. E. 4, 7: "When the heresies arose, Basilides in particular, and very many churchly men, fought for the truth, and defended the faith of the Apostles and of the Church in a more scientific (λογικώτερον) manner: at that time also some provided for those who should come after, prophylactic remedies against these heresies; among these was Agrippa Castor." Eusebius has aptly remarked, that shortly after the rise of gnosis, and at its impulse, the period of the Church's scientific activity commenced,—a tendency which was not merely apologetical, which did not merely preserve, as Eusebius seems to hint, but also developed, the old. In another sense also, as the heading of the present section shows, his remark was appropriate, that from this time onwards the combat was conducted λογικώτερον.

NOTE RRRR, page 264.

It is true, that even in Philo the Logos has also the significance of Word, and not merely of Reason. And so it might appear as though the Church had now arrived, in the course of its development, at the very same thing which Philo had taught a hundred years before. But Philo was unable to distinguish between the world in its unity, the idea of the world and the Son or Logos: hence, either the Son had no true hypostasis, or the world had no actual being (see above). On account of his doctrine of the ὕλη alone, his highest idea lacked that creative Word, whose full energy was developed in the incarnation. The early Church, however, took a different view of Philo, and imported more Christian elements into his system than it really contained. We have shown above that Philo's teachings cannot be regarded as Christian: it can only be found in him, therefore, because it has been first brought to him. The entire development of the Church prior to Justin can be explained apart from Philo.

Justin may have been acquainted with Philo's system; but I quite agree with Semisch ("Justin der Märtyrer" 2, 297 ff.), when he maintains that the real substance of his idea of the Logos rests on Biblical and Church foundations. The Alexandrian and the Platonic philosophy may have aided, however, in moulding the scientific form of the doctrine under consideration. That the latter had an influence on Justin in this respect, is certain.

NOTE SSSS, page 266.

As Semisch does, ii. 423 f. The passages adduced by Semisch, c. Tryph. 90, 93, 95, 96, 111, do not deny that Christ became a curse for us,—or was not Justin acquainted with the Epistle to the Galatians?—they rather assert it; and all that Justin refuses to allow is, that the Jews shall regard the Crucified One as one cursed of God, that is, as a criminal; or shall say, that He was the enemy of God. The appearance he aims to do away with (*δοκοῦσα κατάρα*) is, that the assumption of the curse, and, in this sense, the being a curse, was incompatible with the approbation of the law, with being pleasing to God. It was the will of the Father of all, that Christ should assume the universal curse: hence He cannot be simply and alone described as One who is cursed of God, for He was also the reverse; had He not been the reverse, He could not have abolished the curse. So also was His assumption of the curse approved, and not condemned, by the law. "For," says he in c. 96, "that strengthens the hope we have built on the Crucified One, that the law terms Him who hangs on the cross, a Curse."

NOTE TTTT, page 272.

The regular expression is, *δυνάμει καὶ βουλῇ*. In the latter word, the idea of counsel, of decree, is predominant; so that it implies will (*θέλησις*, c. Tryph. 61) and consciousness (c. Tryph. 100). "He is begotten by the power and the counsel of the Father; not, therefore, as though He had been cut off, or as though the essence of the Father had been divided; in which case, that which had been cut and divided would not be the same as before." (Ib. 128.) Now this expression, that the generation of the Logos also had been the object of a Divine decree and purpose, is the strongest subordinatian expression employed

by Justin. For the phrase, *πρώτη δύναμις μετὰ τὸν πατέρα* (Apol. i. 32, 12), is not necessarily Arian in cast; inasmuch as, at all events logically, the Father does precede the Son, in the Trinity. Still less should any conclusion be drawn from the *δευτέρα χώρα* of the Son, alongside of the *τρίτη τάξις* of the Holy Ghost, in itself (Apol. 1, 13). For he is there speaking of the liturgical succession; further, too, of Jesus Christ, not of the Logos: so also, 2, 13. As little objection can be based, in itself, on the circumstance, that, even in His earlier appearances, the Son was termed Maleach, Angel, Messenger, or Servant (*ὑπηρέτης*, c. Tryph. 93, 57); and that, in correspondence thereto, the Father is styled Lord (c. Tryph. 127, 129). For such terms do but give prominence to the fact of His being the organ of the revelation of the Father. Of this same character are the words, *ὑπὸ τῷ πατρὶ τεταγμένος* (see c. Tryph. 56 and 126).

NOTE UUUU, page 276.

Semisch asserts, indeed (l. c. 2, 407), that in the view of Justin, the Logos created for Himself His own body in the womb of Mary; but this idea does not lie in the words, "He became *δι' ἑαυτοῦ ὁμοιοπαθὴς*." Much rather might the idea be deduced from the following words of Clemens Alexandrinus, who in other respects also was not quite free from Docetism: *ὁ λόγος δημιουργίας αἴτιος ἔπειτα καὶ ἑαυτὸν γεννᾷ, ὅταν ὁ λόγος σὰρξ γένηται, ἵνα καὶ θεαθῇ* (Strom. 5, 3, 16). But from Tertullian's (Justin's?) words, by no means. Nor does the expression *μορφοῦσθαι*, to give Himself a form (Apol. 1, 5), prove this. It is scarcely likely that Justin had reflected on the subject. Indeed, we are led to a contrary conclusion by expressions such as, "Jesus was the Son of David, because His mother was the daughter of David" (c. Tryph. 43; compare 23, 100):—specially, however, compare the passage, Apol. 1, 32, where Christ is designated a blossom of the root of Jesse, immediately after the blood of the grape, in Gen. xlix., had been referred to the blood of Christ, on the ground that even as the former is not made by man, but by God, so the blood of Christ is derived not from human seed, but from God's power (c. Tryph. 54), that is, from the Logos (Apol. 1, 32). The latter expression appears at first sight decidedly favourable to Semisch. But the word *αἷμα*

does not imply that the body of Christ was created by the Logos in Mary, and that she formed merely a point of transition; it rather denotes the animal life, which Mary undoubtedly could not give, even as man cannot create the organic life in the vine. Hence also the Divine share in the incarnation of Christ, and Mary's, are described by one and the same word (Apol. 1, 32): *διὰ παρθένου—διὰ δυνάμεως Θεοῦ ἀπεκυήθη.* He was, therefore, and had, flesh of her flesh. This follows also from Justin's doctrine of the Eucharist.

NOTE VVVV, page 279.

Whether in Apol. 1, 66, he conceives Christ to be present in the Eucharist, cannot be a matter of doubt. On the other hand, he makes no allusion to a conversion of the elements. But it still remains to be asked, whether Justin represents the Logos alone, or the Logos in His humanity, as united with the elements. As an image of the union itself, he employs the incarnation; and this might appear favourable to the former supposition: it would then follow, as Semisch supposes (2, 440), that he held the Eucharist to be a constant renewal of the incarnation, in the more rigid sense. But this is met at the very outset by the difficulty, that Justin does not teach that Christ laid aside His humanity in the state of exaltation, but the contrary. Besides, the words, "the *τροφὴ τοῦ σαρκοποιηθέντος Ἰησοῦ* in the holy Eucharist, is *καὶ σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα*," are opposed thereto. Justin conceives the entire Christ in union with the Eucharist. This might also have been his idea in the use of the image of the incarnation, inasmuch as Christ constitutes the elements the visible organ of His activity and self-communication, and thus restores the visibility of which men were deprived by His exaltation. It is not quite correct to identify his doctrine with that of the Lutheran Church: at the same time, what has been said is enough to show, that the two approximate most closely to each other; Justin's going beyond that of the Lutheran Church, in that he regards the Eucharist, not indeed as a new incarnation, but at all events as a momentum of the one incarnation.

NOTE WWWW, page 295.

That in the writings of his which are yet extant there is no trace of Ebionism, all allow. Photius (Cod. 109, ed. Roth.

1653, p. 286) says, indeed, that in the Hypotyposes (ὑποτυπώσεις) he maintained, that not the very Logos, but a power and emanation of the Logos, the ἥττων λόγος, became man. According to this, he would teach two λόγοι, a great and a less one. Along with this, further, the charge of Docetism relatively to the σαρκωθῆναι—which scarcely accords with the former. Photius himself, however, was not certain whether he ought to regard the errors blamed in the work before him as those of Clemens.—With the detailed description given of the so-called ὑποτυπώσεις by Photius, would appear to accord completely the view of the so-called "Excerpta Theod." as a fragment of the "Hypotyposes." These "Excerpta" are in so far carelessly thrown together, as one is frequently unable to say what belongs to Theodotus and what to the writer who made the extracts. Theodotus held the Ebionitic doctrine of a double Logos (§ 61): thus alone can we explain how Photius should have come to attribute it to Clemens; he did so, because he considered it possible that Clemens was the author of the "Excerpta," though he did not venture confidently to affirm it.—Another charge,—to wit, that of teaching a merely apparent incarnation of the Logos,—which Photius brought against the "Hypotyposes," clung longer to Clement. Photius, however, did not find any confirmation of the charge in the works which are still extant.

NOTE XXXX, page 305.

In favour of the signification "Word," if proof be needed, may be adduced the contrast instituted between σιγὴ and λόγος (2, 15); further, in particular, Irenæus' peculiar collocation of Son and Spirit. These "Manus Patris" (5, 1, 5, 6) are also described in such a manner, that to the Son are attributed love and power (3, 40; 4, 37),—to wit, that creative love which has no need of ought; and to the Spirit, wisdom, so far as it informs itself into the world. "Verbum et Sapientia, Filius et Spiritus," says he repeatedly, have created the world (4, 17, 37; compare 4, 50). It is scarcely allowable here to suppose that the translator has rendered Logos incorrectly. Seeing that he elsewhere views the Logos also as reason, and does not identify the Spirit and the Logos, this designation of the Spirit must occasion surprise, unless we remember that the Old Testament theologumenon of Wisdom, after having aided in the formation

of the doctrine of the Logos, now began to be pressed into the service of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit,—He being always set forth as the Principle of Unity (compare ed. Grab. 331, 4, 37) —as the inward bond of connection between God and the world. The further course run by this doctrine is similar to that run by the doctrine of the Logos. At first it was interwoven with the conception of the world, and stood especially for the immanence of God in the world. In this stadium many things otherwise apportioned to the Logos were apportioned to the Spirit. But gradually, as the idea of the Logos in His distinction both from the Father and the world acquired a more determinate and settled form, it became both possible and necessary to distinguish the principle of unity—which was at first the representative of wise order *in* the world, and was the ground of its susceptibility to God (5, 2, 3, 6)—more clearly *from* the world. Irenæus already directed attention to this point in 4, 37; especially p. 331*a*.

Note YYYY, page 314.

The passage is misunderstood by Baur, in his "Versöhnungslehre" (see page 31). He refers "suadela," "suadentem," to the devil: it was well that the devil should be convinced of the justice of the method adopted by God. On this is based the hypothesis, that the antagonist of Gnosticism himself here reasoned according to Gnostic principles. I should be quite unable to grant this, even if Baur's translation were correct; and it scarcely can be correct. "Suadere, suadela," signifies "persuade," not "convince" ("persuadere"); and so indeed Baur himself translates it elsewhere (p. 30). In other places Irenæus treats men as the object of this "suadere" (see 5, 21, passim). There must be a resemblance between the way in which men fell and the way in which they are redeemed. They fell, not by compulsion, but by seduction, persuasion, suadendo; accordingly, redemption must strike into the same path; although the adoption of such a circuitous route was an advantage to the devil, in so far as God, by giving up His right to the employment of force against him, His creature (5, 18, 21, 22), made it possible for man, by virtue of his freedom, to continue in the power of the devil. We see that, because this circuitous path left still a prospect open for the devil, he might be figuratively

represented as demanding its adoption as a matter of right. And we actually find later writers putting the thing in this way. But Irenæus set the devil too far below God to be able to use such language, even figuratively. The righteousness which called for the adoption of such an indirect method, Irenæus attributed, on the contrary, to God; it is, in his view, the principle which guards the distinction between the physical and the spiritual. If the latter is to retain its dignity and its rights, it must determine to operate not in a physical manner. To the devil, in himself, Irenæus concedes no right against God, not even in the strict sense a right through God, his own damnation excepted. The devil seduced men solely through lies, consequently unrighteously (5, 22); and he employs force against them as though they were his property, although he really has no property in them, and rules them contrary to their nature (5, 1, sec. 1). The only thing in his favour, and which might strictly be termed a right given to him by God over men, was, that God, as love, desired free beings, and therefore could not render a fall physically impossible; and, further, that it was agreeable to the punitive justice of God, that those who had voluntarily given themselves into the hands of the devil, and who refused to lay hold on salvation, should be left in his power, there to learn his lies and to reap death, instead of the promised equality to God. With equal justice, or rather injustice, the passage, Ep. ad Diogn. 7, from which Irenæus probably borrowed the antithesis between *βία* and *πείθειν*, might also be referred to the devil.

Note ZZZZ, page 315.

Experience (experimentum) gives us to know evil in its consequences; whereas we know prior to all experience *that* something is good or evil, and can consequently choose between opposites. When, therefore, Irenæus taught that experience first brings fixity, security, he had no intention of denying to man, at the commencement of his development, freedom of choice. His idea had an eschatological character; it presented to his view the triumph of the good. The superiority of the good is seen in the fact that evil, though freely originated, and permitted to work, is compelled to serve the good,—that the passage through evil finally establishes man in good. To the

adoption of this theory he was the more easily led, as he already (not, as is usually supposed, for the first time Tertullian) had taught the existence of an evil inherited from Adam. Relatively to the latter point, compare Duncker l. c. 140 ff. Strictly speaking, Adam's sin alone was completely free; for, with all his weakness (resulting from the imperfect state in which creation still remained), he might have obeyed the command. His not having done so, and the consequent extension of the power of evil over all men, is an apparent triumph for evil. Irenæus, however, had an answer thereto, in the above-mentioned thought, which at the end reveals, on the one hand, the powerlessness, and, on the other, the serviceableness, of evil.

NOTE AAAAA, page 318.

The word "recapitulare," so frequently used by Irenæus, signifies in general, "to return with anything to the beginning;" that is,—(I.) "to repeat" (for example, 5, 33, p. 455*a*; 5, 12, p. 417*a*; 5, 21, p. 432). From the meaning "to repeat," is then derived the signification, "to sum up." To sum up, namely, is a repetition in the form of a collection of the momenta previously distributed. In this last sense the word is very often employed by Irenæus: So, for example, 5, 25, p. 437,—the thought, "Antichristus omnem suscipiens diaboli virtutem," is soon afterwards expressed in the words, "diabolicam apostasiam in se recapitulans." Similarly also 439*b*, and 5, 28. 29; 3, 11, p. 223*b*, "in bestia veniente recapitulatio fit universæ iniquitatis et omnis doli;" p. 446*a*, "recapitulans in se omnem, quæ fuit ante diluvium malitiæ commixtionem." Thus also of Christ. He comprised humanity with all its guilt in Himself (3, 20, p. 245, 248*b*, 5, 21). But because such a summing up in one, more fully exhibits a sphere, than would the exhibition of its scattered momenta, such a collection is more than a mere repetition, it is also a consummation of all that had gone before (5, 14, p. 420*b*, 421*a*, 5, 21, p. 452*a*). It is a return to the idea of the thing; it is a fuller, a complete representation of it. With this is further connected a second main signification. "Recapitulare" denotes (II.) "to lead back to the beginning, that is, to the original idea;" that is, (1) "to complete," "to fulfil," "to bring into accordance with the

idea." So 5, 23, p. 435, of the fulfilment of a type: 3, 30. 31; 1, 2, p. 45. Christ came in order to bring everything to its source (caput), to its commencement (God), who is also its goal. (2) Then very derivatively, "recapitulare" denotes, when after a normal commencement an abnormal state has been introduced, "to restore,"—that is, not to bring back to the former condition, but to set aside that which contradicts the idea;—a work which Christ could not accomplish unless He recapitulated humanity in Himself in another sense also. For Irenæus' course of thought is, that Christ not merely summed up in Himself the "longa hominum expositio" laden with sin, but also completed and set forth humanity in its purity. "Omnia recapitulans (Christus) recapitulatus est;" summing up all in Himself, Christ is set forth as the summed up unity (compare 5, 21; init. 5, 28, 444*b*). (III.) The passage 1, 2, p. 45, cll. 3, 18, p. 241*b*, probably denotes, humanity is brought to Christ as its κεφαλή; which, however, is but a more concrete expression of its idea, and therefore a realization of its ideal commencement (compare also 5, 20, p. 431*b*).

NOTE BBBBB, page 326.

After what Irenæus says regarding the Holy Ghost, it is inaccurate in Semisch (see Hahn's "Theol. Annalen," 1842, pp. 319–345) to maintain, that during the first three centuries the doctrine of the Holy Ghost was too undeveloped for us to be able to suppose that Irenæus conceived Him to be the mediating principle between the outward elements in the Lord's Supper, and Christ. A glance at Clemens Alexandrinus (see above) shows the incorrectness of this view.

I must especially object to his declaring the second of the fragments of Pfaff to be spurious, because it contains this doctrine. 3, 19, p. 244*a*; 4, 37, 74, prove that Irenæus had this idea.—Equally deserving of condemnation is it, when he represents Irenæus as saying that the Logos was in the Eucharist without His humanity, and that merely the external elements became the body and blood of the Lord. Where does Irenæus say this? Is it because he speaks of the Logos in the Eucharist, and does not term Him Christ? But it needs only a limited acquaintance with Irenæus to know that when he speaks of the Logos, he by no means refers merely to the ἄσαρκος λόγος, but

often refers to Christ (for example, 3, 21); and so, *vice versâ*, he calls the Logos Jesus (3, 10). In what passage, then, does Irenæus allude to the Logos without His humanity, after the ascension, in the place of Jesus, as though He had laid aside His humanity? That would contradict his fundamental idea of the necessity of the incarnation. And why does Semisch supply *Θεοῦ* to *ἐκκλησια* and not *Χριστοῦ*, who *σὰρξ ἐγένετο*? If, as he allows, the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation is excluded by the words of Irenæus, and no less also the Reformed doctrine; it does not therefore follow that they teach the Lutheran doctrine, although it cannot be denied that the two approximate. The mode in which Irenæus establishes a connection between the Holy Spirit and the Eucharist, side by side with the Logos, who, though He became, and will ever continue, man, returned to His former invisibility, accords completely with the fundamental type of the incarnation. It is as follows: — the outward elements, neither converted into, nor merely denoting, the body and blood of Christ, nor again merely the vehicle of the incarnate Logos, are rather, through the action of the Holy Spirit, on the one hand, and of Christ, who assumes them, on the other hand, raised to the position of momenta of His humanity. They thus, therefore, in virtue of the sacramental Unio, form part of the body and blood of Christ, who in them, or through sacramental union with them, restores again and again that objective actuality, that presence and visibility, which He had, as it were, laid aside till He should come again to judgment:—restored, it is true, merely for the eye of faith; for not only the word of God, but even Christ Himself, in His external, historical manifestation, cannot be recognised as that which He really is, save by faith. Compare the remarks made above on Ignatius and Justin Martyr.

END OF VOL. I.

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